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
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
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M O N G O L I A

E R M O N G O L I A





RAILWAY MAP OF CHINA

- Chinese Government Railways
- Other Railways
- Railways under construction
- Railways under contract
- Provincial Boundaries

0 100 200 300 400 500 English Miles

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WESTERN CIVILIZATION AND
THE FAR EAST

WESTERN
CIVILIZATION AND
THE FAR EAST

BY
STEPHEN KING-HALL

WITH THREE MAPS

NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
1924


WESTERN
CIVILIZATION AND
THE FAR EAST
BY
STIGMUND BRINGHAUS



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PREFACE

I THANK my wife for great encouragement and much helpful criticism. My thanks are also due to Mr. Stephen Roskill for the assistance he gave me whilst we served together in China, and to Miss King-Hall and Miss Magdalen King-Hall for their work on the proofs and index. Finally, I wish to thank the Right Honourable Sir Ernest Satow, G.C.M.G., who has kindly revised the proofs and given me the benefit of his invaluable and learned criticism.

STEPHEN KING-HALL

CHINA, 1923

LONDON, 1924

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WESTERN CIVILIZATION AND THE FAR EAST

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTORY

“The universe is change; our life is what our thoughts make it.”
—MEDITATIONS OF MARCUS AURELIUS

I

THE era when national isolation was a normal and even desirable condition is drawing to its close; in its absolute form, national isolation only occurs as the attendant condition of a great war, or a wrecking of society, such as the Russian Revolution. The progress of human civilization on the material side, a progress which is particularly evident in all forms of communication between men, is causing the world to shrink in some respects (see Map facing page 8).

The increasing complexities of modern commerce; the fine spun web of international finance which man has thrown around the world; the growth of concentrated industrialism, are typical examples of those influences which are drawing the members of the human race into a very close communion of interests.

Curious it is, that mankind seems as yet to have but a very faint and uncertain appreciation of the consequences of this knitting process. By the invention and construction of improved aircraft; by the extension of international banking arrangements; by the supplementing of cables by wireless, human beings are deliberately giving hostages to a new God whose laws are those of Economics. They are as immutable as the laws of nature.

It is a consequence of economic laws, under whose jurisdiction human beings are busily engaged in bringing their society, that war as a method of settling disputes is profitless. To war profitably pre-supposes a state of isolation from the enemy. A condition in which “A” has something of value to “B,” something in which “B” has hitherto had no interest. In primitive days the doctrine of loot, of seizing as spoils of war the enemy’s cattle, his

women and his lands, for the purposes of one's personal profit and pleasure, was a sound economic proposition. It was worth while. Those simple days have passed for ever, unless our present civilization is to topple on its somewhat narrow base and fall into the black pit from which the European section began to re-appear some twelve hundred years ago. And yet, though these economic laws are laws from which there is indisputably no escape, the most advanced section of mankind—the white races—have perversely refused to recognize the logics of the case. It has been useless for prophets like Mr. Norman Angell to point out that under modern conditions war could be of no advantage to anyone; that it could only result in a mutual destruction of economic wealth, and produce inconvenience to victors and vanquished alike. The doctrine of nationalism in its extreme form has been the limit of man's spiritual conception when he estimates his position as a citizen of the world. He spends his days in making himself and his business international, and much money in the upkeep of armies and navies designed to destroy his own achievements.

The explanation of this paradox is not difficult; it is simply this, that whether one considers a child or a nation, it will be found that things concrete are always given precedence over things abstract. An infant will scream for its mother's breasts before it understands that it has a duty towards other members of the community. A young nation will first interest itself in its internal affairs, then a foreign policy of a selfish and entirely material nature becomes evident; finally, as the nation mellows, there will appear signs of a foreign policy having in it faint indications of a broad outlook directed towards the benefit of the world—abstract ideas begin to be considered.

Our civilization is very young, and as yet we have barely reached the stage when nationalism in general is influenced by internationalism. It is a boast—and proudly I make it—that the English-speaking peoples, particularly the British, were the first of the white peoples to approach this stage of development. In the half century immediately preceding the Great War, the general lines of political development believed in by the British in regard to their Empire, were typical of those which will one day be applied to the development of the whole world.

The British, having fully tested and perfected a system of domestic government which combined a generous measure of liberty to the individual with the needs of a well-ordered community, extended their theories overseas and began the construction of that monument to political genius—the British Commonwealth of Nations. At this juncture came the Great War; it was as inevitable as a sunrise. Ninety per cent of man's

material civilization was non-warlike, designed for comfort, for convenience, incidentally for mutual benefit. His mind was bellicose. The combative instinct in man, which is one of his most vigorous instincts, was not, and is not yet, under proper control. He could not resist cutting off his national nose to spite an international face he persisted in believing was not his own. Intellectually he was incapable of fully appreciating the consequences of what would happen if he maliciously smashed the delicate machinery of international intercourse—that which was his pride and joy. He gave himself a terrible lesson, and punctuated it with millions of tombs.

When the blood and tears had ceased to flow and men stood back half terrified at what they had achieved, though mercifully most of the consequences to come were hidden from them, the voice of an idealist rang throughout the world. President Wilson enunciated the principles which should govern future international intercourse, and he embodied them in the League of Nations. Needless to describe here the contrast between what he might have achieved and what was achieved ; between hopes aroused and hopes fulfilled ; suffice it that something was accomplished. Whether enough was done to make unnecessary a future war of nations is a question whose answer is in the hearts of men. It is at least promising to observe that the whole question of how diverse races grouped in nations shall continue to exist, mutually dependent one upon the other, without the everlasting menace of war souring their lives, is one which is the subject of consideration amongst many people. It is essentially a problem of co-operation and of organization. It is the problem of world governance, but not necessarily a problem whose solution is a highly centralized authority. Such a solution presupposes a standardizing of human thought and culture, for which thousands of years would be required, and it is probably not at all in the interests of the human race that such a levelling up or down should take place. A standardized world in all its details would be as unpleasant as a standardized State, or a standardized individual. Individualism within reasonable bounds is as desirable a condition amongst nations as it is amongst persons. That highly diverse cultures and peoples can co-operate sufficiently to ensure good public order is a fact exemplified in the British Commonwealth of Nations. We have our internal troubles, but to the nations of the world we are a happy family. In the Union of South Africa there are a majority of Dutchmen, and in Australia, many Irish, but it requires some effort of imagination to suppose Australia and South Africa at war. To imagine Holland and Belgium at war is not so difficult.

Before leaving generalities for some remarks on the particular subject of this book, which has been written as a contribution towards the solution of the great problem, there is one more point to make.

It has seemed to me remarkable that the realization by many men that something must be done to alter the present basis of international relations is strongest amongst the masses. The realization is, of course, vague and undeveloped, but I note the following facts as proving its existence.

When Mr. Hughes made his famous speech at the Washington Conference it seemed to have a most satisfying effect upon millions of ordinary people all over the world. The impression I received was, that if the average Western civilized man could have spoken in English with one voice, he would have said, "That's business. I like its direct common sense. Get on with it." You may say, how on earth can you, a single individual, presume to say what an average of millions was thinking? I would answer that I claim to be average myself; that if you, the reader, are average, and did not think on these lines, I may be wrong; and, finally, that the governments and press of the white man proved my contention. There was an interval of about twenty-four hours after the speech, in which the whole world was curiously silent, then a chorus of praise burst forth from Cabinets and newspaper offices. During those twenty-four hours all the great men of the earth, those who govern us by being just the right amount ahead of public opinion, were glueing their ears to the ground with one eye on the public cat. They were sensing the situation, for that is their business; as soon as they had sized it up, they sang, they bellowed in praise.

I note also that the League of Nations, though defective, fills a definite place in world polity, and I believe that a motion to abolish it would meet with very widespread opposition. Again, I note the rise in power of the Scottish and English Labour party.¹ I do not write as a politician; I am in a profession where there are no politics, but, writing as an observer of contemporary affairs (1923), I see that the Labour party, with all its human faults, is, at bottom, the political party above others in the respect that it is founded on ideals. It has visions. It is inexperienced and uncultured, but its heart is in the right place. It is more capable of *trying* to alter the present state of international relations than are the traditional parties; these latter are the legacies of a great past, but a past whose greatness is overshadowed by the memory that it led to disaster.

¹ Written 1923.

The Labour party is the child of dawn, and to it and its expressed policies many eyes are beginning to turn. Behind those eyes are the minds of the many human beings who feel to-day that there is a large gap between the way they would like to see the political world managed and the actual manner in which it is controlled. All men are more or less agreed that they do not want war; no government in the world could introduce an estimate for the fighting services on the plea of the need of an aggressive policy. Armies, navies, and airforces are invariably maintained for defensive purposes. But, if no one wants to attack anyone else, who then is the enemy? There is a fallacy somewhere, and the realization of this fact is spreading amongst human beings.

I hold the rise of the Labour party to be of more than local significance because of the pre-eminent position occupied by the British in the development of political institutions and ideas, and if the Labour party comes into power and applies to its foreign policy some of the idealism which is the secret of its present strength it will be a matter of world importance. Further signs that a kind of world conscience is becoming manifest are afforded by the fact that even when nations do fight, the contestants are extremely anxious to prove that their action is not aggressive, as was shown by the paper and ink war as to culpability which raged between the nations in 1914 and has since continued. Of course this anxiety on the part of governments to prove that "we were forced to war" is directly due to the fact that modern wars involve the whole nation, and whole nations will only go to war on a really vital issue. Propaganda's most important task on the "home front" is to create this issue. Another manifestation of world conscience was seen at the Versailles Conference when the customary territorial spoliation of the vanquished was decently cloaked for the benefit of democracy under such inventions as "mandates" and as "plebiscites" in disputed areas.

Lastly, I note a disinclination—partly attributable no doubt to reaction—on the part of the British people to support any policy tinged with Imperial aggression. The post-war operations against the Bolsheviki were not well supported by public opinion, nor was the idea of war with Turkey in 1922; nor does it seem to me that the average Englishman has approved of France in the Ruhr.¹ Again I admit I have chosen England, and I have done so deliberately, since the British are the most advanced democracy and as stable as any.

I wish particularly to emphasize that the above illustrations

¹ Written April, 1923.

are only intended to illustrate a tendency on the part of the masses to lean towards an interpretation of "world policy" differing from that which culminated in the events of 1914-1918.¹ As I said before, the realization that a re-orientation is necessary is at present vague and undeveloped, but it is there.

Why is it centred amongst the masses? Why, if it exists, is not this realization strongest among the upper classes? The answers to these questions are to be found in the fact that the upper classes, those who have got the good things of life, are

¹ An exceedingly able description of the old pre-war state of international society is to be found in the opening chapters of the first volume of Mr. Winston Churchill's book, "The World Crisis." He writes on page 199: "The world on the verge of its catastrophe was very brilliant. Nations and Empires . . . rose majestically on every side, lapped in the accumulated treasures of the long peace. All were fitted and fastened—it seemed securely—into an immense cantilever. The two mighty European systems faced each other, glittering and clanking in their panoply, but with a tranquil gaze. . . . Were we after all to achieve world security and universal peace by a marvellous system of combinations in equipoise and of armaments in equation, of checks and counterchecks on violent action ever more complex and more delicate? Would Europe, thus marshalled, thus grouped, thus related, unite into one universal and glorious organism capable of receiving and enjoying in undreamed-of abundance the bounty which nature and science stood hand in hand to give? The old world in its sunset was fair to see."

Running through these opening pages of a book by one of the principal manipulators of international levers; one of the few score men who ruled the world; one is left with an impression of self-satisfaction. The governments were so entranced with the spectacle of the "glittering and clanking" and "the two mighty European systems" that no one seemed to remember that the systems were only a means to an end, and not in themselves an end; that all the complex international diplomacy, the balances of power, the combinations, were only bits of machinery justifiable or not by results. Mr. Churchill seems to feel this, and more than once insists that he and his colleagues "tried our best to steer our country through the gathering dangers of the armed peace without bringing her to war."

I believe this to be true, not only for England, but, to a varying extent, of all countries. The governments were darting about like water insects on a stream outwardly placid, but moving viscously to the waterfall whose ominous roar fell on deaf ears.

Surveying these reflections from the point of view of an ordinary man, I find no better comment than a minute—also written by Mr. Churchill when he read the report of the inquiry into the escape of the Goeben. He minuted it, "The explanation is satisfactory; the result unsatisfactory."

But the ordinary man must remember this: the governments were what they were, and made the frightful mess of things which they did because the ordinary man had never wished it otherwise. Ordinary men got what they deserved, and will get it again unless they choose to take an interest in their international relations, at least as intelligent as that which they take in their relations to each other within their nation.

naturally conservative. They, also, have the realization discussed above, but they apprehend the practical difficulties of effecting a change; though war hits them as hard as it hits the masses, in the peace interval, life is not so bad.

The masses, on the other hand, look at the business from a different angle. They are the people who have not got the pleasant things in life; they do not stand to lose very much by a change of ideas. They feel that the governing upper classes who hold the power would prefer to continue on the old lines of international relationship even with the risk of a periodic war. But as the masses become better educated, they appreciate that the ultimate destiny of their country is in their hands; that modern war is essentially an affair of mass production and mass destruction, and hence a ranging into two camps is slowly taking place. In one, the upper classes, upholders of the old régime, the old style manner of running the world; in the other, the masses, who are gradually approaching an attitude which can be summed up in the demand that either the upper classes drop the old ideas and conform to the new ones, or else the reins of power will be progressively removed from them.

II

Hitherto, I have been writing chiefly from the standpoint of the white races. It is from these nations that Western civilization has come forth, and its material products have spread like a rising tide into every channel of the world, until it is probably true to say there is not a human being who is not acquainted in some form or other with the products of Western civilization.¹ The universal nature of our civilization, its pushing, domineering character, and the great conceit of its missionaries—the white men—is apt to make us forget that there are in the world to-day other civilizations which were glowing in splendid colours before our own was born.

Owing to the disjointed nature of human society which continued until very recent times, it was quite possible for several of these ancient civilizations to exist contemporaneously and yet react very slightly upon each other. The great civilization which has been centred for thousands of years in China, and the civilization which had a bright and short existence in Central America, were coincident in time for some centuries, but so far as I am aware, no evidence exists that there was any intercourse between

¹ The only possible exception to this generalization is a few aboriginals in the interior of Borneo.

them. Similarly, the civilization of Rome and that of China existed side by side in the world, each imagining itself the centre of the universe ; each representing a very high degree of culture, but almost entirely ignorant one of the other. Their outposts touched around the Caspian Sea and a small luxury trade flowed from East to West, otherwise, a blank.

It was reserved for that civilization of the West which arose from the ruins of the Roman Empire to bridge the gap between East and West. As early as the fifteenth century the forceful white man, baffled on land by the Saracens, took ship and tried to reach the Far East, and in so doing re-discovered America, where he effectually destroyed the native civilization. Eventually he reached his goal, but for the moment there was no question of domination. The long tentacle which Europe extended to the Far East was a thin weak thing, content to suck gently and with all due humbleness from the riches of the East, and thus it remained for three centuries.

Then an immense change. In Europe, the centre of the Western civilization, the body to which the tentacles were attached, an enormous access of strength took place. Following upon one of her great wars, the West suddenly became industrialized. The day of machinery—of the application of science to everyday life—dawned in Europe, and soon the effect was felt all over the world. The Far East, farthest from the centre of radiation of Western energy, did not begin to notice the increased size and strength of the tentacles until the middle of the nineteenth century.

Thereafter the process was rapid. The Western tentacles soon thickened until the Far East began to writhe uneasily in their grip. The white men hammered and kicked down the barriers of Eastern exclusiveness ; the process continued right up to 1914. Its details are outlined at the beginning of this book. Its effects were many, but two stand out in importance above all others. In the first place the rising tide of Westernism drove Japan to re-create herself or perish. In the second place it eventually inaugurated a change of outlook on the part of the Chinese, whose civilization was eroded from two directions : primarily from the West, by white men ; and secondly by Japan. Chinese culture is so massive that the effect for half a century of the Western waves on this structure is only now becoming self-evident, but the process of change is definitely in full swing. Twenty years ago, fifteen years ago, books were being written about China in which the author took his stand on the hoary convention that China changeth not. She was written about from the point of view of an archæologist discussing a choice and

MAP I

THE EASTERN HEMISPHERE

MAP I *Is drawn to a scale representing the fastest sailing passage between Shanghai and London.*

MAP II *Is to the scale of the Ocean Mail Service in 1923.*

MAP III *Is to the scale of the Tran-Siberian Mail at its pre-war best. Probably the same in 1925*

MAP IV *Is to the scale of the Imperial Airship Mail of the next decade.*

COMPARATIVE MAPS

TO ILLUSTRATE THE
"SHRINKAGE" OF THE WORLD
DUE TO IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS

1840-1930

MAP II



MAP III



MAP IV



interesting ruin of immense proportions whose walls were just beginning to show signs of the vandalistic depredations of modern souvenir-hunting nations. Little consideration was given to the possibility that China might become one of the most considerable political forces in the world. The West paid as little attention to the question of China's future place in a system of world governance, as the European courts of the Middle Ages had paid to Kublai Khan's extraordinary attempt to conquer Japan in 1280, always supposing that the news of one of the greatest overseas expeditions known to history ever reached the Europe of those days. More attention has been paid to Japan—or rather to what the West has thought Japan to be—because superficially, she was well advanced these last twenty years on her way to become a Western style Power. One of themselves.

Since the Great War, more attention has been paid to the Far East, and it is desirable that the West should continue and extend the attention it devotes to this part of the world and the peoples who live in it. It is my conviction that the most pressing problem now confronting men is that which I summarize by the expression "world governance," and that unless serious steps are taken to tackle this problem within the next few decades we shall be merely fattening ourselves for another holocaust. In the future governance of the world, and the immediate future, the 600 million yellow-skinned men who dwell in the Far East will have very much more influence in the affairs of the world than they had in a past during which human society has been so organized that two great civilizations were able to develop independently of each other. We cannot ignore the yellow men and they cannot ignore us. On the contrary, we shall become more and more dependent upon one another. In the eighteenth century the affairs of the major portion of the world were exclusively controlled by white men; but we are now entering upon a period which will have as one of its distinguishing features the assumption by Asiatics of the position in world politics to which their numbers and the extent of their lands entitle them. Hitherto their civilization has not been of a sufficiently aggressive nature to enable them to seize this position in the teeth of the opposition of Western nations. The only Asiatic nation which has attained its due status in the world has done so by carefully copying the Westerners.

If China were to adopt this policy the consequences would probably be tragic to both East and West. Fortunately there are signs, as I have pointed out, which indicate that the most advanced white men are beginning to recognize that if they do not curb the pugnacious philosophy which has hitherto been a

Western ideal, the white races may destroy themselves. If the white men succeed in re-orienting their outlook on international affairs it seems reasonable to hope that Eastern and Western gear wheels can be synchronized and clutched together without stripping of teeth, for there is much in Chinese civilization sympathetic to the ideals towards which the West must adhere if it is to survive.

In this question of co-operation between East and West in world governance it will probably devolve upon the West to lead the way. It is our duty; it is our privilege. Before the problem can be examined in all its many aspects, knowledge of those with whom we must in future share the direction of world affairs is essential. We must know something of their characters, their past, their inclinations, and, above all, something of their relations to each other and to ourselves. It is the last-mentioned subject which I have elected to study. In one sense I am examining the cart before the horse, as the white men should learn to co-operate amongst themselves before they turn to the East; and yet it is certain that the East, which is stirring and pulsating with new ideas, will not wait for the West. I have also been influenced by the considerations that many abler men than I, have recently published the result of their analysis of the present state and prospects of Western civilization. With the exception of Mr. Bertrand Russell's "The Problem of China"—which appeared whilst my book was being born—no one has yet published a study of present-day Far Eastern political tendencies from the point of view of their relationship to world affairs.

I had hoped to be able to exclude from my book purely historical matter antecedent to very recent events. Examination of the literature on this subject led me to the conclusion that, though there are a number of excellent standard works dealing with parts of the historical matter, a concise and *impartial* statement of the historical foundation of the present political problems in the Far East was not to be found. I have endeavoured to supply this want in my early chapters, but it is to the later chapters of this book that I attach any importance which the work may merit.

In a Bibliography will be found a list of books which I have examined. Some I have thought worth studying, others worth reading. There is one publication to which I am deeply indebted as a source of material in Japanese affairs, and that is the "Japan Chronicle"—especially the weekly edition. In distinction of writing; in accuracy and impartiality and acuteness of editorial comment, this paper, in my judgment, is one of the first half-dozen printed in the English language.

I would also like to commend to those interested in Chinese affairs the "North China Herald". Although I find myself frequently at variance with the opinions of its leader-writers, much can be forgiven a newspaper which in these days of "controlled press" retains complete independence and presents news quite impartially. True, it recently apologized for reproducing a speech by Mr. Karakhan, the Bolshevist representative in China; still it did print it.

The observant reader will notice that there is only slight reference in this book to the Opium question in China. It is not omitted because I do not think it important; it has been left out because I think it less important than the other matters which I had to deal with in the compass of a single volume. Moreover, it is adequately dealt with in special publications on the subject. The current "China Year Book"—a rich storehouse of facts—can be relied upon for an excellent chapter on the contemporary Opium situation.

CHAPTER II

A GENERAL SURVEY

“ Then I began to think that it is very true which is commonly said, that the one half of the world knoweth not how the other half liveth.”

—RABELAIS

I

AS a geographical definition, the expression “ Far East ” is meaningless, but it is a convenient term by which to describe that portion of the world inhabited by the Yellow Races, and since the histories, problems, and ambitions of these yellow-skinned men form the raw material for this study, the term “ Far East ” has been freely employed when convenient.

The two most numerous of the several groups into which the Yellow Races are divided, are the Chinese and Japanese. How many millions these may be no man knows, for, though the figures for the Japanese Empire (77 million in 1920) may be reasonably accurate, the guesses for China vary between 340 and 420 million.¹ Of the 77 million of the Japanese Empire, 17 are Koreans, whilst additional to the unknown hundreds of millions of Chinese subjects there are approximately 9 million Chinese resident in the Malay States, the Dutch East Indies, Indo-China, etc. For an ethnological discussion of the Yellow Races the reader must refer to the controversial pages of text-books. Suffice it to say here, that though both the Japanese and Chinese belong in a general way to the same major group in an elementary classification of the human race, yet politically and mentally they are poles asunder.

As a race the Chinese are very mixed, since the true Chinese, whose cradle is generally considered to have been located in the Yellow River Valley, have invariably absorbed the members of various races who have invaded and conquered China from the North. Though large differences of type, of custom and of

¹ It is estimated by sociological experts that with the present fecundity of the race the Chinese nation would double its millions in forty years if Western health and sanitary methods were in force throughout the land. The positive need for every man to leave behind him ancestor worshippers is one of the most potent causes of the heavy breeding in China.

language are often to be found between the inhabitants of different Provinces in China, the main line of cleavage is between North and South. It is not inaccurate to say that in many respects an inhabitant of Kwangsi province is as different from an inhabitant of Chih-li province as is a Spaniard from a Swede.

The Southern Chinese average 4 inches less in height than their Northern countrymen, and have a more restless character and quicker wits. The Southern Chinaman is typified by the Cantonese, and, for centuries, political movements of a revolutionary character have had their birth in the Southern Provinces. Here also is the home of the great secret societies which have exercised so much influence in the past and continue to be of great importance to-day. Canton is politically to China what Barcelona is to Spain. In language, the South and North are by speech inexplicable one to the other, though they meet on the common ground of the written character, whilst Mandarin—the language of the North—is the speech of officialdom throughout China. But, apart from this extremely rough and ready and quite unscientific division of the Chinese into Northerners and Southerners, there are also in China many distinct races and tribes with their own language and customs.¹ Some of these peoples, such as the Hakkas, in the South-west and South-east, would be considered as nations in Europe.

Though from these points of view the Chinese nation has the appearance of a mosaic, it is a mosaic pieced together on a very definite and ancient pattern, since for many hundreds of years, ancestor worship and the extreme importance of the family group have been cardinal points in Chinese social life; these influences, together with the prolonged application throughout China of a definite national philosophy and culture, have combined to produce a uniformity which is in striking contrast to the mixtures mentioned above.

From the official point of view, the Chinese nation of to-day is composed of five groups, which are, the Manchus, the Mongols, the Thibetans, the Mohammedans,² and the Chinese.³ Consideration as to what extent the Chinese possess the European conception of national consciousness must be deferred to a later chapter.

In the case of the Japanese, one encounters a much purer race, since these people have been isolated upon their islands for at least two thousand years. Modern investigation lends

¹ See Language: map, page 316.

² Chiefly located in the West and South-west of China.

³ These groups are typified in the five colours of the national flag.

support to the theory that there is Malay blood in Japanese veins, whilst the existence of the so-called "Hairy" Ainus invests Japan with a quite peculiar interest to ethnologists and tourists who go to the island of Hokkaido to look at the miserable remnants of what was once the powerful aboriginal race of Japan.¹ To the ethnologists, the Ainu with his Aryan characteristics provides a puzzle as fascinating as that posed by the Basque in Spain; to the tourist, the Ainu is a disappointment, since his hairyness, though noteworthy in contrast to the Japanese, is not remarkable to a European.

Having thus dealt in the most general fashion with some of the outstanding racial distinctions between Japanese and Chinese, an equally brief description will be written of the principal political and geographical features of the lands in which these yellow men live.

The Chinese Republic, as shown in atlases, is composed of eighteen Provinces and the three Dependencies of Thibet, Mongolia, and Manchuria. Manchuria is divided into three Provinces. There are also in China various enclaves which are themselves of differing status. There are for instance, European colonies such as Hong-Kong; foreign settlements (of several kinds) such as Shanghai; and in Manchuria, there is the Japanese railway zone of the South Manchurian Railway Company. Since China is a country considerably larger than Europe, every kind of scenery and climate is to be found within its boundaries. The lofty mountains of the West, leading up to the great plateau of the world from which successive generations of hardy men have spilled West into Europe, East to China, and South to India, contrast with the dead monotonous level of the immense plains through which the Yangtze-Kiang and Yellow Rivers roll majestically towards the China Sea. The bitter cold of the Manchurian winter and the dust-laden heat of its dry summer, contrast with the almost constant damp heat of Southern China which is varied only by a month or two of cooler temperature in the winter.

The same wide range characterizes the natural resources of this vast area, most of whose natural wealth, especially the enormous mineral deposits, is as yet largely undeveloped. There is an extensive bibliography on these subjects to which the reader must refer for details.

¹ Some authorities consider the Ainus to be the foundation of the Japanese race, and there are Japanese writers, who, notwithstanding the present despised position of the race, have claimed that the Ainus are the root stock of Japan. The object of this claim is to connect the Japanese with Aryan forefathers, and so prove that white racial prejudice against Japanese is illogical.

From a military point of view the approaches to China are only easy from two directions. One from the North, the other from the sea, and it was to defend her Northern flank that one of her dynasties constructed the famous Great Wall.

The Japanese Empire is chiefly pelagic. It consists of three main islands; also Formosa, the Loo-Chow Islands, and half of Saghalien Island in the North, together with Korea and the leased territory of Kwantung¹ on the mainland of Asia. Japan also holds the mandate for the ex-German islands North of the equator. The main islands of Japan are mountainous in nature, with plains along the sea coast; her mineral wealth is poor. Formosa is a semi-tropical island with immense forest-clad mountains in the centre, and it is in these fastnesses that the aboriginal tribes maintain a hopeless but prolonged resistance to Japanese penetration. Saghalien is an island of forests and hills, sparsely populated and wholly undeveloped. There are reports of oil fuel in Saghalien, and the Japanese Admiralty attach importance to the experimental borings now being carried out in this territory.

Korea is a country of great possibilities, both agricultural and mineral; its development has been hindered by political circumstances. The Japanese do not emigrate to an appreciable extent to either Korea or Formosa; they cannot compete with the Korean at primitive agriculture, and the climate of Formosa is distasteful to them.

The geographical distribution of the Japanese Empire makes the Sea of Japan a lake from the strategical point of view, whilst her Eastern flank has been to some extent protected from attack by the possession of the mandates for the ex-German islands.

* * * * *

When confronted with a great series of political and social movements extending over several centuries and culminating in certain present-day conditions, which conditions are to be the special subjects for investigation, it is essential to extract from the whole mass a few bed-rock facts. If this is not accomplished there is a danger of wandering round and round the subject instead of assaulting it along methodical lines, tearing it apart, and spreading its inwardness to the light of day.

If the recent history of the Far East be thrown into the distilling machine the first products are two in number:—

1. The impressment of the West upon the Far East.
2. The inter-relationship of China and Japan.

¹ Also referred to geographically as the Liaotung Peninsula.

These two statements are the foundation from which the investigations in this monograph will be conducted.

At this stage a difficulty must be mentioned. From the purely expository point of view of dealing with the subject it will often be necessary to write of certain parts of the problem in a local manner, but from the mental point of view it is always necessary to think of the whole. This difficulty is unavoidable if much repetition is to be dispensed with, but provided its existence is realized, it can be discounted.

* * * * *

When the Turks spread themselves across the land-bridge between Asia and Europe, the Europeans who desired to carry on trade with Asia were confronted with four possibilities.

The infidel could be beaten down and the old routes across Asia Minor re-opened. Much of the impulse behind the crusades was due to this ambition. It failed.

Asia could also be attained by going round the world West-about. This idea led to Europe discovering America.

Thirdly, attention could be concentrated on outflanking the Turk to the Northward. This route to Cathay was hazardous, terribly unknown, and bleak; but it was the natural line which the Russians would, and eventually did employ, in their glacier-like progress towards the rising sun. Lastly, there was the scheme which depended on outflanking the Turkish obstacle to the South. Portuguese navigators blazed the trail round Africa and the seafaring nations of the world followed in the wake of their keels and came to Southern China at the City of Canton. The Portuguese arrived here as early as 1517. They were followed by the Dutch and English, the latter first appearing at Canton in 1637.

The Russians had meanwhile been creeping East across Siberia, and by the end of the seventeenth century they were on the Amur River and making frontier treaties with the Chinese Empire.

About the middle of the sixteenth century the Portuguese came to Japan. They were followed by Dutch, Spanish, and English. For a hundred years intercourse continued; then occurred a remarkable event. For reasons connected with the propagandist zeal of missionaries, the Japanese began to distrust and fear the foreigners. In the early days the newcomers had been well received, but in 1639 the Shogun of Japan replied as follows to a Dutch deputation: "His Majesty charges us to inform you that it is of slight importance to the Empire of Japan whether foreigners come or do not come to trade."

In 1636 all Europeans save the Dutch were expelled, the English having already withdrawn voluntarily, and to ensure the success of the policy of isolation, it was further made a capital offence for any Japanese to leave the Empire. The construction of ships of a greater length than 75 feet was forbidden, and any foreign naval vessel arriving in Japan was to be seized. Her crew were to be slain. The Dutch and Chinese were alone exempted from this extraordinary edict, but with the reservation, in the case of the Dutch, that they should be confined to a small artificial island,¹ little more than a compound in extent; they were also subjected to other most humiliating conditions. These they accepted in order to retain the lucrative monopoly, but their commerce gradually dwindled to negligible proportions.

Astonishing as is this page from Japanese history, the sequel is still more so, for the policy was rigidly enforced for a period of 217 years. During these two centuries, Japan, so far as the remainder of the world was concerned, might almost have been in another planet.²

In this external calm Japan lay stagnant as far as the general progress of human knowledge was concerned, until the slumbers of this Rip van Winkle of the East were rudely disturbed by the uninvited visits of an American squadron in 1853 and 1854.

Meanwhile during the two centuries in which Japan was behind the veil, China was experiencing increasing trouble with the Western nations.

From the beginning of the seventeenth century up to the beginning of the nineteenth, the Europeans were absolutely interested in the commercial side of their relationship with China. At first the China trade was small, exceedingly profitable, but speculative. It was carried out principally at Canton under the most unpleasant and humiliating conditions, but any insult was tolerated so long as the Chinese permitted trade. It was obvious that as

¹ At Nagasaki.

² The "Kokumin"—a leading Japanese paper—summed up this seclusion in connexion with an article opposing the appointment of Prince Iyesato Tokugawa (descendant of the last Shogun) as head of the delegation to the Washington Conference, 1921.

It said: "For two hundred and fifty years the Japanese slept at home while the European nations were busy making colonies and conquering territories. We were forbidden to go abroad. We were forbidden to build big ships. We were compelled to keep indoors, wasting our energies on such pastimes as versification and tea ceremony. The Tokugawa policy of seclusion enabled that Government to remain on its legs in security and prosperity for two hundred and fifty years, but it prevented the people from expanding abroad during that time, with the result that we are now suffering from over-population and racial discrimination. . . . We are now paying for the prosperity of the Tokugawa régime."

the trade increased, this state of affairs must become intolerable, and towards the close of the eighteenth century the British Government decided to attempt to place intercourse with China on a more conventional footing. By this time the British had reached a pre-eminent position amongst foreign traders, and it was natural for the British Government to take the initiative.

It was felt that the only solution lay in persuading the Chinese to open up international relations with the British Foreign Office in the usual manner. Until some such machinery existed it was hopeless to expect any redress for foreigners in China, who were in fact "outlaws," practically dependent for their very existence on the whim of the Imperial Government or even that of local authorities. To European minds, accustomed to centuries of diplomatic intercourse with other Powers, the proposal of the British Government seemed very commonplace. To the Chinese, it seemed (equally naturally) a suggestion almost ludicrous, certainly insulting, and absolutely impossible of achievement.

The history of European relationship with China during the first sixty years of the nineteenth century revolves entirely around this question of the recognition by China of the Western Powers, and ere she conceded the point at issue, two wars were fought.¹ Before outlining the events of this period an explanation of the Chinese point of view is necessary.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century it was a fact that for "so far back as the mind of man runneth not to the contrary" the Chinese had considered themselves as supreme amongst all nations.² China's wealth, her civilization, had always been immensely superior to those of the nations on her borders. These borders—always far flung—had been at times of immense extent. Beyond the borders of China a circle of lesser States had for centuries more or less continuously paid tribute to her, and their kings and princes had acknowledged the overlordship of the Chinese Emperor. Who, then, were these preposterous barbarians from beyond the seas who claimed equality of position with the sons of Han?³

¹ For a fully documented account of this period see "The International Relations of the Chinese Empire," in three vols., by H. B. Morse.

² "The barbarians are like beasts, and not to be ruled by the same principles as Chinese. Were one to attempt to control them by the great maxims of reason, it would tend to nothing but the greatest confusion." From the writings of Sung Tung-po, a Confucian commentator, cited by H. B. Morse, *op. cit.*

³ "The Chinese State came to regard itself as the sole depository of power over the human race. . . . Men were either its subjects or tributaries, or rebels against its authority."—W. T. Clenell in a Paper read, 1917 . . . at Newchang, entitled: "Status of Foreigners in China under the Treaties."

Curious as such an attitude may seem to us, it was a natural and logical consequence of the past, and possibly in abstract no more remarkable than the Western conception that whether China was agreeable or not, Europeans had a right to trade with China.¹

Whatever the rights and wrongs of China's conception may be from the philosophical point of view, it existed as a very definite fact, and to some extent the tradition of contempt for the foreigner still exists in the Chinese mind. There is little doubt that many cultured Chinese, whilst recognizing that force of circumstances have obliged China to fall into line with the Western nations of the world in many matters contrary to her traditions, do so with reluctance and are by no means such ardent believers in the virtues of foreign civilization as might be supposed.²

¹ For a minute description of China's attitude to Foreign Powers see "Journal of Proceedings of Late Embassy to China," by Henry Ellis. John Murray, 1817.

Two extracts from Imperial edicts in connexion with Lord Amherst's mission will give some insight into this attitude. On 4 September, 1816, "Upon the occasion of the English nation sending Envoys with tribute . . ." "I (the Emperor), considering that the said nation had sent a tribute of sincere and entire devotedness from beyond a vast ocean of the distance of ten thousand Li's, could not bear to reject the expression of veneration and obedience; hence again, I sent down my pleasure requiring that the most trifling articles of the tribute should be presented and the kindness conferred of receiving them. They were maps, painted likenesses, and prints, three articles. At the same time I conferred upon the King of the said country a white precious Jo-ee, sapphire court beads, and different sized purses, to manifest the idea of giving much and receiving little . . . The Ambassador received them with extreme joy and gratitude, and also rather showed by his manner, contrition and fear. . . . The said Embassy came with the intention of offering tribute; still, treat it with civility, and silently cause it to feel gratitude and awe, then the right principles of soothing and controlling, will be acted on."

It is, perhaps, needless to add that the "tribute" was the customary exchange of presents, and that the embassy was so little "filled with awe" that Lord Amherst firmly refused to "kow-tow" and the embassy was abortive so far as immediate results were concerned.

For other examples of edicts illustrating the Chinese attitude to embassies or humble deputations (as they seemed to China) from the Western Powers, see "Annals and Memoirs of the Court of Peking," Bland and Backhouse.

² "Les fins de la vie : le sens de la vie : en effet, pour L'oriental tout est là. Une seule chose importe : la vie intérieure ; une seule civilisation compte : celle des sentiments. Toute autre est vaine. Pour lui, la civilisation matérielle dont nous sommes si fiers n'en est pas une ; elle n'a rien ajouté à la valeur morale de l'homme : tout au contraire. La justice et le bonheur valent mieux que la connaissance et la domination des forces naturelles. . . . L'un (L'occidental) veut agir ; l'autre être ;

The type of Government existent in China when the European nations, led by Great Britain, began to press for official recognition, was peculiar to the country. It was modelled on the idea of the family as the unit, and cemented by the conception of the duty of the child to the parent.¹ This duty of filial obedience which exalted the merits of filial piety, was, to a large extent, and still is, the first of all duties and the highest of all virtues. It fostered obedience to regular society and respect for age.² This system of social philosophy was of great antiquity, and remained unchanged by dynastic successions. The actual machinery of government from the unit upwards and in the lower degrees is still as follows: The families of a village are represented by a head-man; he is not officially of the Government in the sense of being a subordinate member of the civil service, but he is responsible for the general behaviour and welfare of his village. Prior to the revolution of 1911 he was responsible to the district magistrate—the “Chih-Hsien.”³

The “Hsien,” or district, is the smallest administrative area. Several districts form a prefecture, and the prefectures are united into a province.

The district magistrate, sometimes referred to as the “father and mother of his people” is responsible for all the administrative work of his district. He is the court of first instance.⁴ Above him is the prefect, whose principal functions were more concerned with the external affairs of his prefecture than with its internal administration, most of which work was decentralized on to the district magistrate who carried it out through the instrumentality of the head-man. The prefect’s court was the court of first appeal. Above the prefect stood the governor or viceroy of the province. Sometimes a viceroy was responsible for more than a province, but each province generally had a governor. The

l’un tend vers la science et la domination, l’autre vers la sagesse et la paix intérieure” (Hovelaque, “La Chine,” p. 12).

¹ See “Village and Town Life in China,” by T. K. Leong and L. K. Tao, for an interesting, but rosy account of lower social organization in China.

² “L’individu par lui même n’existe pas, n’a aucun droit, n’a que des devoirs; il n’est qu’un chaînon dans une chaîne infinie dans le passé et dans l’avenir” (Hovelaque, *op. cit.*, p. 125).

³ For an account of the theoretical system of government under the Republic, see “China Year Book,” 1922, Chapter XXX.

⁴ The “Chu Chi Shen Pan Ting” (district court) was abolished in 1914, and there are now theoretically three courts. The prefectural court, provincial court, and supreme court. Concerning the latter, the “North China Herald,” the foremost Far Eastern paper, and not given to flattering the Chinese, has written “[it] is one of the very few things of which the Chinese Republic may be justly proud” (29 March, 1924).

governor ranked with, but after, his viceroy. In provinces which supported both a governor and a viceroy the two officials ruled jointly ; it was customary for the viceroy particularly to control military matters, and for the governor to supervise the civil service. The governor and the viceroy were assisted by a provincial council, which consisted of the provincial treasurer, the judge, the salt commissioner, and the grain controller.

All officials down to the district magistrate held their positions at the appointment and during the pleasure of the Emperor. The Emperor was supreme. His edicts automatically became law and his power was, in theory, arbitrary. In practice, however, the Chinese people considered that the Emperor wielded these powers as the Son of Heaven for the benefit of his people ; if he abused these powers, "Heaven" would withdraw its support, disasters would occur, even rebellion would be justified.¹ The ultimate "right to rebel" was a kind of franchise in China.

The central administration consisted, in addition to the Emperor, of a Privy Council and six boards. Their titles were :—

Board of Civil Service.

Board of Ceremonies.

Board of Revenue.

Board of War.

Board of Punishments.

Board of Works.

Towards the end of the Manchu dynasty, when the pressure from foreign Powers was beginning to exert considerable influence on the internal government of China, these boards were increased in number and their composition modified. Of certain other great departments of state which were in existence under the old regime it is of interest to note the existence of a peculiar body called "The Censors." They were officials whose duty it was to report direct to the Emperor on any maladministration of government. They could denounce officials of any rank in a memorial to the throne ; they even had the legal right to criticize the conduct of the Emperor, and in many ways they filled in old China the rôle exercised in modern European society by the Press. Like the latter they were popularly supposed on occasion to be susceptible to bribery, or "subsidies" as we should now call it, but there is also no doubt that they often carried out their difficult duties in an honest manner.

¹ Mencius stresses the divinity of the ruler's mandate and his ultimate and very definite responsibility to God even more emphatically than does Confucius.

From the foregoing outline of the old Chinese Government, which in the lower spheres is substantially the same to-day, it might be assumed that the administration of the country was more or less centralized in Peking. Such an assumption would be entirely wrong.

The Chinese have in the past been reluctant to place national interests before local interests, a characteristic which has been a source of weakness to their country when she has been confronted with the mobilized unity and determined policy of foreign powers. To the mass of the people, the prefecture, or, at the most, the province represented the largest unit to which they felt that they belonged. Each province managed its own affairs in accordance with local customs.¹ Precedent is, to the Chinese mind, a factor of immense importance, and so conservative are the race that if a law runs counter to custom it is much more likely that the law will be altered or lapse than that the custom will change.

The central government was chiefly interested in two things. Firstly, the maintenance of the dynasty, secondly, the possession of sufficient funds to meet its own expenses, which included the expenditure entailed by a luxurious and splendid court. The dynasty would feel secure so long as the people were contented. The needs of the masses may be summed up in the words "good crops, reasonable taxation, and peace in the land." Good crops being dependent on Divine mercy, the Emperors spent much of their time in ceremonial worship before their ancestral tablets and at the altar of Heaven. Peace in the land and a peasantry without grievances were matters dependent on the faithfulness and integrity with which the hundreds of provincial officials carried out their duties.²

For the more certain control of these people the Emperor held their appointments in his hand, and in this matter especially was the stroke of the vermilion pencil a thing from which lay no appeal. For this reason also, the viceroys and governors were

¹ The importance of "local custom" in matters of finance, trade, and law, is still very great.

² Hovelague, the French writer, commenting upon the rigidly defined spheres of duty in the old system of administration, remarks: "Chacun est responsable du bien et du mal qui echoit a la communauté dont il a la charge. . . . Par contre, son activité ne s'exerce que dans la sphere de ces droits et de ses devoirs; le reste ne le concerne point. Et la est le secret de cette indifférence des Chinois aux questions politiques et nationales. Gouverner, administrer c'est affaire à qui en à charge; s'en meler sans mandat, c'est manquer gravement aux rites." Hovelague quotes Confucius in support of his theory: "Celui qui n'as pas d'office dans le gouvernement, n'a point à y voir ni à juger les plans de ce gouvernement."

usually only appointed for three years, and never as rulers in their native province. The same principle governed the appointment of lesser officials.

As regards finance, a certain contribution was demanded of each province. There was practically no direct taxation by the central government. Each province raised its own funds as seemed most suitable, paid its own officials, and forwarded a certain tribute to Peking.¹

In effect the Emperor said to the provincial officials: "Let us hear no news of troubles in the country and let us receive with regularity the provincial contributions and we will not meddle in your affairs. In case, however, there should be troubles and you should endeavour to conceal them from us we have appointed the Censors."

A similar decentralization existed down to the district magistrate, and, by bearing this in mind, it will be realized that the officials of every grade were to a considerable extent controlled by the people. The people clung to the local custom, and gross interference with this custom, really bad injustice, or extortionate taxation, were events liable to beget trouble, which in its turn might result in the official losing office and perhaps life.

Thus the old government of China, though despotic in theory, was on the whole a despotism of a distinctly benevolent nature, and gross tyranny was usually resisted by the masses with success. The people were, in effect, organized into a multitude of tiny republics managing their own local affairs.² This system of government endured for centuries, and in the hearts of the millions its principles are unimpaired to this day. The system remained unchanged for so long for several reasons. One of these is the inherent conservatism of the Chinese race; another is to be found in the peculiar system by which the civil service was recruited. With certain exceptions, service in the administration could only be obtained by passing examinations. Any person, however humble his birth, could enter for the competition, and there are numerous instances of poor men with good brains rising to the highest positions. The official or literary class, terms which were synonymous, was held in the highest esteem throughout the Empire, being considered superior to the other three great classes who were the agriculturists, artisans, and merchants;³ villagers

¹ For an account of Chinese finance see Morse's "Trade and Administration of China."

² This communistic basis of national life is a strong contrast to the Japanese feudal system with its landed nobility.

³ The military class was despised. To-day they temporarily control China.

sometimes subscribed to assist the education of a promising man in order that his achievements might shed lustre on his birth-place.

Advancement and distinction in society were only to be obtained through the literary class.

The all-important examinations which tested a man's qualifications for official work were not in the least concerned with subjects considered essential by Western examiners for public services. The examinations were entirely concerned with the Chinese Classics. It was as if England selected her administrators solely from their knowledge of, say, the philosophical writings of the Greeks and Romans.¹ Since the Chinese Classics, especially the teachings of the sage Confucius, whom all China has delighted to honour for two thousand years, lay stress on the importance of ancestor worship and filial piety as the only sure foundations for a stable and happy society, it came about that for centuries all Chinese officials were imbued with these principles,² which were alike the keystones of Chinese philosophical thought, and the doctrine which underlay her system of government.

Finally, perhaps the principal cause of the endurance of the Chinese governmental system is that it admirably suited the requirements of the people until the dynamic philosophy of the West came into conflict with the static doctrines of the East. Then it became apparent that however excellently it was suited to China's local requirements it was sadly at fault from an international point of view.

Before concluding this review of the Chinese Government under the Manchus, something must be said on the subject of "squeeze." Nearly all Western writers lay emphasis on the financial corruption which has always existed, and is said still to exist, among the higher official classes in China. It is of course impossible to make accurate comparisons between the Chinese and other races in this respect, but it is well, perhaps, to remember that English politics about a hundred years ago were saturated with bribery and corruption, that as recently as 1922 it appears that honours in England could be purchased; that at the present time corruption in American politics is sometimes de-

¹ This parallel is only approximate as essays of a rigid formality where style and subject were invariable was the main test in China.

² The famous "Five Relations" taught by Confucius are as follows: "The duties of universal obligation, or those between sovereign and minister, between father and son, between husband and wife, between elder brother and younger, and those belonging to the intercourse of friends."—From Chapter XX, Section 8, "The Doctrine of the Mean" (Legge, "The Chinese Classics").

scribed as notorious by those qualified to know, and that "bribery scandals" in Japan are commonplaces of political life. The Chinese never seem to have made much effort to conceal or deny the existence of "squeeze," and perhaps this is the reason why they are often selected as examples of excellence in the art of jobbery. To an impartial observer it always sounds curious to hear "experts" on Chinese affairs denouncing "squeeze," and in the same breath testifying to the high standard of probity amongst the generality of Chinese merchants.

"Squeeze" is, perhaps, best understood on the assumption that every Chinaman is from birth a commission agent.

In the Manchu days the salaries of the officials were small, because it was a recognized fact that each official "squeezed" from the man below him a sum which totalled the amount he had to pass on to his immediate chief plus an amount for himself. His own personal expenses would include a regular "douceur" to all in direct authority above him—failing which his position was precarious—in addition to the maintenance expenses of his immediate entourage. These expenses were, of course, additional to his entrance fee into the job and various outgoings necessary in order to obtain the position. It will be realized from this incomplete description of a system with hundreds of ramifications which flourished in the Court, and by example and necessity spread downwards to the Chih-Hsien, that "squeeze" was a recognized institution.

For example, in 1905 the amount of land tax for the Empire remitted to Peking was in sterling equivalent to £4,000,000. Reliable authorities estimated that the amount actually collected from the people was a figure somewhere between 14 and 56 millions.¹

At the present time in China, even in the treaty ports "squeeze" is a recognized custom. No European housewife of any experience would be otherwise than astonished if her house-boys did not "squeeze" her for a more or less definite amount. The No. 1 boy and cook will, of course, "squeeze" their underlings.

For so long as the Chinese masses considered the "squeeze," which in their case meant taxation, was reasonable, no trouble arose, but, as will be seen, European intervention so increased the financial needs of the central government that "squeeze" and taxation rose until the people were enraged, and this factor became one of the principal causes of the downfall of the Manchu dynasty.

¹ Peace Handbooks, Vol. XXII, 1920, p. 112.

² For a full account of Chinese financial intricacies, see Morse's "Trade and Administration of China."

Such, then, was the Government of China when the European Powers began to insist on their right to be received through the front door in view of the increasing interest being taken by their nationals in the tradesmen's entrance.

So far as England was concerned, two wars¹ were fought before moderately satisfactory relations were established. In addition to the treaties which concluded these wars, various agreements were drawn up between China and several foreign Powers, the general tendency of which was the progressive opening up of China to foreign trade by the establishment of treaty ports and her proper recognition of foreign representatives.

For further and detailed information, Morse's "The International Relations of the Chinese Empire" (three vols.) should be consulted.

These wars involving defeat for China had indirect results far exceeding in importance their immediate consequences. The superiority of the Western Powers on land and sea convinced the Chinese Government that it was impossible to ignore the barbarians and refuse them equality of treatment. The wars also caused the central government great expense in the shape of indemnities. This form of external national expenditure for whose payment the Western Powers held the central government responsible, was a new thing in Peking, and the capital found it necessary to call upon the provinces for larger contributions. This meant heavier taxation for the people, since the provincial authorities were not disposed to abandon any of their "squeeze." It was also brought home to Peking in a forcible manner that the central government would be held responsible by European Powers if outrages on foreigners were committed in the provinces.

The old scheme by which all dealings with foreigners were de-centralized into a monopoly of hong¹ at Canton was plainly out of date. It therefore became apparent that a centralization of government was essential. A further train of events drove

¹ Concerning the first war. "War came when it did because the Chinese had precipitated a crisis by a vigorous campaign against opium; but it was not fought to uphold the trade in opium, and it was only the beginning of a struggle which lasted for twenty years, and which was to decide the national and commercial relations which were to exist between the East and the West." Chap. X, Vol. I, H. B. Morse, *op. cit.*

² Hong or Co-hong, a semi-official guild of Chinese merchants at Canton. From 1760-1820 all trade with China had (officially) to be done by Europeans through the Co-hong. It acted as a convenient buffer between the Chinese Government and the intrusive foreigner; it also acted as a source of revenue to Peking and a political instrument for the control of the foreigners.

this lesson home. About the year 1880¹ began the process by which China's Dependencies were gradually either lopped off or "peacefully penetrated" by other Powers.

In considering this question it must be remembered that for centuries the central government's general attitude of decentralization towards the eighteen provinces of China proper had been especially marked towards the tributary states such as Burma, Annam, and Korea. The Chinese policy appeared to have as its object the acceptance of occasional tribute and the maintenance of the prestige she enjoyed by an admission of vassaldom on the part of the outlying states, but China was not prepared to accept responsibility for the actions of her tributaries.

By the year 1895 Burma, Annam, Korea, the Loochow Islands, and Formosa were definitely severed from the Chinese Empire. The replacement in Korea of Chinese influence by that of Japan and the incorporation in the Japanese Empire of Formosa and the Pescadore Islands were the outcome of the China-Japanese War, which conflict had far-reaching after effects. During the hostilities which, in 1885, resulted in the abandonment of claims to Annam in favour of France, the Imperial arms had been defeated but by no means routed, and China in 1886 was still looked upon by European statesmen as a Power of unknown strength with whom it might be dangerous to press conclusions beyond certain limits.

Ten years later all was changed. The "dwarfs," as the Chinese contemptuously called the Japanese, had, in a short campaign of half a year, conclusively exposed the weakness of the giant and proved that his feet were of clay. An immediate reaction took place in the attitude of the European Powers to China; it also appeared in Chinese domestic politics. Before considering these reactions it is necessary to describe what had happened to make the Japanese victory a foregone conclusion amongst those who realized the relative progress in material civilization of China and Japan up to the year 1894.

We left Japan on the eve of being awakened from her slumberous isolation of two centuries, and within scarcely four

¹ But Great Britain had acquired the barren island of Hong-Kong from the Chinese as a result of the Opium War in 1842 (Treaty of Nanking), and then begun the process of making it the greatest transit port in the world.

"You have obtained the cession of Hong-Kong, a barren island with hardly a house upon it; . . . now it seems obvious that Hong-Kong will not be the mart of trade any more than Macao is so. . . . However, it is possible that I may be mistaken in this matter."—Lord Palmerston (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) to Captain Elliot (British Commissioner in China), 20 April, 1841.

decades, we find her leaping with one bound into a considerable position amongst the group of nations who ordered the conduct of the world.

What had happened to Japan ?

II

When the American squadron re-discovered Japan in 1853-54,¹ the visitors found that the country was being governed through a feudal system in which the chief executive powers appeared to be vested in a person called the Shogun.² An Emperor, theoretically supreme, the fount of all honour, of divine descent, lived in cloistered seclusion. But for several years the European pioneers seem to have been ignorant of his existence. Actually, the Shogun was much less of a power and much more of a figure-head than Europeans imagined, for the new arrivals came on the scene at a time when the Tokugawa Shogunate was in the evening of its rule, and hard pressed by envious rivals. In order to understand this situation it is necessary to be acquainted with the pre-restoration government of Japan, and for this purpose one must go back to the early Middle Ages. In the twelfth century a certain Yoritomo—head of the Minamoto family—rose to power in Japan and was given the title of Shogun. This event inaugurated a dual system of government in which all power gradually passed to the Shoguns, though the Emperor remained in theory the direct ruler. The office of Shogun was hereditary and was held by various dynasties, the last and greatest being that of the Tokugawa family, whose founder (Iyeyasu) was able during his tenure of office to extend the authority of the Shogunate to all parts of the Empire.

The country was organized on the basis of a feudal system, and the "daimios" held their fiefs at the pleasure of the Shogun, though about half the country was governed directly from the Shogun's court at Yedo—the modern Tokio. The people were grouped in clans, and for an explanation of the Japanese clan one cannot do better than quote from the Peace Handbook, Vol. XII.

On page 10 of Book No. 73 J. H. Gubbins writes: "The Japanese word 'Han,' the usual English rendering of which is 'clan,' does not in its feudal sense refer to the territory included

¹ A British fleet was in Japanese waters a few months after the Americans.

² Shogun = great general.

in a feudal area, but to the people inhabiting it. The truth is that, although Japanese feudalism, in its general features, resembled the feudal systems which prevailed in the continental countries of Europe, in one respect (the position of the population inhabiting the fiefs) it had a close affinity to the basis of Scottish feudalism: with this important distinction, however, that whereas the Scottish clan was a family organization, the basis of the Japanese clan was purely territorial, the clansmen being held together by no family link. Nor, as has already been stated, was this territorial basis of the Japanese clan always even strictly provincial. The territories of a clan were simply those composing the fief of the daimio, who was its chief. The area of a fief in earlier unsettled times was, as we have seen, subject to constant changes, expanding or contracting according to the military fortunes of the daimio concerned, and in those days the word Han (clan) was not much used, the personality of the daimio of the fief being the chief consideration. When, however, under the centralized administration of the Tokugawa Shoguns, conditions became more settled, the boundaries of the fiefs became more fixed and permanent, the result being that the personality of the daimio counted for less, and the term HAN gradually came to be more commonly employed to express the idea of a distinct feudal community united solely by territorial associations, which acted in a way similar to provincial ties in all countries. Naturally, in cases where the provincial and feudal boundaries corresponded, the tie uniting the inhabitants of a fief was stronger than elsewhere. A knowledge of what the clan really was in Japan is necessary in order to understand what seems a paradox to many people, namely, how it was that clan spirit should have survived the abolition of the feudal system, and how it is that Japan to-day, more than half a century after the disappearance of feudalism, should be ruled by what the Japanese themselves speak of as a 'Clan Government.'"¹

In the period when feudalism held sway in Japan, society was in four groups—the "kuge," "daimios," "samurai," and "Heimin."²

The "kuge"³ were court nobility who shared the seclusion, long ancestry, and political insignificance of the Emperor. They had no wealth. The "daimios," who were sub-divided into

¹ See Appendix VII, Militarism and Clan-rule in Modern Japan.

² For an account of feudalism in Old Japan see "The Mikado's Empire," Vol. I.

³ The court nobility (kuge) consisted of 150 families, there were about 300 daimio families and 400,000 samurai households. See vol. 42, part 1: "Transactions Asiatic Society of Japan."

several classes, were the rulers of fiefs and at their head stood the Shogun. The "samurai" were the military class. Warlike pursuits, a blind obedience to the orders of his lord, and adherence to a rigid code of military honour filled the life of a samurai. To them was reserved the privilege of wearing swords, and by them all trade and money were utterly despised, a contempt they extended to all merchants and members of the "Heimin." The social exaltation of the fighting man, which was considered to have reached some height in Imperial Germany, was there negligible compared to that attained by this class in feudal Japan. Lastly, there came the "Heimin," or commerce people, a class comprising agriculturists, artisans, and traders. The latter were the lowest and most despised of all "Heimin," but even they had inferiors in the shape of the "eta"—defiled people—or outcasts. The origin of these latter is interesting but irrelevant to this discussion. When, after the Restoration, their social disabilities were theoretically removed they numbered over a million persons.¹ For a full account of the Eta question see an article by Dr. Kita in the May number of "Kaiho" (Emancipation), 1923. Also "Japan Weekly Chronicle". New Series, No. IIII4.

The two hundred years of settled government which Japan enjoyed under the Shoguns of the Tokugawa family caused a profound change to take place in the position of power.

The Shoguns became effete and affairs were directed to an ever-increasing extent by an upper and lower Council of State composed of daimios. Similarly many of the daimios whose ancestors had led their clans to battle became enervated, and the business of the fiefs passed largely into the hands of retainers. This curious predilection on the part of the Japanese for a shadow government in which the central figure retains his position in theory but is divorced from the exercise of its practical functions has been much commented on by foreign writers. As the Tokugawa régime drew to its close, the Emperor, the Shogun, and most of the daimios, each in their own sphere, occupied analogous positions so far as the exercise of real power was concerned; and, as we shall see, even the so-called Restoration of the Emperor at the close of the Shogunate period did not affect the existence of this peculiar system, but merely altered the personalities of the

¹At the present time the Home Office authorities are making an effort to ameliorate the lot of the heimin (eta). The latest figures indicate that there are 5,300 "eta" hamlets containing 850,000 people. As an indication of the slowness with which they are being absorbed by other classes, it may be noted that in 1918 450 marriages took place between "eta" and other people. In 1923 the "eta" caused disturbances in Japan in pressing for their "rights."

actors, substituting for the men who had controlled the Shogun, and, therefore, the Emperor, a body of bureaucrats who, by means such as Shinto and a Constitution modelled on Bismarck's ideas, were destined to govern Japan autocratically from 1870 until now.¹ It is probable that had not the second coming of European Powers taken place, the Tokugawa Shoguns would soon have been ousted by one of the powerful clans, such as Satsuma and Choshu, which were their principal rivals. It was, therefore, unfortunate, from the point of view of the Tokugawa party in power during the years 1853-1868, that, in addition to internal weakness and faction, they were called upon to face external complications of grave and novel natures. These, were the questions arising out of the resumption of international relations after a rupture which had endured two centuries, a period, moreover, which, in the West, had witnessed the most revolutionary changes in every department of life, whilst Japan's civilization had remained practically static.

On the other hand, the many enemies of the Shogunate, enemies chiefly influenced by feelings of envious rivalry, saw in the bewildering foreign complications a heaven-sent opportunity for the prosecution of their own ends. It is not surprising that the enfeebled Tokugawa Shogunate broke beneath the strain, and, in its collapse, carried with it the whole Shogun system.

From 1858, when the first general treaty of commerce and friendship was concluded between Japan and the United States of America, until 1869, when the Japanese and Austro-Hungarian treaty was signed, a number of such treaties were ratified between Japan and Western Powers. Their principal clauses related to the fixing of low tariff rates and the granting to foreigners of the privileges of extra territoriality.

During this period the Tokugawa Shogunate moved steadily to its destruction. The court party at Kyoto, taking advantage of the complicated position, began to claim a wider share in the administration. The great Southern and Western clans, Satsuma and Choshu, always jealous of the Tokugawa family, lent their support to the movement against the Shogun. The treaties, notably those with Britain, America, and France, had been more or less forced on Japan by the use of naval demonstrations, and the enemies of the Shogun alleged that in addition to his usurpation of the Imperial power, he had further sinned in allowing Japan to be humiliated.

Another source from which the Imperial, anti-foreign, and

¹ See Chapter XIII, "Shinto," and Chapter XIV, "Modern Japan." Also Appendix VII.

anti-Shogun party drew strength was in the movement known as the revival of Pure Shinto—which began towards the end of the seventeenth century.¹ At the time now under consideration, this movement, originally of a purely literary nature, had become partly political. It aimed at analysing Japan's political condition from the standpoint of the first principles of Shintoism. It sought guidance from purely Japanese writings, and was hostile to Buddhism, Confucianism, and the Chinese Classics as being of foreign origin. As will be seen later, when discussing the present religious system in Japan and its political importance, any movement in favour of Shintoism was admirably suited to the production of theoretical reasons in condemnation of the Shogun's government. This movement, with its insistence on the importance of national culture, may, in a general way, be compared to the "Back to the Vedas" idea of certain modern Indian nationalists, and the intellectual section of the late Sinn Fein movement in Ireland. It provided that foundation of idealism and apparent moral right which is generally found as part and parcel of all large movements to change governments.

In the closing years of the Shogunate régime several cases of attack on foreigners took place at the instigation of the anti-foreign party. In some cases the victims were murdered, and this created further difficulties for the Shogun, who was held responsible by the foreign Powers for the acts of parties over whom he was rapidly losing all control.²

Finally, the cause of the Imperial party was strengthened by events in China. It will be remembered that, at about this time, the European Powers had just forcibly impressed China with the fact that it was their intention to secure equality of treatment, and it seemed unlikely to Japanese observers that foreign policy would rest content with concessions already obtained from China, and parallel action in Japan seemed probable if once the "barbarians" obtained a footing.

The Shogun was signing treaties and admitting the foreigner; his opponents chose to ignore the fact that in the face of Western national force he had no option but to comply with foreign demands. That many of the master-minds knew the truth of the position he was in, is well known, and it is also proved by their conduct when they eventually came into power. As regards the popular attitude, it must be realized that at this time the mass of the people were politically quite negligible, and that the move-

¹ See Chapter XIII, p. 282.

² Cf. similar attitude of European Governments towards Peking during nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

ments now being described were only engineered by a small minority in the nation consisting of some of the daimios and samurai in the clans. 1868-1869 saw the end of the Shogunate.

Four clans rose in revolt, and a short civil war ensued in which the Imperial forces were completely victorious.

The Tokugawa Shogunate had gone, but it would be a grave error to suppose that the "Restoration" introduced a Western form of government. The instigators of the Restoration, of whom the most important were the leaders of the Choshu and Satsuma clans, held different opinions as to the form of government which should be introduced. Choshu favoured a return to the bureaucratic system which existed in pre-feudal days, whilst Satsuma supported a feudal system, and many Satsuma samurai hoped to see a Satsuma Shogunate. The Choshu clan prevailed, and eight bureaux were formed to administer affairs.¹

Now occurred a remarkable change of policy which, in the ease of its consummation, supplies a striking proof of the despotic power of the leaders. One of the battle-cries of the Imperial forces had been "The expulsion of the foreigner." No sooner did the new men come into power than they discarded this idea, and in their dealings with Europeans out-Heroded Herod, so far as the late Shogun was concerned, by the encouragement they gave to the study and introduction of Western ideas. To these men, who had the wisdom to see that Japan must bend before the Western blast until her roots had been strengthened by the infusion of Western civilization, their country owes a debt of gratitude.

It soon became apparent that the new Government, in which it should be noted that the sacred person of the Emperor still remained little more than a mysterious and semi-Divine figure-head, was destined to have a short life. It was evident that the loose system of feudalism, in which the clans were largely interdependent, was in discord with the needs of the times; these called for a uniform system of government, a centralized revenue (in feudal days each Daimio controlled his own finances), and other political innovations. These reforms were an essential prelude to the immense task of catching up with the Western nations in the matter of material civilization.

In 1871 the following brief decree was issued:—

"The clans are abolished and prefectures are established in their place."

¹ See "Japanese Government Documents, 1867-89," by W. W. McClaren. "Transactions Asiatic Society of Japan," Vol. 32, part 1. Also "A Political History of Japan during the Meiji Era," by same author.

This announcement had been made possible by the voluntary surrender to the Crown of their feudal rights by 277 nobles. For details as to the negotiations and temporary arrangements which led up to this step, and to the financial compensation paid to the daimios and the samurai, the reader should consult "A Political History of Japan during the Meiji Era, 1867-1912," by W. W. McClaren. Also "Modern Japan," by J. H. Gubbins.

The peasant was an immediate gainer by these changes. Subsequent events arising from them which were to enable the peasant to enjoy many blessings of civilization hitherto undreamt of in his philosophy, such as the privilege of bearing arms (in a conscript army modelled on German lines)—to mention but one important consequence—make one pause in an effort to appraise the true measure of the peasant's gain. It is a speculation of interest, but the temptation to pursue it on these pages will be resisted.

Should any philosophical historian decide to investigate the question as to the relationship between the absolute happiness of a people and the "greatness" of their country in the international polity, he might well consider selecting the Japanese as a principal example for analysis.

The "samurai" were immediately losers through the new scheme. Ultimately it benefited them by forcing them to abandon the rigid distinctions of their class and blend themselves into the national body. It was not to be supposed that this hereditary class of warrior could be transformed by the stroke of a pen. A natural disinclination to abandon their privileged position was the principal foundation on which the leaders of the Satsuma clan in 1877 based their revolt against the central government.¹ The rebellion was crushed after heavy fighting. Even more important than the victory was the manner of its achievement. The Satsuma forces were samurai; the Government troops were drawn from the non-military classes, the artisans, the farmers, and the traders. The bubble of samurai supremacy was pricked, and the rulers of Japan learnt that ready at hand lay the ingredients of a first-class fighting machine,² whose achievements were twice to startle the whole world within the next half-century.

The business of re-organizing the country on Western lines had been started by the new Government in 1868, and it progressed with astonishing, and perhaps dangerous, rapidity. Railways,

¹ Another cause was a difference of opinion between Satsuma and Choshu as to Japanese foreign policy.

² This was the great discovery of the late Prince Yamagata—Japan's foremost militarist.

telegraphs, dockyards, harbour appliances, lighthouses, a mint, foreign clothes for ceremonial occasions, stock exchanges, newspapers, the establishment of conscription, and the reform of the judicial system towards something approaching Western ideas were a few of the great changes which, under the guidance of foreign advisors, followed each other with amazing speed. To enumerate all these innovations, together with the dates of their initiation, would merely result in a long and uninteresting catalogue. The Satsuma rebellion in 1877 checked, but did not interrupt the impetuous absorption of Western ideas, and with the suppression of this outbreak the central government firmly established its position.

The terms of the treaties concluded by Japan with the Western Powers before the fall of the Shogunate accorded ill with national aspirations to reach equality with the foreigners as quickly as possible. The clauses regulating the tariff of Japan and granting to foreigners in Japan the right of extra-territoriality were particularly obnoxious to the new Government. The Japanese argued that these treaties had been forced on Japan at a time when she was not only helpless but also quite ignorant of ordinary international procedure. Revision of the treaties could only be obtained by the unanimous consent of the signatory Powers, and, as early as 1871, a mission left Japan to visit Europe and obtain it. It was not successful in this object, and the treaties remained a thorn in Japanese flesh for a further twenty-five years; though the mission did learn by what reforms Japan was most likely to secure the consent of the Powers to revision. During this period there was continual agitation in favour of revision, and the matter was a source of much anti-foreign feeling.

Notwithstanding the Satsuma rebellion, many leading Satsuma men were in the Government both during the outbreak and afterwards. The two clans Satsuma and Choshu really ruled the country, and this fact led to the withdrawal from the administration of the then Mr. Okuma, a brilliant politician and a member of the Hizen clan. He lent his influence to a movement which had been in existence for some years and had as its object the acceleration of Government reform. Its adherents were principally drawn from two classes. Firstly, there were men who had acquired a smattering of political theory from Western writers, and, more or less ignoring practical considerations, wished without delay to apply these theories to Japan. Though genuine reformers their ideas were often crude and visionary. Secondly, there were men who objected to the absolute and bureaucratic ascendancy in the Government of the clans of Satsuma and Choshu. The Government applied the time-honoured

remedies of bureaucracy, viz. the withdrawal of the right of holding public meetings, the muzzling of the press, and the granting of very arbitrary powers to the police, but in 1881 the Government promised that in ten years' time a constitution would be granted to the country.¹

At this stage in the outline of Japanese affairs the general survey will be terminated. Japanese domestic history just prior and subsequent to the Restoration has been treated in some detail, because the events are sufficiently recent to be still connected closely to affairs of the present day.

One example will illustrate this fact. In 1921 the Crown Prince of Japan was betrothed to Princess Kuni, daughter of a Satsuma lady. Soon after the announcement, Japan was in a ferment over a matter which the press, due to an embargo, were only able to refer to as "the very serious matter." It has since transpired that statesmen of the Choshu clan attempted for political reasons to prevent this match. The final result of this affair, the importance of which in Japan was very great—far exceeding the bounds of a mere household intrigue—was that the Choshu clan were defeated, the Government's and Satsuma's position strengthened, and the prestige of the once all-powerful "Elder Statesmen" ² was markedly reduced.

"The Elder Statesmen"—known as the Genro—and the peculiar part they have played in Japanese affairs during the last two decades will be separately discussed; the above incident is merely quoted to illustrate the fact that unless the principles of the clan system are apprehended much recent history will be misunderstood.

III

It will, perhaps, be convenient to re-capitulate the matter dealt with in the general survey before passing on to particular consideration of the present day stresses and strains in the Far East. We have seen in the case of China the gradual success of the Western Powers in their policy of insisting on equality of treatment. We have briefly described the state of China's government, her unsuccessful resistance to Western claims,³

¹ The announcement was made, of course, as if it was the personal gift of the throne.

² The Genro at this time were: Prince Yamagata, Choshu; Prince Saionji, a Kuge; Marquis Matsukata, Satsuma.

³ "Et comme tout en Chine est, l'on à vu solidaire, la plus petite modification apportée aux moeurs, à la structure sociale, aux habitudes mêmes, est une atteinte à son intégrité. Les Chinois le sentent bien; et c'est le

and further, we have noted that as Chinese resistance weakened, she lost a group of dependencies to England, France, Russia, and Japan. In the case of Japan we have observed that her early intercourse with the West was interrupted by over two centuries of seclusion, which was invaded by the Western Powers in the middle of the eighteenth century. Beneath this shock, Japan's feudal government crumbled away. Finally, we have traced the beginning of Japan's astonishing and successful attempt to escape the fate of China by becoming almost more Western than the Westerners.

sentiment qui explique leur, conservatisme passionné ; c'en est la forme Chinoise, puisque ce qu'ils defendent en repoussant tout changement comme un ennemi de leur pays, c'est l'essence meme de la Chine, l'ame de sa civilization, le principe qui l'a faite et maintenue identique a elle-meme a travers toutes les vicissitudes de son histoire."—Hovelaque, op. cit., p. 129.

CHAPTER III

THE BEGINNING OF CHINA'S LABOUR

“Wheresoever the carcase is, there will the eagles be gathered together.”
—MATT. xxiv. 28

I

THE victory of Japan over China in 1895¹ was an event of very great consequence, whose results are still with us at the present time. In the first place it afforded convincing proof that as a result of her feverish activities since the Restoration, Japan had reached a point at which her foreign policy was a matter of serious concern to all nations having interests in the Far East. Secondly, it exposed the nakedness of China—exposed it not only to the Western Powers but also to the Chinese. The object-lesson was plain. Japan, once despised, had in twenty years so profited by reform on Western lines that she was able to tear Formosa from China, and exact a heavy indemnity. Only the self-seeking intervention of France, Russia, and Germany had postponed further loss to China.

The effect of China's defeat on the foreign policies of the Powers towards her, will first be considered. Prior to the War of 1895 the policies of all the Powers, with the exception of Japan and Russia, were almost entirely inspired by purely commercial motives, the word “commercial” being here used in the narrow sense of immediate trade. Though during the period preceding the Sino-Japanese War, when Chinese dependencies were being lopped off, several of the Great Powers, and the growing power of Japan, had enlarged their dominions at China's expense, these outlying vassals had only been attached to China by very tenuous threads. Nevertheless, their loss to China was important, in that after 1895 she found her frontier marching with those of the territories of the Great Powers.

¹ The outward and visible cause of the Sino-Japanese War of 1895 was the independence of Korea, for which Japan was supposed to be fighting.

As soon as the Powers fully appreciated the weakness of China, Western policies underwent a new orientation. From being purely commercial, the interest of the West in China became strongly political. It is, of course, true that a great many, perhaps the majority, of international policies are fundamentally commercial, in that statesmen's territorial policies usually aim at securing favourable trading conditions for their nationals, but there are both commercial and political methods by which these conditions can be secured, and, in the case of China, the political methods began to take precedence after the Japanese War. The first indication of the new direction from which the wind was about to blow came within a month of the conclusion of the war.

In May, 1895, Russia, Germany, and France presented Japan with what was virtually an ultimatum in which she was advised not to occupy permanently the southern portions of the Manchurian Province of Fengtien, which had been ceded by China to Japan. This area included the Liaotung Peninsula, which is the northern sentinel to the Gulf of Pe-Chili and hence commands the sea-approaches to Peking. Great Britain was urged to join in the threat to Japan on the plea that the political balance of the Far East was in jeopardy. She declined to interfere. The Japanese were helpless in the face of this menace, and the Emperor of Japan "yielded to the dictate of magnanimity, and accepted the advice of the three Powers."

This incident naturally infuriated the Japanese people, and their indignation was increased as the true reasons for the intervention of this coalition became plain; for Russia at once obtained from China the right to extend the Trans-Siberian Railway to Vladivostock across Manchuria. This concession saved much expense in construction, and 300 miles of distance.

Russia also negotiated a loan with China by means of which the latter country was able to begin payment of her war indemnity to Japan. At the same time France secured certain commercial advantages and territorial adjustments in the provinces adjoining French Indo-China.

Germany had yet to claim her share of the pickings. She did so with a brutal straightforwardness which still further impressed Europe and Japan with the impotence of China. Two German missionaries had been murdered in Shantung Province, and Germany made use of this incident to secure for a period of ninety-nine years the lease of the harbour of Kiaochow (Tsing-Tau) and an area of surrounding territory. It was plain that the Shantung Province, a province of peculiar sanctity in Chinese eyes, was earmarked for Germany. The scramble proceeded with breathless

rapidity. Study of this period leaves an impression of an atmosphere of furious intrigue carried out with indecent haste.¹

Britain and Russia were both in the field to "assist" China with the second instalment of the Japanese indemnity in return for various concessions. The Russians, anxious to consolidate their new hold on Manchuria, forced China to grant them a twenty-five years' lease of the Liaotung Peninsula,² in which they proceeded to create the great naval base of Port Arthur and the commercial port of Dairen (Dalny), and connect them by rail with the Trans-Siberian system. Thus the whole area retroceded by Japan to China had in three years come under Russian domination. This Russian "forward move" was considered by Great Britain as one which "*would inevitably be considered in the East as a standing menace to Peking and the commencement of the partition of China.*"

Having failed to prevent Russian aggression, Great Britain secured the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei (on the southern side of the Gulf of Pe-chili) "for so long as Russia holds Port Arthur."

Meanwhile France dug a talon into the other end of China's succulent but flabby body. In April, 1898, it was announced that France had secured the lease of Kwang Chow Wan and some territory in Southern Kwangtung Province, as a coaling station in addition to certain railways and commercial concessions in the South. This move aroused the anxiety of Great Britain who, since her acquisition of Hong-Kong, had always felt a particular interest in South China. To counteract France, the British Government secured a lease of 100 square miles of territory on the mainland opposite Hong-Kong and a railway concession in Kiangsu Province.

One of the most ironical of the features of many of the agreements which were forced from China at this time, consisted of the alienation clauses. Each Power was always careful to insist that the agreements with China contained a statement that no territory in any of the provinces in which it professed particular interest was to be granted to any other Power; so far as China was concerned it was a case of "save me from my friends." The above-mentioned negotiations, though perhaps "deprivations" would be a more suitable word, closed the first stage of foreign political aggression in China proper.

¹ "The foreign nations are all greedy, and are preparing to cut up the Chinese melon. . . . China must be on the alert and reform herself, and must guard against aggression."—From a vernacular paper, 1898.

² In Kwantung territory, not to be confused with the Province of Kwangtung.

Looking back with a mind chastened by the recollection of the Great War, it is easy to see how fatal to the well-being of China such a policy was bound to prove. It is also now apparent to a great many people, especially, perhaps, those who passed through the hottest furnaces of 1914-18, that the type of world policy which was in favour amongst the Great Powers in pre-war days and of which the great grab in the Far East was but one phase, was a policy which in due course was bound to bring the Great Powers into conflict with each other. But to apprehend the situation at the close of the nineteenth century we must refrain from too much latter-day wisdom.¹

At that period in the history of the world, territorial aggrandizement was the central feature of the international political philosophy then in vogue. All self-respecting Foreign Offices were busily engaged in the task of painting the faintly coloured parts of the world's map red, green, or yellow, as the case might be. The great white spaces of Africa's map had been almost all painted in, largely with British vermilion; only Morocco remained a somewhat neutral tint, and on either side of this patch, map-painters of the Quai D'Orsay and Wilhelmstrasse flourished their paint brushes at each other.

The Chinese-Japanese War had suddenly drawn aside the veil from a new canvas of immense extent and tremendous possibilities. The preliminary dabs were most encouraging, the material absorbing the first coats of foreign paint without any real trouble. Serious inconveniences were, in fact, only caused when the edges of foreign colour schemes ran into each other.

By the trend of international policies it seemed not at all unlikely that China would gradually so far come under the influence of foreign Powers that her final partition would be a painless and merciful act. There is no doubt about the fact, though curious it sounds to-day, that intelligent men held these beliefs, and worked towards their fulfilment.

The next stage of the process of disintegration is best described as the "railway and concession" period.

The four big Powers, France, Great Britain, Germany, and Russia, with Japan like a cub walking round the kill until she had grown in stature and could claim equal rights, were now entrenched as follows:—

France and Great Britain were competing in the South—the British based on Hong-Kong and the French upon Indo-China.

¹ "Foreign Powers were now (1899) contemplating with complacency the impending break up of China."—"The International Relations of the Chinese Empire," Vol. 3, p. 127.

Great Britain also claimed special interests in the Yangtze Valley. Germany was at Tsingtau and had ear-marked the rich Province of Shantung as her particular happy hunting ground. In the North, Russia was perfecting her grip on Southern Manchuria, and her shadow already lay across the Korean landscape and struck a chill over the nearby islands of Japan.

From the various areas which were already being spoken of as "Spheres of Influence" the Powers pursued their policy of peaceful penetration (backed up in the ultimate resort by threats of Western force). The methods most in favour were those of railway concessions, loans, and mining concessions.

A detailed account of the tactics employed by the several Powers would overweight the general description of this period. The "China Year Book" contains a list of the agreements concluded with China at about this time by the foreign Powers.¹

An important exception to the general attitude of the Powers must here be noted. The United States of America refrained from entering the fray, and steadfastly advocated the policy of the Open Door and equal commercial opportunities for all.²

In the general excitement engendered by the scramble for bargains, the Powers failed to observe what effect these proceedings were having on that most interested of all parties—the Chinese Empire. Actually there were then being sown seeds of what was to be the first signs of Chinese national consciousness, that element which, according to orthodox Sinologues, China entirely lacked.

If China is in the future to take her place as one of the great nations of the earth,³ she will attain that position through the medium of the national consciousness. Since the 1890's it has made considerable strides as will in due course be described, but it is yet a feeble growth and far from what it might be. The next section will be devoted to some account of its early beginnings.

II

The General Survey of the Far East included a brief account of the traditional form of government in China. A government

¹ *Vide* "China Treaties," Vol. 1, Hertslets. Also "Treaties and Agreements With or Concerning China, 1894-1919," 2 vols., J. V. A. MacMurray.

At the Washington Conference Mr. Wang, a Chinese delegate, produced a list of foreign treaties which were designed either directly or indirectly in connexion with the spheres of influence policies of the Powers in China.

² For an official exposition of U.S.A. policy see the Hay Notes of 1899.

³ In some respects she has for long occupied this position, but in the above sentence, reference is intended to her influence upon world policies.

in which the provinces enjoyed almost complete administrative independence in relation to Peking ; a government decentralized through all its ramifications ; a government corrupt in its financial ways ; a government hopelessly weak in the presence of foreign aggression, but judged by the verdict of the centuries, it was a government well suited to the domestic needs of China. It was further pointed out that this system in its broad outline was rooted so deep in the Chinese character that it remained unchanged by the downfall of dynasties. To a considerable extent this fact is true to-day, for though China has now no dynasty, and is officially a Republic, her districts, her prefectures, and her provinces are, in practice, administered (when anarchy is not rampant) much as they were under the Ming and Manchu dynasties.

When the inexorable expansion of the West forced China into the world arena, the weaknesses of China's jelly-fish system were exposed. The Emperor was obliged to sign treaties with foreign Powers, and the foreigners expected the central government to honour its bond and force the provincial authorities to observe the treaties. The War of 1895 had saddled the central government with an indemnity, and this meant additional calls on the provincial treasuries.

Since 1861 the central government had been controlled by one of the most remarkable women of all time—the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi.

In power of intellect, resolution of character, and administrative ability, "Old Buddha"—as she was nicknamed—is in every way entitled to rank with Elizabeth of England and Catherine of Russia. It was her genius which kept the Manchu dynasty on the throne for half a century after it had plainly "exhausted its mandate from Heaven," and was by the teaching of Chinese history ripe for its fall. When the Emperor Tung-chieh died in 1875 only two years after reaching his majority, his first cousin Kuang-Hsu was irregularly chosen as Emperor. The new Emperor was an infant, a fact which ensured a new and prolonged regency together with a fresh lease of power to the Empress.

Mention has been made of the fact that the South-eastern Provinces of China, and particularly the intellectual centre of the great city of Canton, are the traditional foci of new ideas and advanced thought in China. This phenomenon is due to a number of circumstances of which the most important are as follows : Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and parts of Fukien are geographically isolated from neighbouring provinces by mountain barriers. The Cantonese are by character restless and turbulent,

and resisted the Manchu conquerors for many years after the rest of China had submitted. Secret societies, such as the Triad and White Lily, whose origins are obscure, but whose influence in the Far East, and especially the Southern Far East, is very great to-day—how great probably no European can say—have their headquarters in these Southern Provinces. There has always been a considerable emigration from this area of China, and the exiles are conspicuous for the fidelity with which they maintain touch with their home-lands and the generosity with which they finance political movements having their origin in the Southern Provinces. Finally, it was through the South-eastern ports of China that European trade first came to China, and Hong-Kong for the last eighty years has been to the Cantonese an adjacent centre in which the Western ideas could be studied.

In Canton, about the year 1897, certain foreign educated Cantonese, amongst whom Kang Yu-wei and Sun Yat-sen were prominent figures, started a reform movement. Sun Yat-sen¹ professed anti-dynastic views, and, being compromised in an abortive rebellion, he was obliged to fly the country. Kang Yu-wei² proceeded on different lines. He was not opposed to the Imperial authority, but he hated the Empress Dowager, who represented the core of the old-time system. Circumstances favoured the reform party, for they were able to obtain the ear of the Emperor—then just attaining his majority. He embraced the new idea with enthusiasm, but probably not entirely from conviction. It is likely that he was attracted to this movement not only for the sake of its principles, but also because he saw therein an opportunity for freeing himself from the trammels of the redoubtable Empress and thereby securing some of the reality of power.

From June to September, 1898, China was startled by a series of edicts of a revolutionary nature.³ They covered nearly every field of administration. Some of the most remarkable were those which, at one stroke of the vermilion pencil, abolished the ancient regulation that the subjects of public examinations by which officials were recruited should be confined to the Classics. Western subjects were in future to be studied; foreign travel was encouraged; colleges were to be established in which students could prepare themselves for the new style examinations; foreign books were to be translated, and various redundant offices were

¹ Speaking at Hong-Kong in February, 1923, Sun Yat-sen declared that he imbibed his revolutionary ideas from living at Hong-Kong.

² "Kang Yu-wei, the Erasmus of the Reform Movement," H. B. Morse, *op. cit.*

³ For a list of the 1898 decrees see Vol. 3, H. B. Morse, p. 138, *op. cit.*

abolished or merged into others. In modern phraseology a heavy "axeing" was announced.

These proposals naturally aroused violent opposition from the officials, and the opposing parties were further antagonized by the fact that the whole business of reform was closely connected with the question as to whether the Southerners or the Northerners should control the central government. Reform was largely a pivot about which revolved two factions. On the one hand, the Western-educated Cantonese, claiming to represent the native Chinese, and pinning their faith in the Emperor. On the other hand, the Empress Dowager's entourage and the vested interests of officialdom, both Manchu and Chinese.

The reformers determined to eliminate the Empress and for this purpose they relied on Yuan Shi-kai, later to become internationally famous as China's strong man. At this time he was in command of certain foreign-trained troops, but, though reputed a reformer, he was not in favour of extreme measures. He communicated the plans of the Emperor's adherents to the viceroy of Chih-li (the metropolitan province), a Manchu named Jung-lu. The latter informed the Empress, and the Emperor found himself imprisoned in his palace with Yuan Shi-kai's troops on guard outside. The reformer Kang Yu-wei managed to escape at the last moment, but other leaders were executed, and the Emperor was compelled to issue an edict which restored the Empress to power. The unfortunate Emperor was soon "reported to be in failing health," and it is probable that only the intervention of the British Minister ensured the patient's recovery.

The return to power of "Old Buddha" immediately resulted in a heavy swing of the pendulum in a reactionary direction. The edicts of the hundred days of reform were rescinded, reform societies were suppressed, and the new press muzzled.

This reaction was accompanied by a rising tide of anti-foreign feeling which was backed up by the indignation aroused amongst patriotic and educated Chinese by "the battle of concessions," which was at this time in full swing.¹

There is some evidence that the Empress herself and her immediate advisers realized the futility of attempting to force the foreign Powers to stop their peaceful absorption of China, but this view was not that of many influential officials. At the end of 1899 an order went forth from Peking that the provinces were to present a firm front to foreign aggression. In Shantung

¹ See p. 42. "The blood of the martyrs will be the seed of the New China."—"North China Daily Herald," 10 October, 1898. Cited by H. B. Morse.

Province, where the German sphere of influence was being consolidated with especial rapidity, an extremely reactionary Manchu named Yu-Hsien was appointed as governor, and in the sympathetic atmosphere of his régime the "Boxer" society began to come into prominence. Their banners bore the slogan: "Down with the foreigner, protect the Manchu," and they claimed miraculous powers. The activities of this and kindred organizations, which culminated in the murder of missionaries, alarmed the Court, who began to fear the inevitable complications with foreign Powers, which would assuredly lead to further "concessions." Yuan Shi-kai was sent to stamp out the movement, and this strong man succeeded in controlling Shantung. In the Capital the Boxers found a strong supporter in Prince Tuan, father of the heir-presumptive, and eventually attacks on foreigners and the siege of the Legations took place.

For details of the Boxer outbreak and an account of the attempt of the Empress to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds, the reader should consult the books which have been written with the Boxer rising as their subject. For our present purpose it is only necessary to note the following points. Firstly, that notwithstanding the decrees issued from Peking ordering the extirpation of foreigners—decrees issued when the Boxer cause seemed likely to triumph—the viceroys of the Yangtze Valley, and Yuan Shi-kai in Shantung were more statesmanlike, and, realizing that the foreigner would ultimately triumph, these men agreed to ignore the edicts. In Manchuria the viceroys obeyed the decrees and thereby gave Russia her opportunity, for she immediately overran the provinces with her troops. The second point of importance lies in the bitterness of feeling and jealousies which existed among the Powers who were sending contingents to punish China. It was obvious that the question of filching some national advantage from the prevailing confusion was the primary objective of most of the Powers; co-operation against the Boxers and just punishment of the central government being a secondary business. This spirit of self-seeking was particularly prominent in the case of Russia, who endeavoured to negotiate separately, and refused to give support to the Powers on several important points. A third matter of interest is afforded by the ridiculously inflated claims, made by Russia, Germany, and Italy as compensation for the expenses incurred and damage sustained by their nationals.

The Russian policy of dis-association from the Powers was soon explained, for as a result of negotiations which came to light, it was revealed in 1900 that Russia intended to establish what practically amounted to a protectorate over Manchuria. This

scheme had to be temporarily abandoned by the Russians as a result of Chinese opposition. The resistance of the Peking Government was stiffened by protests from the viceroys of the Yangtze Valley and promises of support from the other Powers. The negotiations between the allied Powers and the Chinese Government were prolonged, since the latter strove ceaselessly to extract advantage from the obvious jealousies of its enemies. At length in September, 1901, the final protocol was signed in Peking. Its main terms were as follows:—

1. Punishment of officials implicated in the murder of foreigners.
2. An indemnity (the Boxer indemnity) of £67,500,000, to be shared in various proportions amongst the Powers.
3. A fortified Legation quarter in Peking in which the Powers could maintain troops.
4. The maintenance of foreign troops on the lines of communication between Peking and the sea.

* * * * *

The Boxer rising was the last attempt on the part of China to resist European influence by force. When the Empress returned to Peking, whence the Court had fled, she seems to have realized that reform was essential. Once again the weakness of China as a fighting Power had been demonstrated. The difficulty of raising money was further increased by the Boxer indemnity, and fresh engagements had been entered into with the European Powers, who would certainly hold the central government strictly to account for the observance of these undertakings. But equally with these considerations there was the need for reform if the Manchu dynasty was to be saved. The advanced wing of the Southern reformers had ever been anti-Imperial, and the reactionary measures after the reforms of 1898 had increased the numbers of those who believed that the rule of the Manchus was incompatible with progress.

Though some measures of reform were begun immediately after the Boxer rising, the movement did not gain real impetus until after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5.

This war arose from Russia's action in Manchuria, which was a direct continuation of that policy whose ultimate aim was prematurely exposed in 1901 and 1902. Russia had promised to evacuate Manchuria in stages within a period of eighteen months. By the end of 1903 Russia was still in effective occupation of the provinces, she had even gone so far as to appoint a viceroy of the area, and, most menacing of all to the Japanese, she had begun to secure concessions and exert authority on the Yalu River, frontier of Korea.

China could be treated contemptuously with impunity, but when Japan was the offended nation it was a different matter, and in February, 1904, war broke out. Ostensibly the war was fought by Japan partly on China's behalf to expel the Russian from Manchuria and partly to keep Russia out of Korea, but actually it was fought in order that Japan might take Russia's place in both these spheres of influence. Before embarking on this contest Japan had the wisdom to secure the treaty of Anglo-Japanese alliance in order to discount the possibility of a second tri-partite intervention, similar to that which had robbed her of the fruits of victory after the Sino-Japanese War.

More concerning the Russo-Japanese War will be said when writing of Japan; we are here chiefly interested in its effect on China. Fought almost throughout on Chinese territory it resulted in the establishment of Japan in South Manchuria, where she succeeded to the Russian lease of the Liaotung Peninsula (Port Arthur and Dalny), the Manchurian railway south of Changchun, and all privileges attaching thereunto. As far as China was concerned it was merely the substitution of a menace from the North by one from the East. Important as were these political changes, an even more important moral influence was produced by this war. From Singapore to Vladivostock, all up the China coast and far into the interior, there passed startling news to the effect that a great white nation had been defeated in battle by an Asiatic Power. This astonishing event led men in China to inquire into the cause of Japan's progress, and the lessons they then learnt seemed applicable to their own country.¹

It is from this time that the beginnings of the "Rights Recovery" movement are generally dated. This phenomenon, which marks a distinct stage in the growth of Chinese national consciousness, manifested itself in a very general movement against the granting of any further concessions to European Powers, and, where possible, the non-fulfilment of existing undertakings. Some of the practical results of this agitation between 1905 and 1908 were as follows:—

Foreign railway and mining concessions and contracts were obstructed and repudiated in the Yangtze Valley and Shansi; American goods were boycotted on account of her decision to enforce the exclusion of the Chinese from California, and President Taft felt it necessary to telegraph personally to the Prince Regent.

¹ "The result of the Russo-Japanese War electrified the nation. Japan had reversed the relations which had long been recognized as those naturally existing between East and West. Every Chinese, even to the unlettered peasant, began to ask by what method Japan had worked this result."—Morse, *op. cit.*, Vol. 3.

Japanese goods and a German steamship line were also boycotted for political reasons. The Chinese press, which at this time was rapidly increasing in numbers, gave full support to the "Rights Recovery" movement, and was generally most hostile to any commercial operation in which foreigners or their capital was involved. Another matter to which much attention was paid during the "Rights Recovery" movement was the suppression of opium smoking in China.¹ An attempt was made to extend Chinese control over the Maritime Customs—a service whose chief was, by an agreement dated 1863, an Englishman, at that time Sir Robert Hart. This service was famous for being the only department of State directly under foreign control, and enjoyed a world-wide reputation for integrity and efficiency. The foreign (Government) loans were secured on its revenue; its efficiency, and the value of various administrative services which had grown from it, largely helped to avert the final downfall of the Manchus.

Simultaneously with this incipient "Home Rule for China by Chinese" movement, the Empress began her policy of reform. In 1905 the old system of classical examinations was once more abolished in favour of a curriculum containing "modern subjects," and this move gave a great impetus to Western education. At this time a commission was sent abroad to study Constitutions. It was observed by the reformers that all progressive countries had Constitutions, and the advanced men from the Southern Provinces were always referring to the American Constitution. Japan had also got a Constitution, and it seemed that in this invention there might be a sovereign remedy for China's troubles. It was also apparent to those who were willing to concede to the reformers the semblance of power whilst retaining its actuality in their own hands, that there were Constitutions and Constitutions. A decree was issued on 1 September, 1906, which promised a Constitution.

To quote the "Peace Handbook," Vol. 12 :—

"The preliminaries declared to be necessary were :—

1. Re-modelling of the public service.
2. Revision of the dynastic laws.
3. Development of general education.
4. Financial reforms.
5. Re-organization of army.

¹ This reform has hung fire owing to the confused state of the country since 1911. At one time great progress had been made in stamping out the cultivation of the poppy. In 1923 Sir Francis Aglen suggested that opium should be made a State monopoly. At present (1924) the situation is very bad in most provinces.

6. Establishment of a police force.

7. Awakening of public interest in State affairs."

Many Edicts were issued to further these objects.

It is possible, had the fates been kind to China, that this charter might have proved the starting-point for the regeneration of a new and politically stable China, but this was not to be. The Empress, last hope of the Manchu, was to die within two years, and with the removal of her strong personality the disruptive tendencies in existence in China gained the upper hand. The hostility between the Manchus and the Chinese; the assertion of the organizers of the "Rights Recovery" movement that the central government was hopelessly weak in dealing with foreign Powers; the unpopularity of Peking in the provinces due to demands for money and interference with provincial railway schemes, were beams of thought carrying that dust of dissatisfaction which became focussed in the revolution of 1911.

The steps leading up to this revolution and the reforms carried out by the old régime during its deathbed repentance will be described in the next section.

III

*"As for ourselves, it is necessary at present to make a careful investigation into the matter, and prepare ourselves to imitate this government by Constitution, in which the supreme control must be in the hands of the Throne, while the interests of the masses shall be given to the elect, advanced to such a position by the suffrage of the masses"*¹ (from an Edict of 1906).

* * * * *

*"Any impetuosity shown in introducing these reforms will, at the end, be so much labour lost. . . . It is incumbent upon us as a beginning, therefore, to reform the official system; next to revise carefully the laws in their most minute details; promote and encourage universal education; regulate the finances and sources of revenue of the Empire; re-organize the Army; and establish a strong gendarmerie throughout the Empire. In a few years' time, when it is found that there is a rough outline of what is needed, the time will come for appointing a day for the inauguration of a de facto constitutional government. . . . Let all observe law and order, and prepare themselves to enjoy the solid advantages of a constitutional government"*² (from the Edict of 1 October, 1906).

* * * * *

¹ "China Year Book," 1912.

² *Ibid.*

The above extracts from the Edicts of 1906 reveal clearly the two guiding principles which were to actuate the Empress and her advisers in their plans for constitutional reform. First and most important, the supreme power was to remain in the hands of the dynasty. The Constitution was to be a free gift from the ruler to his people and not an organism forced upon him by the nation as a check to his arbitrary power.

The examples of Germany and Japan had been closely studied by the Constitution Commission, and the form of government in these two countries proved that all the paraphernalia of Western government, such as Cabinets and Elective Assemblies could be suitably adapted to the exercise of autocratic rule.

The second guiding principle, and in this respect the wisdom of the Empress has been justified by subsequent events, adumbrated that reform was to come gradually. Eventually, as we shall see, a nine years' programme was drawn up, details of which are contained in Appendix I. Under pressure of the impending revolution this plan was curtailed and eventually disappeared in the chaos of civil war. For two years—from 1906-8—little progress was made, though a good many Edicts with reform as their subject were issued. From 1908 onwards, the situation quickened. Steps were taken to outline the procedure by which constitutional government was to be introduced, and measures were designed to bring into being, first a National Assembly and then Provincial Assemblies. The latter, which first sat in 1909, were on an electoral basis, but the franchise was very limited, and the electoral college whose members were in turn chosen by the voters of the "Hsien" in a "Fu." Vinacke quotes Millard in "Our Far Eastern Question" as estimating that approximately $\frac{1}{35}$ of 1 per cent of the population of China constituted the electorate.¹

The powers of the Provincial Assemblies were strictly limited. They were to "act as places where the public opinion of the respective province may be ascertained. They shall deliberate as to what would seem beneficial for the province and shall advise their superiors of their opinions." "*The above shall be their principal function.*"²

The business that came before the Assemblies was placed

¹ The present writer met a leading Chinese official who was waiting to be civil governor of a province in 1923. The Chinese gentleman remarked that the Provincial Assembly needed re-electing. On being asked what the electorate consisted of he smilingly replied, "I have no idea—I haven't studied the question."

² Edict quoted by Vinacke, "Modern Constitutional Development in China," p. 71.

there by the governor, and their power of initiating was nil. They could, it is true, on matters concerning which an Assembly was at issue with the governor, ensure that the dispute be referred to Peking. But the limited powers of the National Assembly there sitting, offered slight hope of defeating the official point of view. The governor could question the Assembly in order to ascertain provincial opinion, but the Assembly could not question him; whilst he could dissolve the Assembly if they expressed sentiments likely to disturb the peace, or if they refused to agree with him after several adjournments, and if sufficient members did not attend the meetings.

Before discussing the National Assembly, there are several points in connexion with the Provincial Assemblies which require notice. From the date of their inauguration in 1909 these bodies proved of much greater importance than foreign observers thought would be likely, and—it is safe to assume—than the official class intended. In the first place they provided a rallying centre for those opposed to the Government, and, notwithstanding their limited powers, means were discovered by which considerable pressure could be brought on the administration. This was chiefly due to the fact that the Assemblies were places in which provincial opinion came to the front.

The importance of public opinion in China has already been commented on, and it was pointed out that the Government "exhausts the mandate from Heaven," and must make way for others so soon as the social conditions of the people become intolerably bad. The ultimate importance of "what the people think" was in the past as great as the channels for voicing public opinion were small. With the advent of the Provincial Assemblies a flood began to flow through the new outlets.

Further, the long eclipse in the minds of the Chinese gentry of the national point of view by the provincial point of view, a state of affairs from which arose the traditional decentralization of the administration, was another source of strength to the Assemblies. The Provincial Assemblies were not looked upon in the provinces as subordinate bodies to the National Assembly. They had the prestige of the present-day State Parliaments in Australia rather than that of the Provincial Councils in the Union of South Africa. In fact, when the National Assembly first met in 1910, and shortly proceeded to come into conflict with the old Council of State, it derived its chief support from the Provincial Assemblies. One curious and interesting development as a result of the birth of the Provincial Assemblies, was that the difficulties of centralizing the administrations of the country were not decreased, but actually increased, for where measures

aiming at control over provincial independence were introduced by Peking, opposition crystallized in the local assemblies. We shall see later how such opposition in regard to a centralized railway policy was a contributory cause to the outbreak of the rebellion.

The National Assembly and the programme of reform will now be described. On 27 August, 1908, the Empress Dowager published an Edict which announced her approval of "The principles of the Constitution" which had been laid before her by a board of officials appointed to consider the matter. The memorialists pointed out in their proposals that constitutions were of two kinds. Some had come from above and some from below, and they expressed the opinion that "The Parliament must grow out of the Constitution, not the Constitution out of the Parliament." "The Government of China is to be constitutional by Imperial decree. This is an unchangeable principle." And again they wrote: "The Constitution is designed to conserve the power of the sovereign and protect the officials and people."¹

The actual principles themselves, which were published in fourteen sections, faithfully interpreted the advice of the memorialists. The Emperor retained all legislative, judicial, and executive powers in his own hands; he controlled the Army and Navy; he made peace and declared war; he arranged the budget. In "Modern Constitutional Development in China" Mr. W. W. Rockhill—one-time American Minister in Peking—is quoted as holding the opinion that the object of the Imperial Government was "no other than a perpetuation of the existing system under a thin veil of constitutional guarantees."

Together with the "Principles of the Constitution" there was published a programme of nine years' development in which the progress to be made during each year was foreshadowed, and was to culminate in the assembly of a Parliament (see Appendix I). This system of steady annual progress over a decade during which the nation was to be educated up to the benefits of constitutional government, was borrowed from Japan, as we shall see when the examination of Japan's political development is resumed.

The inauguration of the Provincial Assemblies in 1909 has been described, and this innovation was followed by the establishment of the National Assembly, which first met in October, 1910.

The death of the great Empress Dowager and the Emperor

¹ Quoted from Vinacke, p. 76, from "American Foreign Relations," 1908. Incl. 1 in No. 1005, p. 192.

Kuang-Hsu within a few days of each other in October, 1908, had not officially affected the reforms, for the Regent—Prince Chun, who enjoyed a good public reputation—took particular pains to issue Edicts pledging the new Government in this respect. In the opinion of some authorities the length and humility of his Edicts cheapened the prestige of the Throne.¹

He certainly made one grave error when, in 1909, he dismissed Yuan Shi-kai from the central government. Yuan's high reputation with foreign Powers, his strength of character, and the fact that though progressive he was hostile to revolutionary movements made his departure a great loss of strength to Peking. His dismissal is ascribed to several causes. The most probable are that the Manchu officials were jealous of his influence and also that it was an act of revenge by the relations of the late Emperor Kuang-Hsu, who had never forgiven Yuan Shi-kai for the part he played in frustrating the *coup d'état* against the Empress Dowager in 1898. It was, therefore, in an atmosphere of uncertainty as to the real attitude of the central government that the National Assembly began its first session.

The Assembly was composed of 200 members, half of whom were appointed by the Emperor, from the Manchu, Chinese, Mongolian, and Tibetan nobility, the literati, the officials and the large taxpayers. The remaining hundred were elected from the Provincial Assemblies, the number from each Assembly varying with the size of the province, and being selected by the head of the province from a list submitted to him by the province. The president and vice-president of the Assembly were appointed by the Emperor. The functions of this Assembly, from which at the end of the "working up" period of nine years a National Parliament was to be formed, were strictly limited. Officially it was as restricted in a national sphere as were Provincial Assemblies in matters provincial. It had no control over the executive, though it could, in exceptional circumstances, impeach a Minister to the Throne. It could question Ministers, but the latter

¹ An example taken from one of several Edicts issued by the Prince Regent in the autumn of 1910 will illustrate the humble attitude of the Manchus as their position became more and more precarious: "*In Szechuan trouble first occurred, the Wuchang Rebellion followed. Now alarming reports came from Shensi and Honan. In Canton and Kiangsi riots appear. The whole Empire is seething, the minds of the people are perturbed, and the spirits of our nine Emperors are not able properly to enjoy the sacrifices made to them, while it is feared that the people will suffer grievously. All these things are my own fault. Hereby I announce to the world that I swear to reform . . . being a very small person standing at the head of my subjects, I see that my heritage is nearly falling to the ground. I regret my fault and repent greatly.*"

answered at their discretion. But, like the Provincial Assemblies, the new creation showed signs of becoming a Frankenstein's monster. It immediately gave evidence of being actively progressive, and agitated for a very substantial reduction in the time of nine years' preparation. It was successful within a month.

In November, 1910, an Edict was issued which promised that the National Parliament should be formed in 1913 instead of 1917 as previously foreshadowed. As an insight into the true feelings of the central government and the need they felt for "saving face," the wording of the Edict is instructive:—

*"There is no need for the high Ministers and the people to beg and pray. We ourselves have arrived at this conclusion . . . the shortening of the time limit is the result of taking the opinions of memorials from the Viceroy and Governors, and of the most careful counsel of the Princes and Ministers who have requested our decision."*¹

Encouraged by this partial success, the National Assembly girded up its loins and launched an attack on the Grand Council of State. The unconstitutional position of this body was insisted upon, and a Cabinet responsible to the Assembly was asked for. The Government appeared to give way, and in 1911 issued an Edict authorizing a Cabinet. In reality the concession was valueless, for the new "Cabinet" was nothing but the Council re-christened. The members of the "Cabinet" were the heads of the old boards, and they were only responsible to the Emperor by whom they were appointed. This was the situation when the long, simmering discontent in the provinces boiled over into the rebellion, as a result of which the Manchu dynasty passed into comfortable and even honourable retirement, whilst China entered upon the period of sporadic civil war and internal dissension which is still to-day (1924) permeating her system, completely arresting her political progress, and heavily retarding her commercial development.

The study of Japan's development was broken off at a point when the feudal system had been overthrown, the debris cleared up, the reaction dealt with, and the country, wide-eyed with surprise, was under the guidance of a few men of genius, beginning that astounding process of material development which is a wonder of the twentieth century.

By 1911, when China was about to enter a period of disorder comparable to, but much more prolonged and serious than the period in Japan immediately succeeding the downfall of the Shogunate, Japan was a great Power. She had been victor in two wars, and she dominated the Far East. It is, therefore, necessary, before continuing the account of Chinese affairs, to bring our minds up to date in regard to Japan.

¹ "China Year Book," 1912, pp. 372-73. Quoted by Vinacke.

CHAPTER IV

SYNTHETIC MANUFACTURE OF A GREAT POWER CALLED JAPAN

“As if increase of appetite had grown by what it fed on.”

—SHAKESPEARE

I

WE have seen that a small body of Japanese statesmen became aware of the fact that, if Japan was to maintain her position as an independent nation, it was necessary for her to be prepared to play a part on the stage of international politics. To fit her for this rôle, radical alterations were required in nearly every phase of her life, though it was principally in the material aspect that the contrast between Japan and the Occidental nations, by whom she was no longer ignored and whom she could no longer ignore, was strikingly violent. To the word “material” as used above, the writer wishes to attach a meaning more comprehensive than is strictly legitimate, for by it is meant, not only obviously material matters, such as trains, telegraphs, steamers, etc., but also the institutions which, though material in themselves, are closely connected with man’s intellectual activities. Such are, for example, the press, the judiciary, the legislature, and education. We have also noted how the Japanese leaders, having overthrown the Shogunate system of government, and skilfully revived the authority of the Emperor as a smoke-screen behind which they might prepare their tremendous transformation scene without stampeding the masses, had in many and diverse ways laid the foundation of modern Japan.

The next period, which chronologically falls roughly between the years 1880 and 1911, consisted in building up on the foundations which had been laid with such tremendous speed.

This process can be conveniently considered in four sections.

There was the development of government—and this will be treated in separate chapters. There was also the foreign policy of Japan which resulted from her new status and growing ambitions. This will be dealt with in two sections; one devoted to diplomacy, the other to war. Finally, there was her material

development in railways, steamers, and trade generally. This last-mentioned phase of development forms the fourth side to the Japanese House. It may, perhaps, be objected that this simile is a singularly poor one, in that a four-walled house without a roof would be most uncomfortable to live in. The reply to this objection is that there is a roof, and this is represented by the non-material development of modern Japan. Japan, like every other nation, has a culture and a soul. The chameleon-like changes through which she has passed during the last sixty years have profoundly affected her inner being as we shall see in due course, but until those material changes have been described and analysed, it would be a waste of time to attempt the much harder task of examining their effect upon the present state of Japan's spiritual ego. It is for this reason that attention for the time being will be concentrated on how her walls were raised up.

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF JAPAN (1880-1911)

II

During the period now to be reviewed, Japan's foreign policy has manifested itself in two directions. She has expanded territorially and she has won diplomatic recognition. In neither of these directions does it appear that her ambitions are as yet fully realized, but, at the beginning of this period, say about 1880, they had been scarcely formulated. On the one hand, Japan's dominion, either theoretical or practical, did not extend beyond the main islands, whilst, as regards diplomatic recognition, she laboured under the disadvantage of a tariff fixed by the Western Powers, whose nationals enjoyed extra-territorial rights in Japanese territory.

By 1911 Japan had progressed considerably towards the realization of her twin ambitions, for by this date Formosa had been added to her territories, Korea had been annexed, half Saghalien was hers, and she had succeeded to Russia's plunder in the shape of the South Manchurian sphere of influence. These territories, when added to the main islands, gave some dignity to the title of Japanese Empire. Along the other path she had also progressed. Extra-territoriality had been abolished and her tariff was autonomous. She was treated diplomatically with the respect due to her position as the most powerful nation in the East; even the British Empire had not disdained to conclude two alliances with the Empire of Japan. These two "uplifts" were naturally closely connected with each other, but, for

simplicity of treatment, it will be convenient to consider them separately.

Japan has progressed in her relations with foreign Powers either by the sword or by diplomacy. Sometimes diplomacy has worked openly with armed force and been the natural sequence to wars ; at other times it has been supported by the threat of force—though the most striking example of this use occurred subsequent to the period we are now reviewing¹—whilst on yet other occasions Japan has gained her ends diplomatically when the use of force was impossible. The purely diplomatic side of the picture will be considered first.

The first factor in foreign relations to engage the attention of the builders of modern Japan was the question of extra-territoriality and autonomous tariff. It was this question which, under the name of "capitulations," was one of the stumbling blocks between the Turks and the Allies at Lausanne in 1923, and in which matter Baron Hayashi, the Japanese delegate, advised the Turks to follow Japan's example.

When discussing Japanese relations with Occidental Powers at the time of her emergence from feudalism, it was pointed out that a number of treaties were signed between Japan and the foreign Powers between 1858, the date of the American and British treaties, and 1869, the date of the Austro-Hungarian treaty. These treaties, which conferred extra-territorial rights upon foreigners in civil and criminal proceedings in Japan and fixed Japan's tariff at a low rate, were drawn up to last for an indefinite period, and as the treaties were interdependent through the "most favoured nation clause" being common to all, they could not in legal theory be revised without the consent of all signatories. Concerning these treaties it is fair to make several observations. Firstly, they were to all intents and purposes forced on Japan, or, at all events, she was not in a position to do anything but accept them. Secondly, they were concluded at a time when the Japanese signatories had no experience of treaty-making with Western Powers or knowledge of the general relations between Western States. Thirdly and fourthly, whilst the low tariff dues were solely designed to benefit foreign trade, and might have been higher had the Powers shown a spirit of altruism which has never yet appeared in international dealings, the extra-territorial clauses were certainly necessary for the safety of foreigners in Japan. At the time when the treaties were concluded, the anti-foreign party had been guilty of a number of savage murders of foreigners, and the legal arrangements in Japan were

¹ The twenty-one demands on China, 1915.

entirely Oriental. Rightly or wrongly the Westerner favours his own punishments and judicial system, and has never willingly submitted to the peculiar code and punishments of Asiatic courts. Lastly, one may fairly say, and this contention has been supported by eminent Japanese, that as soon as the Japanese realized the inferior position in which they were placed by the agreements, the existence of the treaties acted as a sharp spur to progress.

The Japanese Government realized the true meaning of the treaties at a very early date, and, in 1871, a mission under Prince Ikawura visited America and England to ask for revision. Their visit was in vain. The next move took place in 1876, when America agreed to a new treaty, but this concession was more spectacular than practical, since it was only to come into force at the moment that the other Powers signed similar agreements. In 1882 a conference was held in Tokio to consider treaty revision, but it came to no conclusion. A second conference held in 1886 also collapsed, as did another one in 1889. In this last attempt, two new treaties were actually arranged between Japan on the one hand and America and Russia on the other, but when the conference failed—its failure being accompanied by an attempt on Okuma's life—these treaties were cancelled. In 1890 Great Britain made proposals which were distinctly favourable to Japan, but once again negotiations fell through.

The causes which resulted in these four attempts being abortive, were several. There was on each occasion much popular dissatisfaction at the idea of Japan having to negotiate at all to recover her full sovereignty, and the suggestion that foreign judges should participate in trials which concerned foreign defendants aroused a storm of passion. Secondly, there was, as we have already seen in our review of Japan's early constitutional government, a great deal of jealousy amongst the statesmen who controlled the Government. There is reason to believe that the personal desire to claim the credit of having secured treaty revision was, by some men, placed superior to the national advantages which revision would mean. Yamagata, the Choshu leader, was the main supporter of the agitation against the employment of foreign judges which was advocated at the conference of 1889 and supported by the Foreign Minister Okuma and the Premier Kuroda (Satsuma). When the conference broke down and an attempt was made to assassinate Okuma, Yamagata formed a Ministry. There was also a feeling that Japan should propose the terms of the new treaties and not have them placed before her for acceptance. That the Japanese attached considerable importance to this matter of amour-propre would seem to be confirmed by the fact that two years later (1894) they

approached the British Government with proposals for a new treaty which differed only in detail from that one which Lord Salisbury had offered them in 1890. This treaty was accepted by England, and was to come into force in 1899 so that other Powers might have time to imitate it. The treaty abolished consular jurisdiction, raised the tariff, and was eventually to lead to complete tariff autonomy. The British Government did not escape criticism over the new treaty; it was vigorously opposed by British nationals in Japan, the bulk of whom professed little confidence¹ in the new Japanese codes, and it met with similar opposition from the China merchants, who saw in it a dangerous menace to the extra-territoriality they enjoyed in China. However, the British Cabinet was taking a broader view. It was obvious to anyone, save, perhaps, the most narrow-minded residents in the Far East, that treaty revision was bound to come sooner or later, and it was equally obvious that a distinct gain in prestige would accrue to the nation which first satisfied Japan in this respect. Great Britain's position as the premier trading nation in the Far East made it doubly necessary that she should not allow another nation to seize the initiative in so important a matter.

By 1899 the majority of treaties between Japan and the European Powers had been revised, and in the respect of sovereignty she was on all fours with any Power in the world. She had, however, undergone an experience after the Sino-Japanese War which convinced her that something more tangible than revised treaties was necessary before she could claim to speak with effect in the world, for it was after this war that Russia, France, and Germany made their famous intervention by which they barred Japan from expansion in South Manchuria.²

This humiliation was much felt in Japan, and had its reaction in the immediate efforts which were made to strengthen the Japanese Army and Navy in preparation for the next conflict, and in the conclusion of the first Anglo-Japanese alliance. It is now necessary to consider the expansion of Japan as a result of war between the period of 1880-1911, but before doing so, mention should be made of two other incidents of Japan's diplomatic progress, of which part falls within this period. The problem first came to the front in 1906 and 1907 when disputes were in progress between Japan and Canada on emigration, and between Japan and the United States of America on the question of Japanese

¹ A lack of confidence, which is still being justified to-day (1923), e.g. the Nyhus case at Kobe in 1923.

² See p. 39.

children being admitted to the public schools. This racial question¹ not only still affects the American continent, but also touches Australia. The second incident was the denunciation, in 1910, of the revised treaties of 1889, which had been fixed for twelve years, subject to a year's notice. The new treaties of 1911, also for twelve years, gave Japan complete tariff autonomy.

TERRITORIAL EXPANSION

III

Between 1880 and 1911 Japan fought and won two wars. In each she startled the world. At the end of each she did not rest upon her laurels but immediately enlarged her armed forces.

The territorial growth of the Japanese Empire during this period has been in accordance with two guiding principles. Whether these principles have been clear-cut in the minds of her rulers, or whether those who have directed her policy have been the unconscious victims of circumstances, is a question which cannot be answered with certainty. If an answer be attempted, then one might hazard a guess that Japan's policy has been a mixture of design and chance, one thing leading to another; to this guess a fact can be added. It is that since the Restoration, Japan has been controlled by men who are the lineal and mental successors of the military aristocracy which was supreme in the land during the centuries of feudalism.

The two principles are as follows:—

- (a) The formation of a barrier off the east coast of Asia.
- (b) The political and economical control of the area within the enclave so formed.

As early as 1805 Japan was sending expeditions to the Island of Saghalien and the Kurile group, impelled to this action by fear of the Russians, who, by this time, had reached the Eastern Siberian coast. In 1875 the Japanese, who certainly had better claims to Saghalien than had the Russians, were obliged to abandon the island in order to secure from Russia an acknowledgment of Japanese sovereignty over the Kuriles. This convention temporarily closed a long-standing Russo-Japanese dispute, but it left Japan with the northern end of her barrier in alien hands.

The southern end of this barrier, consisting of the Loochow group of islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, was under Chinese sovereignty. In 1879 the Loochow group was annexed by Japan. It cannot be said that China ever evinced any great interest in these islands, and they stood in their relationship to

¹ For further discussion see Chapter XV.

Peking much as did the other outlying dependencies which at this time were being detached from China.¹ With the possession of these islands,² Japan secured a further section in her barrier.

Fifteen years later the Sino-Japanese War took place. Its principal cause was connected with the second principle which has been mentioned, viz. Japanese influence on the Asiatic coast inside the barrier, in this case the particular area being Korea. Here we have an instance of the mixture of design and circumstance which has been referred to. It is probably not correct, or, at all events, it is not right, without proof, to say that in 1894 Japan had definite designs on the integrity of Korea. This proof is lacking.

It is probable that Japan realized that her safety was intimately connected with the question of who controlled Korea. To employ a modern phrase recently used by Japanese statesmen in connexion with Manchuria, Japan had a special interest in Korea by virtue of "geographical propinquity." There were, moreover, historical grounds for these interests. It was from the Korean ports and across the narrow gut of Tsushima that Kublai Khan's great gathering of junks had sailed on their invasion of Japan. To be impartial one must also note that Hideyoshi had quite unwarrantably invaded Korea in 1592 during his grandiose attempt to war with China, and that for several years Japanese troops had devastated the Hermit Kingdom until Korean sea power had forced them to withdraw, leaving behind them a legacy of hatred which endures to-day. M. J. Bau³ quotes a Japanese diplomat as saying in the "Kolnische Zeitung" of 25 July, 1894: "This, at least, I can tell you for certain: we neither can nor will leave Korea until our aim has been obtained in one way or another. We are fighting in Korea for our own future—I might also say, for our own independence. Once let Korea fall into the hands of a European Power, and our independence will be threatened."

The Japanese had good reasons to suspect Russia's intentions in the Far East, and in 1894 the lessons of the previous twenty years went to show that China was singularly helpless in resisting attacks on her dependencies, of which Korea was a shadowy example. It was evident to the Government of Japan that some nation was bound to control Korea, and if this was so it had best be Japan.

Apart from the Korean *casus belli*, there was another reason which certainly exercised some influence in favour of war so far

¹ *Vide* p. 27.

² The Satsuma daimios had long claimed the over-lordship of this group.

³ "The Foreign Relations of China," p. 33.

as Japan was concerned. In 1894 Japan had just succeeded in obtaining the consent of one Power—Great Britain—to the revision of the treaties.¹ Five years were to elapse before this treaty came into force, a period in which other nations were to be persuaded to adopt England's liberal attitude. Was it not likely that a successful war against a great Oriental Power would assist to establish Japan's claim to being a race superior? It must have appeared to the Japanese Government, as was in fact the case, that judged by Western standards, a nation's social standing in the world was largely determined by her military strength. That Japan intended to show that henceforward she was in a different social position from the Chinese is demonstrated by the fact that Article Six of the Treaty of Shimoneseki laid down that all existing treaties between Japan and China were amended, and new ones would be drawn up, based on "the treaties, conventions, and regulations now subsisting between China and the European Powers." This placed Japan on a level with the other treaty Powers in China, and gave her nationals extra-territorial rights in that country. Territorially, Japan, as victor, demanded and received the Liaotung Peninsula in Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, but she had over-reached herself and omitted to allow for the jealous hostility which any social circle evinces towards the newcomer. The tri-partite intervention of Russia, Germany, and France forced her to relinquish Liaotung, but she retained Formosa and the Pescadores. The barrier from the Pescadores to the Kuriles was complete; there remained for future achievement the completion of the barrier through Saghalien, and the development of control of the area within the chain of Japanese territory which lay like a girdle round the Central and North China coasts.

The successful issue of the Sino-Japanese War had a great effect in Japan,² and it was from this time onward that the militarist element amongst the governing classes began to exercise increasing influence. In reality they were openly resuming that position in the country which they had held in feudal days and which the samurai class had never willingly abandoned. Under the guise of a quasi-constitutional government the methods were different but the results were the same. The chief of the militarists was Yamagata,³ a Choshu clansman, who died a prince,

¹ See p. 60.

² Its influence in China, though less easy to determine, was also far-reaching. The reform movements of 1898 owed much of their impulse to the results of this war.

³ His first great discovery was the fact that levies recruited from the common people, when officered by samurai, could defeat the flower of the

the last of the original "Elder Statesmen," in 1922. In many ways this soldier-politician was the Bismarck of Japan. He it was who had introduced conscription to Japan, and his life-work was the fostering of Japan's military strength and the strengthening of bureaucracy. A close personal friend of the Emperor, his influence rivalled that of Ito, and it was Yamagata who was selected to pacify the indignation of the Army when the tri-partite intervention robbed Japan of some of the fruits of victory. This accomplished—and he was probably the only man who could have succeeded in the task—he went to St. Petersburg to negotiate with Russia and obtain an acknowledgment of Japan's interests in Korea. He was partially successful, but it is probable that all the time he considered a conflict with Russia inevitable. His rival, Ito, is known to have favoured and worked for a peaceful solution of the conflicting interests between the two Powers. In 1898, Yamagata formed his second Ministry,¹ and armaments were expanded, for, the Army being particularly his own child, was practically in the hands of Choshu men—a complexion it still retains to-day.²

The diplomatic negotiations which succeeded the Boxer outbreak³ proved, if any proof were necessary, that Russia's ambitions in the East were still at full tide. It is still uncertain to what extent the militarists forced the hands of the peace party in declaring war, but it is certain that many of the latter were apprehensive of the result. Since the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese standing Army had been doubled and its reserves trebled; the Navy had been enlarged and modernized, whilst the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 had been signed, thus guarding against the disaster of a second unfriendly intervention in the event of a Japanese victory, and guaranteeing that the ring would be held during the war. Furthermore, the political situation in Russia was known to be in a very unstable condition, and Yamagata considered that a trial of strength could safely be made.

Into the immediate causes of the war, such as the Russian timber concessions on the Yalu River, and her refusal to evacuate the second zone in South Manchuria, it is not necessary to enter. So long as Japan and Russia both desired dominance in the same area, war was inevitable. Japan fought a "limited war" with considerable skill and secured her objects.

Satsuma fighting men. He discovered this at the time of the Satsuma rebellion, and forthwith began to create a national Army.

¹ See p. 133.

² The Navy is "Satsuma." As a naval officer told the present writer, "Anyone can get *into* the Navy, but you have to be Satsuma to get *on*."

³ See p. 46.

At the Treaty of Portsmouth, Russia recognized the paramount nature of Japan's political, military, and economic interests in Korea; she also transferred to Japan her lease from China of the Liaotung Peninsula which contained Port Arthur and Dalny; likewise the ownership of the southern half of the South Manchurian Railway from Changchun to Port Arthur passed to Japan. Russia also ceded the southern half of Saghalien.

Thus, as a result of this war, Japan had almost completed the barrier from the Pescadores to the north end of Saghalien. Within the fence she had also accomplished a good deal towards the realization of her second ambition, for, in South Manchuria, she had succeeded to the Russian position, and in Korea she was left with a free hand. We shall here leave the consideration of Japan's expansion. Her policy in Korea which led to the annexation of that country in 1910 will be dealt with when we come to the relations between Japan and the Koreans at the present time; her expansion in South Manchuria is also a question which is best studied in connexion with recent events and present policies, and will be dealt with elsewhere.

QUI S'EXCUSE, S'ACCUSE

IV

At the beginning of this chapter I hinted, in fact as good as promised, that I would examine the growth of modern Japan from several points of view; one of these was that which is directed towards her material development, but now, having reached the stage of spreading out before me the informative Year Books, the Commercial Supplements, the Commercial Guide Books, the official reports of trade and such-like heart-breaking stuff, I revolt. Let it be said without further excuse that sheer laziness has played its part in making me rebel, and, this admitted, I will now proceed to advance a whole series of excellent and irrefutable reasons for the omission from this book of any attempt to compress into a chapter an account of the present state of Japan's material development.

Firstly, it is all displayed so categorically in the above-mentioned literature. Secondly, it is in a state of constant change, and in such matters only up-to-date information is of much value. Thirdly, anyone with a little imagination at his disposal can visualize the material state of Japan by imagining what Western civilization is like when it is tremendously State-controlled and has only been used by a people for half a century. Tokio is an

excellent mirror in which to look for a reflection of Japan. In this capital city, large limousines plough their way through inches of mud or dust in the main streets. When it rains, many of the inhabitants wear sea-boots, and it is quite easy to find a pool of mud, after rain, six inches deep in a road corresponding in importance in Tokio to, say, Regent Street in London. A strange mixture of architecture rises on every side. Great banks and offices (hopefully earthquake-proof), worthy of New York and London stand without a pavement in front of them, whilst, clustered round about these ferro-concrete giants, are the thousands of little ground-floor native houses whose numbers are annually reduced by devastating fires. A Londoner would be indignant if he met a man at 4 p.m. pulling a hand-cart with twelve tubs on it down Piccadilly; the tubs leaking steadily; the tubs containing human household sewage. In Tokio this is the sanitary scheme. Likewise at Yokohama, Osaka, Kobe, etc. There is a scandalously inefficient telephone service, whose wooden poles in Tokio lean over at astonishing angles and are held up by odd bits of wire. The municipality is notoriously corrupt, and a very few years ago an inquirer in the Diet asked whether the municipal meetings were being held in the Tokio prison, owing to the large number of councillors who were then locked up. Middle-aged and elderly Americans declare that Tokio is in a certain well-recognized state of development familiar to residents in the West of America who have seen towns grow up. To an Englishman, Japan is rather bewildering. At first glance he sees what appears to be a kind of an American-English type of civilization which seems quite understandable. Gradually he discovers that it is only working at 50 per cent efficiency, and that, from his standpoint of comfort and convenience, he must adjust himself to a degree of modernity and efficiency comparable to that existent in, say, the less developed areas of Spain. The plain fact is that the Japanese have not yet had time to understand the object and inner workings of half the pretty toys they have imported from the West. They have imported many of them, not because they felt their need, but because they were the indispensable attributes of Westernization; and one of the results of this fact is that the only way to get the Western machinery to work at all is to control it in all its ramifications by officialdom, which means bureaucracy, monopolies, and graft. Gradually a change for the better is taking place, as the people begin to use Western materialism—motor-cars, beds, telephones, hotels, commercial methods, clothes (the Japanese taste in European clothes is simply frightful; in Tokio there is a public statue of a man in a frock coat and a bowler hat), for the

sake of the things themselves and not because it is the thing to do. But at present there is much chaos. From certain artistic points of view, the material Westernization of Japan is to be regretted, but it seems inevitable. In the present state of world development, Western civilization is predominant, and its adoption is a necessary condition of national life; nor need it be harmful in its influence, provided that in the future it develops along lines which lead to the increase of comfort amongst human beings, and their co-operation in such matters as legitimate commerce and the waging of war against disease which is alike the enemy of West and East. It is in its cruder manifestations, when the combative spirit in man takes for the gratification of its impulses the science of the West, that Western materialism has been a curse and not a blessing, which reflection brings us again to the words written at the head of the introduction to this book: "The Universe is Change; our life is what our thoughts make it." And in Japan,¹ the ultimate result of overlaying a culture and civilization copied from the Chinese with a lacquer of Western manufacture will depend in the end on the thoughts of the people.

V

The preceding section had only been written for a few months when there occurred the appalling earthquake and fire which destroyed Yokohama and caused immense damage and loss of life in Tokio. The writer was in the devastated area a few days after the event, and the destruction was certainly terrific, and it would be difficult to exaggerate its comprehensiveness. With a courage which well illustrates the unconquerable spirit of man even when pitted against forces he can hardly hope to discount and certainly not control, the Japanese at once began to make plans for the rebuilding of their capital city. It is already apparent that the opportunity is to be taken to eradicate the anomalies which characterized old Tokio; it also seems probable that Yokohama will grow again but in a new manner. The silk export will continue to sail from Yokohama because the Government wills it so, and also because of its geographical position relative to the silk-producing areas. In other respects I anticipate that Yokohama will become the Tilbury of Tokio; a shipping centre. The small foreign concerns at Yokohama will disappear, the large ones will have their head offices at Tokio. A great deal

¹ By Japan is meant the large towns and manufacturing districts. In the mountains, in Hokkaido and the extreme south, districts can yet be found which are still almost "Old Japan."

of speculation has taken place in regard to the effect of this earthquake on the international position of Japan. The general opinion seems to be that it has much weakened the country; from this view I dissent. At first glance it seems rather absurd to say that so large a destruction of material wealth does not weaken a country, but in considering nations it is fallacious to draw analogies from private individuals or large firms. In the present case Japan has lost about 110,000 lives, and with her present birth-rate this loss is negligible. She has lost a great deal of material in the shape of houses, factories, etc., but a great deal of this material would in any case have been replaced in the next decade. Thousands of individuals have been ruined in the devastated area, but the credit of the country is absolutely sound. The disaster is going to be paid for by Japanese as yet unborn, and I doubt whether the payment made by the present generation will have any effect at all upon the general standard of living throughout Japan. The Japanese will probably have to raise a large foreign loan, and they will find it cheaper to do this than to borrow all the reconstruction money in the home market, but the amount they will have to borrow should not exceed £100,000,000, and the interest on this sum will not break or even strain the Japanese taxpayer. Owing to the Washington Conference, the naval estimates are relieved of much expense up to 1931. Had the Eight and Eight programme been carried out, millions of yen would have been raised and spent on the Navy, and if this could have been done, and it certainly would have been done, in the name of national necessity, then a portion of this money can be spent on national reconstruction.

CHAPTER V
CHINA IN TRAVAIL

"Doomed for a certain term to walk the night."
—SHAKESPEARE

I

THE account of Chinese affairs was left at a period when the Manchu dynasty was struggling to avert the long overdue rebellion. We have measured the length of the strides Japan was taking during the years which witnessed the prolonged twilight of the Imperial rule in China, and it is now time to describe the events which accompanied the actual eclipse of the Manchus, a phenomenon which plunged China into the darkness of a night whose end is not yet definitely in sight, though many persons believe the dawn to be near at hand.

A study of Chinese history¹ clearly shows that the many revolutions which have, in the past, overthrown ruling dynasties, have been caused by similar circumstances.

Although the Chinese theory of government considered that the supreme power was vested in the Emperor, whose sanctity² may be judged from the fact that, as Mr. Clennel remarks in explaining the origin of Nien Hao or Reign-Name: "In Chinese documents, names of Emperors, whether personal or posthumous, require to be raised, honorifically, to the top of a fresh column of print or writing, or even to two or three places above the margin, wherever they occur."

Yet even the Emperor was but the Son of Heaven. Above him was Heaven, the supreme power to which he sacrificed and offered worship on behalf of the nation, and it was from Heaven

¹ One of the best of such histories, suitable for a reader who desires a general outline of China's history and does not know or care much about Chinese characters and minute details of internecine struggles, has been written by Mr. W. J. Clennel. It is unfortunately still in manuscript.

² Compare the theocratic position of the Chinese Emperor with that of the Emperor in Japan. See Chapter XIII, "Shinto." The Japanese conception is, of course, derived, like most of their art, culture, and political theories from Chinese sources.

that he obtained his mandate to rule. He was but an agent, although one of celestial rank. Should he misuse his power, Heaven would visit displeasure upon the nation in the guise of famine, floods, riots, and disturbances. The accumulation of such trials would eventually convince a section of the nation of the fact that the existing dynasty had "exceeded its instructions." The agent was being abandoned by his principals. In these circumstances, when a leader was thrown up from the people, rebellion broke out and the dynasty fell. This victorious leader then "received a mandate from Heaven" and founded a dynasty which, in its turn, lasted for so long as it enjoyed public confidence.

Thus rose and fell all Chinese dynasties—the Han, the Sui, the T'ang, the Sung, the Mongol, the Ming, and the Manchu dynasties. From the second century B.C. to 1911, the same causes appear, disappear, and re-appear, but I cannot resist the temptation to interject the reflection that the Chinese nation, as a social organism, apparently goes on for ever.

In many ways the 1911 revolution was no exception to precedent, but in some respects it had original features; here, for the first time, we find amongst the causes of the upheaval, intellectual effects produced by an alien and Western civilization. The foreign-educated revolutionaries from Canton, with their anti-monarchical views as opposed to the anti-dynasty attitude, are a new factor in Chinese history. It was also a comparatively bloodless revolution. Manchus to the number of some 10,000 were slaughtered at Sianfu, and a considerable number were slain at Wuchang and Foochow, but these are negligible numbers in comparison to the 25-40 million victims of the unsuccessful Taiping rebellion (1849-66) and the 12 million deaths which occurred during the revolt of the Yunnan Mohammedans (1858-74).

The immediate cause of the revolution is generally considered to have been the opposition of the provinces, and especially Szechuan,¹ to a decree of 9 May, 1911, which announced that in future all trunk railways would be built by the central government. This was contrary to provincial opinion for two reasons. Firstly, it removed from them sources of revenue, both illicit and legitimate; secondly, it transferred the financial gains to the notoriously sticky fingers of one Sheng Hsuan-huai, the Minister of Railways. The revolution was also hastened by the "rights recovery movement," which, especially in the treaty ports, was increasing in strength, and by the fact that the Manchu

¹ Szechuan—secure in its Western remoteness, and buttressed by an exceptionally clearly defined provincial opinion—has always carried the rule of Peking very casually on its shoulders.

dynasty was identified in the public minds with famine, revolts, and high taxation. Of these various circumstances, the Southern Republicans made full use, and were able to employ for the overthrow of the dynasty, men of various shades of opinion who were certainly not subscribers to the principle that the monarchical regime as such had outlived its day in China.

The rapidity with which the revolution spread (between 20 October and 2 December eleven provinces renounced allegiance to the central government) thoroughly unnerved the Prince Regent, and, as early as 14 October, Yuan Shi-kai was hastily recalled from his retirement, and appointed viceroy at Hankow—a centre of dissatisfaction. As the situation became increasingly critical, Yuan was summoned to Peking and appointed President, in the hope that he could at least save the dynasty from the ruins of the crash.

It is unnecessary to describe the military operations which ensued. They were unimportant, desultory, and, so far as the crisis was concerned, the issue of engagements had little effect. By the end of 1911 an armistice was declared and a conference arranged between the two parties. On the one side there were ranged the Imperial family, the Manchus, and Yuan Shi-kai. On the other side were the representatives of the rebellious provinces and the Cantonese party (the Tung-meng Hui¹ leaders). Of the latter, Wu Ting-fang and Sun Yat-sen were the most important. It was soon apparent that the direction of the revolution was in the hands of the Cantonese, and the fate of the monarchical system was therefore a foregone conclusion.

There is no doubt that, had it been possible, Yuan would have saved the dynasty. He publicly said: "If the dynasty were overthrown, all interests would suffer, and for several decades there will be no peace." As one contemplates the state of affairs in China to-day (1924), it would be hard to find a more striking example of human prescience.

His efforts on behalf of the dynasty were rendered nugatory by three causes. First, the weakness and lethargy of the members of the Imperial family, who even at this critical moment in the fortunes of their House, were quarrelling amongst themselves as to supremacy. Secondly, Yuan was hampered by the fact that the revolutionaries enjoyed a large amount of sympathy and moral support from the foreign Powers, which the Tung-meng Hui leaders obtained as the fruit of an exceedingly able propaganda they carried on from Shanghai. Lastly, Yuan was compelled

¹ Party formed by Sun Yat-sen when in exile in Tokio. Its members were chiefly foreign-educated students.

to modify his attitude by the action of the Imperial delegate at the Shanghai Conference, where this gentleman, T'ang Shao-yi by name, began to speak and act as if he were a Republican.

The delegates to the conference, who came from the seceding provinces, proceeded to elect Sun Yat-sen provisional President of the Chinese Republic, whereupon Sun departed to Nanking,¹ in which city he selected an official residence. T'ang Shao-yi resigned his appointment at this stage in the proceedings and openly joined the revolutionary party.

It was soon apparent to Yuan that the dynasty was doomed, and that for the time it was necessary to bow to the storm and accept the Republic. He therefore concentrated his efforts in obtaining generous terms for the Imperial family as the price of abdication, and these terms were readily granted by the rebels. This achieved, Yuan negotiated with the Southern leaders in order to form a Government which should carry on the administration when the Emperor abdicated. Sun Yat-sen, with an unselfishness which, as far as available evidence goes, was, notwithstanding the hard things since said of him by various foreign experts, a perfectly genuine gesture, resigned the presidency in order to make way for Yuan Shi-kai.

On 12 February, 1912, the Empress Dowager² issued, on behalf of the boy Emperor, an edict of abdication, and the Manchu dynasty passed into a retirement which, if not exactly honourable, is, at all events, extremely comfortable.

The Republic of China came into being with a great leader, Yuan Shi-kai, as its first President, and with T'ang Shao-yi, by birth a Cantonese, as its Premier.³

Yuan Shi-kai was far from being on a bed of roses, and a lesser man would have collapsed before the terrible difficulties which confronted him. He was faced with the following problems: First and foremost, there was the question of finance, a problem which was to hang like a millstone round his neck during the four years of his presidency. During the year preceding his accession to office, the fiscal arrangements of the country had become thoroughly disorganized. The land was swarming

¹ There were historical and sentimental reasons for this choice, as Nanking had been the capital city in pre-Manchu days.

² Not to be confused with "Old Buddha," who had died three years previously.

³ T'ang performed yeoman service in bribing various Southern leaders to agree to Yuan Shi-kai's presidency. The funds came from the proceeds of an Anglo-Belgian loan of 1½ millions. In 1912, T'ang's political enemies called upon him to account for this money. An attempt was made on his life and he sought shelter in a treaty port.

with troops, of whom the larger number were much in arrears of pay. For several months at the latter end of 1911 no contributions whatsoever had been paid into the central treasury by the provinces. Money was a prime necessity.

Yuan Shi-kai was also aware of the fact that he was personally far from agreeable to the majority of the Southern leaders. He and they had definitely parted ways during the reform movement of 1898, and his last-hour defence of the dynasty in 1911 showed that, though the circumstances might oblige him to wear a Republican coat, yet at heart he was a monarchist. The Republicans, ever suspicious of the Peking atmosphere, insisted on Nanking being the future capital, this town on the Yangtze being selected as a compromise between Canton and Peking. The President agreed to the change, but managed to avoid carrying it into effect, his excuse being that mutinies were taking place amongst the troops at Peking, and the change must be postponed until discipline had been restored.¹

Additional to his internal difficulties, Yuan Shi-kai was embarrassed during the first years of his régime by foreign complications. Though, chronologically, some of the events occurred subsequent to matters which have not yet been described it is convenient to consider them at this juncture.

The two chief offenders from the Chinese point of view were Russia and Japan. Russia took advantage of the troubled waters to fish for advantage in Mongolia and Manchuria. When the Republic was declared in 1911, the princes of outer and inner Mongolia declared their independence and threw off the Chinese yoke, whereupon fighting took place between Chinese troops and the Mongols, the latter enjoying Russian diplomatic support. In the autumn of 1912 an agreement was signed between Russia and Mongolia, or, at all events, with persons posing as representing the Mongolian people, by virtue of which Mongolia became something difficult to distinguish from a Russian Protectorate. This agreement caused a great deal of resentment in China, torn though she was by domestic strife, and, as a result of diplomatic negotiations in 1913, China regained something, but not much, of her old position in Mongolia. In Northern Manchuria Russia was also aggressive. She delivered an ultimatum to China on 24 March, 1911, concerning a Manchurian frontier dispute, and China had to give in; the Treaty of Tsitsihar in December, 1911, registered her submission.

¹ It is generally considered that these mutinies were staged by Yuan Shi-kai.

Japan was at heart hostile¹ to the Republic, and there is reason to believe that at one time she contemplated interference on behalf of the monarchy, but her active hostility did not materialize for some time.

Lastly, it may be noted that in Thibet, China had trouble. The Thibetans took advantage of the revolution of 1911 to drive out the Chinese garrison. Yuan's operations to recover the dependency brought him into hostility with Great Britain, which country, for reasons connected with Indian defence, desired to see an independent Thibet.

During the first year of Yuan Shi-kai's presidency, he was in no position to combat the extreme Republicans, all his energies being devoted to getting the machinery of government into some semblance of working order. The wheels were chiefly rust-bound due to lack of financial lubrication, and the President struggled desperately with the Powers and the banking group in his efforts to raise money.² So urgent was his necessity that attempts were made to borrow in various quarters which were competing with the more or less official Sextuple group of Government-supported financiers. Notable instances of this behaviour were the attempted Belgian loan of 14 March, 1912, and the famous Crisp loan for 10 million pounds of 30 August, 1912. These actions on the part of China—perhaps excusable in view of the urgency of her situation—were indefensible in law, and brought upon her the hostility of the all-powerful Sextuple group. Though she raised a little money by these desperate expedients, the floating of the big loan, which was so imperative to her stability, was further postponed.

Meanwhile the political situation was developing. In April, 1912, an advisory council had been convened as a stop-gap in the representation of the country until the elections for a Parliament could be held. On this council the Tung-meng Hui (Sun Yat-sen's Radical party) were in a majority. The Radicals at once began to obstruct Yuan Shi-kai's policy, and it was by them that the campaign against T'ang Shao-yi was engineered. The President—always a fighter—accepted the challenge, and, secure in the knowledge that he enjoyed the support of the provincial military leaders (the Tuchuns) with their armies, he threatened to use force against the refractory delegates.

December, 1912, to January, 1913, witnessed the elections for the Provincial and National Assemblies under the laws

¹ This statement needs modification to the extent that certain influences in Japan, hopeful of large concessions from the Republican leaders, were prepared to support them on these terms.

² See p. 76.

promulgated by the National Council at Nanking in August, 1912.¹

For the purpose of these elections the Tung-meng Hui combined with certain other Liberal parties of lesser importance, and the Kuo-min Tang (Nationalist party²) was born. By monstrous corruption the Kuo-min Tang obtained a majority in both the Provincial and National Assemblies.

The Provincial Assemblies met in January, and their hostility to the President was so obvious that he felt impelled to issue to them a severe warning. He accompanied his words with deeds, attempting, not always with success, to appoint men of his own choice to high provincial posts, thus resuscitating the old theory that the patronage of the country was administered from Peking. Though the President's action was arbitrary, yet, by the terms of the Nanking Constitution, Yuan Shi-kai was within his rights in disposing of high offices.

In March, Sung Chiao-jen, the very able leader of the Kuo-min Tang party and a thorn in Yuan Shi-kai's flesh, was assassinated in Shanghai, and it was generally believed that the President was implicated in this crime, a suspicion which served to increase the animosity of Yuan Shi-kai's enemies.

The National Assembly, with a Kuo-min Tang majority, which met in Peking on 8 April, 1913, was bitterly hostile to the President. They carried this antagonism to such a pitch that the two Houses refused to allow Yuan Shi-kai's secretary to read them a congratulatory message, nor was the President able to attend the inaugural ceremonies, as his reception would probably have been discourteous. The proceedings of the National Assembly were not such as to reflect great credit on its members.³

Weeks were expended in wrangling over the question of the appointment of Speakers; the attendance of members was irregular; and the chief constructive work carried to a conclusion was a decision that members should receive a salary of four thousand dollars (about £400) a year.

¹ For details of the Provisional Constitution see "Modern Constitutional Development in China," pp. 141-47.

² The official programme of the Kuo-min Tang was as follows: (1) To protect and uphold a strong and united government and to organize a system of centralization. (2) To promote local government and self-government as necessary for a Republic, so as to be able to mend the deficiencies of the central government. (3) To promote racial unity in China. (4) Improve standard of living and develop resources in China. (5) Cultivation of friendly feelings with foreign Powers. See also Appendix VI, Chinese Political Parties.

³ For an opposite view see "The Fight for the Republic in China," by Putnam Weale.

Of the political situation at this time, Vinacke writes: "The majority of the members of the Parliament, the Kuo-Ming members, as well as others, were struggling against the dominance of Yuan Shi-kai, not solely or mainly because of their desire to preserve free government. In considerable part they were actuated by the desire to prevent the President from leaving them out in the distribution of offices and the spending of the public money. Votes were for sale openly in Peking before the convocation of the Assembly, and it was largely because the spoils were going to Northerners instead of Southerners that the Kuo-min Tang so constantly opposed the Government. Parliamentary government was desirable in the eyes of many political leaders because it created an opportunity for a greater number to participate in the disposal of patronage and the disbursement of the State Revenue than was the case under monarchical rule."

The self-seeking salary resolution stood in striking contrast to the laboured efforts the President was making to raise money for the administration of the country, whose financial condition was going from bad to worse.

All temporary sources of supply having either dried up, or else been cut off by the influence of the Sextuple Group (Britain, Germany, Russia, France, Japan, and the United States), the President was eventually obliged to make the best terms he could with the Six Power Banks. This condition was reached in April, 1913. As a matter of fact the group at this time was a Five Power Group, since the United States of America had withdrawn from the syndicate as the American Government considered that the conditions of control on which the group insisted in return for a loan, were of such a nature that they conflicted with the traditional American policy of non-interference with Chinese sovereign rights.¹

Suddenly Sun Yat-sen, who, though the founder of the Kuo-min Tang, had so far supported Yuan Shi-kai, changed his attitude. He declared that if the President signed the loan agreement without first referring it to the National Assembly, all the provinces south of the Yangtze would secede. Yuan Shi-kai knew that to submit the loan agreement to Parliament was tantamount to ensuring its rejection, for the Kuo-min Tang held that the terms of the loan were wholly unacceptable infringements on China's sovereign rights.

Viewed in the light of the more liberal attitude towards China which at present—1924—seems to govern the actions of foreign Powers (whatever may be the inner opinions of Cabinets)

¹ President Wilson stigmatized the terms as obnoxious to the principles of the American Government.

the terms were severe. But it must be remembered that in those days no Great War had opened the eyes of millions to the futility of much of that international rivalry which, in 1913, seemed of great consequence. Self-determination was an expression yet unborn. Above all, it was a case for China of needs must when the devil drives.

A big loan was essential. Given the money, Yuan Shi-kai was confident that he could crush opposition to his policy, so he defied his enemies, and upon 27 April signed what is generally known as the "Reorganization Loan" for 25 million pounds.

On 2 May, Yuan Shi-kai received important moral support in the formal recognition of his Government by the United States of America. The other Powers decided to await events. Once again the U.S.A. played a lone hand in her dealings with China.

Within two months a rebellion broke out in the Yangtze Valley, organized by office-seekers whose hatred for Yuan Shi-kai was largely based on the fact that they were disappointed in their hopes. These men were supported by the majority of the Kuo-min Tang party. The rebels failed to appreciate that Yuan Shi-kai controlled the secret of success in the shape of the proceeds of the Reorganization Loan, and he experienced no difficulty in crushing the outbreak, which, so far as fighting was concerned, was *opéra bouffe*. This accomplished, the President was now in a position to deal faithfully with his Kuo-min Tang enemies.

The connexion between this party and the suppressed revolution was established. Some of the extreme Radicals had bolted from Peking when the rebellion broke out, but others remained and foolishly continued their obstructionist tactics. These men were arrested. A fresh Cabinet—entirely Conservative—was appointed, and the Assembly, being now thoroughly in hand, Yuan Shi-kai decided to hold the election for President. He was at the time theoretically *provisional* President. At the third vote he was confirmed in office for five years, and the Powers recognized his Government.

This matter disposed of, Yuan Shi-kai proceeded to exploit his triumph. In November the Kuo-min Tang was proclaimed, and its members declared incapable of sitting in either the Provincial or National Parliaments. These institutions were not to live long. Already they could not sit through inability to form a quorum, as the proclamation of the Kuo-min Tang had unseated 313 members. Their doom was foreshadowed in the announcement at the end of November that a Council of State of 71 members was to be formed. The composition of this Council ("all were to be men over thirty-five, possessing previous administrative

experience" ¹) ensured that it would be uncontaminated by Radicals, whilst the fact that the President examined proposals before they reached the Council, still further ensured its control by Yuan.

On 19 December Parliament was dissolved, whereupon the Council of State was instructed to examine the question of a new Constitution and a new Parliament.

Yuan Shi-kai, though virtually dictator in all save name, was too astute at the outset not to realize the value of dressing up his actions in some form of constitutional clothing.

It had already been mentioned that the Council of State were directed to make suggestions for a new Constitution, and Parliament designed to supersede the unruly child of the Nanking Constitution which Yuan Shi-kai had scattered with a heavy hand, and on 1 May, 1914, the regulations for a new Provisional Constitution were promulgated. They were never to come into force for reasons which will be described in due course, but they are of interest from two points of view. Firstly, they became important after Yuan Shi-kai's death. Secondly, they represent—if Yuan Shi-kai believed in them at all—the degree of self-government for which he thought China was at that time fitted. If this was Yuan Shi-kai's real opinion, it is well worth consideration, for it is the opinion of many ² that the China of 1924 is little more capable of assimilating richer self-government without indigestion than was the China of 1914.

The main features of the Provisional Constitution of 1914 were as follows:—

First, centre, and last, it insisted on the power of the President. He appointed all officers of State, and organized their offices. He made war and declared peace, and was Commander-in-Chief of the forces. He negotiated treaties, though, if a territorial change were involved, he had to have the approval of the Legislature, which was to consist of a single chamber.

The powers of the Legislature were strictly limited. Its sessions were to be for four months, ³ and, though it was furnished with certain weapons, such as the right to impeach the President, their value was more apparent than real. In the latter case, for example, no impeachment was valid unless supported by a three-fourths majority of a four-fifths quorum!

In the control of finance the Li Fa Yuan, or Legislative Council, was equally impotent, whilst the members of the Legislature were

¹ "Peace Handbook," No. 67, p. 81.

² The author is not amongst them.

³ Cf. The sessions of the Japanese Diet.

to be obtained by a system of double indirect elections which ensured that they would consist of the gentry of the provinces.

In fact, the proposals foreshadowed that the Legislature would be a deliberative Assembly with the minimum of power, to which Yuan Shi-kai was prepared to submit certain subjects for approval whenever he felt like being ultra-constitutional and democratic. The Council of State formed a Privy Council appointed by Yuan Shi-kai. It interpreted the Constitution and advised the President on any matter he laid before it. Yuan Shi-kai was now in the plenitude of his autocratic power, and he vigorously prosecuted his task of restoring order in the provinces and asserting the authority of the central government. Conditions were deplorable, notably in the three restless provinces of Fukien, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi, where piracy and brigandage were rampant. Secret societies were at work in Shensi and Szechuan, in Kiangsu and Kiangsi, and their activities led to much disturbance. Perhaps the most striking example of the general chaos is afforded by the career of a super-brigand—Pai-lang-Tzu—the White Wolf—who ravaged Hupeh and Honan to an enormous extent until he was finally hunted down and destroyed in August, 1914.

Nevertheless, the President-Dictator made considerable progress. An order was issued which, except for a change of names, virtually revived the old provincial system of government, and the civil powers of the provincial military Satraps (the Tuchuns), who had sprung into power at the 1911 revolution, were removed.

Unfortunately for China, this last reform was to have a short life, and the evil of irresponsible militarism is still one of the greatest, if not THE greatest of Chinese curses.

The fair promise of Yuan Shi-kai's administration was not to bear fruit. It failed through the personal ambition of this man. Enough has been said in preceding pages, and more could be quoted from his utterances, to show that Yuan Shi-kai was not at heart a Republican.¹ Circumstances had obliged him to swear loyalty to the Republic and to declare that "I, Yuan Shi-kai, sincerely wish to exert my utmost to promote the democratic spirit, to remove the dark blots of despotism, to obey strictly the Constitution, and to abide by the wish of the people. . . ." But he also believed that the masses agreed with himself in being "no lovers of changes which run counter to immemorial custom."

¹ For a very unflattering estimate of Yuan Shi-kai's behaviour towards the Republic see Putnam Weale's book, "The Fight for the Republic in China."

He felt that his countrymen were indifferent to the nomenclature of government or even to its form, provided that it gave them a reasonable amount of peace in the land. To secure this essential, Yuan believed that a strong benevolent despot must be at the head of affairs. He must be someone who could control the military leaders on the one hand, and the professional Western-educated politicians on the other—two classes who were jointly responsible for stirring up unprofitable strife.

To the strong man, the identity of that strong man was Yuan Shi-kai, and he began openly to shape events with the aim of becoming the acknowledged autocrat of China. He was, however, well aware of the necessity of cloaking his designs under a veneer of respect for form and usage, and for this purpose a society called the Chou-an-Hui was called into being. Its title meant "Society to Maintain Peace," and its real mission was to produce propaganda on behalf of Yuan Shi-kai. By what is generally considered to be a pure coincidence, the Chou-an-Hui was provided with invaluable material by a certain Dr. Goodnow, an American jurist who was an adviser to the Chinese Government.

Authorities differ as to whether Dr. Goodnow was aware of the use Yuan Shi-kai proposed to make of this acknowledged expert's views, when the adviser was asked to submit a memorandum on theoretical aspects of government. However this may be, Dr. Goodnow, in the normal course of his duty, prepared a paper for the Chinese Government in which he expressed the opinion that a monarchical system was best for China. He was careful to make his approval of a monarchy contingent on three fundamentals. One was that it should be supported by the people and by the Powers; the second was that any new system must contain within it the seeds of constitutional reform, and lastly, that some arrangement should be made to avoid disturbances on the death of the head of the executive. This essay was seized upon by the Chou-an-Hui and widely circulated.

There was, however, propaganda of a different kind. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao,¹ a leading scholar of very far-reaching influence, was a member of Yuan Shi-kai's Council of State, but, when he saw clearly the direction which the President's policy was taking, he resigned his position in August, 1915, and wrote a pamphlet warning Yuan Shi-kai of the dangers of toying with Imperial ideas. Liang's pamphlet,² which was published in the "Peking

¹ Said by many to be the "first brain in China."

² Reproduced in Putnam Weale's book, "The Fight for the Republic in China."

Gazette," was apostolic in its authority, and Yuan Shi-kai tried hard to obtain the scholar's support. He failed.

In his writings, Liang stressed the need of accepting the Republic, of ceasing disputes about forms of government, and of concentrating on improving the machinery of government so that it might bring order into the internal affairs of China and enable her to resist external pressure.¹ He particularly insisted on the danger from Japanese aggression to which an attempt to restore the monarchy would expose China.

In this last respect he had put his finger on the crux of the situation.

It is probable that, if Yuan Shi-kai had only been obliged to deal with his Chinese opponents, he would have succeeded in his aims, a success which might have been good or bad for China, according as to whether one is an adherent of the J. O. P. Bland or the Putnam Weale school of thought. For Yuan Shi-kai understood his countrymen *à fond*. He could be cunning and ruthless, suave and ferocious, and he never for one moment lost sight of the importance of doing nothing which openly conflicted with orthodox tradition. Where he failed was in his appreciation of the influence and importance of what the Powers thought and did. He had already had experience of their grip on his destiny in connexion with the Reorganization Loan, but this lesson seems to have been lost upon him. He especially failed to apprehend the power of Japanese opposition.

To understand this opposition we must go back a few months to May, 1915, the date of the famous twenty-one demands.

Much has been written about these extraordinary demands from Japan to China, but what has been written and said is probably not half of what is still to come, for the questions they opened up are as alive to-day—1924—as they were in 1915.

We shall have occasion to mention them again when we resume consideration of Japan, but, so far as their effect on Yuan's fate was concerned, they will be dealt with at this stage.

It may be as well to remind the reader, whose thoughts are now presumed to be concentrated on the Far East, that in August, 1914, the Great War broke out. With one exception, the Powers found themselves too much interested in the war to pay great attention to China. The exception was Japan. After a slight delay she declared war on Germany, landed an expeditionary force on Chinese territory in the Province of Shantung, and, with

¹ Still words of wisdom to-day (1924). The concluding sentence of Liang's pamphlet is as follows: "My hope is that there will be no occasion for the country to think of my words ten years from to-day."

the co-operation of British troops, the German fortress of Tsingtau was captured.

At the time of its capture, Japan declared her intention of restoring the lease to China, and the negotiations to this end, which were finally concluded in 1922, form the Shantung question, a consideration of which must now be deferred. The Chinese Government had protested in vain against the infringement of their neutrality involved by the landing of the Tsingtau Expeditionary Force, and had been forced to content themselves with declaring a neutral zone.

Mention has already been made of the lines along which the military party in Japan were directing their country's territorial and economic expansion. With all rivals busily engaged in a suicidal struggle in Europe, a splendid chance of playing a lone and profitable hand presented itself to Japan. On January 18, 1915, the Japanese Minister at Peking put forward the twenty-one demands (see Appendix). A very real wave of indignation spread over China, and, for the moment, Yuan Shi-kai found in the demands a source of public support. It has often been said that the people of one province in China are so intensely local in their outlook, that they are indifferent to what happens in another province, and are practically without comprehension of matters affecting their country as a whole; in short, that Chinese public opinion, especially as applied to foreign affairs, is almost non-existent. The truth or otherwise in this matter is so important, affecting, as it does, the whole question of China's future, that it has been further discussed in a subsequent chapter, and it is sufficient to say here that the anti-Japanese feeling was widespread, that the Japanese demands undoubtedly stimulated national consciousness in China, and that the anti-Japanese commercial boycott, which was inaugurated when Japan forced her demands on China by means of an ultimatum, was a blow which affected Japan's commerce to a considerable extent.¹

The twenty-one demands revealed Japanese policy as a flash of lightning illuminates what may have been suspected but not seen. The revelation of this policy should have made plain to Yuan Shi-kai that Japan was his enemy. The Japanese policy was obviously not one which would profit by the strong and well-ordered China which it seemed might be evolved if Yuan Shi-kai sat on the Dragon throne as an autocrat, and the first of his line.² Not

¹ See also p. 321, for further remarks about anti-Japanese boycotts.

² At the interview, when Mr. Hioki, the Japanese Minister, confronted Yuan Shi-kai with the twenty-one demands, he spoke *inter alia* of "Chinese revolutionists who have very close relation with many Japanese outside of the Government, and have means and influence. . . . It may be not pos-

only this, but Yuan Shi-kai's name was already in Japan's black book for his opposition to Japanese policy when he was Chinese resident in Korea. Either ignoring or despising the portents of Japan's opposition, or, perhaps, comforted by the support he had obtained from all over China in his struggle against the twenty-one demands, Yuan Shi-kai busied himself in the autumn of 1915 with the matter of cloaking his monarchical proposals in Constitutional garb. The Council of State were directed to examine the question of a change of government, and, as a result, the Council ordered the convening of a special Citizens' Convention.

Composed of approximately 1800 persons who were carefully selected by the Government, though nominally elected, the members of the convention had no deliberative powers. It was their duty to vote on questions submitted to them by the Government. Lest their task should prove too great a strain on their intelligence, certain precautions were taken. Some of these were as follows: The printed ballot papers to be signed were already marked with a vote in favour of the Government's proposal, and each paper was opened and examined before the voter was allowed to leave the polling booth.¹

On 11 December, the Council of State made the redundant announcement that the country favoured the restoration of a monarchy with Yuan Shi-kai on the throne. After some show of hesitation, the President sanctioned the going forward of the coronation.

As early as 28 October, the Japanese, British, and Russian Governments² had advised that no change be made in the form of government, as they feared it would provoke unrest and much opposition. To renewed advice from the Powers Yuan Shi-kai replied that, if they would undertake not to support his enemies, he was quite able to deal with the internal situation, but it seems

sible for the Japanese Government to restrain such people from stirring up trouble in China unless the Chinese Government shall give some positive proof of friendship. . . . They (the Japanese people) believe that the President is strongly anti-Japanese." Authority: Mr. Reinsch, American Ambassador, in "An American Diplomat in China." Mr. Reinsch was at the time in close and sympathetic touch with the harassed Chinese Government.

¹ After the third revolution, when Yuan Shi-kai was thrown down, the Southerners published a large collection of circular telegrams from Peking to the provinces which laid down, in minute detail, how the oracle calling upon Yuan to found a dynasty was to be worked. Putnam Weale in his book, "The Fight for the Republic in China," Chapter XI, reproduces many of these telegrams. The last telegram of all directed that all documents showing how public opinion had been faked should be burnt.

² In accordance with their traditional policy, the United States of America refrained from participating in this advice.

that for once his estimation of Chinese politics was in error, for the opposition in the South was to prove too great for his strength. The Japanese Government persistently maintained that this opposition would be important. They said: "The undercurrent of opposition is far stronger than would be imagined, and a feeling of unrest is spreading to all parts of the country."

If Yuan Shi-kai and his friends really believed that the opposition to the restoration of the monarchy was negligible, it is difficult to understand why the voting of the carefully selected members of the Citizens' Convention was so elaborately nursed.

In the closing days of 1915 the Province of Yunnan declared its independence of the central government, and prepared to support the maintenance of the Republic by force.

The Yunnanese leader was one Tsai-Ao, a Japanese-educated military man. The example of Yunnan was followed by Kwangsi, and the Southern and Central Provinces began to fall away from Yuan Shi-kai's grasp. So far as military operations were concerned, not much fighting took place, the best troops being loyal to the President, and he might have crushed the outbreak but for the implacable hostility of Japan towards his purpose.

T'ang Shao-yi and other leaders of Young China were in close contact with Japanese at Shanghai, and Japanese officers were assisting the revolt in Yunnan, Canton, and elsewhere.¹

With the swiftness of a falling star, Yuan Shi-kai's prestige began to wane, and this, in spite of the fact that, on the balance of such fighting as took place, the President was the gainer. The Sampson of China tried hard to retrieve something from the wreck of the grandiose edifice his ambitions had pulled down upon his head. Too late he announced that the restoration of the monarchy was postponed; too late he sent forth the edict at the end of March, 1916, in which the monarchy was definitely abandoned, that edict in which are written the words: "*Through misunderstandings the present trouble has arisen. My sincerity has not been sufficient to move the heart of the people, and my misunderstanding has not been able to read the signs of the times. It is the lack of virtue on my part, and, therefore, I have no right to blame others. . . . All preparations for the restoration of the monarchy are stopped. Thus I hope that, by imitating the repentance and remorse of the ancients, the love and grace of Heaven will be received. We will cleanse our hearts and thoughts so that trouble will be averted and the people will obtain peace and tranquillity.*"²

He hoped in vain. His enemies were now in full cry on his

¹ See p. 89 of "Peace Handbook," No. 67, Vol. 12.

² Extracts from Vinacke's quotation from the "Peking Gazette."

track, and were determined to break his power. They forced him to establish a Cabinet of a responsible nature under the Premiership of Tuan Chi-jui, though this did not solve the question: "To whom is the Cabinet responsible?"

The Northern leaders were, on the whole, prepared to support Yuan Shi-kai as a President to whom the Cabinet should be responsible, since they realized that his personal influence amongst the Northern troops was still extensive. The Southerners would have none of him. In the Central Provinces, General Feng Kuo-chang, the Commander-in-Chief at Nanking, was in power. This Tuchun held a consultation with other leaders and published a programme for a conference at Nanking which should reunite all parties. The Southerners saw in this proposal an attempt to substitute the dictatorship of Feng Kuo-chang for that of Yuan Shi-kai, and they retaliated by establishing an independent government based on Canton. It seemed that a sharp break would occur as between North and South on the question of the future position of Yuan Shi-kai when the problem was solved in an unexpected manner.

As members of the suppressed Parliament were meeting in Shanghai and issuing appeals to the country, the object of their hatred was a sick man.

On June the 6th he died.

II

When Yuan Shi-kai was gathered unto his ancestors, there passed from the Far Eastern stage a man of genius. Yuan Shi-kai, though he went down into darkness in an hour of defeat, was an example of one of those great minds and strong characters which are thrown to the surface from time to time in every race. It is often said by foreign observers, and by some Chinese as well, that, had Yuan Shi-kai lived longer, he would, if it were humanly possible, have restored order in China. With due deference to the weight of authority which stands behind this supposition, I take leave to differ therefrom. Yuan Shi-kai was the last outstanding figure of the old type Mandarins. He was a great despotic administrator of the period of the Empress Dowager. He was, being a great man, sufficiently broad-minded to see that the impact of Western civilization on to Eastern culture and philosophy, though it might be temporarily warded off, was bound to return again and again with renewed violence. Knowing this, he gave way slowly, but at heart he opposed the alien thoughts and all that they represented and produced. He made practical

use of things from the West, but occidentalism never permeated his mind. He died as he had lived—a Mandarin of the Mandarins.

In my view, there is no doubt that Westernism—I apologize for the ugliness of this word, but can find no other—is certain to do more than leave the mark of its impact upon the externals of the East. It has already influenced outward things to a large extent, though more in Japan than in China. But it is still impinging upon the East, and it is now beginning to make its effect felt below the surface.

Having covered Japan with railways and telegraphs, given her frock coats, top hats, elastic-sided boots, and newspapers, Western civilization has changed the appearance of Old Japan. But it has done more. It is now changing the thoughts of her people. Similarly, but at a slower rate, has this process taken place in China. Through the treaty ports, through the American and British-financed universities and colleges, through the foreign-educated students, through the Chinese colleges, through the bagmen of British, American, and Japanese firms selling cheap manufactures in the interior, the Western ideas are not only changing China's outward appearance—they are slowly but surely moulding her thoughts.

Opinions may differ as to the degree of change which has so far taken place and the rate at which it is taking place, but I am convinced that the whole process is in action.

No one can deny the existence of the process so far as material things are concerned, but many authorities, obsessed by the shibboleth of the "inscrutable and unchanging East," pontifically assert that the visible change in the Far East is all that is taking place; that what is obvious in outward change is surface froth beneath which nothing is changed. I think them wrong, because it seems to me that unless one event takes place, of which as yet I see no sign, then Western culture, being dynamic in its nature, is bound to impose itself on Eastern culture, which is essentially static. The West is always on the offensive, the East on the defensive. The West cries "attack," the East murmurs "defence." Sooner or later a determined offensive will penetrate the defence, however stubbornly the latter be maintained. Let it not be imagined that I visualize within the lifetime of a generation, Eastern minds working on parallel lines with Western minds. I do not. The dough is of vast extent, and the leaven will take a long time to work. But I do maintain that, from a physiological point of view, a Chinese brain or a Japanese brain is fundamentally the same as an English brain, and that no idea comprehensible to a European is inevitably incomprehensible to an Asiatic.

I mentioned that there was one possibility which might

arise and prevent the continuance of this steady transformation.

Eastern thought and culture might react. There might be a great revival of the old faiths which would strip them of their fungus-like latter day growths and give them new vitality. The East might abandon its traditional adherence to philosophical immobility and become active, carrying the war into the enemy's camp. Of this possibility becoming a probability I see no speck of evidence.

I have developed this line of argument in order to explain why it is that I think Yuan Shi-kai would not, in the long end, have placed China on a suitable basis. He would have failed, in my judgment, because he would have sat on the safety-valve. Possibly for ten years, twenty years, or even longer, China would have been outwardly quiet, but in the end the burst would have taken place. It would have been an explosion and not as it has been and is still—an intermittent series of pops. Some people think that Yuan Shi-kai would, during this period, have gradually experimented with democracy and educated China up to an understanding of how to make use of the new ideas from the West. I think that as he grew older and as his personal power solidified, he would have become more reactionary. What China wanted at this stage was a man with Yuan Shi-kai's administrative ability and his strength of character, but that man needed to be one who believed in his heart that Eastern culture and modes of thought were destined to be fundamentally modified by the West as a condition of the increasing participation of the Eastern people in the general affairs of the world.

China wanted a strong Liberal, able on occasion to wear Conservative clothes. Yuan was a strong Conservative, with a wardrobe of Liberal suits which were always bought off the peg. China is still wanting and waiting for that strong Liberal.

Since Yuan died, his successors have always been, compared to him, insignificant men. The Conservatives have not been strong, nor have the Liberals. Much of the "Liberalism" of the latter has been theoretical book stuff, divorced from the realities of governance. Consequently for more than a decade China has drifted along in casual anarchy. Whether one is an adherent of the school which maintains that China can only become strong under the régime of benevolent despotism, or whether one believes that sooner or later she will flourish under some form of representative government, there can be agreement on one point, and that is, that China's immediate and pressing need is internal order. To achieve that desideratum a central government acceptable to China is needed. Whether, out of

that government, shall come forth despotism or democracy is another matter.

Before plunging into the welter of confused history which has distinguished Chinese internal politics since the death of Yuan Shi-kai, some remarks will be made on the subject of a line of comparative analysis much favoured by certain writers.

Comparisons have been drawn between the after-effects of the revolution in China and those of the Restoration in Japan. On the one hand we are invited to contemplate anarchy, on the other we are asked to stand amazed at the material uplift of modern Japan. Historical analogies and comparisons are notorious traps to the unwary and temptations to the lazy, but there are few pairs of circumstances superficially alike, actually less paralleled, than the pair we are now considering. Parts of this book will have been written in vain if the reader has not already realized that the social conditions in Japan at the time of the Meiji Restoration were absolutely different from those in China in 1911. Japan was absolutely dominated by a feudal aristocracy which had, in its turn, been controlled for two hundred years by the Tokugawa family. The Restoration in Japan was originally an inter-feudal dispute in which one section of the nobility employed the person of the Emperor and the sacred prestige of the throne as a political weapon against their opponents, who were centred around the decadent Tokugawa Shogunate. As a consequence of the Restoration, the power passed horizontally from Tokugawa to the Satsuma and Choshu clans. The people remained as before—the serfs of the aristocracy. The nobles who had grasped power were sufficiently intelligent to perceive that the adoption by their country of Western materialism was essential to its future independent existence. They Westernized Japan; they revolutionized her from top to bottom, but all the impulse came from above. It was not, however, to be supposed that the masses could be introduced to these novel Western inventions without absorbing Western ideas, and this result was the more certain in that the bureaucrats had found the abolition of feudalism to be a necessary administrative reform. Therefore the outward form of Japan's revolution, from an Asiatic Feudal State to one modelled on Western lines, took shape before the people had absorbed the ideas which normally produce such revolutions. In subsequent chapters the consequence of this peculiar state of affairs has been fully discussed, and we will here leave the bare statement as it stands.

In China, on the other hand, the revolution, like every other Chinese revolution recorded in history, came from below.¹ There

¹ That of Japan in 1860 was from above.

was not in China a feudal aristocracy controlling the country, or, excepting the Manchu nobles grouped around the Court and the ducal descendant of Confucius, any nobility at all. The revolution of 1911 was, at bottom, due to the discontent of the Chinese people, expressed by the gentry and literati, with the conditions of existence under the Manchu rule; a discontent due to conditions which had arisen as a result of Western aggression during the nineteenth century; a discontent which seemed removable by a change in the system of central government. Western philosophy had been sufficiently examined by various reformers to produce a body of men who believed that the panacea they sought would be found in the application to their country of a Western system of government. They may have been right or wrong, but there can be no question that, having adopted a Republican form of government, they found themselves unable to employ efficiently the imported machine. They have been experimenting for twelve years, and no one can certainly predict the outcome. The period of trial and error has been one which has witnessed considerable confusion in the machinery of administration, but this may not prove so serious a matter as it now seems. In Japan, the confusion consequent upon a *volte-face* in the system of government was avoided because Japan possessed an aristocracy to whom the business of government was a natural function, and indeed, a cherished perquisite. It is now apparent that the people in Japan must share to a greater extent and eventually must predominate in the business of government. Power must be transferred vertically.

Can they assume this duty without wrecking the complicated machine in whose inception and construction they have had no share? That is a question of import, not only to Japan, but to the whole world, and for this reason it is further considered in a later chapter. In China, on the other hand, there has been no hereditary governing class, and her future administrators have been learning and building the Republican machine at one and the same time. The process is slow and there have been many set-backs, but it is going on. Only once since the inauguration of the Republic has China been controlled by a centralized force comparable to that exercised by the old Genro in Japan, and that was when Yuan Shi-kai was in power. The subsequent reaction from the beginnings of administrative order which then became apparent has led some observers to declare that China has been going backwards since that time. The confusing effect of the World War has also produced abnormal conditions which must be discounted in any attempt to measure China's real progress or retrogression. Taking a broad survey of the existing conditions

in the two countries, the conclusion I have reached is that China's revolution is of the normal type in which order is developed from initial confusion amongst the people, whilst that of Japan is abnormal in that a state of artificial order was first produced and has ever since been producing mental confusion amongst the masses. China's upheaval is comparable to the early stages of a slow construction of a pyramid on its base; Japan has rapidly produced a pyramid on its apex, and her great problem now consists in discovering how to reverse the structure without collapse. I believe China has had the worst of her teething troubles whilst those of Japan are probably still to come unless her rulers display the highest degree of statesmanship. If Japan does have trouble, the complexity and rigidity of her bureaucratic administration will merely serve to accentuate the acuteness of her malady. For the moment, the reader is invited to make a note of this comparison between China and Japan and the conclusions drawn therefrom. In subsequent chapters the ground upon which these conclusions are based is fully traversed.

III

An account of the events in China since the death of Yuan Shi-kai is now necessary. The trend of affairs in China can be best understood by keeping in view the following leading marks:—

There has been almost continuous fighting, sometimes in one area, sometimes in another, between sundry military leaders.

* * * * *

There has been a general line of cleavage between the central government at Peking and a revolutionary government with its headquarters at Canton.

* * * * *

Much of the fighting has had as its object the control of one of these two governments.

* * * * *

Neither of these two governments exercises any power except in its immediate vicinity.

Many provinces, especially in the West, have been, and are (1924), to all intents and purposes, independent of either government. They are ruled by military governors (Tuchuns).

* * * * *

All the strife that has taken place is a struggle which revolves around personalities and the fruits of office, but it is usually

camouflaged under a smoke screen of principle. The sufferers have been the common people.

* * * * *

The Powers, with one exception, have refrained from fishing in these troubled waters, for two reasons:—

- (a) The World War kept them too busy.
- (b) As a result of that war, a new orientation of internal politics took place. Spheres of influence and the diplomacy arising therefrom became unfashionable; self-determination became a popular formula.

* * * * *

As a result of this new attitude of the Powers, China's Western-trained diplomatists have obtained substantial advantages for China, notably at the Washington Conference of 1921-22, though China was less able to make her weight felt as a Power (in the customary manner—by pointing to armed forces) than she had been for years.

* * * * *

The one exception to this edifying conversion in the attitude of the Powers towards China, was Japan.

Japan followed up her twenty-one demands, and for some time pursued a very "forward" policy in China. The victory of the Allies—which was an unexpected and disconcerting event to some Japanese—and the appearance of all the Powers in nice new white sheets at Washington, has obliged Japan to follow the fashion. During the years 1919-24 she has been chiefly concerned in the delicate business of advocating the open door and supporting the cry of "hands off China," whilst retaining and consolidating her position in Manchuria.

* * * * *

Bearing in mind the foregoing points, it is now possible to deal in outline with the tangle of recent Chinese politics. When Yuan Shi-kai was dying, he signed a mandate in which, with dignified words, he lamented his own shortcomings, and appointed Li Yuan-hung, "a man of courtesy, good nature, benevolence, and wisdom," to the office of President. Li Yuan-hung obtained the office chiefly because he was inoffensive, both to the Southerners and to the Northern military party, each of whom had their nominees, but agreed to compromise on Li Yuan-hung.¹

¹ Li Yuan-hung first came into prominence at Wuchang in 1911, when, as a colonel, he led the revolt which eventually overthrew the Manchus. He has the reputation throughout China for absolute honesty, but is a jelly-fish in character.

It will be remembered that, in his later days, when his star was beginning to wane, Yuan Shi-kai appointed a Cabinet which survived its creator, and had for its Premier one Tuan Chi-jui. This gentleman was a member of the Northern military party associated with a group called the Pei-Yang party. Their chief characteristic was bitter antagonism towards the Southern and Radical Kuo-min Tang party, which had been driven out by Yuan Shi-kai. The situation, then, was as follows:—

The Northern militarists controlled the Cabinet and the Executive—such as it was; the Southern Radicals controlled Parliament, which had re-assembled at Shanghai. Precariously balanced between these two groups stood the President—Li Yuan-hung—from all accounts well meaning, but weak, and not very clever. The immediate issue was joined over the question as to the relationship between the Executive and the Parliament, or, in other words, who was to rule, the Pei-Yang party or the Kuo-min Tang.

There were two legal alternatives. If the Provisional Constitution of May, 1914, was in force, that tool of Yuan Shi-kai's fashioning, which had made the President all-powerful, then the very existence of the Parliament was illegal. If, on the other hand, the Nanking Constitution, which was the first fruit of the revolution, was in force, then Parliament was in order except for the fact that, owing to the time which had elapsed since the election of the members, fresh elections were necessary. The Cabinet under Tuan Chi-jui, having succeeded to the powers wielded by the President when Yuan Shi-kai was in the saddle, were eloquent in argument supporting the maintenance for the time being of the 1914 Constitution. On the other hand, the provinces, which had declared their independence at the time of Yuan Shi-kai's monarchical movement, refused to return to the fold unless the original Constitution was revived. These provinces were supported by the fleet, which threatened to mutiny.¹ The Cabinet and the Northerners had to give way, and Parliament met at Peking in August. The Cabinet was now in the position which had been occupied by Parliament whilst the 1914 Constitution was in force, for the Cabinet derived its legality from

¹ The two sections of the fleet, at present more or less equally divided between North and South, mutiny, or threaten to do so, fairly often. Frequently they do it in the hope of getting some back pay. Though negligible as a fighting force, the Navy wields considerable influence in Chinese politics. It is worth remembering that, given good material, the Chinese Navy would be as good, if not better, than the Japanese. The sea-sense of the maritime population in China is very well developed. In the past Chinese fleets have convoyed expeditionary forces into the Indian Ocean.

the 1914 Constitution, whereas, by assembling again, Parliament had made this source of authority null and void, since, by the Nanking Constitution, the Cabinet could only derive its authority from Parliament. However, this threatened deadlock did not materialize, for the Parliament, satisfied with their triumph in reassembling, were moved to confirm the Premier and his colleagues in office. For an instant the future seemed promising, but appearances were deceptive. The antagonisms between South and North, the military chiefs and Parliament, Pei-Yang and Kuo-min Tang, were still strong below the surface. They crystallized over the appointment of a Parliamentarian—T'ang Shao-yi—to the office of Foreign Minister. He was distasteful to the military leaders, and they met at Hsuchow to consider the matter and issue attacks on him.

Hsuchow was the headquarters of a notorious and hard-bitten old satrap named Chang Hsun. An out-and-out supporter of the old Manchu régime, a kind of super-Tory, he had been in absolute control of North Kiangsu and Southern Shantung ever since 1912. His power rested on 20,000 troops, who wore pig-tails and fantastic uniforms as indication of their War Lord's belief in the virtue of the old days. The one thing Chang Hsun hated more than anything else was the Kuo-min Tang party.

At the first Hsuchow Conference (there was a later and more important one in 1917) the TUCHUNS outlined a "Union of the Provinces," which was an euphemism for a league of military leaders banded together to resist interference by Parliament in the affairs of the provinces they controlled. For the moment this union did not materialize owing to the mutual jealousies of the Tuchuns, but they did succeed in forcing T'ang Shao-yi to resign his office. The Premier then endeavoured to fill the post with two of his own henchmen, but each in turn was rejected by Parliament. Eventually the appointment of the aged and respected Dr. Wu Ting-fang was agreed upon as a compromise. The settlement of this dispute did not bring peace. A ceaseless guerilla warfare was carried on by Parliament, and the Cabinet were continually obstructed and heckled in every possible way. A conspicuous feature of this criticism was its lack of constructive-ness. One can hardly insist too strongly on the fact that at bottom, the dispute was between the old men, trained under the Manchu administrators, who whatever their faults were certainly men experienced in the art of government, and the younger school, who were full of ideas and theories based on their Western learning, but quite inexperienced in practical government. Equally strongly must it be emphasized that China's millions were quite ignorant, and, therefore, indifferent concerning these intrigues.

It will be remembered that the members of the Parliament dissolved by Yuan Shi-kai were, at the time of their eclipse, engaged in drawing up a permanent Constitution. This task was continued by the Parliament of 1916, and soon brought Cabinet and Legislature into conflict. The particular bone of contention was the future status of the provinces. There were the extreme views sponsored respectively by the Chin-pu Tang party and the Kuo-min Tang. Between these extremes were a number of compromises. The Chin-pu Tang (and Pei-Yang party and Cabinet) wished to have the Government of China centralized in Peking. The Kuo-min Tang went to the opposite extreme, and visualized a federation of states loosely linked together for certain purposes.

Whilst the Parliamentary mice were playing their little game of word-spinning, the military cats came once more into the picture. The occasion was the matter of the relationship between China and Germany.

Soon after the outbreak of the World War, Yuan Shi-kai had made proposals to the Allies that China should join in against Germany. He was probably actuated by his need for money and the advantages to be gained by participation in the final peace settlement. He was advised by Great Britain to remain neutral, partly because it was felt that it could do no good to China to become enmeshed in the war,¹ and possibly because of Japanese opposition. Japan, anxious to take Germany's place in Shantung, had no desire to find China an ally who would have had an indisputable right to assist in the capture and decide in the allocation of Tsingtau.

By 1917 the situation had changed. It was now of considerable political importance to the Allies to have China on their side, and this for two main reasons:—

- (a) It was desired to make use of Chinese labour behind the lines in France.
- (b) It was desired to obtain control of the German shipping interned in Chinese ports, and so supplement the world tonnage, which was being seriously reduced by the German submarine campaign.

It is now known that Japan's consent to China's declaration of war was obtained by a secret promise on the part of Great Britain and France that they would support Japanese claims, particularly those relating to Shantung, at the final peace.²

¹ The late Dr. Morrison, then adviser to Yuan Shi-kai, stated this fact to the editor of the "Japan Chronicle," 1916. Putnam Weale (Mr. Simpson) has confirmed this in 1921. See "Japan Chronicle," July, 1921.

² See Chapter VI, "Japanese Policy in China from 1911."

In February, 1917, the United States of America invited China to send a protest to Germany in connexion with the submarine campaign. No satisfactory reply being received to China's note to Germany, the question arose in Peking as to whether China should declare war. We are still much too close to the events to make it safe to dogmatize concerning all the intriguing which took place at Peking at this time. Outwardly, the situation was as follows :—

Tuan Chi-jui and the military party advocated war. Parliament was opposed thereto. The inner reasons on which these advocacies were based were in some cases probably, and in others, certainly, to be found amongst the following :—

The Cabinet felt that, by declaring war, they would be assured of the diplomatic support of the Powers. This support and recognition, always important to a Government not too firmly seated in the saddle, is doubly so in China, where foreigners have such a large measure of control over national finance. (Tuan's Government was desperately hard pressed for funds.¹) Secondly, a declaration of war meant that the payment of the yearly instalments of the Boxer indemnity would be suspended for five years and also that the Powers would agree to China's tariff being revised. It meant that China would be entitled to a seat at the Conference table when a peace was concluded which was obviously going to affect all parts of the world. It also meant that, in the case of two Powers—Germany and Austria—relations would be resumed at the end of the war on a basis of equality. Finally, a declaration of war ensured financial assistance from Japan.

On the other hand, from the Parliamentary point of view, opposition to the declaration of war meant opposition to the Cabinet, which was the traditional policy of the Assembly. Secondly, a great deal of propaganda and bribery directed by Germany took place amongst the members of the Parliament with a view to keeping China neutral.

At this juncture, Tuan Chi-jui decided to brisk matters by producing an expression of public opinion in favour of war. The opinion best calculated to influence Parliament in the desired direction was that of the Tuchuns, and the military governors were called to Peking to confer upon this matter. They reported that public opinion favoured war. It is probably superfluous to add that 99·999 per cent of China's millions were profoundly indifferent to this question, of which millions had never even heard.

¹ A chronic state of affairs in China since 1911.

Nevertheless, though Parliament, after hearing the verdict of public opinion, from its interpreters—the Tuchuns—declared itself in favour of war, the Bill introduced into Parliament to make China a belligerent was shelved on the grounds that no proper Cabinet existed to carry out the provisions of the Act. Some colour was lent to this excuse by the fact that a number of Cabinet Ministers resigned at this time owing to attacks on them in Parliament.

To end this deadlock the military chiefs stepped into the arena, and with abruptness called upon the President to dissolve Parliament. They gave as their reasons for this demand certain objections entertained by them to the Provisional Constitution which had reached its second reading in the House of Representatives. The main objection voiced by the Tuchuns was based on the ground that, according to the proposed Constitution, the Lower House could only be dissolved with the approval of the Senate.

This, and other clauses, said the Tuchuns, "have greatly shocked us."

In response to the demand of the Tuchuns, President Li Yuan-hung, being at the time in one of his determined moods, upset all calculations by refusing to dissolve Parliament, as such action would be "unconstitutional," and, more than this, he nerved himself to dismiss the formidable Tuan Chi-jui from the office of Premier. Tuan refused to recognize his dismissal and fell back on the support of the war lords. These latter straightway assembled in conference for the second time at Hsuchow where they organized declarations of independence from the central government. Fengtien, Anhui, Fukien, Chihli, Shantung, Hupeh, and Chekiang were amongst the provinces controlled by the Tuchuns of the Pei-Yang party. Szechuan was too busy with an internal provincial struggle for power to take much interest in larger matters. The Premier whom the President had appointed—a man called Li Ching-hsi—refused to take up his office, and was evidently a broken reed against the military party, of which he was, in fact, a moderate member. On 1 June, 1917, the harassed President, not having the strength to resist the Tuchuns, even if he had the will, and finding that all attempts at a compromise were in vain, took a most remarkable step.

In a mandate he summoned the notorious General Chang Hsun to come to Peking to act as mediator. This super-satrap, whom most Europeans would have classed as a kind of glorified brigand, was eulogized in the mandate as being "*highly meritorious and respected, as well as public-spirited and patriotic.*" The President bewailed his own "*lack of virtue and ability, as well as the fact that my prestige is insufficient to command respect,*" and he was

"*smitten with regret and remorse.*" He concluded with the statement that: "*In earnest longing I wait for his (Chang Hsun's) arrival.*"

Chang Hsun began to mediate in characteristic fashion. He first paused for breath at Tientsin, which was now the headquarters of the Tuchuns, and also that of the ex-Premier, Tuan Chi-jui. The day after his arrival, Chang Hsun pronounced his solution: "*I have wired to the President to dissolve Parliament, and I will go to Peking on Sunday to finally settle matters.*"¹

Although the Southern provinces promised the President their support if he would stand by the House of Representatives and the Constitution, he found the personal army of Chang Hsun and the immediate vicinity of the Tuchuns to be irresistible arguments, and after some further wavering, he gave in and dissolved Parliament, whereupon the Tuchuns obligingly rescinded their declarations of independence.

Then there occurred an entertaining interlude.

Chang Hsun had always been an ardent Imperialist. Vinacke says: "His loyalty to the former rulers of China is the one redeeming feature of his entire career." The ease with which he had made the President do his bidding, and the fact that he held Peking with his personal troops, led him to suppose that the time was ripe for a *coup d'état*. He suddenly proclaimed the restoration of the Manchu dynasty and issued edicts in the name of the boy Emperor. Chang Hsun was probably right in supposing that the common people were profoundly indifferent as to who ruled in Peking, and if any of these gave a thought to the matter they must have argued that, in any event, the administration could hardly be in a worse state of confusion. What Chang Hsun omitted to allow for was the attitude of his fellow Tuchuns. Chang Hsun was no Yuan Shi-kai, and he lacked the personality with which to awe the other war lords. He also seems to have neglected the extremely necessary precaution of coming to terms with the Tuchuns as to the fruits of victory in the shape of offices and perquisites. His own idea of a "picking" for himself was the vice-royalty of Chihli, and this did not commend itself to the other Tuchuns.

Under the leadership of Tuan Chi-jui, the outraged Tuchuns easily ousted this would-be Earl of Warwick, and the boy Emperor, whose innocence of the whole affair was never in question, returned once more to the dignified seclusion of his Imperial Palace.²

Tuan Chi-jui now came back to power as Premier, and formed

¹ Quoted by Vinacke from "Far Eastern Review," July, 1917.

² Bland says that this *coup d'état* was "made in Germany."

a Cabinet of Pei-Yang and Chin-pu Tang members. The Presidency was occupied by Feng Kuo-chang, the former Vice-President, so that the Northern military party were now in complete control of the Peking Government.

The Kuo-min Tang members fled first to Shanghai and subsequently to Canton, where, under Sun Yat-sen, they established a Provisional Government in September, 1917, and maintained that, though they could not muster a quorum (they consisted of about one-third of the original number of representatives), yet they were the only Government in China deriving its authority from a legal source.

There was difference of opinion at Peking as to the methods to be used against the Southerners. The President—Feng—was in favour of moderation, whilst Tuan Chi-jui advocated the use of force. This difference of opinion was due to rivalry between the President and the Premier. The President was not anxious to embitter the Canton party, since he hoped for their support against Tuan when, if ever, the country became united under one Parliament.

In the autumn of 1917 Tuan Chi-jui had summoned a Parliament—a mere stalking horse and entirely subservient to the Tuchuns. He had also declared war on Germany. This last act secured for his Government the support of the Powers, who were not particular at this period of the Great War as to the antecedents of anyone who could give them assistance against Germany.

The immediate result of the declaration of war was the elimination of the great commercial and political influences which Germany, and, to a lesser degree, Austria, had laboriously built up in the Far East. German nationals serving in the various foreign organized departments of Chinese administration were dismissed, about 40,000 tons of Germany's shipping passed into the hands of the Allies, and German clubs, banks, and newspapers were shut down.

Thus the immediate effect. The subsequent results have been less spectacular, but will probably prove far more important, for, as a consequence of China's participation in the Peace Conference, the Germans and Austrians now no longer enjoy extra-territorial rights, nor do the Russians, as a result of the Russian Revolution. This is the thin edge of a very big wedge, and other Europeans and the Japanese in the Far East may yet regret the energy with which the Chinese Government was urged to proceed against Germans and Austrians in 1917.

To return to the struggle between North and South. The President, Feng Kuo-chang, was defeated in his struggle with

the Premier, and the Tuchuns selected Hsu Shih-chang to succeed him. Tuan Chi-jui, who had resigned, returned to power as Premier. The puppet Parliament, which was exclusively comprised of nominees of provincial governors, and did not contain a single member of the Kuo-min Tang, confirmed this choice. The new President had been an intimate of Yuan Shi-kai's, and was said to have been implicated in negotiations with the Japanese on the subject of the twenty-one demands. During this period, sporadic fighting took place between North and South, this being apart from the endemic fighting between minor rival leaders for Provincial supremacy in various parts of China, and the continual and widespread brigandage. To attempt a description of these disturbances would need a volume, and any attempt at condensation would merely leave the reader hopelessly confused in a maze of unrememberable Chinese names. These conflicts are individually of no importance, but in the aggregate, serve as a mirror in which is reflected the dark confusion which reigned, and continues to reign supreme in parts of China.

The manœuvres and intrigues of the bigger men have this much importance, that out of one phase of their disputes may emerge the situation which shall lead to China's regeneration.

Therefore, an outline account of these larger movements will be given. An important point to be borne in mind is, that, though by their propaganda and nomenclature, the Canton Government pose as democrats and constitutionalists, they suffer like the rest of China from the curse of militarists.

It was early in 1918 that a wide public was first informed of generals who were subsequently to achieve some distinction, and who now figure prominently in Chinese affairs. Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin came on to the stage in this wise :—

Chang Tso-lin, ex-swineherd, brigand, and one-time irregular free-lance under the Japanese Army in the Russo-Japanese War, had subsequently risen to be war lord of Manchuria. With a well-drilled Army of some 100,000 men, fully alive to the possibilities of air-craft and motor-cars, assisted by Japanese military advisers, with his provinces, and especially their revenue, well in hand, Chang Tso-lin has, for the last five years, hung like a storm-cloud over the Government at Peking.

When President Feng initiated peace movements in 1918,¹ Chang Tso-lin, generally referred to as the head of the Fengtien party—moved his troops down into Chihli Province and effectually stopped all talk of peace.

¹ In an attempt (made just before his dismissal by the Tuchuns) to unify the country by mandate.

Wu Pei-fu is a man of different stamp. He was at this time a subordinate to Marshal Tsao Kun¹—a Tuchun associated with the Chihli Province—but during the summer of 1918 he ignored his superiors, and memorialized the President on the need of peace. Theoretically he was supposed to be fighting Southern troops in Central China. Nothing of great import happened until the end of the year, when President Feng, having been succeeded by Hsu Shih-chang, a Conference was arranged at Shanghai between Northerners and Southerners. This result was largely attributed to the fact that the World War was over, and the Powers strongly advised the several factions in China to compose their differences. As mentioned before, this type of advice has always carried a considerable weight, not only in Peking, but also with whoever may be the power behind Peking for the time being, because of the control the Powers exercise over Chinese finance. In addition to the representations of the Powers, there was also an extensive and vociferous protest from the commercial interests in China, calling for the cessation of strife. The Conference met, and, in any other country than China, one might have been justified in building high hopes on this meeting.

At the Conference, the Southern delegates, headed by T'ang Shao-yi, put forward eight demands. The two most important were that the mandate of the late President, Li Yuan-hung, in which he had dissolved Parliament, should be recalled, and, secondly, that the connexion between the Northerners, and particularly Tuan Chi-jui (and his satellites in an organization known as the Anfu Club) with Japan, be broken off.²

The whole question of Japanese intrigue during these years of confusion in China will be dealt with separately, so no more will be here said in connexion with the Southerner's insistent complaint that, ever since his advent to power, Tuan Chi-jui and the Anfu Club had been selling their country to Japan.

The Conference broke down on the question of the reassembling of Parliament.

The next incident of note occurred in the South, and was the invasion of Kwangtung Province by troops from Kwangsi, an operation which caused the flight of Sun Yat-sen and the temporary dispersion of the Southern Parliament. In 1920 Sun Yat-sen and his General, Chen Chiung-ming, succeeded in turning out the Kwangsi troops and re-establishing the Southern Government at Canton.

At this juncture Marshal Tsao Kun and Wu Pei-fu of the Chihli clique, decided to round on Tuan Chi-jui, and, advancing

¹ Now (1924) President of China.

² See Chapter VIII.

on Peking, they overthrew the Premier, General Hsu Shu-tseng (Little Hsu) and Tsao Ju-lin, the Finance Minister, and drove them and their supporters of the Anfu Club either into exile or to seek shelter in foreign legations. This result was also due to the student agitation in Peking (see p. 176). The Japanese legation, sarcastically referred to as "Mr. Obata's Hotel," sheltered the most notorious of the Anfu intriguers; Mr. Obata was then the Japanese Minister at Peking.

Liang Shih-yi became Premier.¹

Wu Pei-fu has been largely concerned in the operations which drove the loan-mongering Anfu Club-men and their Japanese-trained troops into exile,² and, after this episode he proceeded, ostensibly at the order of the central government, to crush an independence movement in Hunan and Hupeh. He did so with much efficiency, but then negotiated privately with Chao Heng-ti, the Hunanese Tuchun. This action aroused the fear and anger of the Peking Government. From his position in the Central Provinces, Wu Pei-fu seems to have decided that Chang Tso-lin and his Premier, Liang Shih-yi, were as undesirable as the Anfuites. He eventually charged the Premier with being pro-Japanese, and "telegraphically" overthrew him. It became evident that Wu Pei-fu had ideas of his own as to who was to run the Peking Government—ideas which were bound to bring him into open conflict with Chang Tso-lin.

In the spring of 1922, Wu Pei-fu moved north with about 100,000 men, with the intention of attacking Chang Tso-lin. Considerable hopes—now in abeyance—have been at times placed in Wu Pei-fu by disinterested observers of Chinese affairs, as he has the reputation of being a democrat, he is a good soldier, and his personal character stands high. At least twice he has expressed the desire for a national convention which may lead

¹ Mr. Liang Shih-Yi's appointment was the subject of much protest from all sides. He was supposed to be a creature of Chang Tso-lin's, and therefore his elevation to office was strenuously opposed by the Chihli clique led by Marshal Tsao Kun and his first assistant, Wu Pei-fu. The Tuchuns of Shansi, Hupeh, Kiangsu, and Chekiang also registered their disapproval of the appointment to the Premiership of a man who had been outlawed for his complicity in Chang Hsu's monarchical plot, was closely allied with Yuan Shi-kai in his attempt to found a dynasty, and whose general reputation is that of a financier of wonderful ability and resource, but of the Bottomley school of economics. He signalized his arrival in office by procuring a presidential mandate "pardoning" the Anfu Club-men who had been outlawed or driven by the agitation of the students to the security of the Japanese Legation for selling their country to Japan.

² See Chapter VIII, and the activities of the War Participation Bureau and the Sino-Japanese Military Pact.

to reunification. Associated with Wu Pei-fu has been the "Christian General Feng," a remarkable character, whose 30,000 troops are admitted to be apart from all others in discipline and orderliness. The General is unwearied in his public profession of faith, and, as these lines are being written (1923), a report is to hand that he is holding weekly Bible classes in Peking for the Christian members of the Cabinet.

But we anticipate, and must now turn to South China. Sun Yat-sen and Chen Chiung-min, on their restoration to Canton, in their turn invaded Kwangsi Province in order to revenge themselves upon the men who had temporarily driven Sun to the luxurious wilderness of a foreign settlement in Shanghai.

The expedition was successful, and on 5 May, 1921, Sun Yat-sen was elected President of China by the Canton Parliament.¹

There were then, apart from sundry provincial independence movements of a local nature, the following groups:—

The Canton Government in the South:—

Chief men	Sun Yat-sen. Wu Ting-fang.
General	Chen Chiung-ming.

The Central Provinces, controlled by Wu Pei-fu (Chihli party) and Tsao Kun.

The Peking Government:—

President	Hsu Shi-chang.
Premier	Liang Shih-yi.
Chief String-Puller (Probably).	Chang Tso-lin; super-Tuchun of Manchuria.

Encouraged by his success in Kwangsi, Sun Yat-sen bombastically announced his intention of forcing reunification by a military advance to the North. Chen Chiung-ming, his General, and a man of considerable reputation both as a soldier and administrator, did not approve of this expedition. Nevertheless it started.

At the same time Wu Pei-fu was advancing north against Chang Tso-lin.

This situation produced what should properly have been—if Sun Yat-sen's public statements are any index to his private policies—a most unnatural alliance between Sun and Chang Tso-lin

¹ His enemies contest the legality of this appointment on two grounds: (a) There was not a quorum for a presidential election; (b) the terms of office of the members had expired.

with the object of nipping Wu Pei-fu. Nothing came of Sun Yat-sen's advance from the south, as it gradually spent its force on its way north. Wu Pei-fu took little notice of the attack from the south, and concentrated his energies in moving against Chang Tso-lin. Some moderately heavy fighting took place to the south-east of Peking, and Chang Tso-lin was well beaten. Hostilities were concluded as a result of an armistice arranged in a British cruiser.

He retreated and took up a position on the coast just south of the Great Wall in order to cover Manchuria. This defeat was the first bad reverse Chang Tso-lin had experienced, and outwardly it seemed that Wu Pei-fu had the ball at his feet. It was especially at this time, when his popularity was high, that big hopes were felt by many people that in him the much-needed saviour had arisen. His public utterances were entirely satisfactory. He deplored the indiscriminate militarism which pervaded the country, he advocated reunion on a constitutional basis, and he supported the ideal of the supremacy of the civil power. Added to these was the fact that he had routed Chang Tso-lin and he held Peking.

These high hopes were not realized. Though he had denounced Chang Tso-lin as a traitor, yet at the armistice Wu Pei-fu concluded with him, Chang Tso-lin was left in supreme power north of the Great Wall.

In the meanwhile, the uproar directed against Liang Shih-yi, which has been mentioned on page 101, resulted in his retirement and flight to Japan, where his enemies declare that he has many influential friends. He was succeeded in June, 1922, by Dr. Yen, a man of good reputation, whilst the Presidency was re-assumed by Li Yuan-hung, since President Hsu Shih-chang had likewise abandoned his post. In his mandate, the new President declared: "My circular telegram calling for the abolition of the Tuchuns and the reduction of the Army has not only been received with most sincere approval by Tsao-Kun and Wu Pei-fu, but by the Tuchuns of Hupeh, Honan, Shansi, Kiangsu, Shensi, and Kiangsi. . . . I will restore the old Parliament . . . upon the re-convention of the old Parliament it will be asked to carry out the abolition of the Tuchuns . . . this task is of supreme importance," 12 June, 1922. After considerable delay, due to the difficulties of getting a quorum, Parliament was opened at Peking on 1 August. Three hundred and forty-six representatives (who they represented, save themselves, it would not be easy to say) attended the Lower House, and 140 came to the Senate. This ceremony marked the coming together of the "Old Parliament," which had been dissolved by the Tuchuns on 12 June,

1917. The first session of the Lower House lasted for one hour of turmoil. At subsequent meetings the members voted themselves a salary of which, in August, 1923, they had received arrears up to December, 1922. Save for this achievement the members have done little else than wrangle with the President and intrigue with various militarists. They passed resolutions abrogating the Sino-Japanese pact of 1915, but they failed to go forward with the one piece of constructive work for whose accomplishment they were principally assembled, viz. the drafting of a permanent Constitution, until in 1923, after being heavily bribed to elect Tsao Kun as President, they rushed a Constitution through the House. In the majority of cases they are no longer legally members, and new elections should be held. Their corruption is rife and shameless.

Were it not that it is a kind of parasitical encumbrance attached to the so-called central government, which government drags along its phantasmal and unreal existence by virtue of the recognition of the Powers, the Peking Parliament as now constituted would fade from the scene it has long disgraced.

During the latter part of 1922 and the early part of 1923, Wu Pei-fu seemed to lose influence. A great deal of telegraphing took place, but nothing of importance happened, and in the spring of 1923 Wu Pei-fu was at his headquarters at Loyang, reputed to be preparing for another trial of strength with Chang Tso-lin, though why he did not follow up his advantage in 1922 and finally eliminate Chang Tso-lin is a mystery yet to be solved. Many rumours are floating around, but their reproduction would serve no useful purpose.

In the meanwhile, 1922 witnessed some events of importance in the South. It will be recollected that Sun Yat-sen endeavoured to co-operate with Chang Tso-lin by threatening Wu Pei-fu in the rear. This was in the spring of 1922. As an instance of the rapidity with which policies change, or, perhaps, it would be more accurate to say "professed policies change," it is of interest to note that in the middle of 1921, Sun Yat-sen's propaganda department published a document in which one finds the President, Hsu Shih-chang, stigmatized as a "reactionary of the worst type," the Parliament of Peking is called "a bogus Parliament composed of hirelings of the Northern militarists," and Chang Tso-lin is described as a "military adventurer . . . formerly a brigand, who has been made Military Governor of Manchuria, and ever since his appointment he has used his position to further the interests of Japan."¹

¹ "Why There are Two Governments in China," p. 6.

Yet six months later Sun Yat-sen was virtually in alliance with Chang Tso-lin, and refusing to recognize the reinstatement of Li Yuan-hung as President.

Sun Yat-sen was not, however, in control of the troops in the South, and he who controls the troops, controls the situation. The leading military figure in the South was General Chen Chiung-ming. He had been opposed to the punitive expedition into Kwangsi; he was still more opposed to the Northern expedition. This being the case, Sun Yat-sen endeavoured to oust Chen Chiung-ming, but the upshot of some disturbance was that Chen Chiung-ming ousted him, and Sun Yat-sen escaped with some difficulty to Shanghai. It was freely said, even in well-informed circles, that his day was over and that this last blow would write "finis" to a career of much romance, but moderate practical achievement.

Not so. In January, 1923, Kwangtung Province and Canton was invaded by Yunnanese troops ostensibly acting for the indefatigable Sun Yat-sen.

In addition to this stroke, Foochow, the capital city of Fukien Province, was captured late in 1922 by a portion of Sun Yat-sen's Northern expedition, which had been wandering about, unable to return to Canton since Chen Chiung-ming's coup.

Canton was occupied, and Chen Chiung-ming, in his turn, got away to Hong-Kong after narrowly escaping execution. In February, 1923, Sun Yat-sen arrived in Canton to clear up the situation. He came via Hong-Kong, and he was made much of in the British Colony—a curious change from the attitude previously adopted by Hong-Kong towards himself and his provisional government. He made a speech at the University, in which he explained that he had obtained his "revolutionary" ideas from his early impressions of the orderly government of Hong-Kong when he worked in the Colony as a medical man under Sir James Cantlie. He also professed to have come to the conclusion that the use of armed force against the Northerners was a mistake, and he announced his intention of disbanding 50 per cent of the troops in Kwangtung Province.

At first it appeared that Sun Yat-sen might re-establish himself in peace at Canton, but it was not to be, for Chen Chiung-ming took the field again, and intermittent fighting took place in the vicinity of Canton during the summer of 1923. On the whole, Sun Yat-sen held his own. In the North, the principal events were: firstly, the Lincheng bandit outrage, in which a number of foreigners were abducted in Shantung Province from the famous Tientsin-Pukow express. They were confined under bad conditions for several weeks and were finally released on condition that

the bandits were enrolled in the regular Army. This unprecedented outrage focussed a far wider circle of opinion than that of Europeans in China upon the chaos in the country, and, profiting by the temporary stir created in Europe and America, the foreign commercial interests in China made a concerted effort to secure support from their home Governments. A study of the majority of resolutions passed by Chambers of Commerce, the speeches of leading men, and the editorials in the Press, shows that the general trend of opinion on the spot—which "spot" is the Treaty Ports—favours the theory of intervention in China. Its advocates range from those who frankly hope to see a military expeditionary force land at Tientsin, to those who favour further foreign control of China's administration. The actual result of this agitation fell far short of the hopes of those who had supported it, since, after long delays, the Diplomatic Body presented a note to the Chinese Foreign Office demanding the punishment of certain officials, better policing of the railways, and cash payments to the victims. At the moment of writing (1923) the discussion has begun, and will doubtless proceed for some time. Matters were not assisted by the fact that the Cabinet became to all intents and purposes, non-existent, since, after the bandit outrage, the President, Li Yuan-hung, finding his position hopeless, fled to a foreign concession in Tientsin. His flight was due to the machinations of Marshal Tsao-Kun and the Chihli party. The Marshal was known to be ambitious of the post of President, but as the National Parliament likewise packed its trunks and scattered, one section to Tientsin, one to Shanghai, whilst a third group remained in Peking, there was some delay before this ambition was realized.

October, 1923. Tsao-Kun managed to secure his election to the presidency in the autumn of 1923. The bribery of members was tremendous, cheques being handed to the members as they entered the Parliament buildings. It was commonly said that only twelve members were not bribed. Up to the present the election of Tsao-Kun has produced no striking change in the political situation. Chang Tso-lin has adopted an attitude of neutrality, and the South do not recognize the new President. At and around Canton Sun Yat-sen is still struggling with Chen Chiung-ming, the fair promises which accompanied his return from Shanghai in the spring not having been fulfilled. Sir Robert Ho Tung, a leading business man in Hong-Kong, has been endeavouring to promote a round table conference between all the contesting factions—up to the moment of writing he has had many fine words but few favours.

* * * * *

The Situation in February, 1924. In the North little change. The "gold franc" controversy with the French Government has been the chief political event. The French, who propose to devote the resumed payments of their share of the Boxer indemnity to the re-establishment of the Banque de L'Indo-Chine, which collapsed so scandalously in 1922, demanded that payment be made in "gold francs." The Chinese proposed to pay in paper francs. Both sides have made out quite a good legal case. The moral aspect of this business is not pleasing to European self-respect.¹

The Lincheng banditry negotiations have apparently fizzled out; for this result the Japanese are largely responsible.

In the South, Sun Yat-sen continues to hold Canton against Chen Chiung-ming. Sun is being hard put to it to pay his Yun-nanese supporters. In December, 1923, he caused a sensation by threatening to seize the Canton Maritime Customs, as he declared that Cantonese revenue was going to Peking and financing Northern military operations against the South.

The Situation in June, 1924. Sun Yat-sen and Chen Chiung-ming are still at loggerheads in the South. Sun Yat-sen continues to hold Canton. A naval demonstration made him think better of his threat to seize the Canton section of the Maritime Customs.

In the centre of China, Wu Pei-fu's star is again in the ascendant. From his central position at Loyang he appears to be gradually bringing an increasing number of Tuchuns and their provinces under his influence. His generals have recently achieved considerable success in Szechuan Province. It was freely prophesied in China that the spring of this year (1924) would see a renewal of the important Wu Pei-fu versus Chang Tso-lin feud; up to the present (May) the pessimists have been confounded. The Christian General Feng, with his astonishingly well-disciplined troops, remains under Wu Pei-fu's banner. It is generally considered that Wu Pei-fu is not over friendly to his one-time leader Marshal Tsao-Kun, now the President of China. However, Wu shows no sign of going to Peking, and probably finds it very convenient to have a buffer Government between him and the Powers. It is probably equally convenient in some respects for the diplomatic body.

Chang Tso-lin continues to confine his attention to the development and control of the three provinces of Manchuria,

¹ For the correspondence see "North China Herald." The Diplomatic Corps sent notes to China in February and November, 1923. The official Chinese reply was published, 28 December, 1923.

of which he is the Super-Tuchun. In a letter to the Press (March, 1924), he stated that though he was hostile to the Government at Peking because of its unrepresentative character, he did not intend to get embroiled with affairs outside his provinces unless he could help it.

In the sphere of China's international relations, the following events must be recorded :—

In March, 1924, the Russo-Chinese negotiations temporarily broke down.

China had secured a number of concessions from Mr. Karakhan, the Soviet envoy. The most important of these consisted of the abolition of Russian extra-territoriality (it has been in abeyance since the Russian Revolution) and the cancellation of the pre-Soviet treaties between Russia and China in accordance with the Soviet declarations of 1919 and 1920 which proclaimed magnificently that Russian Imperialism in China was dead for ever. In return for a far higher status in relation to a great European Power than China has ever yet attained, she had—so far as can be ascertained—merely to recognize the Soviet. But by 1924 Chinese recognition did not mean quite as much to Russia as it might have done in 1923 before Italy and Great Britain had recognized the Soviet. Also there had been signs of a rebirth of Imperialism in Russian Far Eastern policy ; a renaissance which has only just become appreciable, but which may have great international consequences. So it came about that the Soviet began to harden its heart about two matters, and the consequent divergence of views brought about a rupture. One matter was concerned with Mongolia. This territory, vast and remote, is admittedly a Chinese dependency, but one which has been recognized as independent by Moscow and occupied by Russian troops for several years. The excuse for these troops has been that Mongolia was a centre of "White Russian" activity.

The second matter at issue between the Soviet and China was the question of the Chinese Eastern Railway. It would require a small book to contain an account of the complicated ramifications of this international problem, and for details the reader must consult the minutes of the Washington Conference, the 1922 China Year Book, and the contemporary Press. The Chinese Eastern Railway was originally the property of the Russian Government, who controlled it through their agents, the Russo-Asiatic Bank. At the revolution this concern established itself at Paris beneath the friendly wing of the French Government, whilst the railway became a centre of "White Russian" activity in the Far East. The Chinese claim that it should revert to them ; the French state that it is really owned by French bondholders. By the terms of the original agreement only Chinese or Russian

subjects could be shareholders. Much more will be heard of this question during the next year or two.

The Chinese-Russian negotiations were soon renewed, and a Reuter's telegram of June, 1924, announced that a complete agreement had just been reached between China and Russia.

The "Gold Franc Controversy" drags on. France has refused to ratify some of the Washington Conference arrangements concerning China until this dispute is settled.

The beginning of 1924 was marked by the explosion of a miniature bombshell in foreign commercial circles. This was due to the announcement by the Chinese Government that they proposed to bring a Trade Mark Law into force which would make it compulsory for foreign firms to register their marks with a Chinese Bureau if they desired protection. A chorus of protest at once arose from the foreign firms at the Treaty Ports, as it became evident that one result of this law would be an appreciable weakening of the foreign extra-territorial position. The issue is still in doubt.

The Lincheng Banditry question remains in a state of suspended animation, and will soon be a fossilized monument both to the change of attitude towards the Powers of Modern China and to the inability of those Powers to agree on a common policy in defence of foreign interests.

The importance of this change of attitude on the part of Modern China, a change of which the Lincheng correspondence is only one recent example, is further discussed in a subsequent chapter. Here, in the month of June, 1924, I must leave this outline of Chinese affairs; leave it with the gloomy probability that some outstanding event will arise in China between this day and publishing day. But if this be so; if every laboriously achieved conclusion becomes nonsense, I cannot complain, for that is China; a paradox incarnate.

It may be as well to pause here and draw the attention of the reader to a curious point in connexion with the internal struggle in China. He may well have the impression after reading the foregoing outline of events, that China is the scene of more or less continuous fighting, and that it would be, for example, a perilous proposition for himself and family to journey from Canton to Peking up through the central provinces. Such an impression is not correct. China is so vast and populous that even very large-scale disturbances, are, as it were, easily absorbed without wrecking her commercial activities and progress; that they hinder them is obvious, but, on the whole, this hindrance is exaggerated in the minds of most Europeans, especially in the minds of men who have lived and worked for years at the Treaty Ports. Dismissing as unproven and unfounded the accusation sometimes

heard that some Western commercial interests are, for selfish reasons, anxious to stress the shadows in China's picture, we must seek another cause for the pessimistic utterances of bank managers, "Taipans," and Far Eastern newspaper editors. It is to be found, I think, in the fact that hardly a day passes without some heading such as :

" FIGHTING IN SZECHUAN,"
" GENERAL HSU'S TROOPS COMING SOUTH,"
" BRIGANDAGE IN HUPEH,"

appearing in the European Press. A foreign newspaper in the Far East is often nothing more than the waste pipe of a printing office,¹ and consists, in most cases, of one page of Reuter's telegrams, one page of re-hash from English and American papers three to six weeks old, and masses of shipping advertisements. The only Chinese news printed is the sort which can appear under a heading which may conceivably arouse a flicker of interest in the mind of the average resident of a Treaty Port. Such news is news of fighting or brigandage. When it is published, there is nothing to indicate its importance relative to the affairs of China as a whole ; concerning these latter, the average Treaty Port resident is astoundingly ignorant. In 99 per cent of cases its relative importance is extremely slight. Nevertheless the cumulative effect of the only kind of Chinese news the Eastern residents are offered, is considerable. He forgets (if he ever knew, and, as a general rule, often tested and proved by the present writer, the longer he has been East the less he knows²) that military operations in China, even when dignified with such titles as "North versus South," are conducted on lines of strategy which would arouse amazement in the mind of a staff college graduate. Newspapers, telegrams, and letters circulate freely. Railway systems, sometimes much, sometimes little, disorganized by troop train movements, continue to function. River steamers, on the whole, continue to make regular passages up the West River³ and Yangtze. Sometimes they are peppered a little by troops who are not at the moment under control. Merchants move freely to and fro.⁴

¹ "The North China Daily News," and the "Peking and Tientsin Times" and the big Japanese papers must be excepted from this generalization.

² "Et donc ce n'est pas parmi nos marchands, si longtemps qu'ils aient été établis en Chine, que l'on trouvera sur le pays des renseignements qui l'éclairent, une compréhension de sa vie, mais parmi nos missionnaires qui eux, vivent avec simplicité et humilité dans l'intimité du Chinois."—Hovelague, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

³ But in 1922 the fighting in the South did completely disorganize the West River services for several months.

⁴ It is only right to mention that this statement would be denied by many people. It is admittedly an arguable proposition as to what may

It is the rule rather than the exception for military opponents to negotiate before, and during any military operations which may take place. For example, Sun Yat-sen, claiming the leadership of the South, is theoretically a rebel as far as the Peking Government is concerned. Nevertheless his agents will move and live freely in Peking without let or hindrance.¹ Similarly, representatives of the Peking Government will go freely on business to Canton. In January, 1923, Foochow was in the hands of a General who supported Sun Yat-sen. Sun Yat-sen was then in Shanghai, whither he had been driven by Chen Chiung-ming. The General in Foochow, who claimed to control the Province of Fukien on behalf of Sun Yat-sen, was thus in opposition to the Canton Government under Chen Chiung-ming, and the Peking Central Government. The Peking Government had sent down Admiral Sah—he happens to be a K.C.B.—as civilian Governor of the province. He arrived to find Sun's General in control. He merely took up his quarters at the Naval Club in the centre of Foochow and awaited events. Some Chinese gunboats, over which Admiral Sah had control, were at Pagoda Anchorage on the Min River, carrying out a really strict blockade of arms to prevent the "rebel" troops in Foochow from strengthening their

be "freedom of movement." Several persons of considerable experience in China have criticized this sentence, but, weighing up all the information at my disposal, I am convinced that it is right to leave it as it stands. To-day (February, 1924) I have had another mite of evidence confirming my opinion. A gentleman, writing as the correspondent of the "North China Daily News"—a newspaper never backward in describing the chaos in China—says: "It would seem that those who undertake to make reports upon the state of the country, whether consular, mercantile, or other grouping, should be particular regarding the section referred to, for in spite of the rumours of "the lawless condition of Szechuan, in at least this country, all foreigners have been able to go about their usual work without fear of hindrance for the past several years. Wherever there has been fighting there has been lawlessness, but there are large sections of Szechuan where there has been neither for a long time." It is worth noting that this observer has lived in Szechuan for twenty years. The Province of Szechuan is repeatedly being described in the European Press and in the Treaty Ports as an outstanding example of chaos.

¹ In January, 1921, a representative from the Canton Government was in Peking protesting to the Legations that Canton's share of the Maritime Customs should be paid direct to the Southern Treasury. He was not hindered in any way by the Peking Government. From 1919 to the spring of 1920, 86.3 per cent of the Maritime Customs surplus went to Peking, and 13.7 per cent to Canton. When the disturbances of 1920 drove Dr. Wu Ting-fang to Shanghai, the 13.7 per cent was withheld. The diplomatic body finally approved of this percentage being distributed as follows: 50 per cent to pay for Chinese Legations, 25 per cent to Canton Conservancy, and 25 per cent Plague Emergency Measures and National Loan Service.

position. In these circumstances one might suppose that Admiral Sah's position as a resident within about two miles of the Yamen which sheltered the "rebel" General whose troops swarmed all over the city, was one of some danger.

Obviously it was not, and the only answer seemed to be, though admittedly it is no answer, that these events were taking place in China. Admiral Sah admitted that he had been inconvenienced to the extent that one of his chair coolies had been commandeered by the military for transport work. (At least 100 coolies were being commandeered every morning by gangs of soldiers), but the Admiral added: "I expect the General and most of the troops will go away soon." Which, sure enough, they did.

To quote another instance of the Gilbertian system.

When the Yunnanese troops "captured"¹ Canton, acting supposedly for Sun Yat-sen, who was then in Shanghai (February, 1923), he telegraphed the appointments of certain people to various posts. His nominees were arrested by the invaders, and the European Press talked of Sun Yat-sen's counting his chickens before they were hatched, and the danger of inviting outsiders into Kwangtung. Nevertheless, within a fortnight Sun Yat-sen was on his way down to Canton, where he received an ovation.

It is not with any wish to minimize the fact that grave confusion and a state of disorder which is deplorable are existent in China, that these qualifications are mentioned. It is only to warn the reader that, due to a variety of circumstances, some excusable, some not, the news about China circulated through European channels paints the Chinese picture in too gloomy a set of colours. It is difficult, but it is necessary, to get the internal confusions into their proper relationship to the workings of this vast and ancient social machine called China. Personally, I conceive the matter by analogy on the following lines:—

I suppose the continent of Europe to be theoretically a single State, known, let us suppose, as the Union of Europe. To this conception I apply the existing state of affairs in Europe (1923). Turkey, Greece, and the late Allied Powers verging on war. The French in occupation of the Ruhr and virtually at war with Germany, her relations with England becoming strained. Bulgaria in a ferment of which her neighbours are gravely suspicious. Russia, a giant question mark for future answering, exchanging ultimatums with England. Ireland slowly simmering down after two years of considerable fighting. England, more or less normal—the model province, comparable to that of Shansi in

¹ The actual capture was quite bloodless. Chen Chiung-ming and the Kwangtung troops walked out and the Yunnanese walked in. Many of the Kwangtung troops then walked back again.

China. Italy just entered under the autocratic yoke of Fascism, and domineering Greece by bombarding and seizing Corfu. Now, arguing from one point of view, a dark and gloomy picture can be drawn of European affairs, of armed conflicts, actual and potential, of economic chaos, of tyrannies and misgovernments arising from the political grouping of Central Europe, which came out of Versailles but which no thoughtful person contemplates with equanimity or believes to be permanent. And yet, from another point of view, it cannot be denied that, whatever may happen in the future, Western civilization is still at present more or less functioning in its original home. One can send a letter, a telegram, or pay a visit to any European Capital, subject, it is true, to irritating regulations. One can do business, again with more or less difficulty, in any European country. Just so in China. Three times during the last two years bandits have held up trains; once they held up the Paris-Constantinople express as it would have been in the Union of Europe. There has been one considerable campaign, involving, perhaps, 150,000 troops and two provinces. There have been a number of minor fightings, linked together by interminable and complicated negotiations between military leaders, but at the same time trade has increased and travel in China is nearly as safe as in Europe,¹ bearing in mind

¹ Since writing this chapter I have come across some remarks made by Mr. Barton, C.M.G., H.M. Consul-General at Shanghai, who speaks with very considerable authority, not only by virtue of his position, but also on account of his great ability as a student of Chinese affairs. Speaking of the thirty-sixth annual report of the Christian Literature Society for China, he commented upon "its note of hopefulness, and its tale of progress." He continued with the remark that he had just (October, 1923) returned from a trip through a good deal of China, and he could not help feeling that the survey was justified in its hopefulness, in spite of the conditions which appear on the surface.

"I saw a good deal of the actual state of the chaos and civil war now prevailing, but in spite of that I think the hopeful view is justified, because, if you look, even cursorily, at the country in which all these upheavals are taking place, you cannot help being struck on the surface, at any rate, by the actual and visible marks which have been left on the people and the country itself. I arrived in Chungking (principal town on the Upper Yangtze, S.K.H.) after that city had fallen as a result of a siege lasting three weeks. It is a very large city, and there were something like eight Generals in it, but one could not help noticing how little effect the war had had on the life of the people as a whole. All the shops were open and every one was going about his business more or less normally. Perhaps they were accustomed to this sort of thing, but it shows how small a portion of this great country actually is affected by the upheaval."

To these remarks of Mr. Barton's, I would like to add this comment: I have read a great many statements emanating from missionaries and I have been much impressed by the general strain of optimism which runs through them, and by optimism I do not mean that the missionaries conceal

that by Europe I mean all Europe and not only the West. Sir Edward Backhouse, than whom few speak with greater authority, though he differs from the generally pessimistic utterances of the experts, has written :—

“ The consolidation of each new dynasty occupied at least a generation of internecine turmoil and relentless strife, beside which the vicissitudes of the Republic assume their proportionate insignificance, and yield a full hope for the future.”

To me, these words seem prophetic wisdom.

the existence of disorders, but they do seem to me to put the chaos in its proper perspective in the Chinese picture. These missionaries who live and work amongst the Chinese all over the interior, in places often far removed from Treaty Ports, almost invariably speak Chinese, and are undoubtedly in a position to obtain accurate information as to the internal conditions of the country. Yet, how rarely are their observations studied by the European merchants in China, and I would add, by many of the “ experts ” who interpret the Chinese jig-saw puzzle to the outside world. The mere fact that a man is a missionary is sufficient to damn him in the eyes of many ignorant and self-satisfied persons. I have personally observed this fact on several occasions. I would urge all who desire to really find out the truth about China to make a special point of ascertaining the views of the missionaries and co-ordinating the output from this most important source of information with that from other sources.

CHAPTER VI

THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF JAPAN

"It matters not what you are thought to be, but what you are."

—PUBLIUS SYRUS

FROM the Restoration to the present time is a period during which the domestic politics of Japan have passed through one phase and entered another. The first phase endured from about 1868-84, and the events of those years, though interesting historically, are very slightly connected to those of the second phase, or what I shall term the modern era in Japanese politics.

To the first phase belonged such institutions as the Sanshoku and the Daijowkwan, and the archaic governmental system of which they were part. The system by which the clan leaders endeavoured to replace the Shogunate was supposedly based on the type of administration which existed in Japan in the pre-Shogun days of the ninth and tenth centuries, and, like all Japanese institutions of any antiquity, it was of pure Chinese origin. When slightly modified and applied to a Japan which was starting along the road to Westernization, it failed; about the year 1880 the clan leaders realized that if Japan were to be thoroughly modernized her form of government must also undergo reorganization.¹

In 1884 a Bureau to study Constitutional Reform was established, and the present era in Japanese politics had begun.

In this Chapter and its successor it is proposed to examine, in some detail, the present state of Japanese politics, and for this purpose it will be necessary to probe into the past and review the events of the last forty years.

Japanese politics, for reasons which will be mentioned in due course, are not easily understood by English people, and the reader is advised to refer from time to time to the chronology of political

¹ For details of the administrative system during the first half of the Meiji era, see Transactions, A.S.J., Vol. 42, part 1, "Japanese Government Documents."

events in Japan ;¹ this will be found of assistance in keeping the sequence of events in mind.

There are certain factors in connexion with Japanese politics which must first be considered before one can proceed to narrate events. One of the most important of these factors is Shinto. This is the peculiar national "religion" of Japan upon which the national morale is officially founded. It is so different from anything encountered elsewhere in the world to-day (though its parallels can be found in ancient history) and its meaning is so imperfectly understood by Europeans, that I have devoted a separate chapter to an account of Shinto. Another matter of great future importance which is treated in a chapter of its own is the question of the growing Labour and Socialist movement. A third point of note is the question of terms. It is customary and convenient in writing of Japanese politics, to employ certain terms which have a definite meaning in English politics. Examples of such terms are: "Party Politics," "Cabinets," "Premier," "Political Party," and "Opposition."

The reader must be prepared to find that there is a very wide difference between the meaning he is accustomed to attach to these expressions and the meaning they bear in Japan. The explanation of this irritating fact will be obvious in due course.

Then there are the "Genro," or "Elder Statesmen." They have been, and still are, an extra-constitutional body of men which arose from among the clan leaders who brought about the restoration and inaugurated the task of modernizing Japan. The only official authority they ever enjoyed was derived from an Imperial Rescript despatched from time to time to certain veteran statesmen; the Rescript declared that its recipient was a "Genro," or "Elder Statesman." Of recent years it has come to be considered that if a statesman leads two administrations that fact qualifies him for Genroship.

In the past the Genro, notwithstanding their unofficial status, have been omnipotent. They have been the real rulers of Japan, exercising their power from behind the shadows of the semi-divine throne. They act "from behind the sleeves of the Sacred Dragon." The Chinese flavour of this expression is of interest. It is a phrase taken from the political writings of Mr. Hiroshi Saito, M.A., and is a quaint illustration of the not unimportant fact that in every branch of Japanese life the ultimate origin of things is to be found either in Chinese culture and philosophy, or in borrowings from Western civilization.

Technically speaking, the "Genro" advise the throne as to

¹ See p. xvii.

whom shall be called upon to form an administration. If English politics were run on Japanese lines, the English Genro to-day would consist, in all probability, of Lord Balfour, Lord Rosebery, Mr. Asquith, Lord Stamfordham (representing Court influence), Lord Haig, Lord Beatty, and Lord Curzon. Mr. Lloyd-George might be expected to be what the Japanese call a "Quasi-Genro"; that is to say, anxious to get into the ring but not entirely acceptable to its members.

Although to the outside world the Genro have always appeared to be a sacrosanct body of superbureaucrats whose secret decisions moulded the destiny of Japan, in actual fact they have had their internal quarrels, as will be explained in due course.

The preceding paragraphs have been written in the past tense, but though the Genro are greatly reduced in numbers, all that has just been written is broadly speaking, still true to-day. As the hand of death thinned the ranks of Genrodom, and as popular opinion rose and fell against their subterranean activities, so from time to time the Genro ostensibly gave ground, but they are still the big hidden force in Japanese politics. At the moment of writing (November, 1923), the surviving Genro are Prince Matsukata¹ and Prince Saionji. There is also the present Premier, Count Yamamoto, who is now in charge of his second Ministry, and, according to the Saionji and Okuma precedents of 1912 and 1916, this fact will qualify him for Genroship. All these men are over seventy years of age. There are also persons whom the Japanese call "Minor Genro," or "Quasi Genro." At present, Viscount Kiyoura,² President of the Privy Council, Count Hirata, Keeper of the Privy Seal, Viscount Makino, Minister of the Imperial Household, and Viscount Iriye, Grand Chamberlain, are gentlemen who are sometimes called by this title, and who ran about between the two major Genro at the time of the last political crisis when Admiral Baron Kato died.

Before temporarily leaving the Genro, for they re-appear again and again in any survey of Japanese politics, it is worth considering what were the causes which led to the creation of this peculiar political institution.

They were several. Many writers have commented on the curious predilection of the Japanese for what they themselves call "Shadow Government"; the Japanese seem to like being ruled by "powers behind thrones." The Restoration theoretically replaced the Emperor as the *de facto* ruler of a united and centralized Japan; actually he remained in seclusion, and power resided in the clan statesmen. There is a close analogy between

¹ Died 1924.

² Succeeded Yamamoto as Premier, see p. 145.

the position occupied by the Shogun in relation to the Emperor during the Middle Ages and that occupied by the leading clansmen in regard to their daimios towards the end of feudalism. To the same analogy belongs a comparison between the position occupied by the Genro towards the Diet and the Emperor in modern times, and the position held by the leading Tokugawa clansmen towards their Shogun as the Shogunate began to decay. Japanese history abounds with instances in which the power has moved downwards whilst the original source of authority has been carefully retained as a façade behind which the real executive forces could function in sheltered seclusion.

A second reason leading to the formation of the Genro can be attributed to the Westernization of Japan. There is a well-known truth in the statement that for the rapid and determined execution of a policy an autocracy is a more efficient machine than a democracy; for this reason all Governments, even that of England, become less democratic in time of war, for war is a condition of affairs calling for rapid decisions and hazardous ventures.

When Japan began her period of Westernization she entered upon a form of existence which had much in common with a form of war; it was a period of grave emergency. There was, however, one feature in the Japanese situation which was peculiar. In Japan there was no democratic form of government already existing which the clan leaders had to over-ride in order to act despotically and hasten forward their policy. It was easy, necessary, and natural, for the rulers of Japan to be autocratic. They could, and did, change their policies with impunity, secure in the knowledge that the people, politically negligible, bewildered and blinking at their emergence from the twilight of feudalism into the glare of Western civilization would do as they were told with sheep-like fidelity. The only dangerous possibility lay in dissension amongst the leaders. It took a decade for this possibility to be realized. It is now necessary to touch upon another matter in Japanese politics, which, though unpleasant, is of great significance.

This is the matter of the corruption which permeates Japanese political life. W. W. McLaren, writing of the events in the early days of the Meiji era, says: "Two characteristic features of Japanese political life stand out clearly, the corruptibility of the officials and the susceptibility of the Government to displays of mob violence;" and again he says: "The history of graft during the Meiji era, when some day it can be written, will form an interesting parallel to the eighteenth century in England. Between the two stories there will be one curious difference, however, for in Japan there was little, if any, sentiment against dishonesty

in public life. With such a public sentiment, the result, both of feudal tradition and Chinese philosophy, there is nothing remarkable in the all but unbroken uniformity of the practice amongst the highest officials of starting life in comparative poverty and dying millionaires." Though McLaren was writing of the last half of the nineteenth century the situation has not changed. When Okuma died in 1921 estimates were actually published in the Press of the amounts he had received from certain commercial interests who subsidized him. It is also a fact well known to everybody in Japan that certain leading politicians, who shall here be nameless, are subsidized by various big firms. The average Japanese looks upon this procedure much as an Englishman looks upon party funds. Perhaps not a very admirable feature, but nevertheless a necessity. The corruption permeates downward from the leading men into the lesser ranks of officialdom, and the average election in Japan is a most scandalous proceeding from an English point of view. A typical Japanese comment is of interest:—

"In Japanese politics reason counts for nothing and power is everything. Moreover, those who are acquainted with the actual conditions obtaining in Japanese election circles can easily see that the introduction of manhood suffrage will not purge elections of these evils, and that it will not cause popular wishes to be more respected in the Diet. The chief reason for this is that the Electoral Law is not properly administered in this country.

"In Japan those in power can play fast and loose with elections with impunity, and this scandalous state of affairs will not be a whit improved under the manhood suffrage system." (But the "Yomiuri," from which paper these remarks are quoted, seems to forget that the wider the suffrage the more expensive corruption becomes.—Author.) "The Premier and the Home Minister issue instructions to their subordinates at the time of elections, and the Governors, the Police Chiefs, and other local authorities do their best to get the pro-Government candidates elected by foul means. Indeed, in some extreme cases, it would appear that elections are not decided by the people, but by police officials. Official interference is most marked in the rural districts. Pressure is brought to bear upon the ignorant and powerless provincial electors to influence their votes." ("Yomiuri" leading article. Trans., J.W.C., 26 October, 1923.)

It is probable that all political affairs are tainted to a varying degree, for they reflect human nature, but why so corrupt in Japan? The question is worth answering.

Undoubtedly the Oriental races have for a very long time shown a tendency to be broadminded in the matter of perquisites of office, or "squeeze," as it is commonly referred to in the East,

The Eastern man does not seem as yet to have fully grasped the Western conception of government as being, in its ideal form, an art divorced from commerce and personal profit, and having as its reward, abuse on earth and—one hopes—benefit in the next existence coupled perhaps, with posterity's tardy recognition.

So much may be peculiar to the East, but it is true of all parts of the world to say that if the Government of a country is closely concerned with, or directly interested in, commerce, then the political life of that country tends to become impure.

As soon as the State becomes concerned in such matters as preferential tariffs, monopolies, subsidies, State-owned banks, railways, steamship lines, or factories, the occupants of administrative posts become subject to temptation to manipulate legislation in the special interests of certain commercial concerns. This is one reason why it would require men of a very high morality to administer a socialist state in an upright manner.

Political life in England was never cleaner than during the latter part of the Victorian era, when all Government interference in commerce was tabu and free trade ruled supreme. The necessary inter-mixture of Government and industry which took place during the World War cast a faint cloud over the spotlessness of which all Englishmen are so proud, in that there were at times grounds on which some elements of a case accusing the Government of being influenced by oil and financial groups could be made out. It is the writer's personal conviction that these charges were absolutely baseless, but t'were better they had never been made. In the United States political life is far from pure. The lobbying by the Big Interests at Washington is notorious, and the scandals in connexion with the American Shipping Board are recent history. In the United States of America the system by which, on a change of administration, many of the civil servants are displaced leads to corruption.

In the Dominion of Canada somewhat similar causes have produced like results, and many Canadians deplore the fact that the standard of political life in their country is low.

Finally, there is the case of China. In this country it is in many cases frankly a matter of pure business. Under the Empire there was no concealment whatever of this fact, and at the present time Tutchuns in the provinces and Cabinet Ministers and members at Peking are often where they are, simply for personal profit. Corruption is rife.

Now, if it be a fact that the inter-mixture of administration and commerce produces conditions favourable to corruption in public life, then the soil in Japan is extremely well prepared for the seed. It is difficult to find any enterprise in Japan on a large

scale which is not either openly or secretly official. The Imperial family is a large shareholder in the big steamship lines, which are virtually subsidized by the Government. Railways, tobacco, salt, and camphor are Government monopolies. An attempt to make sugar a monopoly was only defeated by the exposure in the Diet of the fact that the Dai Nippon Sugar Company was bribing members to press for monopolization at a time when the company was only too anxious to sell out in order to cover heavy trading losses. The immense organization of the South Manchurian Railway Company is a Government concern. We shall have cause to examine its peculiar position in regard to the Government in a subsequent chapter.

The great banks are so closely connected to the Government that a microscope would be required to detect the dividing line. Many large industrial concerns are in a similar position. Thus it comes about in Japan that when the leaders are out of office they are kept by the "Big Interests," and when they get into office they return thanks in a manner most appreciated by their friends. There is no mystery about this fact in Japan, and the names of the leading political people, together with their patrons, the big firms, such as the Mitsubishi Company, the Mitsui Company, etc., are frequently coupled together in the columns of the Japanese Press. The lesser men in politics follow the example of the leaders, which explains the curious fact that whichever party is in power at the time of a general election, it is sure to obtain a majority. This phenomenon will be further discussed later on, and some remarks made thereon in the Diet will be quoted. The corruption in Japanese politics has been dealt with at some length, for it is probably the most important feature in the politics of that country at the present time. It is also the greatest handicap under which she suffers in her slow progress towards a truly democratic Government, with parties actuated by political principles and genuine policies.¹

¹ "Cette vénalité est la tare de la vie politique japonaise. Elle n'atteint pas seulement les politiciens et l'électorat. La corruption est générale; les chefs de partis, les grands seigneurs, les plus grands noms du Japon n'y échappent pas: de retentissants scandales l'ont prouvé. Jusqu' alors les représentants des clans étaient détestés, on les croyait intègres; les révélations de 1914 et surtout de 1915 ont montré que l'honneur de leur lignée n'empêchait pas ces chefs d'être des escrocs."—Hovelague, "Le Japon."

* * * * *

See also on this subject of corruption the last chapter in McLaren's excellent book, "The Political History of Japan in the Meiji Era." As Hovelague, himself a somewhat ardent admirer of things Japanese, regretfully remarks on page 260 of his book, "Les faits qu'il (McLaren on

Since this corruption is so prominent a feature in Japanese politics, it is not surprising to find that in Japan, politics and politicians occupy a low position in public esteem. It would however, be a mistake to attribute this fact entirely, or even largely, to contempt; it is due as much to indifference as to anything else. The conduct of the Lower House in the Diet is not such as to raise its prestige. Turbulent scenes are the invariable accompaniments to the annual impeachments which are launched against the administration by the minority parties, and the professional interrupters, known as "Yagi," continually create uproar. Mr. Osaki Yukio, the veteran Liberal, has described the Diet as a "Saru Shibai," or "performance of monkeys." The Press monotonously asserts that the Diet is useless. A typical comment was voiced by the "Nichi Nichi," an independent and popular paper, at the close of the forty-fourth session. It wrote: "We are more convinced than ever that the Diet at present is a private assembly of personages called members and chosen through the formality of elections, and that it has nothing to do with the entire life of the nation."

The lack of political consciousness amongst the Japanese masses is a noticeable feature in the subject now under consideration. It is not surprising that there should be this deficiency, since political consciousness, and such matters as the appreciation of having a vote, are things which are evolved and cannot be artificially created. In England, political institutions grew largely as a consequence of pressure from below; they supplied a demand. In Japan, as we shall see, they were imposed from above upon a slightly bewildered people. The agitators who pressed for reform, and by their efforts did much to bring about the inauguration of so-called Constitutional Government in Japan, were in no sense representative of a large body of opinion amongst the people. It is only quite recently in Japan that the political institutions which were given to the country have produced an intellectual echo amongst the people; the note of this echo is not always pleasing to the ears of authority.

In concluding this introductory chapter on Japanese domestic politics, an observation will be made on the subject of the so-called political parties in the country. In the next chapter their careers will be described and proof will be afforded of the statement now to be made. It is this: That in Japan, perhaps more than any

corruption) avance sont malheureusement indiscutables." Moreover, the most cursory study of the proceedings of the Diet during the last few years will reveal the astounding extent and frequency of this corruption, together with little indications of its diminution, or the growth of any public opinion which might eradicate it.—S.K.H.

other country, political parties are grouped around personalities, and are not based upon principles.

Finally, the reader is warned that this chapter and its successor are complementary. They were originally amalgamated, but reflection convinced me that it would be best to write two chapters of which the first must be considered as supplying equipment with which the better to attack the second.

CHAPTER VII

THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF JAPAN (*Continued*)

“ I would say that civil liberty can have no security without political power.”
—C. J. Fox

I

IMMEDIATELY after the Restoration, and until 1874, the coalition of Western clans which had overthrown the Tokugawa Shogunate remained in supreme control and busied itself with the policy of abolishing feudalism, stamping out its traditions, and generally paving the way for that process of Westernization of which the clan leaders realized the need if they were to prevent their country from coming under the control of foreign Powers. A study of what was taking place in China at this time convinced them that this was no imaginary danger.

In 1874 the coalition split. The issue revolved around the question of Japan's foreign policy, for there was a peace and a war party amongst the clansmen. The latter favoured an aggressive policy, and advocated a war with China as the best settlement of certain outstanding disputes between that country and Japan ; they also considered that a foreign war would have a good unifying effect upon the nation, and provide employment for the restless samurai class, who were chafing under the inactivity of the times, and looked back with longing eyes to the good old days when the cultivation of the martial spirit and the pursuit of arms were the main objects of a gentleman's existence. The peace party was led by Okuma and Itagaki, and after a lengthy struggle it triumphed, and for some years Japan's foreign policy was non-aggressive. In this schism in the clan bureaucracy is to be found a principal cause of the Satsuma rebellion, which broke out in 1877.

As early as 1874 a few advanced thinkers had raised their voices in protest against the extremely bureaucratic manner in which the country was being administered. It is not libelling the memories of these men to say that though some of them were advocates of a democratic form of government by conviction, many of them were chiefly moved by jealousy and dislike of the

bureaucrats in power. In 1881 Okuma, who for many years had been one of the foremost agitators against the SATSUMA-CHOSHU clique decided to come out into the open. Although he was actually a member of the administration at the time, he suddenly made public exposure of what has come to be known as the "Kaitakushi Hokkaido Colonization Scandal." The details of this scandal are of no present-day importance, but they were sufficiently startling to create a sensation and bring much odium upon the Government, of which Okuma had been made a member in order to keep him quiet. Okuma accompanied his bold move by a memorial to the throne in which he prayed for a Constitution and a democratic form of government to be operated through a Parliament.

His gamble failed, for he had under-estimated the strength of the forces against him. Nevertheless, the SAT-CHO clique were beginning to realize that it was impossible to Westernize the country, and leave its form of government out of the melting pot.

At this period an immense amount still remained to be done, though the modernizing process was in full swing. The Japanese Empire had yet to be created, and the Army and Navy, tools designate for this work, were still lamentably crude and weak. Treaty Revision was not yet accomplished. A mercantile marine was undergoing the throes of birth. Banking on modern lines had just started; the first commercial company was only seven years old in 1880, and at the same date about a hundred miles of railway had been constructed under foreign supervision. These few examples, which could be multiplied almost indefinitely, illustrate sufficiently the formidable nature of the task which still confronted the few men who ruled Japan during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Since all progress that Japan had to make must necessarily be imposed from above and could not arise from an inward consciousness on the part of the nation, the bureaucrats felt that whatever they did to the Government in outward form, the real power must remain in their hands until the country had outgrown its period of tutelage. So far as the immediate exigencies of the situation were concerned, they were right; but their policy was fraught with grave danger for the distant future. The leaders of Japan erected a grandiose structure upon mental foundations which might not stand the weight, and certainly did not apprehend the consequences of supporting such an edifice. In the West the material side of civilization has progressed as a result of, and in response to, intellectual advancement. In Japan the process has been reversed; there the problem at the time we are considering was

how to transform the Government and yet keep the centre of power unchanged.

The hands of the SAT-CHO clique were forced by Okuma's plot, and they decided to cut the ground from beneath the feet of their critic. They did so by causing the Throne to state in its reply to his memorial for a Constitution that this instrument would be granted to the nation in ten years' time. This important document was dated 12 October, 1881, and it is very likely that its terms were in the mind of the Empress Dowager of China when she drafted the edict of 27 August, 1906 (see p. 50). The reply from the Throne was a heavy blow to Okuma's ambitions, since they were certainly refrigerated for a decade by a decision from which there could be no appeal whatsoever.

The period from 1881-89 was marked by preparations on the part of both the reformers and the bureaucrats. Although the latter had made some concession by promising a Constitution, they had qualified it in their own minds by certain conditions to which they resolutely adhered. In the first place they were determined that the rate of progress towards Parliamentary Government would be set by them. The Liberals attempted to hasten matters; the bureaucrats introduced repressive measures; this in 1883. During the next year there were riots and disturbances, whilst in 1887 an extremely severe Press Law was promulgated, and the newspapers found it necessary to have dummy editors, who earned their salary by living in prison. It was also in 1887 that the "Peace Preservation Regulations" were passed, and the administration carried out a *coup d'état* against many noted Liberals, who were rounded up and forbidden to live within fifteen miles of Tokyo.

Meanwhile the opponents of the clan statesmen were not idle. In preparation for the coming battle in Parliament, Itagaki and Goto formed the JIYUO (Liberal) party, and Okuma formed the KAISHINTO (Progressive) party.

These parties were not based on any principle, unless, indeed, the desire for power be a principle, and their unity depended upon the centripetal attractions of the personalities around whom they were grouped. In justice to these parties it must be remembered that there was in Japan no body of public opinion to whom they could appeal, and from whom they would receive support; secondly, the bureaucrats maintained a stony silence as to the nature and scope of the forthcoming Constitution. The parties which were being formed to do battle in the Diet were kept in ignorance as to the place that institution would fill in the coming dispensation, and what its powers would be. Concurrently with these events, the SAT-CHO bureaucracy pursued their policy with inflexible

determination. Neither the repressive measures they felt obliged to promulgate, nor the activities of the agitators caused them to modify their plans.

In 1884 a special bureau in the Court, under the direction of Ito, was established. Its purpose was the study of constitutional reform; its location was significant and indicated that any modifications in governance would come from the Emperor, sole source of power and privilege. In order to obtain information regard to constitutional reform, a mission, led by Ito, had been despatched abroad. It returned, having been greatly attracted and impressed by the personality of Bismarck, and the ingenuity of his system of governance, which appeared to combine the outward semblance of democratic government with the inward reality of bureaucratic power.

In the judgment of the SAT-CHO leaders, such a system was exactly suited to the needs of Japan, for though these men realized that a change was needful, they had no intention of allowing that change to affect the focus of power, and in the German system they saw their ideal.

In 1884 five orders of nobility were created, thus providing a source from which members of the Upper House would be drawn. The new titles were conferred on the ex-samurai, especially those belonging to Satsuma and Choshu, the ex-daimios, and the kuge (Court nobility).

In 1885 certain edicts were promulgated, and a kind of Cabinet, called the Naikaku, was established. The ostensible motive for these acts was declared to be the fact that the Emperor had then reached an age when he could adequately exercise personal rule. This Cabinet was made solely responsible to the Throne. Side by side with the production of these shadows of coming events, the Westernization of Japan in all things material proceeded apace.

In 1889 an imposing scene was staged in Tokio; the Emperor, surrounded by officials, generals, and admirals, promulgated the long-advertised Constitution. The harmony of the proceedings were somewhat marred by the assassination of the Minister of Education on the morning of the ceremony. He had given offence to the reactionaries by being too liberal in his tendencies.

His Majesty proceeded to the ceremony through deep masses of respectfully silent and wondering people. The gathering dispersed, and the great deed was accomplished. The semi-divine ruler of a race chosen and privileged by the gods had been pleased to give his people a written Constitution and a Diet with Upper and Lower Houses. There were conditions. To the Emperor alone was reserved the right of initiating amendments in the

Constitution. His also the power to dissolve the Diet—a power which was to be used freely during the next forty years. The power to issue decrees having the force of law during any period when the Diet was not in session was reserved to the Throne, and, since the Diet does not assemble for nine months of the year, this was an important reservation. No opportunity was lost of emphasizing the great powers of the Emperor. Prince Ito, in his commentaries on the Constitution, which he had largely designed, wrote:—

“Article 13 is to state that the Emperor shall dispose of all matters relating to foreign intercourse with the advice of his Ministers, but allowing no interference by the Diet.”

And again he wrote:—

“The legislative power is ultimately under the control of the Emperor, while the duty of the Diet is to give advice and counsel.”

The Emperor promulgates his wishes by means of an Imperial Rescript. It is a document absolutely above criticism, for it is the voice of a Being who, by his divine descent, is the head of every Japanese household; it is also the voice of a temporal Emperor to whom loyalty is due; it is also the voice of GOD.

Finally, it is noteworthy that the nominations of the life members of the Upper House were disposed of by the Throne, as were also all appointments to high administrative posts. The Cabinet Ministers were individually responsible to the Emperor, and not to the Diet.¹ The Throne retained power of peace and war, and, being the head of the fighting services, the Emperor was directly accessible to the Chief of the General Staff, who could short-circuit the Cabinet.

These things are unchanged to-day. In fact, as a precautionary measure, the bureaucrats deemed it advisable to further buttress their position by passing regulations which confined the portfolios of the Army and Navy to the ranks of service men. The latest pronouncement on this subject was made by Admiral Takarabe (Minister for the Navy), who said in the “Osaka Jiji” of 1 December, 1923: “Should the portfolios (of War and Navy) be thrown open to civilians it is inevitable that the posts would be filled by party men—the more so because there is now much talk of party politics.” At the same time (in 1894) the Governor-Generalships of the Colonies were confined to the same class, though, of recent years, this has been modified, since the present Governor-General of Formosa (Baron Den) is a civilian.

¹ By Article 7, “Regulations for the Organization of the Cabinet,” translated from the Hochi in J.W.C., 23 January, 1922.

So far as the Diet was concerned, the chief power conferred upon it was that all Bills had to pass both Houses before being presented for the Imperial assent. But, lest this law should give the Diet too much control over administrations, it was enacted that if any Budget be rejected, then that of the previous year automatically came into force.

The full text of the Constitution is to be found in Volume 42 part 1, of the "Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan," and an illuminating insight into the bureaucrats' interpretation of the document is obtained by reading the commentaries on the Constitution by Prince Ito. This last work may be regarded as 100 per cent official, since Ito more than any one man was responsible for an instrument whose reactionary tendency he was bitterly to regret.

II

In July, 1890, the first general elections were held in Japan, the franchise then extending over 11 per cent of the population. This figure has since risen to about 6 per cent (excluding the inhabitants of Korea and Formosa, who have no votes). The Yamamoto Cabinet of 1924 were credited with the intention of abolishing the ¥3 tax qualification, and introducing manhood suffrage, but this hope was not realized.

The elections resulted in the radical followers of Okuma and Itagaki, i.e. members of the Kaishinto and Jiyuto parties, being returned in a majority.

The Throne had ordered Yamagata to form an administration, and he at once found himself in a difficult position. There was no Government party; there was a turbulent mass of "Opposition." The only consolation afforded to the administration was the fact that the various members of the opposition disliked each other in private with a venom fully the equal of their publicly expressed distaste for the Sat-Cho bureaucrats.

The Kaishinto and Jiyuto had no principles, they were grouped around personalities who hungered for the spoils of administrative office.

In these circumstances, Yamagata, destined to become the high priest of Japanese militarism; a man of cunning, of indomitable will and infinite patience; a man whose reputation had been made by his discovery at the time of the SATSUMA rebellion that a conscript army capable of overthrowing the samurai troops of the rebels could be made from the "Heimin" class, came down to the Diet and presented his Budget. It was bitterly attacked by the Opposition, who were now beginning to realize that the

long-awaited Constitution and its appendages were useless as weapons with which to assault the bureaucrats. They had hoped for bread ; stones were their portion. Yet there was one thing they could do, they could irritate, obstruct, and abuse. These things they did with a fury born of disappointment. Yamagata reflected. He could have dissolved the Diet ; he could have hushed the clamour by the grave words of an Imperial Rescript, but there were wheels within wheels.

It was a time when the question of Treaty Revision between Japan and the Powers was becoming acute. The eyes of the Western world were fixed with interested attention upon the political experiment in Japan, their ears were filled with assertions from their nationals in Japan, who were imploring their home Governments not to abandon extra-territoriality. Such being the situation, the bureaucrats asked themselves whether it was advisable to coerce this first session of the new-born Diet. Obviously, the impression abroad might be deplorable, it might easily delay Treaty Revision. Yet the Budget, or at any rate a Budget, had to be passed. There was a third method, and Yamagata adopted it.

He bribed. The Budget passed.

The " Outs " of the Opposition were jubilant ; it seemed that if sufficient pressure was exerted, the " Ins " of bureaucracy could be made to part with some bread. Events were soon to show that the " Outs " were unduly optimistic. The Sat-Cho bureaucracy had merely burrowed slightly in order the better to erupt. This became evident during the next session when the Lower House resumed its obstructionist tactics and was promptly dissolved.

Yamagata was succeeded by Matsukata.

At the ensuing general election the bureaucrats decided to run some candidates, but failed to secure a majority.

The third session of the Diet was remarkable for a financial dispute between the Upper and Lower Houses. The Throne issued a Rescript deciding the matter in favour of the Peers. In the fourth session the Opposition again attacked the Budget, but on this occasion the device of the Imperial Rescript was employed in order to silence criticism. In the fifth session (1893), when Ito was at the head of an administration, the Opposition to Government business became so riotous that Ito resigned. The Throne refused to accept his resignation, the Diet was twice suspended, and finally dissolved by Imperial Rescript.

There was only one event which would silence the outburst of the Opposition and that was a foreign war. This came about in 1894 ; during its progress all was peace in the Diet. The Sino-

Japanese War is of importance in Japanese politics in that its outbreak definitely marked the resurrection of the military party's influence, which, as we have already seen, had been temporarily defeated in 1874. The Treaty of Shimoneseiki, which concluded the war, was considered to be unsatisfactory by public opinion in Japan, whilst the Tri-partite intervention which robbed Japan of many fruits of victory, further inflamed the passions of the mob ; on these grounds the attacks upon the administration in the Lower House were resumed. It is not proposed to run the risk of confusing the reader by describing the events of each session of the Diet. Some notes on the various sessions will be found in the chronology of political events in Japan. Generally speaking, the bureaucrats adopted one of two courses in their treatment of the Opposition. First they examined the possibility of securing the support of one of the Opposition groups, but if this method failed, and the Lower House persisted in its resistance, it was dissolved. Matters went on in this manner with the Satsuma and Choshu cliques taking it in turns to form administrations until 1898, when two events of importance took place. In that year Yamagata formed the Supreme Military Council, and upon the resignation of Ito and the dissolution of the twelfth session of the Diet, the retiring Premier advised the Throne to call upon Itagaki and Okuma for an administration.

Having said this much, it is necessary to go back a little in order to discover the inner meaning of these events.

It has already been mentioned that the Sino-Japanese War indicated an accretion of power to the military clique, which from this time onwards, until his death in 1921, was centred on the personality of the late Prince Yamagata.

Immediately after the Sino-Japanese War the militarists began to work for the expansion of the fighting forces in preparation for the war with Russia, which they held to be inevitable. They were not without opponents, of whom the most important was Ito. The Opposition parties in the Lower House were also opposed to the militarists, but their opposition was merely part of their general antagonism towards and their jealousies of, the Sat-Cho bureaucracy.

With Ito it was a different matter.

Exactly when the divergence of his views from those of Yamagata became an open breach is not certainly known to me. They were both Choshu men, both great pillars and creators of modern Japan, both great bureaucrats. But there came a time when Ito came to the conclusion that Japan's future would be best planned on lines of peaceful progress and expansion. It is interesting to note that his Liberal tendencies appear to have grown more

pronounced with advancing years, a curious feature in his career which was noticeable up to the day when his assassination at Seoul Station in 1911, closed the long struggle between him and Yamagata.

In 1898 Ito definitely joined issue with Yamagata, the occasion for the dispute was as follows: After nearly eight years of Parliamentary experience, eight years during which the Diet had been five times dissolved by the Throne, it became obvious to the Opposition groups that if ever they were to shake the grip of the Sat-Cho clique, an essential preliminary was the creation of a united front against the common foe. Up to this time the SATSUMA and CHOSHU groups had formed administrations with monotonous regularity. Between 1885 and 1898 the list of First Ministers in the Cabinet reads as follows: Ito (Choshu), Kuroda (Satsuma), Yamagata (Choshu), Matsukata (Satsuma), Ito (Choshu), Matsukata (Satsuma), Ito (Choshu). It is a striking instance of the strength of the jealousies amongst the Opposition parties that so obvious a move in political tactics as a coalition took so long to mature.

However, in the summer of 1898, Okuma and Itagaki, leaders of the principal Opposition groups, managed to come to terms, and coalesced under the name of the Kenseito party.¹

When Ito resigned in 1898 he advised the Throne to invite the Kenseito to form an administration. Yamagata bitterly opposed this concession to the forces of what masqueraded under the name of "Liberalism" in Japan, but Ito wielded immense influence, and his policy prevailed.

The Kenseito were in an embarrassing situation. The alliance was only five days old when the Imperial invitation was received; to have refused it on the plea of unreadiness would have been a fatal confession of weakness, yet both Okuma and Itagaki probably realized that the offer of power was the lure of a dangerous trap. They decided to form an administration, and the first party Government of Japan came into existence.

Before considering its brief career it will be advisable to describe the motives at the bottom of Ito's actions. They may have been one of two. He may have hoped that the Kenseito coalition would endure and be available as a strong Liberal party in the Diet with which to counter the militarists; more probably he realized that by forcing the agitators to accept power and respon-

¹ When Okuma and Itagaki coalesced in order to form the Kenseito, Okuma described the Sat-Cho clique which monopolized the administration as "a virtual Tokugawa regency, which, acting in the name of the Emperor, really prosecuted its own designs and increased its own powers."

sibility he would drive them to destruction upon the rocks of their own jealousies and so pave the way for other schemes he had in mind.

At the general election, which immediately succeeded the formation of the Okuma-Itagaki alliance, the Kenseito obtained 259 seats out of 300.

This remarkable event was the first occasion on which the public was treated to a phenomenon subsequently to become commonplace. This "phenomenon"—not unknown in other countries—can be defined as "that series of events due to which the administration which is in power at the time of the general election, and therefore organizes this event, invariably secures a majority."¹ The Kenseito now seemed assured of a prolonged period of power, but the unwieldy proportions of their majority was a source of weakness. The centrifugal forces within the party, which, from the outset had thrown an intense strain upon the bonds of union, increased in strength; there were bitter quarrels as to the division of spoils amongst the 259 open-mouthed Kenseito men; within six months the administration collapsed. A cause contributory to its fall was the resignation therefrom of Mr. Ozaki Yukio, Minister of Education. He had the audacity to make a speech in which he criticized the material outlook of the Japanese, and in order to illustrate his argument, he allowed himself to speculate as to the type of man who would be elected to the Presidential chair if Japan became a Republic. This flight of imagination incensed the clan statesmen and the Court party, by whom it was considered to be a reflection upon the royal family, and Mr. Ozaki Yukio was driven from office.

The collapse of the Kenseito left the field open to the clan bureaucrats, and particularly to the Yamagata group. Yamagata formed an administration, but even this arch-reactionary became convinced that it would simplify matters if the Government could rely on the support of a party in the Diet. A quaint extract from the semi-official "Japan Year Book" (1921 edition), shall continue the narrative:—

"The Yamagata Ministry that was next formed obtained the support of the Kenseito, to which was rewarded, in a disguised form of bribery as sale of Government forests and lands, but the Government posts to partisans (i.e. Kenseito men—*Author*) was closed by a new civil service regulation."

The fall of the Kenseito and the subsequent bribery of its

¹ This phenomenon failed to appear for the first time in April, 1924, when the rump of the Seiyukai, under the name of the Seiyu-Honto was badly beaten at the elections although it was the official party of the Kiyoura administration.

members were the visible political sensations of 1898 to 1900, but below the surface of events matters were shaping in readiness for the second round of the struggle between Yamagata and Ito, the stake at issue being the control of Japan's destiny.

Yamagata was now in power and the next move came from Ito.

The Kenseito having failed—whether in accordance with his expectation or whether to his disappointment is not certainly known—he decided to form a personal party.

He opened, as it were, the subscription lists to a party which was christened the "Rikken Seiyukai" (Association of friends of the Constitution). The issue was heavily over-subscribed, the majority of the Kenseito hastening to avail themselves of this unique opportunity of serving beneath the banner of one of the leading clan bureaucrats, whose personal friendship with the Emperor Meiji Tenno was well known, and whose power and prestige certainly equalled, perhaps still excelled in 1900, those of Yamagata.

Ito fully realized the magnetic attractions of his offer, and insisted upon the adherence to a rigid party programme of all Seiyukai men. This programme was based on two principles. The first was rigid obedience to Ito; the second was an unswerving devotion to the terms of the Constitution. Though the second of these principles ran counter to all the Liberal reforms which the Kenseito had declared to be so necessary, such for example, as the need of making the Cabinet responsible to the Diet, these anomalies were ignored by the place seekers. The formation of the Seiyukai brought about the resignation of Yamagata, but during the thirteenth and fourteenth sessions the leader of the militarists had succeeded in passing measures which increased the expenditure on the fighting services.

Ito formed an administration which was supported in the Lower House by the solid *bloc* of the Seiyukai, which henceforward became the official party of bureaucracy. As we shall see, the alliance between the Seiyukai and various administrations has not always been constant. Sometimes the administration has paid considerable attention to the party, whilst at other times it has almost ignored it. Only twice have the Seiyukai been in a minority in the Diet.

The fifteenth session of the House saw the administration heavily attacked by the Peers, who strongly objected to the spectacle of a bureaucratic government apparently "supported" (to use a Japanese political expression) on a political party. In May, 1901, Ito was obliged to resign. He was brought down by the Yamagata clique operating against him through the House of

Peers, and his resignation marked the final failure of the chief protagonist of civil as opposed to military control of the bureaucracy. There was irony in this failure. Ito possessed complete control of the Lower House, but he could not prevail against the unconstitutional forces at the disposal of Yamagata; he was helpless because the Constitution emasculated the Diet. It was so designed that the Lower House could not directly bring down administrations; the corollary existed. The Lower House was equally powerless to buttress an administration once it had incurred the hostility of the bureaucrats. For this Constitution, Ito, more than any other single man, was responsible. There is a certain fascination in speculating as to what effect would have been written on the pages of history had Ito triumphed over Yamagata, for upon the results of a divergence of views between two men, important in their own country but relatively speaking unknown elsewhere, great consequences depended. Ito and Yamagata both foresaw the possibility of war with Russia, but whereas Yamagata eagerly prepared for the collision, Ito dreaded it, and believed that the conflicting interests in North Asia of Japan and Russia could be reconciled by mutual agreement. There is also good reason to suppose that Ito had formed the opinion that the system of government in Japan needed to be democratized in parallel with the Westernization of the country; Yamagata held that the only way in which to modernize the country as quickly as possible was by keeping all power centralized in a small body of bureaucrats. When Ito fell, General Katsura formed an administration. Katsura was Yamagata's henchman and ardent disciple, until certain events shortly to be described, caused him to oppose his patron.

The next event of note occurred in 1903 when Ito, as the President of the Seiyukai, ordered the party to support the administration during the eighteenth session of the Diet. Though Ito had been fighting the Yamagata clique whose representative Katsura, was the Premier, he realized in 1903, that war with Russia had become inevitable, and he was too single-minded a patriot to allow his country to be unprepared for such a conflict when a word from him might materially assist the preparations. His fiat was not unchallenged, and sixty members of the party refused to obey orders and broke away from the Seiyukai. Two months later Ito resigned from the Presidency of the Seiyukai, and was succeeded in that office by the Marquis Saionji. Ito was simultaneously elevated to the Privy Council, an honour which effectually closed his career as a party politician. The hand of Yamagata was suspected of being at the bottom of this matter.

The Treaty of Portsmouth was considered by the Japanese public to be a bad treaty, and riotous protests took place. Katsura resigned, and the Marquis Saionji formed an administration. This event was principally due to the fact that it was the turn for a period of power of the Satsuma interests in the Sat-Cho clique. At periodic intervals there were general elections and on each occasion there were many election scandals, and the Seiyukai as invariably obtained the majority of the seats. The minority were divided amongst small groups and "independents." The Seiyukai policy continued to be that of "supporting" the administrations in return for what they could get. In May, 1908, Saionji resigned, and was succeeded by Katsura. This second Katsura administration lasted for the exceptional period of three and a half years, during which time Korea was annexed. In August, 1911, Saionji formed an administration, Katsura having resigned to "renovate the spirits of the people." The Saionji Cabinet lasted until December, 1912, when it was forced to resign as the direct consequence of an attempt it made to defy the military party. The Yamagata and Choshu clique demanded the creation of two new army divisions, which were to be stationed in Korea. The financial condition of the country was unsatisfactory, and for this reason, amongst others, Saionji resisted the demand. His Minister for War, General Uehara, promptly resigned; no soldier dared take the vacant post without a pledge that the Two Division Bill would be passed; the Cabinet remained incomplete, and Saionji fell. He was succeeded by Katsura, and there then occurred a series of incidents, mysterious at the time, and not wholly understood even to-day.

The first event was an outburst of popular indignation—skillfully worked up by the Seiyukai—against the Genro. They were accused of bringing to ruin a popular Premier in the person of Saionji, and their appointment of Katsura was bitterly criticized. The Diet was violent, newspaper offices were wrecked by mobs, and in February, 1913, Katsura resigned. To the uninitiated it appeared as if public opinion had brought about his fall, and in one sense this was true, but below the surface events of much importance and significance had taken place.

Unknown to the outside world a tremendous quarrel raged in the secret councils of the Choshu and military groups. Katsura, for many years the faithful satellite of Yamagata, decided to gratify his personal ambitions by forsaking Yamagata and supplanting that man as chief of the Choshu and military faction. Whether Katsura secured the Premiership despite Yamagata, or whether he only rebelled after he secured office is not certainly known to me. The manner of his revolt was thus: he decided

to emulate Ito and form his own personal party.¹ He created the Doshi-kai by the usual methods, and for a moment appeared to be supreme ; but he under-estimated the forces he was defying, and within a month he fell. The result of the whole business was, firstly, that the public thought they had brought about Katsura's resignation, as indeed they had, but largely at Yamagata's pleasure ; secondly, the Choshu clan's influence was so weakened by this schism within their ranks, that Satsuma secured the next administration much earlier than they would have done in the normal course of events ; thirdly, the personal position of the much-abused Yamagata was still further assured, and that largely by the efforts of the mobs, whose Press was violently criticizing his unconstitutional powers !

Admiral Yamamoto (Satsuma) formed a Ministry, but he, also, was unfortunate, though in a different manner. He incurred the hostility of the Peers ; he might have weathered the storm were it not for the fact that his enemies secured and revealed the details of some unsavoury naval scandals. It was clearly proved that some prominent officials and their wives had received bribes from foreign armament firms in connexion with naval contracts. These " Naval Scandals " created a profound impression in Japan, and the Yamamoto Ministry retired in disgrace, having failed to pass the naval estimates through a refractory Diet.

The Genro were now in a quandary. They consisted at this time of the following statesmen : Yamagata, Matsukata, Oyama, and Inoue. Saionji had hardly achieved Genroship, and his status was ambiguous.

In the eyes of the public the awkward manner in which the Genro had handled the last two political crises was deplorable, and their tactless behaviour had brought much abuse about their heads and concentrated attention upon their unconstitutional activities. The Genro were being denounced from all sides as being quite out of keeping with the spirit of the times.

The Choshu clan was exhausted by internal dissension ; Satsuma was in disgrace. The usual sources from which administrations were drawn were therefore not available ; in any case it was politic to avoid them for the moment. After casting about in several directions—Prince Tokugawa, descendant of the last Shogun, received an offer but declined it, whilst Kiyoura was also approached, but he declined because he could not get Admiral Kato into his Cabinet unless he promised the Navy three battle-ships, and no other admiral would serve—the Genro were at length driven into a very unorthodox quarter. They approached

¹ See p. 134.

Count Okuma. The "Sage of Waseda" (so-called from the University of that name which he founded) accepted with alacrity.

For sixteen long years he had wandered in the wilderness carrying with him the memories of but a few months of power ; no man loved power more passionately than he. During those sixteen years he had ceaselessly and with envenomed ability attacked the bureaucratic Sat-Cho clan leaders, earning for himself the reputation of a statesman whose liberal tendencies and advanced principles caused him to be rigorously boycotted by the bureaucrats in any distribution of awards.

At last his turn had come.

It seemed as if the Genro, hoist by their own petard, were coming in their extremity to the veteran political outcast. It seemed thus, but appearances were deceptive. There were conditions. The popular clamour of the preceding few years had in reality produced small effect upon the omnipotence of the Genro, it had merely driven their activities a little further underground. Count Okuma was only offered office on condition that he accepted the dictatorship of the General Staff, an acceptance which included the "Two Divisions for the Army Bill," and was in 1915 to include the twenty-one demands. He accepted office, for as he frankly admitted, what he said out of office and what he did in office were two quite different things. They certainly were.

As soon as he was appointed Premier, he appealed to the country. Allusion has already been made to the phenomenon by which the Government in control of the administration at the time of a general election always obtains a majority. In this case Okuma secured control of the Doshi-kai party (the monument to Katsura's ill-starred personal adventure). The phenomenon was invoked and the Doshi-kai defeated the Seiyukai and came in with a handsome majority ; at the same time sundry lesser groups were attracted to its standards by the prospect of spoils, and its name was changed to that of "The Kenseikai."

The first Government business was the passage of the Two Division Bill. No clearer example of the lack of principle in Japanese politics can be quoted than the fact that Mr. Ozaki Yukio, Okuma's new Minister of Justice, was in charge of the Bill in the Diet. Mr. Ozaki was Okuma's first lieutenant and a prominent Kenseikai man. He had been a leader against the Two Division Bill when the increase was first mooted. Yet even with this stain on his political escutcheon, a stain for which he has since publicly repented, Mr. Ozaki is probably to-day the foremost genuine Liberal of any influence in Japanese politics.

We shall have cause to mention him again later on, but that such a man could sink his principles—for he has principles on whose account he has suffered, and is suffering, politically to-day—is an interesting illustration of the overwhelming part played by the lure of office in Japanese politics. The Seiyukai were, of course, loud in their denunciations of this cynical change of front by the Kenseikai, but such complaints were all part of the game. The subsequent events of the Okuma régime continued to reveal the contrast between what the Kenseikai had promised to do and what they would do. It almost seemed as if some malicious imp had willed this contrast, for here was an administration whose leader had boasted his Liberal views and almost claimed political martyrdom on their account, carrying out a foreign policy on the continent of Asia more chauvinistic¹ than any embarked upon by administrations with which the Seiyukai had been intimate. The irony continued to the end, for the unpopularity which Japan earned amongst the Powers as a result of her attempt to obtain something closely resembling a protectorate over large areas of China at a time when the other nations were pre-occupied with the Great War, was the chief cause of the downfall of the Okuma Cabinet. Another cause was the revelation, during the 37th session of the Diet, that much bribery had been needed to grease the passage through the Lower House of the Two Army Division Bill.

When they lost office in 1917 Okuma and the Kenseikai made a strong effort to retain power. The Premier tried to create a precedent and nominate his own successor, which in this case, he suggested should be Viscount Kato, the President of the Kenseikai party. The Viscount had been Okuma's Foreign Minister at the time of the twenty-one demands, and had been jettisoned from the Cabinet towards the end of its career as a sop to the objections of the Powers to Japan's foreign policy. It would seem at first sight that Kato was a very natural person to become Premier since his party held a substantial majority in the Diet. The Genro thought otherwise, and, with sublime indifference to political majorities, they recalled from Korea the Governor-General Terauchi, whose administration of that colony had been of a markedly "blood and iron" nature. A great outcry arose against the Genro, but it had no influence upon them or upon the course of events.

It has been suggested that this revival of the militarist section in the Sat-Cho clique was not unconnected with the course of the Great War, which at this time was not moving in favour of the

¹ See p. 156.

Allies. During 1916-17 many articles were published in the Japanese Press, suggesting that Japan had backed the wrong horse in the war. The British Ambassador was moved to protest against the articles, which were disparaging the qualities of the Allied forces and exalting those of the Central Powers. The military group in Japan were pro-German, as might be expected from the fact that their training had been supervised by Prussian instructors, and their Staff system was modelled on that of Germany. For analogous reasons the Navy was pro-British.

General Count Terauchi appealed to the country, and the "mystery" was again invoked, but this time the Seiyukai were the chosen race of bureaucracy. The Seiyukai were returned with a handsome majority, whilst the Kenseikai went into opposition and regretfully assumed the mantle of champions of "truly democratic government and non-aggression in foreign affairs."

To what extent the Seiyukai have lived up to their principles as expressed when in opposition we have already noted in the survey of Japanese activities in China during Terauchi's administration. Suffice it to say here, that whereas Okuma and the Kenseikai used the bludgeon of the twenty-one demands, the Terauchi régime employed the more delicate but equally effective weapon of finance in the shape of the Nishihara loans and the Sino-Japanese military agreement.

The Terauchi régime lasted from October, 1916, to September, 1918, and its fall is a landmark in the domestic politics of Japan. It differs from the ruin of all the Cabinets before and after it, in that Terauchi was forced to resign by the pressure of public opinion. The people acted, not through their representatives in the Lower House, for they felt that as a vent for popular feeling that channel was useless; they employed a primitive method which, in Japan, produces more effect than in most countries; they rioted. They rioted so determinedly, they rioted in so many places, that it does not strain the truth to write that during the months of June, 1918, armed rebellion was existent in many parts of Japan.

These incidents are known as the rice riots, and their causes were primarily economic. Partly as a result of world-wide economic conditions, partly due to profiteering in Japan, the price of rice—the staple food of millions—rose to extravagant and unprecedented levels. Exasperated by the increasing difficulty of meeting the cost of living, irritated into action by the spectacle of the "Narikins" (New Rich), leading lives of senseless luxury, the masses formed themselves into mobs and began to loot rice shops. Originating in an obscure fishing village, the movement spread to large towns and rapidly crystallized into an outbreak

directed against the Government, which was felt to be responsible for the miseries of life. It was necessary to call out the troops, and many lives were lost during the encounters which took place. There were numerous executions.

The riots were crushed, for the Army remained true to its salt, but in September Terauchi resigned, in order to "mark his sense of responsibility." For the first time in the history of modern Japan the masses had spoken, and in a manner far from polite.

The Genro realized the immediate need for concessions to democracy. The Marquis Saionji had retired from the Presidency of the Seiyukai in June, 1914, and he had been succeeded by Mr. Hara, a journalist-politician of exceptional ability in party management. Mr. Hara was invited to form an administration, and he inaugurated a Government "supported" by the Seiyukai.

He was the first commoner to become Premier and naturally a great deal was made of this fact by those who wished to persuade the world that Japan was at last enjoying a really democratic Government. We are still too close to the events to appraise with accuracy the degree of independence from the Sat-Cho clique enjoyed by Mr. Hara. He was above all else a master of political tactics, and probably the best parliamentarian Japan has yet produced. Much of his energy was necessarily devoted to controlling the unwieldy mass of the Seiyukai, which of recent years has become unstable, owing to its size and the consequent unsatisfactory relation between "spoils" and "mouths to be fed." At heart Mr. Hara was probably a moderate Liberal; this means that in English politics he would have been a staunch Conservative. He was prepared to patronize certain reforms, but never at the risk of doing that which was not expedient. On one side of his balance sheet stands the increase in the suffrage with which he inaugurated his accession to office. This suffrage reform lowered the tax qualification to yen 3 a year and the franchise then covered 3,000,000 persons. The Bill was a clear echo of the "Rice Riots." Having done this much, Mr. Hara steadfastly resisted all the attempts made by the Kenseikai and Kokuminto parties to introduce universal suffrage. The Kokuminto party was then the third largest party in the Lower House. It has recently been reorganized as the Kakushin Club.

Mr. Hara further gained the approval of Liberal circles by being associated with two events which weakened the power of the Elder Statesmen. The first of these was a Court intrigue. It was, and is, referred to in Japan as "the very serious affair." The Choshu statesmen, led by Yamagata, endeavoured to prevent the Crown Prince (as he then was) from becoming betrothed to a

lady connected with the Satsuma clan. The Choshu people were defeated in what one newspaper described as a "disgraceful clan struggle on the steps of the throne," and Yamagata's prestige, as well as that of the Choshu clan, were much impaired. It is believed in well-informed circles in Japan that Mr. Hara had a great deal to do with the discomfiture of the Choshu clique, but the precise method he employed is uncertain, since great secrecy was maintained in the matter and a rigid Press embargo was enforced.

The second incident which impaired the forces of conservatism arose in connexion with the Washington Conference. Admiral Kato, the Naval Minister, went to America, and during his absence Mr. Hara assumed responsibility for the Navy Office. In fact, he was combining the offices of Prime Minister and Naval Minister at the moment of his assassination. By this combination on the shoulders of one man and a civilian, the rule was violated that the Naval and Military portfolios must be held by naval and military officers. When the War Minister was asked in the Lower House whether a civilian might not also take charge of the Army, the War Minister was at great pains to explain that though the Navy might survive the experiment it was unthinkable in the case of his service.¹ On the opposite side of Mr. Hara's balance sheet it is written that during his tenure of office Japan tried hard to retain Shantung, and the Siberian campaign was vigorously prosecuted. Also during his Premiership the liberty of the Press was restricted to an exceptional degree.

Mr. Hara died by the hand of an assassin; a deluded youth who thought he was being patriotic. The Press comments on this political murder, illustrated again, as they had done in the past, the existence in Japan of many people who consider that murder, when actuated by so-called "idealism," is in quite a different category from vulgar homicide. There have been many political murders in Japan, and the criminal has not infrequently become quite a popular hero. The attitude of the French public towards "le crime passionnel," is a mild example of the Japanese attitude towards political assassinations. Mr. Hara was succeeded as Premier and as President of the Seiyukai by Viscount Takahashi. When out of office Takahashi had written a pamphlet advocating a civilian Minister for War. When in office he was urged to effect this reform, but he protested that it was absurd to expect him to do in office what he had advocated as a private individual. This was a stop-gap administration. It incurred the

¹It is also doubtful whether Mr. Hara had any control over the operational section of the Naval Staff.

hostility of the Peers, who demanded its reorganization. Takahashi was unable to meet their wishes and resigned. The Satsuma wing in the Sat-Cho clique then took advantage of their predominant influence, and Admiral Baron Kato was invited to form an administration. He did so with a Ministry entirely composed of Peers.

This administration was officially described as a non-party Government, and its access to power placed the Seiyukai in an awkward position. During the Hara régime the party had exercised appreciable influence upon policy, but with Kato the position was different. The naval Premier posed as the bluff seaman to whom politics were distasteful, and he evinced no particular desire to make an alliance with any political party. To employ a Japanese expression, his Government was "transcendent" type, and "above all party." Probably a good deal of the expressed indifference was assumed for the purpose of bringing the Seiyukai to heel, for however "transcendent" a Government may be in Japan, it is certainly a convenience to have the support of the majority party in the Lower House. Moreover, this "support" is always in the market. After some chaffering, the Seiyukai managed to come to a working arrangement with Kato, though they loudly declared that he was insisting upon terms which were humiliating to their sense of importance as the majority party in the Diet. Kato cultivated the reputation of an honest and simple man. Honest he was; simple he was not. He was much criticized by the military clique for his concessions at Washington, but his enemies failed to realize that he had no alternative but to fall into line with the attitudes of the other Powers. Kato had the wisdom to give with both hands what he saw must in the end be abandoned, and ultimately Japan's strategic position was greatly improved by the Washington Conference. He was also abused by the militarists and reactionaries for his handling of the Sino-Japanese postal negotiations. The Privy Council, a retreat sacred to the most hide-bound conservatism, and a body of amazingly aged men, maintained that in certain clauses of the treaty he had compromised Japan's special interests in Manchuria.

Kato died of cancer. He continued to attend to affairs of State up to the end and died, as he lived, surrounded by simplicity.

The Satsuma clan were determined to retain their supremacy in Sat-Cho politics, and after the usual running to and fro of Court officials and quasi-Genro between Matsukata and Saionji, the aged survivors of the full Genro, Admiral Yamamoto (Satsuma) was invited to form an administration.

Another "above all party" Cabinet was formed, but it

contained two members whose personalities are of some interest. One was Viscount Goto, the other Mr. Inukai.

Viscount Goto, late Mayor of Tokio, Home Minister in the Yamamoto Cabinet, is an exceedingly versatile and able politician. He suggests something of Mr. Winston Churchill's inclination to be a man of many offices; one is also reminded of Mr. Lloyd George's reputed affection for expediency. For two years he had been advocating recognition of Soviet Russia; apparently he negotiated with Mr. Joffe, as the unofficial agent of the Japanese Government. He is not tactful, nor does he suffer fools gladly. He seems to be a man who foresees that certain reforms are coming, and he intends to be the popular conjuror who shall produce them out of the political bag. Viscount Goto is a person whose career will repay attention to anyone interested in the future of Japanese politics.

The inclusion of Mr. Inukai in the Cabinet was remarkable because he is the leading member of the Kakushin Club—late Kokuminto party. The Kakushin Club poses as being a radical party, a stage more so than the Kenseikai. One of the ostensible reasons for its recent reorganization was the need of a party which should concentrate on the task of bringing about true parliamentary government. It was generally considered in Japan that Mr. Inukai could hardly have accepted office without satisfactory pledges that certain reforms of which he is supposed to be an ardent supporter would be carried out. One of these is universal suffrage.

The appointment of Count Yamamoto as Premier was not at all well received in Japan, and there would have been much hostile criticism against this latest example of the power of the clan statesmen had the earthquake not temporarily silenced all domestic controversy. The Yamamoto administration was literally born during disaster; the Premier was in the act of interviewing his supporters in the Naval Club when the building came down in the great earthquake of 1923.

Hardly had Yamamoto settled himself in the saddle than he caused considerable surprise by virtually declaring war on the Seiyukai party. He did so by dismissing no less than thirteen prefectorial governors who were known to be pro-Seiyukai. The Seiyukai, who have been very shaky internally since the removal of the master hand of Mr. Hara, were taken aback by this sudden intimation on the part of the Yamamoto "transcendal government" that they were not prepared to "lean" on the majority party. It seems likely that Yamamoto relied on the hope that in the December, 1923, session of the Diet the majority party would not dare to oppose legislation required for earthquake

reconstruction. In this event the Cabinet would secure the necessary support for their measures without having to give the Seiyukai the customary *quid pro quo* in the shape of "spoils."

The Yamamoto Cabinet was, however, destined to have but a short existence, and that for no less a cause than an attempt by a young student to assassinate the Prince Regent. The Cabinet immediately resigned "to mark its sense of responsibility," and, after some delay, Viscount Kiyoura (President of the Privy Council) obeyed the command of the Throne and formed a Cabinet.

The Kiyoura Cabinet was "Pure Bureaucrat." Its clan complexion was Choshu and its members were mostly drawn from the Upper House. At the time of its formation this administration could count on no support from any of the regular parties, and negotiations designed to secure votes in the Diet were at once begun. When the Diet met for its forty-eighth session in January, 1924, Viscount Kiyoura had succeeded in ear-marking for Government purposes a certain number of Seiyukai votes, but only at the cost of splitting that unwieldy party into two sections. The Kiyoura administration was so unpopular in the country that about half the Seiyukai men were doubtful as to the wisdom of hitching their political waggons to its star.

One hundred and thirty-seven Seiyukais decided to follow the time-honoured traditions of the party and support the Government of the day; the remaining 142 broke away and declared that they would oppose the Kiyoura Government. The 137 stalwart upholders of bureaucracy formed a new party called the Seiyu Honto; the rump of the Seiyukai under the leadership of Viscount Takahashi went into uneasy alliance with the Kenseikai (Viscount Kato) and the Kakushin Club (Mr. Inukai). Viscount Takahashi resigned his peerage in order to lead the Seiyukai in the Lower House. I hear that his son has assumed the title.

The change in political groupings which took place are shown by the following figures:—

	1923.	1924.
Seiyukai	280	142
Kenseikai	102	103
Kakushin Club	43	43
Seiyu Honto	—	137
Koshin Club	25	23
Independents	9	11

As soon as the first three parties on the above list announced their intention of opposing the Government a turbulent session of the Diet was certain. For a brief period an unnatural calm

brooded over the political waters whilst the Crown Prince's marriage was being concluded with all the picturesque ceremonial of ancient Asiatic civilization. On 29 January there was a sensational return to modernism as the country was startled to learn that a determined attempt had been made to wreck the train in which the Opposition leaders were returning from Osaka to Tokio. The Diet met on 31 January in an atmosphere of intense popular excitement and in a building surrounded by 8000 police and several thousand troops. The crisis was precipitated when Mr. Hamada of the Opposition mounted the rostrum and ended a furious attack on the Government by accusing them of having been at the bottom of the train-wrecking episode. An uproar took place, and the Diet degenerated into a congested prize ring containing a mob of shouting, hysterical, and battling members. It is reported that the aged Premier had a narrow escape from a water jug which whizzed past his head. Eventually the police rushed in to restore order. The sitting was suspended for a few hours. When it was resumed the Premier announced that he had a message from the Throne. In a silence which was the more impressive by its contrast with the previous uproar, Viscount Kiyoura read an Imperial Rescript which declared that the forty-eighth session of the Diet was dissolved.¹

This dissolution is the eighth the Diet has suffered since its creation.

The Premier's action was a bombshell in the Opposition camp, and by putting members to the very heavy expenses of an unexpected election it was also a very severe punishment. The Premier's action illustrates very exactly the present state of development of Japanese politics. A certain degree of support by the Diet is essential to the existence of an administration, but the idea that the nature of an administration depends on the will of the Diet has not yet arrived in Japanese official minds.

The elections, held in April, 1924, resulted in a sweeping victory for the Opposition Coalition, who fought on a "Down with Bureaucracy" programme. The figures were:—

Seiyukai	98
Kenseikai	150
Kakushin Club	30
Seiyu Honto	119
Koshin Club (defunct)	—
Independents	66

¹ There are conflicting reports as to the actual method of this dissolution. In the "Tokio Nichi Nichi" Mr. Tagawa Daikichiro (a member) complained that the Edict was *not* read to the House.

At the date of writing (July, 1924) Viscount Kato has formed an administration.

The Kenseikai leader is chiefly famous for his connexion with the twenty-one demands of 1915, and neither his enemies nor his friends would describe him as particularly democratic, or "anti-Bureaucratic." He will undoubtedly have to angle for adequate support in the next session of the Diet, and with the probability that this support will have to come from Seiyukai and Kenseikai he will have to select his bait with rare judgment. The "Asahi," writing after the election, estimates that: 148 members were for the Government (including 29 Independents) and 301 against it (including 23 Independents). That these two naturally hostile groups will long remain in double harness without kicking each other is improbable. The elections certainly revealed the continual growth of a spirit amongst the electors hostile to the Sat-Cho clique and clan rule by aged bureaucrats from behind the sacred screen of the Throne, but, as explained in Chapter VI, democratic government, as that term is understood by the British, is still at the end of a very long vista in Japan. It is a vista which has several turnings, and the present tension between the U.S.A. and Japan does not tend to bring the distant vision into better focus.

III

The preceding section has been chiefly devoted to a narrative of events, and no mention has been made of one or two matters of interest which should not be ignored in a survey of Japanese domestic politics.

One of these is the Genro, or rather the question of their replacement. It may be asked, "Is their replacement necessary?" Technically, and from a constitutional point of view, the answer is "No." From a practical point of view the answer is "Yes." As matters stand, some persons or person have to advise the Throne on the subject of issuing invitations to form an administration. There are two groups of persons which appear to be intriguing for this honour. One is the Privy Council, the other the House of Peers. The urgency of the problem has been slightly reduced since Yamamoto's appointment, for upon his resignation he attained Genro status. The general views of the Press in Japan upon the present state of politics in that country are interesting, and the following comments were made at the time when Admiral Kato was appointed Premier. I have selected this period because Kato's Government was the last one to be formed under normal circumstances before the earthquake.

The "Kokumin" said: "If the activities of the Genro are

essential to Constitutionalism, then Constitutionalism will soon die as the two remaining Genro are old men." After pointing out that in other countries when one Cabinet collapses another one is formed without the interference of Genros and bureaucrats, it continued: "In this country, however, all sorts of tricks are played by the Genro and bureaucrats at every change of Ministry; and political power is thus prevented from going where it should go. They are, therefore, enemies of constitutional government . . . it is doubtful whether they have sufficient energy or diligence to study the Press comments on current events."

The "Nichi Nichi" (Tokio) wrote: "The political circumstances in this country are so peculiar that the question of ministerial succession is often settled in a manner hardly comprehensible to common sense."

After pointing out that the continuance of the Seiyukai Ministry for four years had shown that a majority was essential in the Diet (the "Nichi Nichi" did not point out that any Government can always obtain the necessary majority by invoking the "mystery") the writer continued: "But the old-fashioned politicians are not yet cured of their old-fashioned ideas, and they must needs bring the tide of politics back to the former practice of bureaucratic governments—a Government carried on by a compromise with one party or the other." (It has never left this practice in Japan, except during the Okuma-Itagaki Coalition.—*Author*.) "The re-emergence of the bureaucrats at the present juncture will shake constitutional government to its foundations."

The "Nichi Nichi" then observed that there was an Opposition party consisting of the Kenseikai, pledged to manhood suffrage, reduction of armaments, price regulation, and the evacuation of Siberia; all these things were matters the Seiyukai had promised to attend to but neglected. No one knew what the real strength of the Kenseikai in the country might be, "but the Seiyukai should be magnanimous enough to let them try."

The "Yomiuri"—Japan's foremost Liberal paper—wrote as follows: "The key to the political situation has now passed completely into the hands of the Elder Statesmen. Party government in this country cannot yet stand upon its own legs. . . ."

It pointed out, in an editorial, that the Genro had entrusted Mr. Hara with power, and that Viscount Takahashi had handed it back to them, without suggesting a successor though he was supposed to lead a majority of 280 in the Diet.

In connexion with the Genro, the "Yomiuri" wrote that "They are entirely free to choose the succeeding Premier at their discretion; they think that power having only been entrusted to the Seiyukai for the time being, they are at liberty to get it back and give it to the bureaucrats. But as they have for some time

realized that political parties can no longer be entirely ignored, it seems their intention to form an intermediate Ministry now, so that a political party and the bureaucrats may take it in turns to form a Ministry. In this respect the interests of the Seiyukai are at one with those of the Genro. What the Seiyukai wants is not the establishment of party government, but the perpetuation of Seiyukai government."

After stating that it does not agree with much of the Kenseikai programme, the "Yomiuri" nevertheless considers that this party should be given a lease of power so that "power may be transferred from the hands of the Genro to those of the political parties." In subsequent editorials, this paper declared that the appointment of Baron Kato was largely the work of the Satsuma faction, which has always been connected with the Seiyukai, and, of course, with the Navy, which is predominantly Satsuma. It calculated that "by means of the Peers' Ministry the Satsuma faction has been resuscitated whilst the Seiyukai will continue to hold power without the show and responsibility thereof."

The "Jiji" wrote: "It is undeniable that the foundations of the new Ministry are irreconcilable with established principles . . . it is a constitutional retrogression." Of the Seiyukai it said: "The entire party has placed itself abjectly at the disposal of the Government, consenting to support Baron Kato unconditionally. When it was threatened with a divorce from power (after the fall of Takahashi) it put up with every humiliation and had no hesitation in offering its services to a Peers' Ministry."

The "Hochi"—being the Kenseikai paper—was, of course, extremely hostile to the new Government, which it described as a "strange monster." It asked what the world would think of a country in which there were 2,000,000 industrial workers but no trade union law; in which there was no manhood suffrage; in which as the spirit of democracy grew, so the Lower House of the Diet became weaker and the House of Peers stronger? It pointed out that Prince Ito in his "commentaries" emphasized that the function of the Peers was not to interfere in the formation of ministries, and yet after thirty years of constitutional government, though two great parties exist in the Diet, "the Government has swirled back from the Representatives to the Peers instead of passing naturally from one party to the other. Nor was that all. The majority party in the Diet had actually done its utmost to further the formation of a Peers' Ministry." It concluded one of its articles at this time with the remark that the Seiyukai "had shown itself an enemy to constitutional government upon which it had left a dirty spot, having been run away with by its passion for power."

According to the "Miyako" (usually referred to as the Geisha's paper, but, curiously enough, very acute articles on political matters often appear in its columns), the absence of Seiyukai men in the Ministry is part of a deep plan on the part of that party, who intend to regain their strength under cover of the Peers' Ministry, and then endeavour to replace it by one of their own. The "Miyako" commented strongly on the fact that nearly all the leading papers considered that as a matter of principle the Ken-seikai should be given a turn in power.

The "Tokio Asahi" considered that the new Ministry was quite unconstitutional.

The "Chugai Shuo" (the leading commercial paper) described the Ministry as being composed of Kenkyukai and Koyu Club people (these are two political groups in the House of Peers), with an element supported by Seiyukai, whilst the whole thing was influenced by the Satsuma faction.

The "Chuo" (the Seiyukai organ) seemed to have some difficulty in doing its duty, and rather weakly said that the new Ministry was a necessary evil in the present state of Japan's political development.

The preceding extracts from the leading Japanese newspapers would be more interesting if the Press of that country had an influence corresponding with its large circulation. This it has not. Its lack of power is shown by the frequency with which suppressions are carried out, and the wide scope of "news embargoes,"¹ against which the newspaper men are constantly

¹ Hovelaque, in his "Le Japon," quotes Sidney Greenbie, "Japan, Real and Imaginary," for the following facts: Press suppressions during the administration of the so-called Liberal Okuma amounted to 1927 (including cinemas). During 1916-17, under Terauchi, they amounted to 391. The most recent instance of the extreme control exercised by the Government over the propaganda of news which came to my notice took place after the recent earthquake, when for a week all commercial telegrams in code were forbidden, presumably for fear that derogatory stories about the post earthquake situation should get abroad. The greatest hardship was caused to foreign firms and individuals by this extraordinary procedure, for which no logical justification could be found. The Government simply got into a kind of panic, and, as a consequence, took refuge in secrecy. A most rigid embargo was enforced on all news in connexion with the murders of Koreans and Socialists, with the consequence that all Japan was humming with the most exaggerated accounts of what was, in all sober truth, a most unpleasant history. This censorship is not without its humours. A couple of years ago a certain Mr. Bin, a Korean on a mission to Japan, was assassinated at Tokio by a fellow-countryman, who considered that Mr. Bin was becoming too friendly with the Japanese Government. A Press embargo was announced, and for a number of days all references to Mr. Bin's corpse were couched in the Press as if he were still alive. The body was returned to Korea for burial and "Mr. Bin was seen

but ineffectively protesting. The comparatively small influence wielded by the Press in Japan is chiefly due to the lack of principle actuating the policies of the large papers. They are consistently inconsistent. The "Yomiuri" is usually Liberal, but sometimes has outbursts of Jingoism; on these occasions it almost reads as if the regular Liberal-minded editor is on a holiday. The Press is for ever abusing the Seiyukai and the bureaucrats, but it does not inquire into the causes which have produced the Seiyukai and enabled that group to dominate the party stage for so long. The chief of these causes is corruption in public life. Until this defect in Japanese politics is reduced to manageable proportions, it is difficult to see how party government in the English sense can be brought about.

Though in outward form Japanese politics bear a partial and superficial resemblance to English procedure, the facts already described make it plain that there is actually very little in common between the two systems. Since however, Governments in Japan undoubtedly fall, there must be some causes producing these periodical effects and these will now be considered.

In a general way it is true to say that an administration falls in Japan when it loses "face." The term "face" is more commonly applied to the Chinese, but it is equally applicable to Japan. Japanese Governments are extraordinarily sensitive to riots, demonstrations, and public disorders; ebullitions of this nature are suppressed with an iron hand, but seldom fail to shake the Government in power. The Terauchi régime collapsed in order "to mark its sense of responsibility" for the serious rice riots of 1918. The fall of the Katsura administration of 1912 was largely due to riots in Tokio. A feeling goes abroad that the Government has lost "face," that the people "are tired, and need a complete change." When this impression gets strong, the Cabinet resigns. Okuma, having lost much "face" over his foreign policy, felt obliged to resign "for reasons of health," in 1917. The Diet has a slight effect upon the fate of ministries since when the above-mentioned impression gets widespread, the Lower House usually becomes obstreperous, and continued obstruction in the Diet leads to "loss of face." In 1924 the Diet became so obstreperous that it was dissolved. The Kiyoura Cabinet felt obliged to have elections owing to its unpopularity.

The Peers also have a considerable influence on the life of ministries, and there are signs that this influence is increasing. It was the Peers who insisted upon exposing the Naval scandals with which the Yamamoto Ministry was concerned, and it was off at the Tokio Station by many high officials in a special coach which had been reserved for his comfort," etc.

the Peers who demanded a reconstruction of the Takahashi Ministry, and when this failed the Cabinet fell.

The question of universal suffrage, or, more accurately, "manhood suffrage," is one which is a hoary annual in Japan. The franchise in Japan is not very wide, but, on the other hand, there is evidence that the political consciousness of the people in so far as it expresses itself in a desire for a vote is equally restricted. The present qualification is the payment of taxes of 3 yen per year, but many people prefer to escape this tax rather than claim a vote. As described elsewhere, a kind of political consciousness is growing amongst the masses, but it seems to be taking the line that the Diet and the political parties are useless as expressers of public opinion.

One of the most recent developments in Japanese politics is the formation of the Shokoto, or "Business Man's Party." Their leader is Mr. Muto Sanji, a very able and progressive capitalist, and the Managing Director of the Kanegafuchi Spinning Company. The programme of this party is very Liberal and of unimpeachable wisdom. Its future may be worth attention. The creation of the Shokoto brings the number of political parties in Japan up to five. In order of numerical importance they are: Seiyukai, Seiyu Honto, Kenseikai, Kakushin Club (late Kokuminto), and Shokoto. In 1923-24 the old Seiyukai split on the question of supporting the Kiyoura administration. That section which elected to follow the traditions of the party and support the men in power were reorganized under the name of Seiyu Honto (see also p. 145).

The fatal weakness of the first, the third, and the fourth from the days of their creation up to the present time has been their lack of principle; for this reason their prestige with the public, and consequently the prestige of the Diet, sinks lower and lower. It remains to be seen whether the Shokoto will prove the exception to this rule. In considering the future of Japanese politics it must always be remembered that despite the difficulties of appreciating the existence of a factor which the Japanese assiduously labour to conceal, both from themselves and from foreigners, it is a fact that a great deal in Japan is only a veneer thinly spread over the centuries-old traditions of feudalism. Sometimes, when the social structure is strained to breaking point, as during the frightful earthquake and fire disaster, the veneer cracks, and those with eyes to see obtain a glimpse of the undercurrents which are still running strongly below the surface of Japan's national life.

In Japan, as elsewhere, it takes more than the ordinances of bureaucrats to change these things; it can only be accomplished by the slow moulding effect of decades, perhaps centuries, of time.

CHAPTER VIII

JAPANESE POLICY IN CHINA SINCE 1911

“ Love thy neighbour as thyself.”—MATT. xix. 19

“ And ye shall hear of wars, and rumours of wars, but the end is not yet.”

—MATT. xxiv. 6

AT the time of the 1911 revolution, Japan, together with the other Powers, broadly approved and gave her blessing to the cause of Young China, though there is reason to believe that this approval did not represent her real sentiments.¹ But at that time Japan was one amongst many who were interested in China. She was not then in a position to air independent views, and she seems to have been mainly interested in consolidating her hold upon Manchuria and incorporating Korea into the Empire, for it was at this period that Japan annexed that country.²

With the outbreak of the World War, Japan's position in the Far East was transformed almost overnight. From being one of several members of the International Company for the Exploitation of China, she became the only representative of the firm. America, it is true, was not involved in the Great War, but on the other hand, the United States had never really approved of the methods of the aforesaid International Company and had salved her conscience, retained some of her prestige, and gained a little profit by adopting the rôle of a sleeping partner, whose hobby was the periodical reiteration of certain idealisms connected with a catchword about an open door. As we shall see, the preoccupation of England, France, Russia, and Germany by matters affecting their national existences obliged the United States during 1914-18 to take a more active interest in Far Eastern affairs than she had hitherto done.

Japan's position in August, 1914, was indeed remarkable. She suddenly found herself sole occupant of the stage, and was evidently uncertain what part to play. Should it be that favourite

¹ See p. 74.

² See p. 183.

soliloquy entitled "The Benevolent Neutral," or "Sitting on the Fence," or should it be "Comrades in Arms," sub-title "Down with Militarism?" Immense possibilities lay at the end of either piece. The Japanese attitude was of much interest to the two principal belligerents—the British Commonwealth of Nations and Germany. By the former, the intervention of Japan was not considered as being an unmixed blessing. The Australian nation, tenacious adherents to the White Australia policy, were not particularly anxious to have Japan as an Ally in war; they feared the consequences at the Peace Conference in connexion with German possessions in the Pacific; they feared that such an alliance might produce a change in the existing restrictions regarding the emigration of Japanese into white countries. But from another point of view Japan's intervention was desirable. Germany had a considerable naval cruiser force, and an important system of cable and wireless communications in the Far East. Owing to the richness of the British naval concentration in home waters, the combined force of the British China Squadron and East Indian Squadron was inadequate to ensure control of sea communications in the East, where flowed the China trade of great importance. There were also the matters of the Indian trade, the Australian trade, and, perhaps most important of all, the Australian and New Zealand troop movement across the Indian Ocean. Finally, there was the important trade down the coast of South America and the defenceless condition of the Canadian Pacific coast. If Japan intervened, her naval force was amply capable of countering the menace of the German Asiatic Fleet, but if she did not come into the war it would be necessary to strengthen British naval forces in the East. This would take valuable time, and would impair the strength of the all-important concentration in the North Sea, which confronted and held in check the German High Seas Fleet.

From the German point of view there was every advantage in keeping Japan neutral. But Germany had a Naboth's vineyard, a very pleasant vineyard, in Shantung; a vineyard which had been secured through the wisdom of a young Admiral, as he then was, called Tirpitz, who foresaw that he who held and developed Tsingtau would have his lips to a tap which would one day drain all the manifold riches of the great Province of Shantung. Faced with the two alternatives, Japan hesitated for a few days and then decided to take the vineyard.

Perhaps if Germany had not been so free with her "advice" to Japan in 1895, when Japan was proposing to stake out a few claims on the continent of Asia, Japan's attitude in 1914 would have been different, for not only in 1914 but during the war

almost to its end, the military party in Japan—Prussian trained—believed that Germany would probably prevail. As it was Japan declared war on Germany and forthwith landed an expeditionary force in China, well outside the zone of Germany's leased territory. A small British force co-operated. These troops were landed on 23 September, inside the German zone.

On 7 November Tsingtau fell, and here let a word be paid in just tribute to the achievements of Germany at that port. Tsingtau was the apple of the German overseas commercial eye, and with good reason. German enterprise, patience, and ingenuity achieved wonders of development, and the colonizers, after an initial period of unpopularity, became much esteemed by the Chinese, due to the wisdom of the German policy which in developing Tsingtau, sought the co-operation of the natives to an extraordinary extent.

When Japan took Tsingtau, there was born the Shantung question, which was to create an immense amount of ill-feeling between Japan and China, and, to a lesser degree, between Japan and the Powers. This matter was settled, at all events in its main outlines, at the Washington Conference of 1922. It arose from the fact that Japan, in her original statement, announced that she was taking Shantung in order to restore it to China. We shall discuss later what this seems to have meant if it be judged by Japan's actions, for, once established in Shantung, the Japanese vigorously pursued a policy designed to extend their influence in the province. They established troops as railway guards on the Shantung railway, miles inland, and even went so far as to place a garrison in Tsinan-Fu, the capital city of Shantung. Later on they opened up civil administrations outside the leased zone, but this business of permeating Shantung was as nothing to the events in the spring of 1915.

On 18 January, 1915, the Japanese Minister in Peking suddenly presented Yuan Shi-kai with the famous twenty-one demands, arranged in five groups.¹ These demands are printed in full in Appendix IV. A study of them, even without any knowledge of the economic importance of the special areas mentioned in the demands, leaves the impression that they represent an attempt on the part of Japan to establish a protectorate over China. They are almost unparalleled in their audacity when it is

¹ Without previously consulting Great Britain, as laid down in the Anglo-Japanese alliance, Japan made every effort to keep these negotiations secret, and when they leaked out she at first denied their authenticity. The Associated Press report was categorically denied by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. See, as authority, "An American Diplomat in China," by Paul Reinsch, Chapter XII.

considered that they were a communication between two Powers ostensibly on friendly terms. The Austrian note to Serbia which precipitated the World War was a modest document in comparison with the twenty-one demands. Though the text as a whole is astonishing, the most outrageous of all the claims were contained in Group V.

Even the Powers, deeply engrossed in the World War, were startled by this Japanese flourish of the "mailed fist." It was plain that if the Powers hoped to resume their commercial and political activities in the Far East at the end of the Great War the "open door" would be bolted and barred by these demands and the Western nations would be on the door-mat.

The President, Yuan Shi-kai, endeavoured to resist the Japanese, and the latter, as a result of protests from the Powers, consented to withdraw Group V, which, they explained, embodied "desiderata" rather than demands.

In consequence of this enforced retreat, a revised set of demands were presented on 26 April, viz. the originals less Group V. China endeavoured to negotiate, but her efforts were cut short by an ultimatum presented by Japan on 7 May. China was given thirty-six hours in which to produce a satisfactory reply, failing which "the Imperial Government will take such steps as they may deem necessary."

China gave in, for she was helpless.

China knew Great Britain to be sympathetic, but the fact that she was Japan's Ally in war made the British position one of extreme delicacy. She could only "advise" Japan, and Japan worried little about that at a time when the issue of the World War was in doubt. Later we shall note her attitude in 1916 when it seemed that the Allies were being defeated.

America might have intervened, she intimated her anxiety.

At the back of these demands were two influences. To the chauvinistic party which then controlled Japan's destiny, the times seemed propitious for a hastening on of those policies of territorial and political aggrandizement whose genesis and progress up to 1911 we have already considered.¹ Secondly, the Okuma Government in Japan, which had just come into power as a result of the elections of 25 March, judged that their position at home would be strengthened by a forward policy abroad.

Sheets of paper have been covered since May, 1915, in explanation,² denunciation, extenuation, and amplification of these famous

¹ See p. 61.

² For a conveniently accessible and remarkably plausible, but entirely partial, account of these negotiations, see the Article "Japan" in 1921 edition of "Encyclopædia Britt." The most of this Article is propaganda.

demands. The Japanese line of conduct, semi-official and private, has been to admit since, that the demands were somewhat extreme.

It is probable that could Count Okuma, his Foreign Minister Kato, and Prince Yamagata, have foreseen the perpetual belabourings their country was to receive with these demands as a stick, then they would never have been put forward. For example, Baron Shibusawa, one of the greatest and most influential of the industrial millionaires in Japan, made the following statement for American consumption when he was in Washington:—

“ I have never had any sympathy with the so-called twenty-one demands. I was frankly opposed to the high-handed methods of Japan in her dealings with China. And the famous demands visualized them with what might be called a brutal emphasis. *I do not hesitate to say that I am echoing the sentiment of an overwhelming majority of the people of Japan when I say to you that it is far from our desire that we should deal with our continental neighbours in such manner.* The demands were particularly distressing because of the time they came. They were not only unrighteous, but they had all the ear-marks and suggestions of being a cowardly act, utterly out of tune with the spirit of the ancient Samurai code or of the modern sense of fair play. And, as many of our foreign enemies and critics were sharp and quick enough to point out, they had an offensive odour of the treacherous act of a coward who presses a rigorous bargain on a helpless victim at a time when the whole of Europe was in a turmoil, when no other Powers in the world were in a position to protest effectively against the Japanese action. It was bad all round. *If the American people think that the people of Japan were behind the notorious demands they are wrong and grievously mistaken.*”

To those sentences which have been italicized, one can justifiably say, “ the truth is not in them.”

A study of the Press in Japan in 1915 shows that the Government had the people thoroughly well in line. Criticisms of the Government's policy were heard, but the Cabinet were criticized because, under foreign pressure, they withdrew Group V. The Japanese Government threatened war, and even mobilized two divisions. They would not have done these things in opposition to popular wishes—even in Japan. Further, when the Terauchi Cabinet fell in 1918, there passed a Cabinet which had continued Japan's “ forward ” policy in China during the two years it was in office, and it was succeeded by Mr. Hara's Government which professed a policy of “ hands off China.” But did that Government voice what Baron Shibusawa describes as the wishes of “ an

overwhelming majority of the people of Japan" by abrogating the 1915 treaties which arose from the twenty-one demands? They did not.

When, in 1923, the Peking Parliament sent a Note to Japan announcing the abrogation of the 1915 treaties on the ground that they were extracted by *force majeure*, the proposal received a flat refusal, and the Chinese had difficulty in submitting the Notes to the Japanese Foreign Office, whilst the Japanese Government expressed their disbelief that China would fail to recognize the "sanctity" of these engagements.

It will be noted that one of the demands, subsequently embodied in a treaty, was that the Japanese tenure of the old Russian leases be extended to 99 years. The Russians held the Peninsula of Kwantung on a 25 years' lease. This 25 years' lease is shortly lapsing, but under the 1915 treaty, Japan obtained a 99 years' extension thereof. It was on this matter that the Peking Parliament raised its voice. There is not the slightest doubt that to-day (1924) "an overwhelming majority" of the Japanese people would furiously oppose any idea of evacuating South Manchuria; the idea that Japan would at present voluntarily evacuate that area in favour of China is ludicrous.

In this connexion Count Uchida, in an interview published in the Osaka newspaper, the "Asahi," said that the Chinese National Assembly had voted for repudiation of the twenty-one demands treaty, and it was now under discussion in the Senate. Even if the Peking Government made a formal demand, the attitude of the Japanese Government, as of the nation, was already decided. "There was no reason for agreeing to the request. . . . Japan could not ignore her vested interests in that land. If the lease should be terminated, the amount that China would be required to pay to Japan as compensation for improvements would be too great a burden for her to bear in the present state of her finances." When the demand came, to which the Japanese Minister referred, it was met as he had foreshadowed. He said: "Japan will never consent to change or abrogate the treaties to which Japan and China were signatories in 1915. Japan will not consider retrocession, as Japan's position at Port Arthur and Dalny is fully understood by the Powers and there is no room for discussion or negotiation." ("Hong-Kong Daily Press," 12 March, 1923—Reuter's telegram.)

It may be as well here to give a brief analysis of the demands (see Appendix IV), but it must be remembered that the treaties which arose out of the demands were not exact copies of their source of origin. This difference will be pointed out in each case.

Group I. was embodied in the final treaty except for Article 2.

The question of the non-alienation of Shantung was made the subject of an exchange of Notes between Japan and China. In this Note the Chinese Government promised never to lease or alienate to a foreign Power under any circumstances any part of Shantung. The vital parts of Group I were Articles 1, 3, and 4, which practically gave Japan a free hand in the development of the Shantung province.

Group II.—Designed to consolidate Japan's grip on Southern Manchuria and increase her hold on Inner Eastern Mongolia.

In the treaty, Eastern Mongolia was omitted but was made the subject of an interchange of Notes. These Notes, from their wording, appear to have the binding force of treaties. Article 3 of Group II was omitted from the treaty. The remaining articles were either in the treaty or included in Notes.

Groups III and IV were embodied in Notes to which China agreed.

Group V.—With the exception of the Article on Fukien, this group was reserved for future negotiation.

In addition to the Notes already mentioned, which were for all practical purposes but appendices to the two treaties, the following Notes were exchanged¹ (there were thirteen Notes altogether—an unlucky number). Japan's Minister wrote:—

“1. I have the honour to state that, when the under-mentioned mines in South Manchuria (exclusive of the mining lots which have already been prospected or worked) have at an early date been examined and selected by Japanese subjects, permission to prospect or work such mines will be granted by the Chinese Government, but until the mining law becomes definitely operative, the practice at present in force shall be followed.

“PROVINCE OF FENGTIEN

<i>Locality.</i>	<i>District.</i>	<i>Mineral.</i>
Nin-Hsin-Tai	Pen-Hsi	Coal
Shin-Shi-Fu-Kon	”	”
Sha-Sung-Kang	Hai-Lung	”
Tieh-C'Hang	T'ung-Hua	”
Nuan-Ti-T'ang	Chin	”
An Shan Chan region	Liao-Yang to Pen-Hsi	Iron

“PROVINCE OF KIRIN

Sha-Sung-Kang	Ho-Lung	Coal and Iron
Kang Yao	Kirin	Coal
Chin P'i Kon	Hua-Tien	Gold

¹ See “Japan Year Book,” 1920-21, p. 472.

"2. If, in future, the Chinese Government desire to employ foreign advisers and instructors on political, financial, military, and police affairs in South Manchuria, preference will be given to Japanese.

"3. It is understood that the term 'lease' mentioned in Article 2 of the treaty respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, signed this day, includes leases for a long term, up to 30 years, and unconditionally renewable."

So much for the twenty-one demands.

When all is said and done, looking at them from as impartial a point of view as possible, it is difficult to refrain from the conclusion that they mean exactly what they say. They are a statement of Japan's policy towards China in 1915. A statement as frank as any in the history of diplomacy. In these demands Japan said publicly that she was aiming at certain things for which she had for long been privately accused of hankering, by European, Chinese, and American publicists.¹ It was a frank statement because, only by blunt bargaining of the "money or your life" type, could results be achieved with rapidity. The military controllers of Japanese policy estimated that rapidity was essential in order to take advantage of the unique World War situation which, for the time being, had left to Japan a free hand in the East. Thus Japan to China in 1915. We shall see that for three more years there was little pretence of change in a policy which must be described as one aiming at the economic, and to some extent, territorial domination of China, till, with the advent of the Hara Cabinet and the downfall of the Terauchi Government, a policy of non-interference in China was proclaimed. Then came the Washington Conference.

We must now examine the events which followed the acceptance by China of the twenty-one demands (less Group V). In reading the next section it is important to bear in mind the account written in Chapter IV of the internal state of China at this time, which produced situations so eminently favourable to Japanese interferences.

It has been pointed out that the growing power of Yuan Shi-kai, in 1915, with its likelihood of bringing order out of China's confusion, and strength instead of weakness to her international position, was not a circumstance calculated to prove favourable to that domination of China which seemed indicated as the goal of Japanese policy. This fact, when combined with earlier incidents in his career when he was Chinese resident in Korea,

¹ "Japan is going to take advantage of this war to get control of China." (Yuan Shi-kai to Mr. Reinsch, American Ambassador, September, 1914.)

made him personally unpopular with the Japanese Government, and was the main cause of his downfall when he attempted to found a dynasty in opposition to Japanese advice. There occurred, then, the resumption of that struggle between North and South in China which had been temporarily checked by Yuan's strong hands. There began also a most scandalous series of loans. These transactions were financed by Japanese, and are generally spoken of as the Nishihara loans, from the fact that the principal Japanese negotiator was a gentleman of that name. In theory they were private¹ loans, but in fact no one attempts to pretend that they are not official.

With regard to the details of these loans, a number of more or less reliable lists are in existence. The Kuo-min Tang (Southerners) party in China, who have never wearied of writing and shouting that the Peking Government during this period was the bribed creature of Japan, have published a list of loans in support of their accusations. With this as one guide, and referring further to a list published in the "Hong-Kong Daily Press Directory" for China, and to an official statement of the foreign debts of China issued in 1920 by the Peking Government Bureau of Economic Information, as well as other lists which have been published, it is possible to prepare a statement which contains some details of the loans from Japan to China which can be considered as authenticated.² It is certain that there are others.

It is sufficient to note here that, between 1916 and 1918, Japan, acting usually through semi-official channels,³ lent to China a sum which probably lies between 225,000,000 yen and 380,000,000 yen.⁴ This money was spent in enriching the Northern leaders, and in the purchase by them of arms for the coercion of the South or for the purpose of conflict between themselves. To secure this money, the Peking Government mortgaged assets over which it had no control, whilst the ostensible security for some of the loans were treasury bonds which have since depreciated to absurd values.⁵

¹ This fiction has now been abandoned. See Diet proceedings, 19 March, 1923.

² In May, 1921, Mr. Obata, Japanese Minister to China, stated to the Peking correspondent of the "Asahi," that the loans concluded under the Terauchi régime, which had already fallen due, amounted to about 150,000,000 yen.

³ See also the list in Millard's "Democracy of the Far East," pp. 187-92.

⁴ Theoretically, Japan was a member of an international banking group, pledged not to support loans to China except by mutual agreement. See p. 192.

⁵ Some of these are in reality nothing more than private I.O.U.'s countersigned by the Minister of Finance without authority of President or Parliament. See "North China Daily News," 20 May, 1921.

As financial operations they were unsound, and from a political point of view they were indefensible except on the assumption that it was Japan's policy to encourage and finance disorder in China and impose upon that country shackles riveted with yens.

A great deal of secrecy shrouded these loans up to March, 1923, and as recently as 28 February, 1921, the official stenographers in the Diet were ordered to suspend their business whilst the loans were under discussion, but on 19 and 20 March, 1923, some very interesting admissions were made in the Diet and House of Peers, when the Government introduced a supplementary Budget of which one item was for 50,000,000 yen, for which the State stood guarantee to the Banks in connexion with the Nishihara loans. In the course of the debate the following facts came to light. The total sum involved is 145,000,000 yen.¹ (This refers apparently to loans in which the Government is partially implicated.) Their details are as under:—

Communications Bank Loan, 20,000,000 yen.	Secured on Chinese National Loan Bonds of face value, 15,000,000 yen.
Telegraph Loan, 20,000,000 yen.	Secured on telegraph equipments in all China, and revenue from telegraphs.
Keiki Flood Loan, 5,000,000 yen.	Secured on revenue from estates in Shantung Province.
Kirin-Huining Railway Loan (advance) 10,000,000 yen.	Repayable by issuing loan for this railway.
Kirin-Amur Forestry and mining Loan, 30,000,000 yen.	Secured on revenue from forests and mines in Kirin and Amur Provinces.
Railway Loans for two railways in Manchuria and Mongolia—an advance of 20,000,000 yen.	Repayable by the issue of a loan for these railways.
Railway Loans for two lines in Shantung — an advance of 20,000,000 yen.	Ditto.
War Participation Loan, 20,000,000 yen.	Security : ?

¹ Interest overdue in March, 1923, 10,725,000 yen, according to the statement given to the Budget Committee. Interest received on Nishihara Loans, 28,000,000 yen. Interest in arrears, 95,000,000 yen, according to an answer given by Mr. Ono (Director of the Finance Bureau) in the Diet on 19 March, 1923.

Apart from this list of loans it came out in the debate that "it was the policy of the Terauchi Cabinet to support the Chinese Government, but the Chinese political situation was changed when the Hara Cabinet took office, and so it was decided that the Japanese Government should support neither side in Chinese politics. At the time of the Terauchi Cabinet, Tuan Chi-jiui was powerful, but at the time of the Hara Cabinet, the Central Government had lost its power." (Statement by the Premier, Baron Kato, 20 March, 1923.) It was also revealed that the loans had not been submitted to a Cabinet Council, but arranged directly between Count Terauchi and the financiers, the latter having been forced to issue the loans. Mr. Ichiki, Finance Minister, regretted that he could not say how the money had been spent. He thought the greater part of the money had been spent for political purposes. Neither the Premier, Baron Kato, nor his Finance Minister could answer the question as to whether the Terauchi Government had alone carried out the negotiations. In other words, Baron Kato declined to say whether the Government had been fools or knaves. Finally, it was announced that Japan was then co-operating (1923) with the other Powers in an effort to make China liquidate her responsibilities. (This probably refers to the recent Joint Diplomatic Note to China calling upon her to meet her unsecured loan obligations out of the proposed 2½ per cent increase of customs revenue.) This increase has not yet been granted to China (July, 1924).

Apart from her financial activities in China, Japan was busy in other directions. On 3 July, 1916, Japan, as part of her policy of consolidating her special interests on the continent of Asia, concluded a treaty of alliance with Russia, part of which was secret. The following extract is authentic: Japan and Russia agreed that neither should be "a party to any political arrangement or combination directed against either of them," and to "take counsel of each other as to the measures to be taken in view of the support or the help to be given in order to safeguard or defend the territorial rights or the special interests in the Far East of one of the contracting parties, should these be threatened."

At the same time the Russian Government ceded to Japan that section of the Chinese Eastern Railway between Harbin and Changchun. Russia also agreed to waive custom dues on imports into Siberia of matches, sugar, and fish. An embargo was placed on the importation of luxuries.¹ By this treaty Japan not only obtained some further security for her "special interests"—

¹ See F.O. Handbook No. 55, p. 28; and F.O. No. 69, p. 22; also "Japan Chronicle," Weekly Ed., 4 August, 1921.

though within a year the Russian Revolution was to prove how illusory that security was—but she also added to those interests.

The next incident to be noted arose from a brawl at Cheng-kiatun, on the Mongol-Manchurian border, between Japanese and Chinese troops. The Japanese Government endeavoured to make use of this incident to present Group V of the twenty-one demands under a different guise. Amongst the demands then put forward was the following: “*China to agree to the stationing of Japanese Police Officers in places in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, where their presence was considered necessary for the protection of Japanese subjects.*”¹

This attempt further to reduce the power of China's sovereignty aroused much protest in that country, and the Okuma Cabinet came to grief in Japan at this time, largely on account of their mis-handling of the China-Japan situation. Pro-Japanese writers assert that Okuma fell because he had bullied China against the wishes of the Japanese people; pro-Chinese writers declare that he fell because, firstly, his bullying was tactless, and had led to foreign criticisms of Japan; secondly, because his bullying had not been sufficiently productive. At all events, the Terauchi Cabinet, which succeeded to office, deemed it advisable to abandon the demands for police and military surveillance in the Cheng-kiatun settlement.

It will be remembered that early in 1917, the Allied Powers were anxious to secure the support of China in the World War for reasons which have been mentioned on page 94. The question arose as to how Japan's opposition to China's declaration of war could be overcome; obviously a bargain was indicated. Japan was bribed by a promise that if she withdrew her objections to the entry of China, the Allied Powers would support certain of her claims at the Peace Conference. On 8 February, 1917, Mr. Krupensky, Russian Ambassador at Tokio, sent a dispatch to his Government in which, after saying that he “never omitted an opportunity” of urging on the Japanese Government the desirability of China's intervention, continued: “On the other hand, the Minister, Viscount Motono, pointed out the necessity for him, in view of the attitude of Japanese public opinion on the subject, as well as with a view to safeguarding Japan's position at the future Peace Conference if China should be admitted to it, of securing the support of the Allied Powers to the desires of Japan in respect of Shantung and the Pacific Islands. These desires are for the succession to the rights and privileges hitherto possessed by Germany in the Shantung Province, and for the acquisi-

¹ See “Foreign Relations of China,” p. 78.

tion of the islands to the north of the equator which are now occupied by the Japanese."

A few days later—16 February, to be precise—the British Ambassador, Sir Conyngham Greene, wrote a letter to Viscount Motono in which, *inter alia*, he said: "With reference to the subject of our conversation on the 27th ultimo, when Your Excellency informed me of the desire of the Imperial Government . . . (there follows then a statement in regard to Shantung and the Pacific Islands similar to that quoted above) . . . I have the honour to communicate to you the following message from His Britannic Majesty's Government: They accede with pleasure to the request of the Japanese Government for assurance that they will support Japan's claims in regard to . . . (here follows the statement of claims just quoted) . . . it being understood that the Japanese Government will, in the eventual peace settlement, treat in the same spirit Great Britain's claims to the German islands south of the equator."

The French were more explicit as to the real objects in view, for, with Gallic precision, the French Ambassador wrote, on 3 March, that in return for Japan's compliance: "Mr. Briand demands on the other hand, that Japan give its support to obtain from China the breaking of its diplomatic relations with Germany, and that it gives this act desirable significance. The consequence of this in China should be the following: First, handing passports to the German diplomatic agents and consuls; second, the obligation of all under German jurisdiction to leave Chinese territory; third, the internment of German ships in Chinese ports and the ultimate requisition of these ships in order to place them at the disposition of the Allies, following the example of Italy and Portugal. According to the information of the French Government, there are fifteen German ships in Chinese ports, totalling 40,000 tons; fourth, requisition of German commercial houses established in China, forfeiting of the right of Germany in the concessions she possesses in certain parts of China."¹

This correspondence reveals the extraordinary fact that the Allies, in their efforts to add to their numbers, were not above bargaining amongst themselves about matters affecting the sovereignty of the candidate.

For such must be the conclusion concerning Shantung, since the Chinese Government expressly stated that their declaration of war with Germany automatically rendered null and void the rights she had conceded to Germany in Shantung. Apart from this particular matter, there is the list of what the French expected

¹ See "Japan Chronicle," Weekly Ed., 15 September, 1921.

in the shape of "consequences." All these negotiations were carried out without China's knowledge.

It was these secret treaties which arose, like ghosts, at the Versailles Peace Conference and forced the idealist, President Wilson, to wrestle with the question: "Shall a man do evil that good may arise?" It was of these treaties that Mr. Lloyd George said that if they were not upheld, Great Britain would not be acting like a gentleman. These agreements, and the situation from which they arose have been called "extraordinary." Similar negotiations in private life would bear a harsher name, but the fact is, that in international morality, the low standard they exemplify is but the normal. They are not extraordinary. They are ordinary. For an account of President Wilson's dilemma, and how he did what he knew to be an injustice to China for fear that Japan would withdraw her support from the League of Nations idea, see Robert Lansing's book on the Peace Conference and the letter of protest written to Wilson by General Bliss and Lansing, in which they say: "It cannot be right to do wrong for good ulterior motives."

Another incident now occurred which clearly indicated Japan's point of view in regard to her special position in China. On 6 June, 1917, President Wilson sent a friendly Note to Peking urging China to compose her differences and stating that a solution of her internal troubles was even more important than the question of China's entry into the war. It will be remembered¹ that, at this time, the question of China's entry into the war was being made the excuse of the moment in the weary struggle in China between North and South. The arrival of this Note, from a country which, in a Note dated 4 February, had invited China to *break* with Germany, was used by the Kuo-min Tang (Southerners) as an argument against the Pei-Yang (Northern Militarists), but it also produced another effect with which we are now more directly concerned. It created a storm of protest in Japan on the ground that the United States was interfering in the realm of Chinese politics without previously consulting Japan. To mark their sense of the importance of this novel principle, the Japanese Government dispatched a mission to America with Viscount Ishii as its senior delegate. Secretary of State Lansing and Viscount Ishii had a number of "conversations" on the subject of American-Japanese relations and the affairs of China, as a result of which the Lansing-Ishii agreement appeared on 2 November, 1917.

Its main features quoted textually are as follows: (1) The

¹ See p. 94.

Governments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and consequently the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in that part to which her possessions are contiguous. (2) The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unimpaired, and the Government of the United States has every confidence in the repeated assurances of the Imperial Japanese Government that, whilst geographical position gives Japan such special interests, they have no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other Powers. (3) The Governments of the United States and Japan deny that they have any purpose to infringe in any way the independence or territorial integrity of China, and they declare, furthermore, that they always adhere to the principle of the so-called "open door," or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China. (4) Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to the acquisition by any Government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China, or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce or industry of China.

The conclusion of the above agreement followed close on the revolution in Russia, and the consequent devaluation to nothing of the Russo-Japanese secret alliance of 1916 which has already been mentioned. It may be only a coincidence, but on the other hand it seems not improbable, that apart from a desire to keep the United States in their place if it could be done diplomatically, there was also a wish to effect a reinsurance of "the special interests" now that the Russian policy had lapsed. The Ishii-Lansing agreement is an instructive example of a diplomatic document which can be construed to mean several things, according to the mentality of the reader. The crux of the matter is contained in the first clause. Here is to be found the enunciation of a new doctrine whose specious vagueness has already ensured it an honourable place in the vocabulary of treaty-makers. It is the doctrine of "territorial propinquity" creating "special interests." The degree of propinquity is not defined. It would seem, if we are to play with words, that it is not easy to say where "propinquity" begins or ends. It would appear to depend chiefly on means of communication, for, whereas in the year 1800, the passage of the Straits of Dover frequently required twelve hours, it can now be done in an express plane in twelve minutes. That "propinquity" between either individuals, towns, provinces,

or countries, gives to each party "special interests" of a certain kind is a self-evident proposition, and it hardly seems necessary to assert and affirm it by all the ponderous mechanism of diplomatic machinery. If this machinery be set in motion, the average observer can hardly be blamed if he forms the conclusion that there is something special about the "special interests." A man is naturally interested in a special manner in his neighbour's house—if, for instance, it catches fire, his own may be involved—but, if he proceed to law and endeavour to obtain some kind of a legal document embodying his concern in his neighbour's affairs, the neighbour may well wonder what is at the bottom of such action. In regard to the question of what constituted Japan's "special interest" in China as mentioned in the Ishii-Lansing agreement, there is some conflict of opinion. It is, in fact, obvious that Mr. Lansing understood "special interests" to mean something quite different from the meaning attached to the phrase by his colleague, Viscount Ishii.

When Viscount Motono, then Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, communicated the text of the agreement to Mr. Krupensky, the Russian Minister at Tokio, he explained that he hoped no misapprehension would be created by the fact that Russia had not been consulted (Russia would seem to have had this right of consultation according to the 1916 Russo-Japanese agreement) as the Ishii-Lansing Note was designed to convince the Chinese that America and Japan were in agreement concerning China, and could not be played off one against the other.

Mr. Krupensky had, as a matter of fact, secretly learnt the text of the agreement some days previously, and he had reported as follows to his Government: "The Japanese are manifesting more and more clearly a tendency to interpret the special position of Japan in China, *inter alia*, in the sense that the Powers must not undertake in China any political steps without previously exchanging views with Japan on the subject—a condition which would, to some extent, establish a Japanese control over the foreign affairs of China. On the other hand, the Japanese Government does not attach great importance to its recognition of the principle of the open door and the integrity of China,¹ regarding it as merely a repetition of the assurances repeatedly given by it

¹ No Power does attach any importance to this type of pledge. Cf. Great Britain and United States in regard to Japanese Protectorate and annexation of Korea, whose integrity they were pledged to uphold; also Germany and Belgium neutrality, and the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin, 1870, in regard to Austria's annexation of Herzegovina and Bosnia in 1911. Expediency used to be the only rule, perhaps the future will see a change.

earlier to other Powers and implying no new restrictions for the Japanese policy in China."

Further evidence as to the varying interpretations of this agreement is provided by the report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations which examined Mr. Lansing in 1918:—

Senator Borah (to Lansing): "You suggested to him (Ishii) that, if that meant political or paramount control, you did not care to discuss it?" ("That" was the inclusion of the "special interests" clause.)

Mr. Lansing: "Yes."

(Q.) "What did he say in reply to that, which would indicate that he waived that construction upon your part?"

(A.) "He continued the discussion."

(Q.) "And continued it along what lines?"

(A.) "Well, only along the line that he inserted it in his counter draft of a Note and urged that it be included. But he understood exactly what I interpreted the words 'special interests' to mean."

(Q.) "And you understood what he interpreted them to mean?"

(A.) "No. I did not."

(Q.) "He (Viscount Ishii) said that his idea was that Japan has special interests in China which ought to be recognized, and by those special interests he meant paramount control?"

(A.) "Yes: and I told him I would not consider it."

(Q.) "Did he say 'very well, I adopt that construction of it' or anything of that kind?"

(A.) "No, but he continued to introduce the words 'special interest,' but he knew that if he did not take my meaning I could not continue the discussion."¹

From the foregoing it seems clear that Mr. Lansing interpreted "special interests" to mean nothing beyond the ordinary interest any country has in the affairs of its neighbours, whilst Viscount Ishii evidently went further than this. It is strange that Mr. Lansing did not observe, or, if he observed it, that he made no comment on the fact that if his version were correct, the first paragraph of the agreement merely stated in general terms a platitude applicable to any country and its neighbours, whilst, if Viscount Ishii's ideas were correct, the paragraph 2, with its insistence on the well-worn open door and equal-opportunity-for-all theories, was a flat contradiction of paragraph 1.

So much for the Ishii-Lansing agreement; its real significance

¹ See "Japan Chronicle," 4 August, 1921, quoting from Proceedings of American Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs.

each must judge for himself. It is now officially dead, having been cancelled by mutual agreement between Japan and the United States of America in April, 1923, on the grounds that the nine-Power treaty concluded at the Washington Conference had made the agreement obsolete. Nevertheless, it is important, for it illustrates certain points of view *vis-a-vis* of China formulated so recently as six years ago, and it may be that these policies are in a state of suspended animation rather than decease.

Another example of Japan's interest in Chinese affairs at this time is afforded by the "War Participation Board." This organization, supposed to be for the purpose of co-ordinating Chinese effort in the Great War, was under the Presidency of Tuan Chi-jui, the Premier, and Generals Chin Ying-pang and Hsu-Cheng. Its principal adviser was General Saito, the Japanese military attaché. No official account of the activities of the War Participation Board are on record, but there is evidence of a second-hand nature that it existed principally as an agency for the importation of munitions made in Japan and as a channel for loans which went into the pockets of the Anfu Club clique.¹

Amongst the better-known fruits of the Board, which ever worked in an atmosphere of mystery worthy of war secrets, were the "Arms Contract" of January, 1918, by which Japan was to supply munitions to China at a cost of approximately 40,000,000 yen—presumably for use in the Great War. Later in 1918 the veil was slightly withdrawn from another mystery begotten by the War Participation Board. This was the Sino-Japanese military agreement (cancelled 28 January, 1921). The exact terms of this agreement have never been revealed; ² it purported to be an agreement between China and Japan for common action against the menace of Bolshevism from Siberia. There seems little doubt that in fact it placed China in Japanese leading strings from the point of view of naval and military affairs. As a result of this agreement, Japanese "military advisers" appeared on the staffs of various Tschuns, and in some cases are still there to-day, though for what purpose it would be hard to say.

It was by virtue of this agreement, that Japan rushed the bulk of her troops into Eastern Siberia via North Manchuria in 1918, along the Chinese section of the Chinese Eastern Railway at the time of the Allied intervention on behalf of the Czecho-Slovaks.

Another instance illustrative of Japanese policy in China at this time is afforded by the wireless contract from which has arisen a British-American-Japanese-Chinese controversy which

¹ See p. 100.

² For published details see "Japan Year Book," 1920, p. 473. See also "China Year Book," 1922, where alleged terms are printed in full.

bids fair to have a long life. In February, 1918, whilst the Anfu Club party were in power at Peking, a contract was signed between the Chinese Admiralty Office and the Mitsui Company of Japan for the erection and operation by the latter of a high-powered wireless station near Peking. Some years later, either in 1920 or 1921, the Federal Wireless Company—an American company—entered into a contract with the Chinese Government. At this time the Japanese Government protested, and produced as grounds for their protest, a secret clause of their wireless agreement by virtue of which the Japanese company had been granted a monopoly until 1948 for the construction and operation of all wireless stations in China.¹

As a final example of the authenticated attempts on the part of Japan to make hay in China whilst the sun shone on European battlefields, there is the case of the Japanese proposal to reform the Chinese currency in 1918. It was proposed that the existing confusion of Chinese currency be cleared up by the establishment of a gold standard. Chinese notes of gold value were to be issued on the security of notes borrowed from Japan, which were, in their turn, to be secured on a gold reserve in Japan. According to the theories of finance experts, such an arrangement would have enabled Japan to exercise a dominant influence on Chinese currency. It should, however, be noted that since the Great War a number of such theories have had to be modified, and gold reserves are no longer the sacrosanct essentials to financial stability which they once were.

In reviewing the trend of Japanese policy in China during the decade 1911-21, one arrives at the conclusion that it was very definitely a "forward policy." There is a tendency amongst some writers to establish this fact and then—judging it in the light of the post-war rectitude which is supposed to govern international relations—they account this policy as being almost criminal of Japan.

Misguided it was, but which among the nations is qualified to throw a stone (with the doubtful exception of the United States of America) considering that, in the three decades previous to the period we have just been considering, the Great European Powers had been hard at work pursuing similar "forward policies" in the Far East and elsewhere? What actually happened was that Japan became powerful enough, under the guidance of the military bureaucrats who controlled her affairs, to assert her right to a position, and a predominating one, in the Far Eastern sun. In her efforts to reach that goal she rebuffed Russia in

¹ See "Weekly Review" of March, 1923, and "Japan Chronicle" of 5 April, 1923. In November, 1923, it was reported that Japan would give way.

1905 and from thence onward the temptation to follow the example set her by the European Powers was increasingly strong. When those Powers became involved in a life and death struggle the temptation was overwhelming and Japan took what, by the standards of pre-war diplomacy, was the obvious course.

Two events have profoundly modified the whole position. One is that China, divided and outwardly helpless though she appears, has in fact, definitely hardened in her resistance to outside interference. Public opinion in China has been growing slowly and it is no longer negligible. Further, it is definitely ranged against foreign interference in general and Japanese interference in particular.¹ Secondly, when the Great War was over it became apparent to many people in the world what had been previously known but to a powerless minority—that the root of such conflicts lay in the desire of nations for economic Imperialism.

The rivalries of the Entente and the Triple Alliance in the sphere of world politics culminated logically in armed strife. With the idea of remedying this defect in human civilization, the instrument known as the "League of Nations" was created, its function being to act as an obstacle to Imperialistic ideas, and, pending a radical change in the nature of man, to prevent such ideas culminating in wars. For a similar reason, amongst others, the Washington Conference was summoned. At this Conference the situation in the Far East was examined, as it was generally recognized that, in that area, there was considerable scope for future trouble. At the time of the Conference, the Great Powers knelt in white sheets and chanted in unison that they had all been miserable sinners in the Far East in the past but that they had now been converted. In the future they promised amongst other things:—

Article 1.—To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.

Article 2.—To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable Government.

Article 3.—To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.²

Article 4.—To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states.

¹ See Chapter IX.

² This is the old "open door" doctrine. It must be almost off its hinges through reiteration by this time.

Article 13.—The contracting Powers agree not to enter into any treaty, agreement, arrangement, or understanding, either with one another or individually or collectively with any Power or Powers which would infringe or impair the principles stated in Article 1.

The history of the future will depend on the extent to which the Powers adhere to those self-denying ordinances, and, if they do act in this spirit towards China, what use will this country make of the opportunity for regeneration which will be hers ?

It cannot be said by China's friends that the two years which have elapsed since the Washington Conference have given particular evidence of any anxiety on China's part to take advantage of the new attitude towards her of the Powers which was officially proclaimed in 1922. Her internal confusion has increased rather than diminished, and there have been signs, fastened upon with alacrity by the conservative elements in foreign circles, that New China or Young China, as typified by the student class, have seen in recent developments a sign, not so much of benevolence, as of weakness amongst the Europeans.

So far as the Japanese are concerned, the general tendency of the Government during the last two years has been that of fostering Sino-Japanese friendship. An excellent example of this attitude was provided by the behaviour of the Japanese Press after the Lincheng bandit outrage in the Pukow-Tientsin express in 1923. The Japanese Press, with singular unanimity, voiced the cry of "hands off China"; yet, however desirous the Japanese Government may have been to inaugurate a change of policy in China, circumstances seem to have conspired against them. In the first place, they have had—in order to conciliate Japanese public opinion—to refuse brusquely to entertain any suggestion in regard to the abrogation of the 1915 treaties which extended Japanese tenure in South Manchuria into the twenty-first century. This action gave offence to Young China, but hardly placated the chauvinists in Japan, who declared that the Government were bent on betraying Japanese interests on the continent of Asia. Young China retaliated by organizing the most effective boycott of Japanese goods there has yet been. This further incensed Japanese business circles, and obliged the Government to send several strong Notes to Peking and exercise armed force at Changsha. The murders of Chinese (mistaken for Koreans) in the Tokio-Yokohama areas after the great earthquake of 1923 were unfortunate incidents in their effect on Sino-Japanese amenities. The consequence of these events has been that relations between China and Japan are at this moment unsatisfactory and showing no signs of improvement.

CHAPTER IX

JAPANESE POLICY IN NORTH ASIA

" Westward the course of Empire takes its way,
The first four acts already past
A fifth shall close the drama with the day."

—BISHOP BERKELEY, 1684-1753

I

SHANTUNG

JAPANESE policy on the continent of Asia can be best considered under headings which correspond to geographical areas. Of these there are four across which the rising sun of Japan has shed its searching rays. From south to north they are Shantung, Manchuria, Korea, and the maritime provinces of Siberia. In each of these areas, since the opening years of this century, Japanese armies have fought, Japanese policemen have policed, and Japanese trade, based on Government foundations, has permeated the land.

The result of Japan's efforts in these spheres of influence have been as diverse as the nature of the lands in which the experiments have been conducted. In the Province of Shantung, the Japanese have been obliged temporarily to abandon all hopes of establishing any kind of sovereignty. In South Manchuria, the sovereignty, nominally Chinese, is practically Japan's. In Korea, Japan rules unquestioned by the Powers, but with the active dislike of the natives. In the maritime provinces of Siberia and the Far North, Japan holds to-day (1924) the northern half of Saghalien, relic of wider ambitions which temporarily passed into oblivion in 1922.

To attempt a detailed description of what has been happening in these four areas during the past twenty years, would be an impossible task within the confines of a single volume, and the reader who is not satisfied with the silhouette which he will get in this book, must dig for himself in the books which have been written

about Shantung, Korea, and the Northern Far East. The importance of some knowledge of the history of Japan's continental policy lies in the fact, that in this history are mirrored the intentions and ambitions of the ultra-imperialists and nationalists in Japan. Whether Japan is to be steered through the troubled waters which lie before her by such men, or whether other and more Liberal hands will be at her helm is a question considered elsewhere.¹ If the men whose gods are weapons of war and whose creed is economic Imperialism are to remain supreme, then we may confidently await the resumption of foreign policies temporarily in abeyance. If however, Japan is to become a truly democratic country, as her best friends hope she will, then what is now to be written concerning her activities in Asia will belong to a past era. At the moment it belongs to the present time, for it must be realized that from the very beginning of her modern history up to certainly 1922, the foreign policy of Japan in Asia has emanated from the military bureaucracy.

The foregoing remarks apply in a general way to all four areas, and I will now describe the events belonging to each sphere of influence.

First, as to the Province of Shantung. Taking advantage of the European War and the possession by Germany of a base at Tsingtau (Kiaochau), Japan seized this port and its leased territory²; then, notwithstanding the protests of the Chinese Government, she took control of the trunk line to Tsinan-fu, established a garrison in that capital city, and, without a shadow of doubt, set to work to dominate in every possible way as much of the province as possible. Since copper had a high value in the world market owing to its value for munitions, Japan denuded the province of copper coins, and actually exported 50,000 tons of copper. This incident is simply mentioned as one example of the complete control exercised by Japan in the domestic affairs of a large part of a Chinese province. She endeavoured to further clinch her position by trying to force China to recognize that Japan had succeeded to all the old German rights in the province. (See Group I, twenty-one demands, 18 January, 1915.) She also took charge of the maritime customs at Kiaochau (Tsingtau) and extended to that area the Imperial Japanese Salt Monopoly. She seized the fiscal lands (set aside to produce a revenue for the development of the port) and sold or let them to private Japanese firms. German private property was expropriated and sold to Japanese.

¹ See Chapter XIV, "Modern Japan."

² "With a view to eventual restoration of the same to China." (Japanese ultimatum to Germany of 15 August, 1914.)

When China declared war on Germany in August, 1917, the Peking Government abrogated all treaties then in force between China and Germany. Amongst these was the convention of 6 March, 1898, which had given the Germans various mining and railway concessions in the province. China's action also cancelled subsequent conventions dealing with the German position in Shantung Province which had been signed in 1905, 1911, 1913, and 1914.¹ On the whole, these latter agreements were in favour of China's sovereignty.

Matters thus remained until the end of the war, the Japanese extending their hold on the province, establishing themselves commercially at Tsingtau, and even setting up a civil administration, not only in Tsingtau, but at Fangtze, Changtien, and Tsinan, towns miles inland and not in any way connected with the old German lease.

In September, 1918, when the Japanese loan policy in China was going full blast, the Japanese effected a loan with the corrupt politicians then in Peking by which they advanced to China 20,000,000 yen for the construction of two branches of the Tsinan-Kiaochow line. Mixed up with this agreement was a statement that in due course the Tsinan-Kiaochow line was to be a joint Sino-Japanese enterprise, policed by Japanese.

At the Peace Conference at Versailles, the Chinese delegation tried hard to get the Big Three (Wilson, Lloyd-George, Clemenceau) to bring pressure to bear on Japan and make her evacuate the province. There is no doubt that sentiment throughout Shantung was intensely anti-Japanese, and that this question aroused an interest amongst the intelligentsia all over China to a very remarkable extent. So much so, that when the decision went in favour of Japan (see Articles 156, 157, 158, Treaty of Versailles), the Peking Government, frightened at the evident indignation which was fostered by the students, felt constrained to order their representatives to refuse to sign the Peace Treaty. Boycotts of Japanese goods at once gained strength in the provinces and the whole of this business at Paris did Japan a great deal of harm throughout China, especially amongst Young China. The real reasons for a decision which President Wilson is now known to have considered unjust, has been dealt with elsewhere.² Suffice it to remind the reader that Mr. Wilson was fearful for the League

¹ For details, see statement of China's case in Shantung, submitted by the Chinese delegation at Paris in February, 1915. It is reproduced in "China Awakened," a fallacious book, save for documents. The above statement also appears in part in "The Foreign Relations of China," not a bad book, but full of repetitions.

² See p. 166.

of Nations, whilst the hands of the British and French Premiers were tied by the secret treaties Japan had extracted from them as the price of allowing China to come into the war. The treatment afforded to China at Versailles, when all being said and done she was an Ally of the Entente, was distinctly peculiar.

The Chinese were not disposed to allow the matter to rest where it stood, and the period between 1919 and the Washington Conference of 1922 was occupied by a long, tedious, and embittered dispute between Peking and Tokio. The mere fact that an issue was in the air indicated a certain weakening of the Japanese attitude.

The Japanese stated in 1919 that it was their intention to restore the leased territory to China in due course, and by 1921 their attitude was that it was impossible to do so because the Chinese refused to negotiate. The Chinese maintained that negotiations were unnecessary. They argued as follows: Japan had promised to give back Shantung. Let her do so. The Chinese knew perfectly well that "negotiations" meant a discussion involving the ex-German economic privileges which legally had never been transferable, and which, China claimed, had been abrogated by the Chinese declaration of war on Germany. Since Germany had never possessed sovereignty in Shantung, there could be no question of negotiating over this, so why did not the Japanese evacuate the province?

In 1921 the Chinese Government began to prepare to bring the matter before the League of Nations, and in June, 1921, issued a circular telegram to the provinces directing the Governors to inform the people that there was no question of opening up direct negotiations with the Japanese.

On 7 September, 1921, the Japanese Minister in Peking submitted certain proposals¹ to the Chinese Government, which in essence, proposed the return to China of the leased territory around Tsingtau, but retained the idea of joint control of the railway and police control thereof. These terms were to be the basis for negotiations. At the beginning of October the Chinese Government handed the Japanese a reply. In their Note, the Peking Government adopted a stubborn attitude of refusing absolutely to negotiate. The Chinese set forth their case, pointed out that there were no grounds for negotiations, and expressed their surprise at the non-evacuation of Shantung by Japan. The independent language of this Note,² which was described by the Japanese Press as "an insolent document" ("Asahi"), "rude and

¹ For text see "Japan Chronicle," 22 September, 1921.

² *Ibid.*, 13 October, 1921.

insolent" ("Chugai Shogyo"), "absurd and outrageous terms" ("Jiji"), was largely due to the growing weight of Chinese public opinion which was hostile to any recognition of the Japanese claims, and also to the fact that the Chinese knew that the Japanese were most anxious to settle or begin to settle the Shantung question before the Washington Conference began. China, in fact, hinted in her Note of 5 October that she would bring up the Shantung question at this Conference.

On 19 October the Japanese sent another Note to China.¹ In this document they claim that ever since January, 1920, they had been trying to negotiate with China, and that "China has merely replied with phrases, characterizing most of the Japanese declarations hitherto made as hollow and devoid of meaning." The Note then continues to the effect that Japan has expended "blood and treasure" in taking Shantung from Germany, and that she, also, "has just claims under the agreement of September, 1918." Finally, Japan expressed her continued readiness to embark on negotiations.

On 3 November the Chinese made a further reply to the last Japanese Note. In this reply the Chinese said that "the views of the Japanese Government differ fundamentally from those of the Chinese Government . . . and show much misunderstanding" (of the Chinese claims). "The Chinese Government, therefore, deems it to be highly necessary to make a further declaration concerning the facts that have happened in the past and concerning its unchanged point of view from the first to the last word."

There followed then a lengthy review of the whole case in which the Chinese flatly denied some of the statements the Japanese had been making,² and concluded with the "earnest hope that the

¹ For text see "Japan Chronicle," Weekly Ed., 27 October, 1921.

² As an example of China's attitude, the Note included the following remarks on the Kiaochau-Tsinan railway: "Again it will be observed that the Kiaochau-Tsinan railway, which was built within Chinese territory, was primarily an undertaking of the nature of a corporation, and Chinese capital was invested in it. It was not German property, nor was it private property belonging exclusively to Germans. Although it was temporarily operated by Germans, China had long been looking forward to an opportune moment for its reclamation. Furthermore, the right of policing the railway belonged exclusively to China. There is absolutely no military necessity justifying the occupation of the railway by Japan. During that time, China repeatedly protested to Japan there was really no justification for the occupation of the railway by the Japanese Army. Furthermore, there were no German troops stationed along the line of the railway, except in the portion within the leased territory. At the time of the occupation of the railway, Japan encountered no resistance whatever, and she can have no ground for any claim that lives and treasure were sacrificed on account of the railway. Later, when China joined the belli-

Japanese troops will be recalled at an early date, whilst the responsibility of policing the railway will be assumed as a matter of course by China's own police force."

The scene then shifted to Washington, where the struggle was renewed. The Chinese delegation moved heaven and earth to have the subject put upon the agenda of the plenary Conference, their opponents endeavouring to make the Shantung settlement a matter of private negotiation between China and Japan. Outwardly, Japan won the day, for on the advice of the British and American Governments, the Chinese opened up direct negotiations with the Japanese. Had they refused to accept this advice, the Chinese would have lost most of the valuable sympathy they enjoyed at Washington. Though the news that direct negotiations had been started caused considerable outcry in China, the delegates from Peking were wise and served their country well. Japan saved "face," but China achieved in negotiations at Washington much more than she would have got had negotiations taken place at Peking or Tokio. Negotiations began on 1 December, and were of a protracted nature. More than once the Sino-Japanese Conference seemed at a deadlock, due to the question of the future control of the Kiaochau-Tsinan trunk line. The Japanese plan was to make a loan to China with which she could purchase the railway, and that Japanese should be employed in high administrative posts on the railway. The Chinese reply was that they would buy back the railway (this alone, they argued, was an enormous concession on China's part, since the railway did not really belong to Japan), but they would buy it back with money raised as they saw fit, and they would appoint their own officials on the line. After prolonged discussion, an agreement was reached in principle by which China was to pay for the railway and its improvement by means of exchequer bonds. The Japanese troops were to be withdrawn in three stages, and China would negotiate with Japan concerning the salt fields, leases, and certain improvements effected in Kiaochau, for which Japan required compensation.

Most of the remaining months of 1922 were spent by two commissions arguing about the actual details of retrocession. Agreement was reached at the end of the year, and, on 10 December, the Japanese finally evacuated Kiaochau and the Chinese took over the administration of the whole province.

gerent nations on the side of the Allies, it was only proper that all railways within the territorial boundaries of China should be returned to her own control. The Japanese troops, however, remained, and refused to withdraw, causing innumerable and endless losses and damage to the Chinese people along the line of the railway.

A study of the terms (see Appendix X) shows that, on the whole, China has not come out of the business so badly if it be remembered that at this time, though one writes of the Chinese Government doing this and doing that, one is not writing of the representatives of a unified country. One of the paradoxes of the Chinese situation is to be found in the fact that, throughout the Shantung controversy, the Chinese delegates appointed by Peking undoubtedly had behind them, and criticizing them, a very considerable weight of public opinion in the provinces, which, on other matters, e.g. domestic policy, was not in the least unanimous. It was as if the intelligentsia of Yorkshire and Durham (Yorkshire equalling in area and population, Italy; Durham equalling Spain) thoroughly disapproved of the Government in London, from whom they acknowledged no orders, and yet were intensely interested in what London proposed doing with regard to the French in the Ruhr, whilst London paid much attention to the views of Yorkshire and Durham, and used them as a lever at the Conference table.

Certainly the Chinese can congratulate themselves when they compare the present situation in Kiao-chow and Shantung with what it was in 1917 and what it was obvious the military party in Japan intended it should become, i.e. a second Manchuria. Further, the present situation is a great step forward from the Chinese point of view compared to the basis on which Japan wished to negotiate prior to the Washington Conference. That even under present conditions, Japanese influence in Kiao-chow and the economic life of Shantung is very considerable, is undeniable. The Japanese struggled hard to maintain their footing, their special privileges, and the threads they had woven between 1914 and 1922 in Shantung, but the important fact from the Chinese point of view is that by the agreement of 1922, the greater part of the military and official support upon which Japanese economic penetration rested, has been removed. More than a suspicion of it is still there, but nothing compared to what it was. Without this artificial support, Japanese commercial enterprise will have to fight its own battles. At the moment of writing (1924) Kiao-chow is economically still in the hands of the Japanese, but when and if the internal conditions of China become improved and the Japanese have to compete on approximately level terms with the Chinese financial and commercial groups, the balance of power will find its true economic level, and unjustifiable Japanese enterprises will either disappear or become a waste pipe for Japanese subsidies.

The point of particular interest about Shantung, so far as the whole Far East is concerned, lies in the question as to whether

Japan will be able to resist the temptation of renewing her continental adventure in this province. In the months which have elapsed since the evacuation, bandits have given trouble in Shantung, and comparisons have been drawn between the municipal conditions at Kiaochau under Japanese and Chinese rule. The available evidence is conflicting, but on the balance it is probable, that all in all, the material condition of Kiaochau and its vicinity is not so good under Chinese rule as it was under Japanese rule, nor is it likely to be for some years to come, and this fact will tempt certain influences in Japan. Whether those influences will be in power or no depends upon which side the balance tips in Japanese domestic politics. To-day (1924) the military party are not popular, but it is too early to forecast the eventual outcome of the internal struggle in Japan upon which, amongst other things, depends the fact as to whether the preceding account of the Shantung question is an introduction to a pamphlet, or the pamphlet itself.

II

CONCERNING KOREA

In dealing with Korea, so far as the affairs of that land enter into the general scheme of this volume, it is proposed to vary somewhat the method of treatment hitherto employed. It has been the writer's consistent endeavour to avoid padding out this work by the inclusion therein of a mass of statistics and whatnots which are to be found for the copying in Year Books and such-like publications. It has seemed to him that it is his business to examine, masticate, and digest these data himself, rather than throw them—an unappetizing heap—on the possibly overladen stomachs of his readers. In the case of Korea, the temptation to be statistical is strong. It draws a writer who wishes to be impartial in two directions. On the one hand, the propagandist writings inspired by the Japanese interests, bulge with impressive accounts of the great material development Japan has wrought in the land of the Morning Calm.¹ On the other hand the publications inspired by enmity to Japan or disapproval of her methods, recount harrowing tales, supported by abundant statistics, of the tyranny which since 1911 has been reigning in Korea. A considerable number of recent books

¹ *Vide*, for example, "Annual Report of Reforms and Progress in Chosen." This has been sometimes unkindly nicknamed by foreigners in Korea, "The Book of Fairy Tales."

setting forth the Korean case have been published, and the official reports on the moral, spiritual, material, etc., "uplift" of Korea are for ever pouring forth. To these diametrically opposed sources of information the reader who desires to specialize on Korea is commiseratingly referred. In this work it is intended to treat the Korean question on broad lines, refraining generally from quoting statistics. Where quotation seems necessary to support a generalization, the reader must either believe or disbelieve, or reserve judgment until he has studied the facts for himself.

* * * * *

It was Korea's evil fate to be between two antagonistic civilizations in the latter years of the nineteenth century. To the north she was overshadowed by the bulk of Russia, to the east by Japan, the latter being determined to catch the Muscovite by the throat and throw him westward before his fleets swung at anchor in Korean ports and his army corps camped in the Korean hills which face the long curve of Japan's eastern shore. In this perilous position a virile race would have been hard pressed to live its national life, and the Koreans were not virile. The nation was tyrannously misgoverned. Sunk in the sloth and dirt of centuries of Oriental stupor; lacking conspicuously every quality necessary to independent national life in the hard days when the doctrine of Imperial expansion was worshipped throughout the earth¹—such was Korea. The country had a natural and indeed a legal protector in the shape of China, but China was herself a mass of flabbiness so far as external affairs were concerned.

In the fullness of time, during which Russia, China, and Japan intrigued furiously and most wickedly, descending even unto the murder of a Korean queen by the Japanese, a plot in whose complicity the hand of officialdom was more than suspected, Korea became the object of a war. Japan fought Russia (on Chinese soil) in order to save Korean independence. This is official and partly true.

The war did Korea no immediate visible good—though, in the lives of nations as in the lives of men, the hand of God moves in strange and wondrous ways—and, in 1910, Japan annexed Korea.

It was not done so curtly as this may sound. The "annexation" developed in the customary manner, that is to say, through the stages of Japan taking over "adviser on administrative

¹ The author, being convinced that man was not intended eventually to destroy himself, has assumed throughout this book that *perhaps* this doctrine is not so universally believed in as it was in 1914.

affairs to Korea" (1904), followed by Japanese control of Korea's foreign relations (17 November, 1905); abdication of the Emperor of Korea in favour of his son (19 July, 1907); convention relating to strengthening of the Japanese Resident-General (25 July, 1907); abdication of Emperor of Korea and surrender of Korean independence to Japan (August,¹ 1910). A smoothly graduated transition from something to nothing; a transition not influenced in the smallest degree by the following academic facts:—

Twice—in 1904 and 1905—in conventions with Korea, Japan solemnly affirmed her intention to uphold Korean independence, and bound herself to maintain the Imperial House in its position. Also Great Britain and Japan had "mutually recognized the independence of Korea²" in 1902, whilst the United States of America were under a similar obligation to uphold Korean independence by a much earlier American-Korean treaty of friendship. Some Koreans in 1910-11 were tactless enough to remind the United States of America of this treaty. They received cold comfort from the Secretary of State, Mr. Knox.

The Koreans thus had an earlier insight than the Belgians into the value of "scraps of paper."

The late Mr. Roosevelt, writing in the "Outlook" in September, 1914, said: "Korea is absolutely Japan's." To be sure, by treaty it was solemnly covenanted that Korea should remain independent. But Korea was itself helpless to enforce the treaty, and it *was out of the question to suppose that any other nation with no interest of its own at stake would attempt to do for the Koreans what they were utterly unable to do for themselves. . . .* They could not afford to see Korea in the hands of a foreign Power. Therefore, when Japan thought the right time had come, it calmly tore up the treaty and took Korea."

There is a sardonic irony in the thought that an ex-President of the United States of America published these words in September, 1914.

With her annexation a new chapter opened in Korea's hitherto rather sordid life, though it is only fair to say that she can look back upon a golden age, and there were some very bright days indeed in the sixteenth century. The heart of any Englishman must warm towards the Nelsonic qualities of the Korean Admiral, Yi-Sun, one of the greatest (if least known) fighting seamen the

¹ At the time of his abdication, the Emperor had issued an appeal to the Powers claiming that his signature had been forged. At the abrogation of Korean independence, some of the nobility disembowelled themselves as a protest.

² See first Anglo-Japanese alliance and compare it with the second. Appendix III.

world has yet produced, who died in the moment of victory against the Japanese Battle Fleet in 1597.¹

The annexation also opened up a host of problems to Japan. Whether she realized it is not certain, but in fact she was on the threshold of one of those great political experiments in whose successful consummation the British are expert.

The political history of the British Commonwealth of Nations is strewn with such experiments, and only once has there been an explosion in the laboratory. True, in Ireland, where one hopes the experiment is now at an end, there have been disruptive reports which warned the chemists who were trying to make a political formula that it would be advisable to vary the ingredients. In Egypt, where the experiment is not quite complete, a certain effervescence in the test tube is still noticeable. In India, the British have only just begun the painful and thankless task.

In Korea the Japanese have found themselves face to face with exactly the same problems as the British have encountered from time to time, and up to a point the Japanese have sought solution along British lines. But only up to a point.

The comparison between British and Japanese colonial policy is accurate on the material side, inaccurate in all that pertains to the spiritual side. Materially, the Japanese have done wonders in Korea. They have introduced all the benefits of a Japanized copy of Western civilization; schools, hospitals, railways, telegraphs, law and order, etc., have come to Korea from Japan. They have developed her natural resources and fostered her trade—with Japan. Grafting all these improvements on to the Korean has had the inevitable effect—it has stimulated his mind, opened up vistas undreamt of in the bad days when the effete Yang-Bans misruled the country. The Koreans are not grateful to the Japanese, any more than the Punjabi, the Bengali, or the Egyptian is grateful to the Englishman for all the material development he has brought to India and Egypt. Japan has created a new type of Korean, just as the leaders of the Restoration in the '60's committed themselves to the creation of a new type of Japanese when they decided to Westernize Japan. Both these new types are likely to be Frankensteinian monsters to their creators.

In Japan, they are typified in the Socialist and Labour movements; in Korea, they are at the bottom of the widespread independence agitation. And here an interesting speculation arises. Japan to-day is still ruled by men who have inherited

¹ For further details of this very remarkable man, see "The Influence of the Sea on the Political History of Japan," by Vice-Admiral Ballard, 1921.

the traditions of the old Genro, and these traditions are, in a modified form, the underlying principles of Japanese domestic policy. If one word is sought in which to crystallize these traditions, it is "bureaucracy." Korea is governed on similar principles, again, with the modification due to the traditional attitude of the old Conservatives towards a conquered and supposed inferior race. In Japan, the anti-bureaucratic forces are working up pressure, and, should they come into power with or without an explosion, there is no doubt that the system of government in Korea will likewise undergo a profound change. In Korea, the independence movement, working chiefly underground at the moment as a result of the failure of the 1919 rebellion,¹ will also gather pressure as education increases, whilst bureaucracy, a harsh police rule, and discriminating treatment of Koreans, remain.² In a sense, then, a race is in progress between New Korea and New Japan. It is interesting to speculate as to which will be the first to break the tape.

It was observed on a previous page that, on the spiritual side (as opposed to material), no just comparison could be made between British and Japanese principles of colonial development. The reason for this fact is that at the bottom of the British policy as developed during the last hundred years, there has always been the idea of educating and fitting the tutelary people for the exercise of self-government.³ In all British colonial policy, the political missionary instinct can be traced, often unconsciously exercised by administrators who would resent the statement that they were spreading the gospel of democratic government round the world. In this instinct, which is a heritage shared by the Anglo-Saxon race, some prophets discern the hope of mankind. The Japanese, on the other hand, have not yet developed this instinct. They have not had time to do so, always supposing it is latent within them. Nor have they copied it as they have copied other things from England. Rather have they imitated the German colonial idea, which is far more concrete than the British theory.⁴

The straightforward way of managing a colony is to exploit it in a monopolistic manner for the benefit of the mother country.

¹ Though the Koreans were unarmed the movement was widespread. It was ruthlessly suppressed. The headquarters of the Korean Independence movement are in Shanghai. Korea is Japan's Ireland.

² In April, 1923, the Press in Japan gave much space to the discovery of a "very extensive Korean plot."

³ See, for example, the Montague-Chelmsford Report, 1918, for the tracing of this idea during the last fifty years of British rule in India.

⁴ See p. 200.

This has been, up till now, the Japanese system in Korea. Part of this system is the material uplift of Korea, as it adds to the value of the property. For nearly a decade, Japan ruled Korea with a rod of iron, but 1919 opened the eyes of some Japanese to the perils of the path their country was treading in Korea, whilst the victorious conclusion of the war by the democratic nations, the "self-determination" catchword, the League of Nations, were all matters which strengthened the hands of those Japanese who desired to see a Liberal régime in Korea. The Liberally-inclined party gained a partial victory. Since 1919 it has been noticeable that, in the Diet, questions as to the state of Korea are becoming increasingly frequent. True, the Diet is largely an assembly *pour rive* so far as power is concerned, but it ventilates views. A section of the Press, notably the "Yomiuri," also preaches Liberalism in Korea. The official attitude has changed. The present Governor-General, Admiral Baron Saito, is the official apostle of a "reconciliation policy." Police rule has been to some extent modified; Koreans have, in theory, equal rights with Japanese, whilst a Korean advisory¹ council exists, and the Korean royal family has been allied to a Japanese princess.

On 25 January, 1921, in a speech delivered in the Diet, Mr. Hara, the Premier, outlined the new Government policy, *vis-à-vis*, of Korea:—

"Gendarmes have been replaced by police where possible. The local and educational systems have been altered so as to conform with those enforced in Japan. . . . Steps are being taken at present to bring all systems in that country to the same state as that ruling in Japan, and the time will come when Korea can send her representatives to the Diet."

The centralization idea runs throughout this speech.

The Government attitude is at present theoretically somewhere between real Liberalism and the old "blood and iron" régime. In practice it is still a good deal nearer the latter than the former, since the subordinate officials lag behind the Seoul Government. Nevertheless, provided the development of a Liberal attitude does not proceed too slowly, a peaceful outcome seems likely. The principal clogs to further advance are two in number. One of these can be charged against the Japanese Government, the other cannot. The first hindrance is the persistent manner with which the Japanese Government maintains the attitude that Korean nationality is dead and must not be revived. The present quasi-Liberal official policy aims at Japanizing the Koreans. They are

¹ Called the Chung-Tchu-Won.

to be equal to Japanese (what more can the troublesome people want?), and the Tsu-Shima Straits are to be ignored. Korea is to be part and parcel of Japan. It is as if London tried to make all South Africans become Englishmen. It does not seem to have occurred to the Japanese that, if treated the right way, there is no reason why the Koreans should not be ardent Koreans, proud of their language, their past, their ancient culture revived, and of their future as joint owners of a Japanese Commonwealth of Nations.¹

The second hindrance to the development of a more Liberal régime in Korea arises from the backward state of the people. The peasantry are, with the exception of the Formosan aborigines, the most backward of all the Far Eastern races. They are at present unfitted to manage their own affairs, and much water must yet flow down the Han River before they will be in a fit state to exercise that independence for which their intelligentsia intrigue and clamour.

It is, however, satisfactory to note that Dr. Midzuno (Chief of the Civil Administration of Korea) stated in the Diet (4 February, 1921), that, in regard to the elective village assemblies recently established, the interest taken in them by the Koreans was greater than had been the case when local government was first introduced in Japan. If a Korean national movement was encouraged by the Japanese, it would divert much of the political independence activity into more useful channels.² Missionaries³—of whom there are many in Korea—agree that the years since the annexation have witnessed a remarkable mental stirring-up of the Korean people. The nation has been roused from its traditional apathy, and new ideas are bandied about the land.

One example is the ever-growing demand for education amongst young Koreans. Another is reflected in the rise of the native Press. There are (or were, at the beginning of 1922) twenty-three daily newspapers, besides weekly and monthlies, published in Korea for the benefit of the 350,000 resident Japanese. Up till

¹ "Korea is neither a protectorate nor a colony of Japan's, but it is our ultimate object that the Koreans should make a thoroughly united nation with the Japanese."—Baron Saito, Governor-General, in an article in the "Diplomatic Review," March, 1923, advocating "Making use of marriages for political purposes."

² See Lord Milner's report on Egypt, February, 1921, in which he points out the importance of respecting the national characteristics of the people as an essential to the successful administration of an alien land.

³ The missions, which are engaged in evangelical, medicinal, and educational work, are viewed almost with suspicious hostility by the Japanese. This is due to the fact that a large section of the most "advanced" Koreans have been educated by the missions.

April, 1920, no Korean newspapers were published except one official paper—the “Mai-Il-Shin-Po.” On 6 January, 1920, Baron Saito, the new Governor-General, who succeeded to the legacies of the Terauchi and Hasegawa régimes, tried the experiment as part of the “cultural policy” of giving permission for three papers to be published in Korean. Of these three, the “Dong-a-Daily” is easily the most important. It was first published in April, 1920, and received financial support from all over the country. Its circulation in April, 1921, was 50,000 copies a day. That the judgment of a Korean editor must be a nice one may be judged from the fact that between 1 April, 1920, and 25 September, 1920, it was suppressed sixteen times. It was then suspended for four months. Reappearing again in February, 1921, it had been suppressed by August, 1921. It claims, and with considerable justice, to be the organ of the Korean people.

It is with this delicate situation, pregnant with great good and with great evil, that Japan has to deal. She is herself so young and inexperienced in her Western clothes that it will tax all her genius to avoid mistakes. She deserves in this task the sympathy of the British, who, with their long experience in such matters, are in a position to appreciate the magnitude of the Japanese task.

CHAPTER X

JAPANESE POLICY IN NORTH ASIA (*Continued*)

I

MANCHURIA

IN official parlance, Manchuria is a dependency of the Chinese Republic; it consists of the three provinces, Kirin, Heilungkiang, and Shengking (Fengtien); it has an area of approximately 370,000 square miles, and a population vaguely estimated at from twenty to twenty-five millions. However, there is more in Manchuria than is ever dreamt of, or at all events committed to paper by official statisticians, and it is Manchuria *as it is*, rather than Manchuria *as it is supposed to be*, that will be here described. At the outset we must make contact with a personality whose name appears frequently in recent Chinese history, viz. Marshal Chang Tso-lin, Inspector-General of the three provinces, super-Tuchun of note in the year of grace 1924. He is the *de facto* ruler of so much of Manchuria as is not ruled by Japan. In 1922 the Marshal, piqued by his defeat at the hands of Wu Pei-fu, proclaimed the independence of the three provinces. This pronouncement had no appreciable result on the Manchurian *status quo*, and may, or may not, be officially in force to-day. The most recent evidence is that it has been consigned to the waste-paper basket. Chang Tso-lin seems not unpopular in Manchuria, and his rule is efficient. His military strength was not impaired by Wu Pei-fu, and he is allied matrimonially with Tsao Kun, late super-Tuchun of Chihli, one time Marshal over Wu Pei-fu, now (1924) President of China. As to Chang Tso-lin's relations with the Japanese, speculations are rife. Some say he is their creature, others—equally likely to know—say the opposite. Information which is considered by the present writer as trustworthy as any available is to the effect that "Chang Tso-lin is anti-Japanese, but is too clever to resist them openly. He gets money and arms from them whenever he can, and fools them as much as possible." Bearing in mind the Marshal's antecedents, his own position as a super-Tuchun is his first and very natural concern.

We now come to the position of the Japanese. These people

were not the first to apprehend the potential value (according to the doctrines of economic Imperialism) of Manchuria. Russia, like a glacier, moved east across Siberia during the nineteenth century until she met the sea ; then veered south in search of the warm waters in which it was her destiny to melt her Imperial strength. The first public sign of the Russian interest in South Manchuria ¹ was the tripartite ² intervention which was swiftly followed by the Russo-Chinese agreement of 27 March, 1898, by which Russia secured the lease of Port Arthur, Taliénwan, and Kwantung for twenty-five years. A year later, Russia concluded an agreement with England which gave to the former the area north of the Great Wall as a railway "sphere of influence," in return for recognition that the "basin of the Yangtze" was the British happy hunting ground for railway concessions. These things, like the Russian lease of Kwantung, are also no more.

Inexorably the Russian plan developed, and when the Boxer outbreak took place, Russia virtually proclaimed a protectorate over Manchuria.

Playing a lone hand in the negotiations after the suppression of the rising, Russia tried to force China to recognize her seizure of Manchuria. The stake was immense ; so was the opposition of the Powers, and Russia was foiled at the Council table. At a subsequent agreement (8 April, 1902) she consented to evacuate the Manchurian provinces in eighteen months.

Russia played for time, carried out one stage of her withdrawal, then made further demands.

Enter Japan—militarized, keyed up for the long-contemplated struggle as to whether she or Russia should dominate on the northern section of the Asiatic coast-line. She offered to leave Russia a free hand in Manchuria in return for similar facilities for herself in Korea. Russia, ruled by a bureaucracy perched on an unstable volcano in St. Petersburg, wanted too much ; the shade of Muraviev dominated her policy, and Japan's proposals were rejected.

In 1905 the Treaty of Portsmouth closed one chapter of Manchuria's history, and a virgin page was opened to receive the ideographs of Japan. So far as our present subject is concerned, the terms of the treaty which require mention are as follows :—

1. Russia transferred to Japan the Russian lease of Kwantung together with all privileges attached thereto. The most impor-

¹ See Treaty of Aigun, 1858, and Treaty of Peking, 1860, for Russian acquisitions in the north before she veered south.

² See p. 39.

tant of these latter was the Chinese Eastern Railway south of Changchun.

2. Both Japan and Russia proclaimed the "open door" in Manchuria. (This is mentioned as being of academic interest.) China, being the country theoretically most concerned, was subsequently consulted, and in treaties of 22 December, 1905, and 4 October, 1909, gave her consent—she could do nothing else—to the change of landlords in her dependency.

In 1909 there arose in America, President Taft, a man of bulk, yet energy, who was dissatisfied with the supine Asiatic policy of the Great Republic of which he was executive chief. American commercial men had been long interested in Manchuria, and, as part of the new policy, an American group secured the concession for a railway from Aigun to Chinchow.¹ Just previous to this American move in Manchuria, Secretary of State Knox made his futile but well-meant proposal for the neutralization of the railways in Manchuria with a view to their eventual purchase and operation by China. From the Japanese point of view anything more monstrous than this proposal it would be difficult to imagine, and, though other Powers, having nothing to lose and much to gain, were agreeable, Japan, having everything she had fought for to lose, assumed a face of stone. She was supported by Russia, and this *rapprochement* between quondam enemies was registered in a convention of 4 July, 1910, having as its object the maintenance of the *status quo* in Manchuria. A month later Korea was annexed by Japan, and many Koreans who had emigrated across the Korean border into Manchuria, automatically became Japanese subjects. By Japan's extra-territorial agreement with China, these same Koreans, now enjoying for the first time the benefits accruing to the subjects of a Great Power, needed Japanese Consuls to look after them. Thus the rays of the Rising Sun lightened many a Manchurian district which, till then, had been ignorant of the principles of economic penetration.

It will be recollected that the original Russian lease in which so much of import to the Far East has had its genesis—and there is more to come—expired in 1923. Japan had only been in occupation for ten years in 1915, and already, with her ambitions formulated but only fractionally realized, the time was drawing near when the almost forgotten and always ignored landlord—the Republic of China—would have a distinct case for re-occupation. At the best, a new lease would have to be drawn up. It was now, by the grace of war, that an opportunity arose to liquidate this

¹ It has never been built and is never likely to be under the 1910 concession.

troublesome matter, and it was done by Group 2 of the twenty-one demands (see Appendix IV). From this group arose the Notes exchanged in May, 1915, between China and Japan (see Appendix IV), which, besides extending the leases until 1997 and 2002 respectively as regards Port Arthur and the South Manchurian Railway, also—

1. Forced China to give Japan preference in any loans required in Manchuria.

2. Gave Japanese subjects the right to trade and lease land throughout South Manchuria under extra-territorial rights.

3. Gave the preference to Japanese in South Manchuria whenever advisers on political, financial, military, or police matters were required.

4. Gave Japanese preferential mining rights, the mines particularly wanted being mentioned by name.

What area is included in the term "South Manchuria" is a point on which there is no information.

As if to make assurance doubly sure, one year later, in July, 1916, Japan signed the Russo-Japanese secret treaty, of which mention has already been made on page 163. The Russian revolution made waste paper of this document and the Ishii-Lansing agreement took its place. The double meaning of this document has also been previously discussed on page 167. It has disappeared from active service as a result of the Washington Nine Power Treaty. If the Ishii-Lansing agreement meant what the Americans said it meant, the Nine Power Treaty at Washington covered the agreement. If the Ishii-Lansing Notes meant what the Japanese were accused by their critics of wanting it to mean, namely, a recognition of special Japanese privileges on the mainland of Asia, then the Nine Power Treaty cancelled the Note.

The latest available evidence as to how Japan stands in regard to Manchuria is afforded by the correspondence relating to the formation of the New International Consortium. This financial scheme, which in theory represents the latest international effort to substitute "open co-operation for the mutual benefit of China and the foreign capitalists," for the "past policy of individual intrigue amongst those anxious to exploit the Chinese market," did not have an easy birth.

Conceived in the United States—that Republic whose idealistic foreign policies have more than once been still-born or else have perished as infants when exposed to the buffetings of an older and wicked world—the New Consortium was not favourably received in Japan. In the preliminary correspondence which took place between the interested Governments it was agreed that the scope of the New Consortium should include "the pooling

of all existing and future options except such concessions as may be already in operation," and that its policy was to maintain the political independence and sovereignty of China, though this was not to preclude the possibility of foreign supervision in the collection of Chinese revenue which might be hypothecated for the service of a loan floated by the Consortium. The proposed loans were to be both administrative and industrial, though when not guaranteed by the Chinese Government they were outside the Consortium.

So far, so good, but the harmony of the proceedings was marred on 18 June, 1919, when Mr. Odagiri of the Yokohama Specie Bank (the Japanese Group Bank in the Consortium and the Government financial agent in Manchuria) wrote a letter to Mr. Lamont of J. P. Morgan & Co.—the American Banking Group—in which he said: "*We have been instructed by our principals in Japan that all the rights and options held by Japan in the regions of Manchuria and Mongolia, where Japan has special interests, should be excluded from the arrangements for pooling, provided for in the proposed agreement. This is based on the very special relations which Japan enjoys geographically and historically with the regions referred to and which have been recognized by Great Britain, the United States, France, and Russia on many occasions.*"

Mr. Odagiri then supported his argument by quoting a reservation made in Paris by the Japanese Group Banks on 18 June, 1912. The occasion at that time was a conference of the old Six Power Group who were trying to float the Chinese re-organization loan, and were having trouble with Yuan Shi-kai and Mr. Birch Crisp.¹ At that conference the Japanese Group had declared that it participated on the understanding "*that nothing connected with the projected loan should operate to the prejudice of the special rights and interests of Japan in the regions of South Manchuria and of the eastern portion of Inner Mongolia adjacent to South Manchuria.*"

On receipt of Mr. Odagiri's letter, Mr. Lamont replied that "Mongolia and Manchuria are important parts of China, and any attempt to exclude them from the scope of the Consortium is inadmissible." However, he announced his intention of referring the matter to the State Department as being of a political nature and outside the competence of the bankers. He did not resist the temptation to make a somewhat unkind cut at Mr. Odagiri by reminding him that, together with the Japanese reservation of 1912, there was recorded another reservation on the minutes of the conference, i.e. "*The British, French, German, and American*

¹ See p. 74.

Groups stated that they were unable to accept or consider either of these declarations upon the ground that they were not competent to deal with political questions."

On 30 July, 1919, the Department of State gave its decision, and not in favour of the Japanese contention. It said, amongst other things: "*Reservations of regions can only impair the Consortium's usefulness . . . as all parties have agreed to pool their rights and options without other reservations than those contained in the agreement itself, it is only equitable that the same rule should apply to all alike.*"

The British Foreign Office sent a similar protest to Japan dated 11 August.

Japan's reply to this double salvo was of a simple nature. She accepted and confirmed the Consortium agreement without prejudice to the "special rights and interests possessed by Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia."

October and November, 1919, witnessed counter replies from America and England. The United States pointed out that Japan's reservations would revive the "sphere of influence" policy with its attendant evils, whilst the British Foreign Office said that, as the sphere of influence which Japan apparently wished to create practically enveloped the capital of China from a strategic point of view, the idea was irreconcilable with China's independence and territorial integrity. A request that Japan would give her prompt attention to the matter, concluded the Note. There followed a prolonged pause till 2 March, 1920, when Japan returned to the charge.

This time the main plank in the Japanese programme was the need of national defence.¹

"South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, located as they are, are vital to Japan's national defence and economic existence, especially in view of the growing Russian menace in Siberia."

Japan suggested a reservation giving her the power to exclude from the operations of the Consortium, loans in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia "calculated to menace the economic life and national defence of Japan." She also submitted a list of railways in South Manchuria which she wished excluded from the agreement.

The State Department retorted (10 March, 1920), that Japan need be under no anxiety about her defences, which would not be menaced by the Consortium, and pointed out that one of the reserved railways—the projected line from Taonan-Fu, through Jehol to the sea—could have no connexion with the economic existence or defences of Japan.

¹ See Appendix IX.

The British Foreign Office was equally blunt spoken. The Japanese proposed reservation was "so ambiguous and general in character that it might be held to indicate on the part of the Japanese Government a continued desire to exclude the co-operation of the other three Banking Groups from participating in the developments, for China's benefit, of important parts of the Chinese Republic." Lord Curzon could not bring himself to believe that "it is essential for Japan alone to construct and control, for instance, the three railway lines mentioned in the third reservation lying to the west of the South Manchurian Railway."

To continue quoting from this correspondence would be tedious, suffice it to say that another "suggested reservation" emanated from Japan only to be countered by polite refusals from Washington and London. Eventually, on 11 May, 1920, Japan came into the agreement, having, by dogged diplomacy, constrained the Powers to agree to the following annex to the Consortium agreement:—

1. The South Manchurian Railway and its present branches, together with the mines which are subsidiary to the railway, do not come within the scope of the Consortium.

2. The projected Taonan-Fu-Jehol Railway and its extension to a seaport are to be included in the Consortium agreement.

3. The following railway lines are outside the scope of the Consortium:—

Kirin-Huining,
Chengchiatun-Taonanfu,
Kaiyuan-Kirin (via Hailung),
Kirin-Changchun,
Ssuingkai-Chengchiatun.

It might be supposed that, with the signing of this agreement, Japan's position in Manchuria was made plain, and that, with the exception of the railways specified above, the Consortium and foreign interests in general were to be at liberty to participate here as in other parts of China. As a matter of fact, in the three years which have elapsed since the agreement was signed, high authorities in Japan, and its Press, have consistently assumed that Japan has special rights in Manchuria which have been recognized by the Powers.

Ignoring many unofficial statements which have been made, we find the following question and answer in the proceedings of the House of Peers in February, 1921:—

Baron Fujimura said that, in his opinion, the guiding principles of "open door and equal opportunity" ought to be applied, not only to the main provinces of China, but also to Manchuria

and Mongolia. What did the Premier think? Mr. Hara (the Premier) said that, in view of the specially close relations existing between Japan and Manchuria and Mongolia, it was impossible for the Japanese Government to adopt exactly the same line of policy towards Manchuria and Mongolia as towards the other parts of China. This point was recognized by the Powers.

Incidentally, Mr. Hara, in an interview with Mr. Ford, Secretary of the American Association, on 16 June, 1920, said that Japan had special interests in Manchuria and Mongolia which could not be viewed in the same light as the interests of the other Powers, and that, though at one time this question had seemed to threaten the creation of the Consortium, yet, in the end, all had been satisfactorily arranged. "America, France, and Great Britain now fully appreciate our situation and are in perfect accord with us."

Mr. Lamont (of the American Group), who had been in Japan for the final negotiations, was alarmed by this statement on Mr. Hara's part. Without delay, Mr. Lamont reiterated the fact that he held documentary proof to the effect that Japan had abandoned all her reservations and entered the Consortium on the same basis as the other Groups. Here the matter rested.

On 1 June, 1921, three members of the Kenseikai party visited Count Uchida, the Foreign Minister, and subjected him to a catechism. The questions and answers, as published in the Japanese Press and translated in the "Japan Chronicle," were as follows:—

(Q.) "On what basis was the Japanese demand made for the exclusion of Manchuria and Mongolia from the operation of the New Consortium in China?"

(A.) "In making this demand, the Japanese Government did not specify the zones which it desired should be excluded from the operation of the Consortium; it simply insisted upon Japan's special interests being recognized."

(Q.) "In our opinion, Japan's special interests are by no means limited to Manchuria and Mongolia?"

(A.) "I agree with you."

(Q.) "It seems, however, that special reference is made by the Consortium to Manchuria and Mongolia, and what is specially regrettable is, that, judging from the replies given by both the British and the American Governments and also from a statement made by Mr. Lamont, the representative of the group of American Bankers, Japan's demand for the exclusion of Manchuria and Mongolia was recognized in principle. Was this really the case?"

(A.) "I do not take that view, because Japan has the guarantee of Britain and America with regard to the safeguarding of

the security of Japan's national defence and economic existence in Manchuria and Mongolia."

(Q.) "What is meant by the safety of Japan's national defence and economic existence in Manchuria and Mongolia? We desire to have your concrete explanation of the point."

(A.) "That cannot be explained beforehand, as it refers to issues that may arise in future."

(Q.) "But, granting that Japan relies upon mutual trust with Britain and America, and friendship with these Powers for the safety of her national defence and economic existence, is this not tantamount to the abandonment by Japan of her special interests? In case these countries refuse to recognize Japan's contention, which is put forward in the interests of her national defence, how does Japan intend to shape her course of action?"

(A.) "I cannot believe that Britain and America will take exception to any proposal by Japan, which she brings forward as a necessary step for ensuring the safety of her national defence and economic existence."

(Q.) "But, judging from the correspondence that passed between the Japanese, British, and American Governments, it seems that, however hard Japan may try to carry her point, her proposals will fall through unless they meet with the approval of those two countries. An official communication, which was addressed by the British Foreign Office to the Japanese Embassy in London, and other documents exchanged between the parties concerned, clearly indicate the point of view of the British and American Governments, that the exclusion of Manchuria and Mongolia cannot be recognized, as China's vital interests would be affected thereby. In short, Japan's demand for the exclusion of Manchuria and Mongolia seems to be completely disregarded."

The Foreign Minister was apparently considerably embarrassed by these questions, and replied: "I hope you will put these questions in written form, and then I shall answer you in writing."

The Kenseikai delegation then asked if the provisions of the New Consortium would not interfere with the rights secured by Japan in the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1915. To this query the Foreign Office replied in the negative.

On the other hand, at the Washington Conference, Viscount Shidehara said officially: "*Japan is ready to throw open to joint activity by the international financial Consortium recently organized, Japan's exclusive rights to loans and the construction of railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and to loans to be secured on taxes in that region, it being understood that nothing in the present declaration shall be held to imply any modification or annulment of the understanding recorded in the officially*

announced notes and memoranda already exchanged concerning the scope of the joint activity."

In 1923 further evidence came to light which showed, notwithstanding all that had passed, that the Japanese attitude relative to their special interests was apparently unchanged.¹ The occasion was the signing of the Sino-Japanese Postal Convention resultant from the Washington decision that China should manage her own postal service. In the Convention, Baron Kato's Government inserted a clause which excluded from its scope the Japanese Post Offices in South Manchuria in the railway zone, and reserved the question of their disposal for future negotiations. The Washington Conference had stipulated that the Post Offices should revert to China "save or except in leased territories or as otherwise specifically provided by treaty."

The conclusion of this convention aroused a storm of protest in Japan, as it was argued by the opponents of the Government that the mere inclusion of the statement that the Post Offices in South Manchuria were a "subject for further discussion," in itself seriously jeopardized the whole structure of Japan's special interests in South Manchuria. At the opening of the Diet in February, 1923, the Premier was severely heckled, and replied that the Japanese Government had no intention to give way in the least in the matter of the Post Offices in the South Manchuria Railway zone. The accessory document in question had been devised as a result of a dispute between the parties, and was simply for the purpose of detaching the Post Offices there from those in other parts of China. There was, therefore, no fear whatever of the country's interests in South Manchuria being impaired as a result. (See Diet Report, 23 January, 1923.)

The accessory document contains these words: "The problem of Manchuria is one that has fully to be discussed between China and Japan." Commenting on this clause, Count Ito, the Vice-President of the Privy Council Committee which investigated the Sino-Japanese Postal Convention with a view to ascertaining whether the Government had any right to conclude it without consultation with the Privy Council, said: "As Manchuria was already within the range of the Japanese acquired rights (and the Powers have acknowledged the fact) it was a serious diplomatic error for the Government to make it a future problem voluntarily.

¹ One theory held by some people in the Far East, and openly proclaimed by the "Japan Chronicle"—amongst newspapers—is, that there is a secret agreement between the Consortium and Japan, allowing her a free hand in South Manchuria. Various *quid pro quo* are mentioned, but the circumstantial evidence, though strong, is not conclusive.

But, as the Government had earnestly declared that it would do everything for the preservation of the acquired rights in Manchuria, the committee had decided to acknowledge the treaty on this point. But the fault in procedure should not be overlooked."

This attitude on the part of the Privy Council towards the Cabinet, and the possibility that it foreshadows an attempt on the part of the Privy Council to take the place of the defunct Genro as the power behind the Throne, has been discussed on page 147.

The anxiety of the majority of the Press and the military party as to the safety of Japanese interests in Manchuria at this time was increased by two facts. One was that the retrocession of Shantung did not, on the whole, produce a good impression in Japan. It was accepted as an inevitable event, but none the more pleasant for that, and was considered by many as showing signs of the beginning of a weak policy on the part of Japan towards China. As if to confirm their gloomy forecasts as to the result of such a policy, it was now that China demanded the abrogation of the "Twenty-One Demands Treaty." Though, as we have seen, this Chinese request was considered to be ridiculous throughout Japan, it strengthened the determination of the "strong policy" people, to watch closely the Government's attitude towards China.

The whole attitude of Japan in Manchuria at the present time is summed up in the words "J'y suis, j'y reste."

Japan's foreign policy in the past has been on the continent of Asia the policy of Imperial expansion, both military and economic. It is the doctrine believed in by the British Empire up to the Great War, and which, so far as that Empire was concerned, was at its height all over the world between about 1890 and 1905. It is the policy which Germany desired to follow, but found that she had come on the scene of world affairs too late in the day unless she was prepared to war. It is the policy which more than any other one cause, lies at the roots of the World War. The League of Nations idea, the Nine Power Treaty at Washington, the general trend of the present foreign policy of the British Commonwealth of Nations are factors opposed to this policy.

But there are variations of the Imperial expansion policy. The secret of the British success in applying this policy lies in the fact that British political genius, acquired by centuries of experience in "colonizing," taught the British that the best results were obtained by opening up to the enterprise of the world the areas acquired by an expansion policy. It was the

Free Trade theory applied in its widest form. From this beginning arose, and is still arising, a complementary situation, viz. that when an area is thus opened up to free development, a time will come when the inhabitants of that area will be fitted to govern themselves. Once, and once only, has the British Foreign Office failed to appreciate this logical outcome. The result of that failure is to be seen in the United States of America. The political histories of Canada, Australia, South Africa, India, Malta, Ireland,¹ and Egypt in the order named, testify to the enduring results of the lesson of 1776.

Such, in brief, is the British variation of the Imperial expansion policy, and it is the keynote of our world-wide association of peoples with their eyes centred on the common symbol of His Majesty's Crown.

There is another and more rigid interpretation of the doctrine, and that is the interpretation which seeks to make the Imperial domains culturally and politically part and parcel of the mother country. This was the interpretation followed by the policies of Old Spain in South America, by New Spain in North Africa, by Germany, by Russia, and, up to the present time, by Japan. It is the policy of centralization; of exploitation of the "annexed," "leased," "ceded," "protected," or conquered area for the exclusive benefit of the nationals of the dominant country.

Japan, believing in this policy, which is always the policy favoured by military opinion, has applied it to Manchuria, and, as we have seen, to Korea. Also, it may be added, to Formosa. The foreign consular reports from Manchuria² are full of instances of complaints by their nationals as to the difficulties of obtaining a fair chance to do business in Manchuria within the sphere of Japanese influence. On every side, and in every walk of life, the foreign interloper, who in theory has a perfect right to trade on a basis of equality in Manchuria, finds himself up against the Japanese Government.

Not directly against the Government, but against their agents. The Yokohama Specie Bank, the Bank of Korea, and the South Manchurian Railway Company are the active obstacles.

One of the peculiarities of the Japanese position in South Manchuria is the number of her administrative agencies in that country. There are: the Kwantung Government, the South Manchurian Railway Company, the Military Command of Kwantung and the Japanese Consulates.

¹ A special case, perhaps.

² Millard quotes American Consular reports in his "Democracy and the Far Eastern Question." See this book, pp. 258-82.

The South Manchurian Railway Company is the mainspring of Japanese activities in Manchuria. The South Manchurian Railway is a very powerful corporation, with a capital, in 1923, of 500,000,000 yen. Of its shares, the Japanese Government owns 220,000,000 yen's worth, perhaps more, and it guaranteed 6 per cent. on the paid-up capital from 1906-21. This corporation, which was founded in 1906, is very much more than a railway company. It manages hotels, gas works, water works, iron foundries, coal mines, tramways, electric power stations, harbour works, shipping lines, etc., besides schools, hospitals, and farms in the railway zone.

Some idea of the magnitude of its operations may be gauged from the fact that the annual output from two of its largest collieries—the Fushun and the Yentai—is approximately 3,000,000 tons. The company also manages the Korean railway system. The Government of Japan controls the appointment of the President, Vice-Chairman, and Directors of this tentacular concern, and the Government-controlled Banks operate in the closest liaison with it. In fact, if not in name, it is a Government office for the monopolistic exploitation of South Manchuria, and the centre from which Japanese projects in Mongolia and North Manchuria are launched and financed. Small wonder was it, with this remarkable organization in being and growing steadily,¹ that the Japanese bitterly opposed inclusion of the Manchurian sphere in the ambit of the New Consortium's interests, and that they still maintain that the Powers have recognized their special and exclusive position in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.

Another political-commercial scheme, designed to increase Japan's economic grip on Manchuria, was the attempt made by Mr. Yamagata (Governor-General of Kwantung) to introduce the gold standard into Manchuria. The idea came to a head in 1921. Considerations of space preclude a detailed description of the scheme, which amounted, in its essentials, to the forcing on Manchuria of an inconvertible paper currency, based (perfectly soundly, by the way) on a gold reserve in Tokio. The utmost confusion was caused on the Dairen produce exchange—the biggest nerve-centre of Manchurian trade—and the proposals encountered the solid resistance of the Chinese merchants, who, of course, finance all their transactions on a silver basis. It was also opposed by the Yokohama Specie Bank, as it gave a big

¹ Like most Japanese Government-run concerns, the South Manchurian Railway Company has not been free from financial scandal. Its connexion with the Seiyukai party is notorious. (See revelations produced in 1921 session of Diet, when the South Manchurian Railway was called a "Den of Devils.")

advantage to the Bank of Korea. Eventually the whole plan miscarried.

In concluding this outline of the Japanese position in an area rich in minerals and of tremendous potential agricultural value, consideration will be given to certain aspects of the Manchurian question not hitherto touched upon.

In the first place it must be remembered that the original reason which was always "officially" at the bottom of Japan's need for expansion on the continent was the over-population "stunt."¹

For some years very little has been heard of this idea, for the very good reason that the Japanese peasant will not emigrate. (Notwithstanding much official encouragement, only about 2000 Japanese emigrate annually to Brazil—a country in which they do well and which has welcomed them.) He will not emigrate for three reasons. One is that he is intensely fond of Japan. The second reason is that he cannot compete agriculturally with the Chinese or the Korean farmer, whose standard of living is considerably lower than that of the Japanese in foreign parts. Thirdly, the Japanese peasant does not take kindly to changes of climate. Formosa he thinks too hot, Manchuria too cold. Hence we find, that notwithstanding every effort on the part of the Government, there were only 110,000 Japanese in South Manchuria in 1918, of which 50,000 were in the railway zone. This, after twelve years of occupation. Of these 110,000, a large number are directly connected with the South Manchurian Railway Company. On the other hand, Manchuria is an empty country, and into it the Chinese from Chihli and Shantung are steadily percolating. It is estimated² that a quarter of a million Chinese from Shantung Province come across the Yellow Sea every spring for the Manchurian harvest. Many of these return in the autumn, but some settle permanently, and it is calculated that in the Kirin district alone, the Chinese population increased by 100,000 between 1912 and 1920.

What does this mean? It means that, in the long run, the Japanese have not got the slightest chance of Japanifying Manchuria. An influx of Chinese, such as is taking place in Manchuria and Mongolia to-day, is quite irresistible when spread over decades. It means that in due course, when China speaks with one voice, that she will have millions of Chinese in Manchuria who will prefer the loose federation of the Chinese Republic to the centralized bureaucracy of Japan.

¹ See postscript, p. 223.

² See "Foreign Office Handbook," No. 69, p. 12.

This view is admittedly a long-distance *coup d'œil*. Of more immediate interest are the following considerations: Since the virtual abandonment of the "over population" stunt, an event which can be dated about 1918, two new theories have arisen. One is that Japan must be industrialized, and everything points to this being her natural development. The other is the theory of economic and strategic national defence.

To deal with the last idea first. It is argued by the military strategists, that in time of war, Japan may have to defend herself by sea and land. She is poor in natural resources, and her food supply of the home-grown kind is insufficient. She must, therefore, feed her munition factories and the bellies of her home front, from the Asiatic mainland. She may also have to fight a land war with either China or Russia. To do so successfully, ample ground for manœuvre to the north-westward of Korea is required. The sea bases and railways of Manchuria are very favourably situated on the flank of North China and are also on the flank of an army invading Korea. Hence the importance of keeping control over Manchuria, and if possible, Inner Mongolia.¹

From a strategical point of view, this appreciation is sound reasoning, just as the Channel Ports on the continent of Europe have always been of strategic interest to England.

Then there is the question of Japan's industrial development. Japan, a wonder-evoking, but, in parts, a crude structure, with "made in Germany" stamped frequently on the struts and ties, does not yet believe in Free Trade. That England industrialized herself under this banner has not convinced Tokio, and, indeed, the analogy is not perfect. Japan sadly lacks those bases of industry, coal, and iron,² and these essentials are to be found in Manchuria. Hence, once again, the Japanese "special interests"

¹ See Appendix IX.

² As illustrative of the unsatisfactory economic position of Japan from a military point of view, a Japanese Staff officer recently collected economic facts and wrote an article to show that the national situation was perilous. The following notes are taken from a translation of the article: "In 1921 the value of raw silk exported from Japan was 518 million yens' worth of which 82 per cent went to America. In war this principal export would probably be cut off. An army of 1,000,000 men requires 4,000,000 tons of iron a year (I am inclined to estimate that this is a moderate figure under modern conditions.—S. K.-H.). The blast furnaces in Korea, Japan, and Manchuria could supply 1,360,000 tons of iron and 2,150,000 tons of steel per year. In peace time they produce 650,000 tons of iron and about 1,000,000 tons of steel. On the other hand, two-thirds of the iron ore smelted comes from China (chiefly the Yangtze valley), whilst there is also a large importation into Japan of manufactured and semi-manufactured iron goods which could not be relied upon in war time. About one-half of

which her rulers believe must be developed in a monopolistic manner. Perhaps they are right. The author is inclined to believe they are wrong. It is certainly arguable. It is also certain that a great many capitalists (not Japanese) who would like a few fingers under the Manchurian pie-crust, and therefore abuse the Japanese, are *not* actuated by solicitude for either the Japanese or those who dwell in Manchuria.

Mr. Inoue, Governor of the Bank of Japan, outlined the theory of Japan's need for economic expansion in some remarks he made to the Associated Press in 1921. He said that the question was "vital," since Japan's population was increasing at the rate of six to seven hundred thousand souls a year, that she had 4 million spindles and no cotton, she wove 34 million yards of wool a year but had no sheep, and consumed a million and a half tons of steel a year and had no ore. "Consequently there may be a difference between the economic activity of Japan and that of other nations in China, but the situation will be readily understood by all the Powers."

Finally, there is the question involved by the Chinese claims for the abrogation of the 1915 treaties, and the consequent retrocession of the Kwantung leased area. On paper there is much, almost everything, to be said in favour of the Chinese case. In practice there is very little. The matter stands from the point of view of practical politics, on a totally different footing from Shantung, which is undeniably China proper. Manchuria is a straggling, under-peopled dependency, ruled by Chang Tso-lin (so far as China is concerned). The Russians had held Kwantung and the railway for ten years, when they were ejected by the Japanese. Had Imperial Russia still been there to-day, it is highly unlikely that China would have had the leased territory returned to her, since one of the clauses of the original Sino-Russian lease was that it should be renewable. But the strongest argument against returning South Manchuria to the Chinese is found in the fact that it is of no use saddling China with the present important responsibilities of Manchuria and the tremendous financial task of buying out Japanese vested interests, until China can speak with one voice. In due course China will resume her sovereignty over these lands. Whether the resumption of that sovereignty will entail a struggle with Japan, or with a Russia hankering once more for the warm waters which break on Asiatic coasts; or whether China will peacefully succeed to the homelands of her

Japan's cotton import is from America. As regards petroleum, the home production is only 300,000 tons, and the heavy oil only 50,000 tons, which is approximately a month's supply for the fleet."

ancient conquerors, are questions which can only be answered by guesses, but the existence of these questions ensures that Manchuria will occupy a prominent position in the future political history of the Far East and therefore of the world.

II

THE SIBERIAN GAMBLE

“The host is happy when the guest has gone.”—CHINESE SAYING

The history of events in Eastern Siberia since the Allied intervention of 1918 is that of a pageant in whose procession the troops and agents of Great Powers—“white” Russians (both adventurers and genuine royalists), top-hatted delegates of conferences, Bolshevik commissioners and armies—pass by in swift succession. At first reading it is all very confusing, muddled, and purposeless, but there is a test which, if applied, reduces the mixture to its component parts. The test consists of examining Siberian politics in their relation to contemporary world affairs.

It will be recollected that one of the large movements in which many millions of human beings were directly and indirectly involved immediately after the war, was the anti-Bolshevik movement. Into the many honourable and dishonourable reasons for the hostility towards Bolshevik Russia of the Allied Powers it is not necessary here to enter, if indeed it be possible so to do, for the story is hopelessly confused by reckless propaganda, and impartial investigation will be difficult even half a century hence; but certain aspects of the Allied hostility require mention because of their connexion with the particular subject of this chapter.

In the first place, it must be remembered that there never was a settled policy in regard to Bolshevik Russia on the part of the Allies, though in all countries there were certain elements hostile to the new style of government. These groups were roughly of three denominations. There were the Sentimentalists—people who believed that Russia was groaning under a Red tyranny; they supported anti-Bolshevik policies for humanitarian reasons. Secondly, there were the Capitalists, by which expression is meant the people who realized that the underlying motives of Bolshevism aimed at the overthrow of the Capitalist system, which had been evolved in Europe during the twentieth century. These people considered that life was not badly organized, and that, though

the Great War had been a very unpleasant event, it was best not to make any radical changes in the basis of Western civilization lest worse befall it. Lastly, there were the Opportunists. These people argued that Russia was bound sooner or later to reassume the important position in the affairs of the world to which she was entitled. During the act of resumption, and afterwards, Russia would need assistance for which she could be made to pay. She was undeveloped, a rich field for the concession hunters; therefore, the Opportunists, seeing at first no business with a Soviet Government so long as it remained true to its principles, opposed the Bolsheviks.

Now, the national policies of the several countries in the anti-Bolshevik entente reflected in a general way the amount of influence possessed in each country by these three groups, and because the influence of these groups waxed and waned with the passage of time and with the interactions of other events in the political life of the world, so the national policies of the Allies varied in their hostility towards the Soviet Russia. These varying national policies will be briefly examined.

In the case of England, our policy was at the outset chiefly sentimental. Russia had been our "gallant ally"; the "Reds," with blood-stained hands, were bleeding their country to death; we would not "shake hands with murder." Making use of the sentimental standpoint were Capitalist groups who took good care that the propaganda tap was left wide open. The Bolshevik atrocities were exaggerated; this was foolish, the truth would have been more effective. But the Opportunists did not have much influence in England. So at first the British policy against Russia was a kind of limited hostility; 1920 saw a change. The Sentimentalists weakened, since the propaganda had been overdone, and this kind of spoon feeding is always rejected in time, especially by the British, whilst the Capitalists became less fearful and the Opportunists grew in strength as possibilities of trade with Soviet Russia became apparent. This is the era of trade delegations, of negotiations with Moscow, of the withdrawal of the British Contingent in Siberia.

The forces in England favouring neutrality were also steadily growing in strength as the chaos in Europe deepened, the war-weariness of the nation increased, the Soviet doctrines were toned down in Russia and the preponderating influence of Capitalists and Opportunists in French and Japanese policies towards Russia became plain. These were influences which evoked little sympathy amongst the English people; further, the Soviet Government was proving a tough nut to crack from the military point of view, whereas the White Russians were generally feeble and

obviously did not enjoy real support in Russia. Therefore, the British Empire gradually relaxed its hostility to Russia, a task made difficult by the entanglements with France.¹

The policy of France has been more consistent than that of Britain. Until its utter failure proclaimed itself beyond dispute, the French policy has been a frankly Capitalist and Opportunist policy. France hoped to overthrow the Bolsheviks so as to safeguard the large French investments sunk in Russia in pre-war days, and, as a price for her assistance to the Whites in South Russia, she hoped for large concessions in oil and other matters. It was a policy on all fours with the intrigues behind the backs of her Allies which she carried on with the Angora Turks. The centre of the French activity was in South Russia, but in the Far East she had a companion of the same way of thinking, and this was Japan. And here it is necessary to make mention of a feature, picturesque and peculiar to the Far Eastern anti-Soviet front, and that is the Czecho-Slovaks.

After the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Czecho-Slovakian prisoners of war in Russia were released, and these men, forming themselves into a military force (of about 12,000 men) offered their services to the Allies in return for recognition of the Czecho-Slovak nation at the final Peace Conference. The offer was accepted, and the Czecho-Slovaks began a long march to the eastward along the trans-Siberian Railway, with the object of being evacuated from Vladivostock. Around this force there rallied monarchical Russian leaders, and it was supposed at the time that the Czecho-Slovaks were being attacked by German prisoners of war and Bolshevik forces. Recent investigation throws doubt upon most of these stories, but at the time they were believed, or, at any rate, assumed, to be true by the Allies.² With the object, therefore, of rescuing the Czecho-Slovaks, the Allies decided to intervene in Eastern Siberia.

The intervention took place in August, 1918, and it was expressly stated in the several official declarations then issued, that the Allied object was bound up with the rescue of the Czecho-Slovaks. For instance, the concluding sentence of the Japanese statement reads as follows: "At the same time, it (the Japanese Government) proclaims that as soon as the object in view has been attained, the troops will be withdrawn without any political or military act infringing on Russia's sovereignty."

Though the question of intervention in Siberia had been

¹ Cf. Pitt's policy towards the French Revolutionaries.

² At one time, when the Allies were supposed to be advancing to the rescue of the Czechs, the latter were, in fact, progressing westward.

canvassed in Japan since 1917, that country had hesitated to take the initiative, and it fell to the United States of America to invite England, Japan, France, and Italy to send contingents to Vladivostock. As soon as intervention became a fact, the general trend of Japanese policy became plain. By the original agreement amongst the Allies, the leading Powers were each to contribute 7000 men. Japan evaded this agreement by sending troops up the South Manchurian Railway and through Korea, in addition to the division she landed at Vladivostock.¹ By the Sino-Japanese Military Agreement of 1918, Japan insisted on taking over and controlling the Manchurian Railway north of Changchun, and of arranging all troop movements thereon. She claimed that she was acting with China against Bolshevism. In effect, she began to control North Manchuria. By the end of 1918 Japan had about 80,000 men involved in the Siberian expedition.

It will be easier to follow the somewhat complicated march of events which now took place if, in certain respects, we anticipate.

As the whole internal situation developed and the impotency of the Allied anti-Bolshevik movements became apparent, the disinclination of the British Government for an active anti-Bolshevik policy extended to Siberia. The United States, whose original motives for intervention had been based on these humanitarian and idealistic traditions which are interwoven with her foreign policies, also realized the futility of pin-pricking Soviet Russia in Siberia. France, foiled in South Russia, where her White protégés had proved men of straw, alarmed by the Sevastopol mutinies, reluctantly realized the impossibility of continuing her adventures in North Asia. Early in 1920 the Czecho-Slovaks had reached the zone of Allied influence, and, glad of this excuse, the Allies, with one exception, shook the summer dusts and winter snows of Vladivostock from their feet.²

The exception was Japan. Japan continued until the autumn of 1922 to struggle for the military domination of Eastern Siberia, and now that accounts are balanced, it is estimated that, in this useless gamble, she expended over 1000 lives and 600,000,000 yen in cash. Japan was tenacious because, from the very outset, she was determined upon a definite policy of expansion in Siberia. In Chapter IV there has been discussed the twin avenues of Japanese Imperial expansion; of how the building up of a wall from Saghalien to Pescadores has been matched by expansion,

¹ The 12th Division, on 11 August.

² The American troops were withdrawn, January, 1920.

territorial and economic, within the enclave so formed upon the coast of Asia.

When Tsarist Russia collapsed, the militarist bureaucrats in Japan saw before them an opportunity such as might never occur again. It is impossible to say what schemes of great ambition were tentatively sketched by the all-powerful General Staff in Tokio. There have been rumours of ideas which contemplated a second South Manchuria extending so far west as Lake Baikal. More likely the general idea was to penetrate Eastern Siberia, economically, politically, and militarily, and then await advantage at the final settling up. Unfortunately for the plans of military Japan, these schemes, launched under the general excuse of co-operation against Bolshevism, and with the particular battle-cry of "save the Czecho-Slovaks," failed almost as utterly as did the schemes of France in South Russia. They did not fail completely, as will be described in due course, but the realization fell far short of anticipation. Having said this much in general outline, we are now better equipped for an analysis of a more detailed account of the events from 1918-23 in Siberia.

* * * * *

By the summer of 1919, affairs in European Russia permitted the Russian Government to devote some attention to the Siberian front, where at this time Kolchak, the Tsarist leader, was upholding the Royalist cause. He was supposed to be receiving support from the Allies, and, to a strictly limited extent, this was true, but so intense were the rivalry and international suspicions amongst the Allies,¹ that the help they might have given him was thereby sensibly reduced. Concerning the making of difficulties and the fomenting of jealousies, many accusations, seemingly based on fact, have been laid against the Japanese High Command which was directing the Allied intervention. Some of these charges are probably exaggerated, but the situation which arose was the inevitable result of Governments placing troops in the field to work in concert, when the Cabinets to whom the troops belonged were bent on varying, and sometimes conflicting, policies.

Moreover, there is no doubt that however honourable Kolchak may have been as an individual, his adherents and advisers could be compared in some unpleasant respects with their "Red" antagonists.

As with Denikin and other "White" leaders elsewhere, it is doubtful if Kolchak's "Governments" ever rested on the

¹ See Colonel Ward's book, "With the Die-Hards in Siberia."

sanction of the people for whom they professed to be fighting. Further, whilst Kolchak maintained a quasi Government of "White" complexion around about Omsk (west of Lake Baikal), Semennoff, with his Cossacks, was the *de facto* ruler in Eastern Siberia. He did not recognize Kolchak, nor did the Allies recognize Semennoff—at all events not officially, though Japan certainly recognized and encouraged him unofficially. Pressed by the Bolshevik forces from the west, harassed and torn by dissension from within, Kolchak and his Government collapsed eastward, and, with the surrender to the Bolsheviks of Kolchak by the Czecho-Slovakians (with whom he had sought refuge), the whole of Siberia up to Irkutsk passed under the rule of the Soviet. Kolchak, betrayed and abandoned, was shot early in 1920. Semennoff was, at this moment, in control of a "White" Government at Chita.

Far in the north of Eastern Siberia, at the extremity of Saghalien, there stands a miserable town called Nikolævsk, which, since the spring of 1920, has played an important part in the Siberian tragedy. It was here that in March and May, 1920, some 700 Japanese were massacred by irregular Bolshevik partisans. Though it is difficult to justify the presence of a small Japanese garrison in this outpost of Russia except on the grounds of Japan's well-known interest in Saghalien, and though the most conflicting accounts exist as to what actually happened, it seems probable that butchery of non-combatants took place. Without entering into the moral aspect of the incident, it is important to note that reparation for this massacre has ever since been used as a trump card by Japan in all negotiations with the Russians.

By the spring of 1920, the change in Allied policy resulting from recognition that, in backing anti-Bolshevism, they were on the wrong horse, was in full effect, and Japan was faced with the alternatives of either conforming to the movements of the other Powers and withdrawing from Siberia, or else of finding new reasons for her continued occupation of those territories. Though there were already signs in Japan that what are best described as the "civil" element in the Government had begun to foresee the barren nature of Japan's Siberian policy, these opinions were swamped by those of the "militarists," who carried the day and further reinforced the Japanese troops. The several reasons which were from time to time put forward from Japanese official sources as explaining the continuance of occupation are as follows:—

(a) The necessity of securing reparation for the Nikolævsk massacres.

(b) The need of protecting the lives and interests of the Japanese residents in Siberia and especially Vladivostock. (Most of these "residents" were camp followers of the army.)

(c) The importance of preventing the spread of Bolshevism towards Japan, China, and Korea.

(d) The necessity of guarding the large munition supplies, the property of the Allies, which had accumulated at Vladivostock during the war.

Though these reasons appear specious enough by themselves, they were actually diplomatic euphemisms for the perfectly well-known fact that Japanese policy at this time was centred in an attempt to extend Japan's influence on the mainland of North Asia, and that circumstances appeared to favour its extension by means of military effort. For nearly three years the military party in Japan kept up the struggle, until, in October, 1922, a definite re-orientation of Japanese policy became apparent. What this change was will be described in due course; for the moment we will confine comment to a description of how Japan tried to retain her military grip on Siberia from the time that the Allies abandoned the anti-Bolshevik campaign in Siberia.

In the spring of 1920 the Japanese, for purposes of security, disarmed all the Russian forces in Vladivostock and along the northern branch of the railway up to Habarovsk. Just previous to this act, an armistice was signed between the Japanese command and the Bolshevik Government which was existent at Verkhne-Udinsk, near Lake Baikal.¹ The situation at this time was as follows:—

Up to Lake Baikal, all Siberia was ruled by the Soviet Government. In Trans-Baikalia, Semenoff precariously maintained himself at Chita. Farther to the East, the Japanese controlled the situation. Early in 1921, Trans-Baikalia went definitely "Red," and amalgamated with the Verkhne-Udinsk Government to form the Far Eastern Republic, with its capital at Chita.

Semenoff fled to Manchuria in an aeroplane—the only one available—and sought Japanese protection.

In some respects originally autonomous, the Far Eastern Republic was always in foreign affairs directed by Moscow, and for practical purposes may be considered as part of the Soviet Government, by which it was eventually absorbed.

In the spring of 1921, it became apparent that at the Colonial Conference at Tokio, the struggle between the men who favoured evacuation of Siberia, and those who wished to continue the gamble, was raging with great intensity. In a general way it is

¹ 29 April, 1920.

correct to say that the Foreign Office favoured evacuation, whilst the War Office held to intervention. This dispute from 1920-22 between the Foreign Office and the War Office, over Siberia, is an excellent example of that dual Government in Japan which has been often commented upon, not only by foreign, but by Japanese writers.

"It appears that an opinion is steadily growing in favour of the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from Siberia. It is true that there is some force in the theory advocating the evacuation, but, as a matter of practical policy, there is every reason to doubt the wisdom and prudence of the proposed attempt. It is strange that the false impression should now prevail among some Japanese that the Empire's diplomacy has been transferred to the military from the Foreign Office because they are well aware of the evil effects attendant on so-called military diplomacy. If the military men ever played the part of diplomats in Siberia, certainly that was only because the Foreign Office *failed to take the necessary steps for the maintenance of national prestige as well as interest.*"¹

This was the state of affairs in Japan with the question of evacuation trembling in the balance, when, on 29 April, a revolution took place at Vladivostock which effectually played into the hands of the War Office and gave the Siberian campaign a new lease of life. This revolution, which was organized by Kapelites (Kappel was a Tsarist leader killed in 1920) and Semenovites, overthrew the existing Government at Vladivostock, which, although dominated by Japanese force, was of Bolshevik complexion and leant so far as it could towards Chita. The brothers Merkuloff assumed the leadership of the new administration, which was anti-Bolshevik and frankly dependent upon Japanese gold and bayonets for its existence.

We now come to a point of some historical importance.

Was this upheaval, which gave the Japanese War Office such opportune evidence as to the continuance of unsettled conditions in Siberia and, therefore, as to the foolishness of withdrawing Japanese troops, deliberately instigated by Japan?

The Bolsheviks state that it was; the Japanese deny it. A careful study of the available evidence,² which is too voluminous to reproduce here, leads to the conviction that, if the "coup"

¹ General Tachibana in the "Tokio Asahi," trans. "Japan Chronicle," 19 May, 1921. Italics mine—S. K.-H.

² See particularly the Note from Far Eastern Republic to Japan, dated 23 May, 1921, and communiqué of 12 May, 1921, issued by General Isomura, Chief of Staff. Published in "Japan Chronicle," 23 June, 1921. Also preceding telegrams from Vladivostock, "Japan Chronicle," 2 June, 1921.

was not actually organized by Japanese, it was certainly encouraged and unofficially assisted by them.¹ One of the consequences of this upheaval and the establishment of an anti-Bolshevik pro-Japanese Government in Vladivostock, was a still closer drawing together of Chita and Moscow. Meanwhile the forces in Japan which advocated some form of understanding with the *de facto* rulers in Chita were gathering strength, and, at the Colonial Conference already mentioned, it was decided that negotiations should be opened up with Chita.

It is significant that, at this time (summer, 1921) the preliminary rumours and invitations connected with the Washington Conference were floating about. The American disapproval of Japanese activities in Siberia was well known, and in this matter—as in the case of Shantung—the Japanese Government were anxious to appear at the Conference without any skeletons in their diplomatic bag.

In August, 1921, Mr. Matsushima, the Japanese agent at Vladivostock, met Mr. Yurin, the Foreign Minister of the Far Eastern Republic, and a date was fixed for the opening of negotiations between the two countries. The Conference which met at Dairen on 26 August was held in secret and dragged on for months. The Japanese were anxious at first to confine the agenda to a discussion of commercial relations, whilst Chita insisted on the importance of being accorded full diplomatic recognition and of the discussion of the question of the evacuation of the Japanese troops.

The chances of the Conference proving a success were not improved by the fact that during the autumn and winter, the "Whites" at Vladivostock began a campaign towards Habarovsk, which brought them into conflict with Chita. The Far Eastern Republic asserted with considerable show of evidence,² that Japan was behind this movement. Speaking on 10 December, at Chita, Mr. Yanson, Minister of Foreign Affairs, said:—

"Here, in the East, the Japanese are the main aggressors, under the pretext of struggle against Communism. Nobody believes this pretext now. . . ." (He then described the gradual

¹ A coup in March failed, but the People's Assembly at Vladivostock were not allowed by the Japanese to punish the rebels. The Japanese then "officially" disarmed both sides. Actually, the Kappellites were not properly disarmed, while the Vladivostock militia was practically denuded of arms. A few weapons were left "on condition that no use was made of them."

² See the Note of the Far Eastern Republic to Japan of 8 March, 1922, in which categorical charges regarding the supply of ammunition to the "Whites" are made. The Japanese reply to this was not impressive. See also the account of the "Arms Scandal" later on in this chapter.

easing up of the attacks by other Powers on Communism.) "The root of the intervention lies deeper than it seems. After the overthrow of Kolchak and Semenov in Mongolia and Manchuria, a new struggle is being organized against us with Japanese support. . . . We have documents proving that Japan closely participated in Ungern's¹ adventure, her aim being to seize Mongolia.

"In order to gain Japanese support, the Merkuloffists in the Maritime Province have launched the present offensive. The forces of the White Guards are small and do not endanger the Republic, but behind them are the Japanese, who cannot come out openly on account of the international situation. We are not in a position to undertake an open struggle with Japan. We have consented to the Dairen Conference, but Japan has brought up demands which prove that she is striving to turn our Republic into a colony of hers. We cannot tolerate Japanese penetration, and we cannot grant Japan exceptional privileges. All Japan's attempts to create a Government in the Far East servile to herself are failures. The latest, the Merkuloff adventure, is also failing."

This speech, of which the above is a summary, was cabled to Japan on 10 December by the Delta News Agency, and led the Japanese to declare that the Far Eastern Republic was "showing insincerity."

At the same time, the Far Eastern Committee of the Washington Conference were receiving memoranda from Russian groups, who were unofficially visiting America, complaining of Japanese influence in Siberia. One of these, cabled by the "Asahi's" correspondent, contained amongst others the following allegations:—

1. The Japanese military authorities declare that they will not recognize Russian administration. Japanese officers have been appointed to take charge of military, civil, judicial, and even legislative business.

2. Local autonomous bodies have been abolished and replaced by assemblies, of which members are nominated by the Japanese military authorities.

3. Japanese names have been given to towns.

4. Japanese law courts have been established.

5. Sale or lease of land is prohibited save with the permission of the Japanese military authorities.

At the same time the Chita delegates at Washington published the text of alleged treaties between France and Japan,

¹ A notorious and extremely barbarous "White" adventurer, who filibustered in Mongolia, and organized a "White" reign of terror.

and Japan and Semenoff, aimed against the Communists in Siberia. The Japanese and French delegates indignantly denied the authenticity of these documents.

The twenty-fifth meeting of the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern questions at the Washington Conference which sat 24 January, heard an exceedingly plain statement by Mr. Hughes on the American Government's views on intervention. His speech is too long to reproduce here, but the American Embassy's dispatch thereon was reproduced in the "Japan Chronicle" on 2 February, 1922. From this it appears that Baron Shidehara, the Japanese delegate, had reiterated to the Committee that Japan intended to withdraw from, and was not seeking any special advantages in Siberia and North Saghalien. He had also pointed out that America initiated the expedition. Mr. Hughes, in reply, reasserted the original objects of the expedition, and drew attention to the fact that, in the spring of 1920, the "original purposes of the expedition had either been accomplished or would be no longer observed by continued military activity in Siberia." This being the case, all American troops had been withdrawn. Not so the Japanese, and Mr. Hughes then proceeded to reveal officially that an "extended diplomatic correspondence" had been proceeding between Japan and America—a correspondence which "has not always disclosed an identity of views between the two Governments."

Mr. Hughes then said that America had expected Japan to withdraw long since. He quoted from a dispatch from Washington to Tokio dated 31 May, 1921, in which the Americans stated that . . . "the continued occupation of the strategic centres of Eastern Siberia, involving the indefinite possession of the port of Vladivostock, the stationing of troops at Habarovsk, Nikolævsk, Decastries, Mogo, Sophiesk, and other important points, the seizure of the Russian portion of Saghalien, and the establishment of a civil administration which inevitably lends itself to misconception and antagonism, tends rather to increase than to allay unrest and disorder in that region. The assurances (originally given to the Russian people) were intended to convey a promise on the part of the two Governments (United States of America and Japan) not to use the joint expedition or any incidents which might arise out of it¹ as an occasion to occupy territory, even temporarily, or to assume military or administrative control over the people of Siberia." And again: "In view of its conviction that the course followed by the Government of Japan brings into question the very definite understanding concluded at the time

¹ E.g. Nikolævsk massacre.

the troops were sent to Siberia, the Government of the United States must, in candour, explain its position and say that, neither now nor hereafter can the United States of America recognize as valid any claims or titles arising out of the present occupation and control, and that it cannot acquiesce in any action taken by the Government of Japan which might impair existing treaty rights, or the political or territorial integrity of Russia. They (U.S.A. Government) reiterate the hope that Japan will find it possible to carry out within the near future, their expressed intention of terminating finally the Siberian expedition, and of restoring Saghalien to the Russian people."

In the meanwhile, the "White" offensive from Vladivostock, like its numerous forerunners, failed to make any lasting impression on the Communist position at Chita, and, by the spring of 1922, was in full retreat towards the safety of the zone occupied by the Japanese. The victorious "Reds" in close pursuit came into conflict with Japanese troops, and casualties occurred.

It was in this atmosphere of strain that the Dairen Conference dragged its acrimonious length to the inevitable rupture.

The principal cause of dispute was that matter which was at the bottom of the whole diplomatic entanglement, viz. the question of the evacuation of the Japanese troops. The Japanese Government obstinately refused to mention a date in this connexion, and without this date, the Far Eastern Republic equally obstinately refused to come to an economic agreement, badly though they had suffered, and were still suffering, from the blockade of their territory due to the three years during which Japan or its puppet White Governments had controlled their natural port of Vladivostock and the railway.

From the available evidence, only a fraction of which has been reproduced here, one conclusion emerges. At this time the military party in Japan were still clinging to their hopes of territorial aggrandizement. They said, in effect, to the civilians: "Get what economic advantages you can at Dairen; you can do no harm, you may do good, but we shall continue to pin our faith to the visible and tangible instrument of an army in occupation."

Though the Chauvinists found this attitude increasingly difficult to maintain, the period had not yet arrived when the pressure of public opinion in Japan, the manifest collapse of all "White" influence in Siberia, and the force of international opinion, combined to convince even the Japanese General Staff that a change of Siberian policy was inevitable.

The summer of 1922 witnessed a kaleidoscopic series of Governments at Vladivostock, each nominally "White" in complexion, but none enjoyed any sound support from the public.

These changes were the dying convulsions of the old Tsarist régime in its last refuge on Russian territory. The growing weakness of the Russian anti-Bolshevik forces seemed, in August, 1922, to presage a day—and a not distant one at that—when the "Reds" would be sole representatives of Russia, and the Japanese Government determined to re-open negotiations with Chita.

Arrangements were made, after tedious preliminaries, to hold a Conference at Changchun. It opened on 3 September, and it was at once apparent that, even in the few months which had elapsed since the Dairen meeting, the position of the Russians had grown stronger, whilst that of Japan was weaker.

The Russian chief delegate was Mr. Joffe, representing the Soviet Government, and it soon became obvious that recognition of Soviet Russia was one of the chief objects of the Russians. It was also obvious that Chita and Moscow were, by this time, synonymous as regards policy. The Japanese were reluctantly compelled to recognize these circumstances.

A further incident weakened the Japanese case. The Washington Conference, and the bitter feeling against the Siberian expedition amongst the masses in Japan, had convinced the War Office that evacuation was inevitable, and 30 October, 1922, had been publicly mentioned as the date upon which the Japanese troops would be withdrawn. As some counter-weight to these handicaps, the Japanese were able to fortify themselves with the following considerations:—

Firstly, the Vladivostock arms. There was in Vladivostock a great depôt of arms and ammunition, originally landed there for the Russian front in Europe. The value of these stores was estimated at, approximately, 250,000,000 yen. The Japanese controlled the disposal of these munitions, and at the Changchun Conference openly threatened that if the Russians proved obstreperous, the arms would be turned over to the "Whites" in Vladivostock when the Japanese left the country. Secondly, the Japanese worked the Nikolævsk massacre for all it was worth.

Thirdly, they were in a strong position in regard to the fisheries of Kamchatka. These fisheries, which are of great commercial importance, have a long and not uninteresting diplomatic history, though considerations of space precludes its reproduction in this book. Briefly, by a convention of 1907, Japanese fishermen were given equal rights with Russians in the Kamchatka-Okhotsk coastal waters for a period of twelve years. In 1919 the Japanese renewed this convention in an amended form with Kolchak's Government. Nevertheless, the Japanese, who as a consequence of their military occupation had progressively taken over the fisheries, refused to attend the annual auction on 4 April, 1922,

at which according to the convention the fisheries were sold. The Japanese Foreign Office practically took up the attitude that the fisheries were of great importance to Japan, and that, owing to the unsettled political condition in Siberia, it was not possible to know whether dealings should be conducted with "Whites" or "Reds," so that until a stable Government was created, the payments for fishing rights would be withheld, but that the fishing would go on, protected by the Japanese Navy.¹

The Changchun Conference broke down, principally on the subject of the evacuation of Northern Saghalien, for which Japan refused to give a date, and maintained that it was a matter quite separate from the general evacuation of Siberia. Contributory causes for the failure of this Conference were: firstly, the insistence by the Russians on the fact that Japan must negotiate with Soviet Russia as an equal, and secondly, the arms scandal. The details of this scandal, which created an exceedingly painful impression in Japan, are too intricate and lengthy for insertion² here, but it assumed considerable international importance from the amount of dirty linen which was washed in public, and the absolute proof which was afforded to the world at large that, at all events, as late as the autumn of 1922, "dual diplomacy" (Foreign Office versus General Staff) was very much a reality in Japanese politics. The War Office and General Staff were accused, in attacks published at the inspiration of the Foreign Office, of having been busily engaged during the periods when the Dairen and Changchun Conferences were in session, in diplomatic gambles, which had they succeeded, would have made the Conferences farcical. The General Staff were accused of attempting to create a buffer State, consisting of Manchuria and Eastern Siberia between Japan and Bolshevik Russia. The State was to be assisted by arms from Japan. As regards Manchuria, Chang Tso-lin was approached, whilst in Siberia the "Whites," under Dietrichs and Sazonoff, were to be Japan's protégés.

This story hardened from plausible rumour into probable fact when it was revealed (again the hand of the Foreign Office appeared) that nineteen truck loads of ammunition had disappeared from the charge of the Japanese Army in Vladivostock in a train

¹ For further information see statement of Japanese Foreign Office ("Japan Chronicle," Weekly Ed., 1 June, 1922) and Resolution of Chamber of Commerce of the Maritime Provinces ("Japan Chronicle," Weekly Ed., 15 June, 1922).

² Full details and official documents relating to this affair, including a report of Major Hara's trial and the comments of the Japanese Press, etc., will be found in "Japan Chronicle," Weekly Ed., Numbers 1083-1088, New Series, October-November, 1922.

marked with the red cross, and, passing over the South Manchurian Railway (Japanese owned), to Mukden, had reached Chang Tso-lin. This particular load of munitions had originally been entrusted to the Japanese by the Czechs. Speculations as to what might have occurred to the remainder of the huge ammunition depot became rife, and, notwithstanding the mixture of bluff and excuse put up by the Chief of the General Staff and the War Office, people again remembered the curious revival of strength of the "Whites" in the winter of 1921-22, when they enjoyed their short-lived successful offensive towards Habarovsk.¹ The War Office could not deny the disappearance of the nineteen trucks, and an unfortunate major was put on his trial, and, accepting complete responsibility, was sentenced to three years' imprisonment. (Sentence suspended.) The evidence adduced at the trial described a state of laxity in the organization of the Japanese Army in Siberia, which, however plausible it seemed to make the disappearance of the arms, was incomprehensible to anyone acquainted with the meticulous rigidity of Japanese official procedure.

The trial did, however, make plain that, though the civilian party in the Foreign Office with the support of the majority of the Press,² had been able to muster sufficient courage and strength to give the General Staff a stab in the back, yet the latter, though temporarily worsted, were still strong enough to put up a scapegoat of the most obvious nature, and the conventions thus satisfied, they refused to countenance all further investigation into their independent action in Siberia.

For the military party in Japan, the autumn of 1922 was a period of depression. The Chita troops entered Vladivostock as the last remains of the Japanese Expeditionary Force were preparing to leave. By 1 November, the last Japanese soldiers had left Vladivostock and landed in Japan; the last phantom "White" Government—that of Sazonoff—which had endured for a few uneasy days, had vanished as if it had been the shadow of the departing troops upon whose bayonets it had relied for support: seven thousand White Russian refugees were forced to sea; they were a motley crowd, in whose ranks could be found, soldiers and officers of the Imperial Army, peasants of Siberia wearing badges denoting that their owners had once shared the fortunes of Kolchak, of Semenoff, of Merkuloff, and of Dietrichs; civilians of all ages and both sexes who had drifted

¹ See p. 216.

² Up till 1922, only one paper—the "Asahi"—had consistently attacked the Siberian expedition; the others had favoured it. In July, 1922, they nearly all began to abuse it.

across Siberia impelled by the east-flowing tide of Bolshevism : this mob embarked in cranky ships and crawled down the inhospitable coast where most of the unfortunates were destined to endure the miseries of a winter in custom sheds at the North Korean port of Gensan, there to receive as charity from Japan the bare necessities of life ; others drifted farther south to the uncertain conditions of a destitute Russian's life in Shanghai ; whilst yet others marvellously endured to reach the Philippines and embarrass the American authorities at Manila : on this day also, the Soviet Government of Russia from its headquarters in Moscow, exultingly telegraphed that it ruled in name as well as in spirit from the frontiers of Poland to the shores of the Pacific Ocean.

Thus ended the gamble of the military party in Japan. It was an enterprise conceived on a scale of magnificence, but it dwindled to its unprofitable conclusion in a shabby manner, surrounded by an odour of scandal and amidst the mutual recriminations of the civilians and the military party.

In criticizing the Japanese policy in Siberia during the years 1918-22, one must remember that to a great extent France, and to some extent England, also engaged on Russian expeditions which in fundamental causes were not dissimilar to that indulged in by Japan. The difference between these various incursions into Russian territory is only one of degree, and this admitted, there is no doubt that in tenacity of purpose and blunt selfishness of design, the Siberian expedition is paramount.

Less appreciative than the European nations of the moral influences of the Great War, the Japanese General Staff failed to apprehend that the military occupation of an alien territory as a prelude to annexation, however excellent a system it may have been previous to 1914, was hopelessly *démodé* in 1922. In these latter years of grace it is apparent that international operations of this nature must possess a moral health certificate in the shape of a mandate from the League of Nations.

Properly speaking, this chapter should end here, but, if this were done, a second chapter would be needed, entitled : "The Peaceful Penetration of Siberia." This latter duty cannot yet be carried out for the sufficient reason that most of the events which it would describe are yet to come. Nevertheless, enough has occurred to justify certain deductions as to the future.

III

It need hardly be insisted that the failure of the military party in Siberia and the dislike of the civilians in Japan for the diplomatic methods of the War Office does not alter the fact that every section of opinion in the Japanese Government is still closely interested in the coast-line and hinterland of Northern Asia. The political developments in Siberia must always be of strategical and commercial interest to Japan. Strategical, because of the danger of invasion from Siberia into Korea or Japan proper; commercial, because of the great and undeveloped natural wealth of this area, which is crying aloud for the capitalist.

Viscount Goto, speaking at Kobe on 5 July, 1923, said: "The solution of the Manchurian and Mongolian questions is the key to the peace of the Orient, and the establishment of friendly relations between Japan and Russia must be the first and foremost essence of the solution of those problems.

"It must be Japan's duty towards the world to exploit the rich natural resources of Eastern Siberia for the welfare of mankind and to open up the natural resources of North China, as well as to ensure the territorial integrity of China . . . (so as) to establish an enduring peace in the Orient, especially so, as there is no Sino-Japanese alliance. Such an unexpected and abnormal claim as the repudiation of the twenty-one demands, makes one feel more keenly the duty of Japan in the above-mentioned direction, which I respectfully consider to be a work bequeathed by the late Emperor Meiji."

The failure of military action produced a swing of the political pendulum—and the last soldier from Vladivostock was hardly in his quarters at Hiroshima, ere the inspired Press was discussing the need for a commercial *rapprochement* with Russia. This was the easier to do, in that the terrible forecasts of the horrors which would accompany the entry into Vladivostock of the "Reds" had been utterly falsified.

At the beginning of 1923 Mr. Joffe, representative of the Soviet at Moscow, was suffering from ill health. He desired to recuperate at Hong-Kong, but the authorities of that island mistrusted his politics and caused it to be known that he would not be welcome. Whether this action was taken on instructions from London (where the Russian Trade Delegation was being received at No. 10) or whether Hong-Kong was merely illustrating that detachment from the affairs of the world, for which some people say it is famous, is not certainly known to the public. However, a strange event took place.

Baron Goto, the then Mayor of Tokio, a gentleman in whom some people see a future Premier of Japan, invited Mr. Joffe to recover at Tokio. Thus the political undesirable (according to Hong-Kong) was the guest of the country which specializes in anti-Bolshemania, and whose rulers are so ludicrously apprehensive of "dangerous thoughts." Mr. Joffe spent several months in Japan, and a number of conversations took place. Events are still too warm to be handled comfortably, but, at the moment of writing, the following facts are plain:—

Japan is still in occupation of Northern Saghalien pending reparations for the Nikolævsk massacre. There is much talk of Japan buying this territory from Russia, for she wants it for strategical reasons and also for the oil suspected to be there. Japan is also trying to make up her mind to take the plunge in being the first of the Great Powers to recognize fully Soviet Russia.¹ The Bolsheviks, who have been steadily widening the gap between their communistic theory and the capitalistic practice, want capital urgently, a want closely connected with official recognition by the Powers.

Whatever may happen in Russia proper, it is evident that Japan has the Russian Far Eastern field to herself once it is opened up. Nevertheless, the feeling of isolation received by Japan at Washington in 1921 has made her chary of acting too independently. Lastly, the fisheries question has been settled between the Russian and Japanese Governments.²

Beyond these statements all is speculation, save only that it seems almost certain that Siberia, and particularly Eastern Siberia, will loom large in the world affairs of the future. For Russia will revive, and, as ever, she will seek the warm water. China will solidify and reclaim Manchuria. Japan will become more and more industrialized and economically dependent on the mainland. Three forces, of which Japan, as yet, is the only one of consequence³; three groups of national and racial ambitions; three cultures converge upon this vast area of unlimited

¹ She has (since these words were written) been forestalled by Great Britain. Mr. Joffe has been succeeded in the Far East by Mr. Karakan.

² These negotiations practically involve tacit recognition of the Soviet by Japan, though actually at the same time, the foreign consuls were being withdrawn from Vladivostock. Though the British Foreign Office and French Foreign Office had always refused to recognize Soviet Russia, consuls were maintained at Vladivostock until May, 1923. The Russian Government remained officially unrecognized until 1924. It is a curious fact that, in length of existence, it was then easily the oldest Government in Europe.

³ "The exploitation of forests, mines, and fisheries in Far Eastern Russia, the navigation of the Amur, etc., are enterprises which await Jap-

economic possibilities.¹ Hovering on the northern edge are the United States of America. *Qui vivra verra.*

anese capital, skill, knowledge, and labour."—Dr. Egi Tasuku (Viscount Kato's principal henchman) in the July edition of the "Taiyo." See "Japan Chronicle," 26 July, 1923.

¹ In the Maritime Province alone there are 2,000,000 acres suitable for paddy. Though rice planting has only just started, the crop for 1922 was 450,000 koku. A rice crop sufficient to support 6,000,000 people could be grown on 2,000,000 acres.

P.S.—Whilst this book was in proof, the Japanese Social and Colonization Department of the Imperial Economic Council published a lengthy report on Colonial policy. For full translation see "Japan Chronicle," Weekly Ed., New Series 1171. The following extracts indicate its general scope:—

"Japan is a country of limited area and poor natural resources with a surplus of population. . . . The efforts of the Japanese Government and people have hitherto been largely centred on vindication of Japan's national prestige . . . hundreds of millions of yen have been invested in Manchuria, Mongolia, or China, but it has contributed very little towards economic development or Japanese colonization. The colonization of the Hokkaido (Japan's northern island) is still progressing at a snail's pace. Efforts have not been wanting towards colonization of the island, but compared to those in Korea, Manchuria, and Formosa, they are insignificant. The island has a population of 2,400,000, and over 4,000,000 people can be put into it."

The report then outlines the details of an extensive policy designed to encourage settlement in the Hokkaido, and then passes to a consideration of what steps might be taken to support Japanese overseas emigration in "*countries of extensive area and rich natural resources which still lie uncultivated for want of labour and capital.*" It will be necessary to "*solve the question of dual nationality*" and to "*take such diplomatic measures as are appropriate, always taking national conditions and public opinion in overseas countries into careful consideration.*"

Although the "overseas countries" are not specified by the Imperial Economic Council, it is probable that the South American Republics are being referred to.—S. K.-H.

CHAPTER XI

THE STABILIZATION OF CHINA

“ To say is easy ; to do is difficult.”—CHINESE PROVERB

“ Wandering between two worlds ; one dead, the other powerless to be born.”—MATTHEW ARNOLD

I

IN this chapter it is proposed to consider the possible lines along which China will, at some indefinite time in the future, reach a stable political condition. That a race which has behind it so remarkable a past, a race which at least once (during the Tang dynasty) produced the most enlightened, extensive, and highly cultured Empire then existent on earth, and which has preserved for thousands of years a philosophical homogeneity for which history affords no parallel, is doomed to perpetual chaos, is an unacceptable proposition. The race has lost none of its vigour ; it has multiplied exceedingly ; the industry of its individuals is amazing ; its aptitude for commerce enables it to compete on easy terms with modern trading conditions, and if, during the last eighty years in which China has been buffeted by the Western Powers and Japan, she has not been mistress of her fate, she is still possessed of that one essential which in the long end ensures that a nation will triumph over all difficulties. China is still the captain of her soul.

Viewed in their proper perspective down the long corridors of Chinese history, the rival gangs of politicians and the militarists, whose evil behaviour fills the columns of the daily Press and the pages of contemporary literature, are froth upon the surface of the slow-moving, immensely deep current of national life which is exemplified in the persons of China's toiling millions.

Much that seems to us permanent in the world to-day will likely pass away, either suddenly, as the Empires of Germany and Russia melted in the heat of war, or gradually, as the British Empire is being transformed into a group of self-governing nations within the lifetime of this generation. But, if one had to select

social-political factors in the world to-day which seemed likely to endure in their essentials for a longer period than any others, Chinese culture and civilization would stand high on the list. For as long as this civilization endures, the Chinese nation will remain a factor of immense importance in human affairs, for it has been well said "China is more than a nation ; she is a *civilization*."

We have here outlined the long-distance aspect of China's future, but we must be careful not to succumb to the attractions which surround such views and ignore the present, for no better reasons than that the present is not pleasing and will one day be a very small item of the past.

It was said in the introduction to this work that one of the great human problems of the future lay in the question as to how the Eastern races were to be incorporated in the future governance of the world. How was the Far Eastern clutch to be let in without stripping the gear wheels of both Western and Eastern civilizations? China is to-day indisputably the largest undeveloped area in the world, and her potentialities from the industrial point of view are literally incalculable. The progress of mankind, such as it is, advances steadily¹ and will not wait on China. Year by year, whether she likes it or not, she becomes more indispensable to the Western nations, and they to her. Meanwhile, as she is swept forward with the stream, the forces within China act and react on each other in the workings out of her destiny. Upon the straining effect of these forces, upon the progress and development of her present discontent, depend the immediate position China will assume in world affairs, and because, owing to the brevity of a human life, the immediate is always the practical, we will here abandon speculative contemplations centred in the far future, and confine our attentions to the present situation and its possibilities during the next ten or twenty years.

Though opinions worthy of much attention differ radically as to the remedy for China's present troubles, there is general agreement as to the symptoms of her disease. They are, in most cases, plain for all to see. To clear the ground and prepare a space in which to lay out and discuss various remedies, the most important of these symptoms will be catalogued.

1. Though the eighteen provinces of China, and to some extent the three dependencies, are considered internationally as an entity, political China is divisible into areas roughly corresponding to the provinces. These are in most cases under the

¹ It may be argued that ethically, mankind is retrogressing, with his wars becoming ever more frightful and his nationalist outlook remaining unchanged, but in the above sentence the word "progress" is used in its popular and material sense.

dominance of Tuchuns¹ or military governors, only responsible to the Central Government when it suits their private ambitions to affect this attitude.

2. Since the Central Government in Peking (from which the majority of the Tuchuns theoretically derive their authority) is itself at present the creature of one or other of the Northern Tuchuns, is little more than a gang of self-seeking politicians deriving their incomes from bribery, and has an effective authority which hardly extends beyond the walls of Peking, the generality of Tuchuns do not rely on Peking as a sanction for their authority in their province. They hold their position by virtue of personal armies.

The position of the various Tuchuns being founded on military power, it follows that any General aspiring to the lucrative post of Provincial Tuchun can probably attain his ambition if he controls an army which can defeat the forces of the Tuchun whose office he covets. The periodical struggles² between Tuchuns and would-be Tuchuns are dignified with the name of "civil war," but are, in reality, nothing more than discreet engagements between soldiery, both sides combining to act with complete indifference to the welfare of the civil population.

3. Though to become—and remain—a Tuchun, some personal prestige is necessary, the control of sufficient funds to munition and pay an army is a *sine qua non*.

4. These funds may be raised by various methods, of which some typical examples are as follows:—

(a) By loans. This method achieved its maximum development in 1917-18, the money coming from Japan. As security for such loans, provincial assets, such as the revenue of regular local taxes or mining and railway concessions are hypothecated.

(b) By private taxation in the province, e.g. in 1922, when Foochow and the surrounding district in Fukien was controlled by an invading General who professed to derive his authority from Sun Yat-sen's "Constitutional" Government at Canton, a tax of ten dollars on every junk and sampan was decreed. In April, 1923, the Tuchun of Chekiang Province, General Lu Yung Hsiang, then experiencing military pressure from subordinates of Wu Pei-fu, imposed a surtax of 20 per cent on cigarettes, and a consumption tax of nine cents a

¹ For derivation of Tuchun or more properly Tu-chun see Appendix V.

² Usually most frequent in springtime, when a Tuchun's fancy lightly turns to campaigning.

case on kerosene. These last-named taxes contravened China's treaty obligations and must be regarded as desperate measures since their enforcement brought down upon the Tuchun the wrath of the foreign concerns, which, in this case, were such omnipotent groups as the British-American Tobacco Company, the Standard Oil Company, and the Asiatic Petroleum Company. General Lu's action was at once made the subject of questions in the House of Commons (23 April, 1923), protests by the Legations in Peking, and by the Chinese, British, and American Chambers of Commerce.

The above principles for the raising of money are commonly employed in many other provinces, though the Chekiang case quoted above is rather exceptional in its open defiance of treaty obligations.¹

The cases mentioned above are what may be described as large-scale illegal taxation. Additional to these, the district in which any so-called "army" is operating is "squeezed" to a quite amazing degree. An example of this small-scale extortion—small as regards area—will now be quoted. The circumstances of this case came under the writer's observation in 1923, and since much of the story is typical of what goes on in so-called Chinese warfare of the twentieth century, some account of the general situation will be given before we pass to finance.

In the summer of 1923 a certain General Tsung Chih-ping was an adherent of Sun Yat-sen's party, and, with his troops, controlled an area of country around Amoy city in the Province of Fukien. Amoy city, which, amongst other and worthier claims to fame, enjoys the reputation of being the second smelliest town in China, is built upon an island facing the smaller island of Kulangsu, which is an international concession. At this time the perpetual struggle between North and South was proceeding rather actively in Fukien Province, which was said to be more or less neutral in sympathy. Around Canton, Sun Yat-sen was struggling to retain his hold against General Chen Chiung-ming, who, ejected from Canton, had seized (without bloodshed) Swatow, the next port on the coast south of Amoy. The Northern party determined to obtain Amoy, and, with this end in view, an "army" came south from Foochow under a General Wang, whilst a force under a General Hung Jao-lin (Chen Chiung-ming's brother) moved up from the south. It was anticipated that a naval

¹ Since writing these words, other Tuchuns are coquetting with the idea of cigarette taxes; the tax is meeting with a surprising amount of opposition from *Chinese public opinion*.

force might be required, and some gunboats, under an Admiral Yang, also left Foochow to co-operate with the Northerners. This naval force was to be strengthened by another ship from Nanking, which left that port for this purpose carrying a store of munitions for the attack on Amoy. However, some of the Southern party in Shanghai had the foresight to send a sum of \$100,000 to the mouth of the Yangtze in time to intercept this reinforcement on its way to sea, with the inevitable consequence that this particular unit of the Northern fleet came up the Wangpoo and anchored peacefully at Shanghai and was seen not at all by Admiral Yang. In the meanwhile General Tsung Chih-ping was "routed" on the mainland by his enemies and deemed it advisable to retreat to the security of Amoy Island with some 7000 men. It is commonly said that, before executing this strategical move, which cost him considerable loss of "face," he had the foresight to remit \$300,000 to his family in Shanghai. Of his enemies on the mainland, General Wang dallied in the vicinity of Tao-Yan, a town in the centre of a district close to Amoy and notorious for its opium growing. The reason for this interest in Tao-Yan at a time when, by all the canons of Clausewitz, he should have been considering the question of a combined naval and military attack on Amoy Island, was the fact that the opium crop was just coming on, and with it, the payment by the farmers of certain locally imposed opium taxes amounting to some three million dollars. At the risk of confusing the reader, it must be noted that two other bodies of troops were also resident in and around Tao-Yan. One group consisted of the local levies. Another group were commanded by a General known to the Chinese as "Eighty-four catties Yet." General Yet had originally been a subordinate of General Tsung Chih-ping's, but when his over-lord retreated to Amoy, General Yet contrived to change his political principles and remain on the mainland and in the vicinity of the poppy fields. His nick-name of "Eighty-four Catties" enshrines the fact that he had recently "squeezed" the district of a dead weight of eighty-four catties of money. A catty is about a pound and a third.

So much for General Tsung Chih-ping's enemies to the north of Amoy. To the east were Admiral Yang and the Foochow ships. Here the story becomes uncertain. Admiral Yang certainly once fired a few shots at Amoy, but, on the whole, his actions were half-hearted. Emissaries passed between the fleet and Amoy, but the results are not known to me. At one time, General Tsung arranged to supply Admiral Yang with coal, but this friendly arrangement did not materialize. It is certain, however, that relations between Admiral Yang and General Wang were

not too harmonious. Possibly that jealousy between the Services which has vitiated greater combined operations in the West was present; possibly the fact that the Navy had some ground at Foochow which the Army immediately appropriated every time the fleet went to sea was also a contributory cause of Admiral Yang's inactivity. There was also a strong rumour, duly confirmed, that the fleet was reduced to three shells, owing to the defection of the Nanking ship which has already been described. A further naval complication arose due to the fact that some gunboats from Swatow came up to join Admiral Yang's fleet, but, upon receiving an account of the bad behaviour of General Hung Jao-lin's troops, they turned south and withdrew from the war as a mark of their disapproval.

It is with General Hung Jao-lin's misdeeds that we must now deal. The reader who refers back a couple of pages will remember that this is the General who came up from the south against Amoy. When General Tsung retreated to Amoy Island, General Hung occupied all the district to the south of Amoy, and proceeded to "squeeze" it in the most thorough style. As a preliminary, the military authorities appropriated the Likin or Transit Tax (nominally a provincial revenue) and the proceeds of the native customs, which, in this particular case, should have been remitted to the administration of the maritime customs at Amoy. In addition, the following list of military taxes were imposed:—

Sugar Tax.	Bean Cake Tax.	Flour Tax.
Kerosene Oil Tax.	Joss Paper Tax.	Live Pig Import Tax.
Wine and Tobacco Tax.	Timber Tax.	Pig Hongs Tax.
Miscellaneous Timber Tax.	Earthenware Tax.	Firecracker Tax.
Brick and Tile Tax.	Potato Refuse Tax.	Narcissus Bulb Tax.
Small Pig Tax.	Large Pig Tax.	Rice Tax.
Pork Tax.	Butchery Tax.	Road-cleaning Tax.
Hot Water Tax.	Stamping Tax.	Prostitution Tax.
Sulphur and Salt-petre Tax.	Fruit Tree Tax.	Latrine Tax.
Fruit Tax.	Flower Seed Tax.	Revenue Stamp Tax on Boats.
Actors' Tax.	Fowl and Duck Tax.	Revenue Stamp Tax on Wines and Tobacco.
Jetty Tax.	Sedan Chair Tax.	Wholesale Merchant, or "Hong" Tax.
Paper Tax.	Public Road Tax.	Tax for compilation of local "Chronicle."
Lime Tax.	Charcoal Tax.	
Sand Tax.	Revenue Stamp Tax.	
Navigation Tax.	Sanitary Tax for Pork.	
Slaughtering Tax.	Shop Tax.	
	Fresh Fish Tax.	
	Bamboo Tax.	
	Cotton Yarn Tax.	

The amount of revenue collected under these heads is an unknown quantity, but the general principle is to tax up to the limit the trade will stand.

Finally, we will conclude with a few remarks concerning General Tsung Chih-ping's revenue. Isolated in Amoy Island, he had 7000 military stomachs into each of which a certain quantity of rice had to be placed each day. The Amoy Chamber of Commerce was obliged to accept responsibility for the feeding of their defenders. The alternative to the soldiery helping themselves was the provision by the merchants of \$2000 a day, which was collected by means of a forced levy on shops. The merchants also endeavoured to relieve the situation by providing free steamer passages to their homes for a thousand men for whom General Tsung¹ had no arms.

Some of the foregoing narrative of events, financial and otherwise, at Amoy in 1923, are in a sense a digression from the immediate subject of the various ways in which Tuchuns raise money, and, perhaps, it ought to be placed in an appendix. But appendixes are more often referred to than read, and the whole business at Amoy was such an excellent cameo of one side of Chinese politics that it seemed justifiable to include it in the main body of the book, with this final warning: that it only represents one aspect of the Chinese question.

To resume consideration of how a Tuchun raises money:—

- (c) Money for the armies is also raised by capital levies on cities. It is common for a Tuchun, or aspirant to a Tuchunate, to occupy a city with troops and assess it at so much cash on demand. Sums of \$50,000 dollars to \$200,000 are raised in this way from the merchants and local Banks.
- (d) By licensing illegalities; illegal, that is to say, from the theoretical aspect of China as a single country, ruled from Peking. The cultivation of poppies and the sale of opium are made use of as a source of revenue by imppecunious military leaders. In February, 1923, when the Kwangsi troops were in occupation of Canton, the fan-tan gambling dens, which had been completely suppressed by the "Sun Yat-sen and Chen Chiung-ming régime of 1922, were reopened by Sun Yat-sen in order to provide money for the troops."
- (e) Money is also raised by selling State property in the

¹ I cannot resist the temptation to add a postscript to the effect that in June, 1924, I received news that General Tsung had been ejected from Amoy which passed into the hands of the enemies of Sun Yat-sen. It appears to have been a victory of high finance rather than of all arms!

province to private individuals, e.g. the sites of temples were sold by Sun Yat-sen at Canton in 1923.

- (f) By the retention in the provincial treasury (i.e. the Tuchun's treasury) of monies legally raised in the province from land tax, the revenues of railways, the receipts from Chinese customs,¹ which should properly be transmitted to the Central Government. This method is so obvious that only a fraction of China's internally-raised revenue reaches Peking, and then only because, for some ulterior object, it suits the remitter temporarily to finance the political group who happen to be controlling the rusty machinery of the Central Government.
- (g) By starting a private mint in the province and debasing the coinage, or by arbitrarily ordering merchants to accept money from troops at above its face value.
- (h) By retaining in the province revenue raised under foreign control, and, therefore, ear-marked for the service of the external loans. Such funds are those of The Maritime Customs, and The Salt Gabelle.

These last-named funds, being paid into the foreign Banks, are very difficult to touch, and this method is attended by grave danger, since it would amount to taxing the foreign bond-holders, if it could be done on a substantial scale. It is a method quite beyond the capabilities of an ordinary Tuchun unless his position became so desperate that he decided to run amok, but it is not out of the question for super-Tuchuns, such as Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin, or quasi-independent Governments, such as Canton. The latter Government did succeed in securing 13 per cent of the customs surplus as its share independently from Peking during 1919-20.²

This was a concession more or less forced from the diplomatic body at Peking, and was subsequently withdrawn. The Chinese Navy in the Yangtze in 1921 secured much back pay by temporarily holding up the Salt Gabelle funds.

So much for the more common methods employed by Tuchuns for the purpose of raising funds with which to pay the troops which are the ultimate support of any Tuchunate.

From the consideration of the Tuchun system to that of brigandage is not a great step, for one arises from the other. It

¹ Not to be confused with Chinese Maritime Customs under foreign supervision.

² Again in 1923 (Dec.) Sun Yat-sen, then hard pressed at Canton by Chen Chiung-ming, endeavoured to substantiate his claim to the Maritime Customs of Canton. A naval demonstration by the Powers prevented this action on his part having any practical consequences.

will have been realized from what has been already said as to how money is raised and from the previous account of the chaos which distinguishes China's politics, that, although in the case of the leading men, such as the Christian General Feng, Wu Pei-fu, Chang Tso-lin, etc., their troops are tolerably well paid—else would the leading men no longer lead—yet there are inevitably in existence many lesser lights amongst Generals, and many thousands of so-called soldiers, who, in the case of the first-named, are unable to pay their troops, and in the case of the soldiers, are confronted with the awkward problem of living without pay. In this latter case the natural solution is brigandage and loot.

The genesis of the bands of brigands, sometimes numbering several thousands of men in a band, which are to be found in many of the provinces of China, especially the mountainous areas, can usually be traced to the defeat of some Tuchun or lesser General's army. Their leader temporarily useless, the soldiers take to the hills, attracting to their ranks the n'er-do-wells of the district, and then proceed to loot towns and villages, carry off rich citizens and hold them to ransom (\$5000 to \$30,000 are the usual limits), rob, and sometimes murder mail couriers, and from time to time kidnap foreigners. In these latter cases a great outcry is naturally caused, but, on the whole, bearing in mind the numbers of missionaries and other foreigners who now live all over the interior, such events are rare in proportion to the number of brigands extant.¹ As to what this number may be, no figures are available, nor are they likely to be, for the good reason that the number of "soldiers" in China is only to be guessed at (three-quarters, or one-and-a-quarter millions are sometimes mentioned), and the dividing line between "brigands" and "soldiers" is a constantly shifting distinction, since a body of men may be the "bandits terrorizing the district of XYZ" one season, "members of the local commander's army" the next, and "bandits once more" within a few months.²

The bandits, in fact, when bandits, are only doing somewhat brutally and with less attention to etiquette and outward form, what their Tuchun would be doing on their (and his own) behalf were they fortunate enough to be attached to the person of a militarist of distinction.

The suppression of these bandits—when they are suppressed—is achieved by two methods. The obvious one of fighting them

¹ But some increase is noticeable since about 1919.

² It is becoming fashionable for brigands who have captured foreigners to demand as part of the terms of release, that the brigand band be enrolled in the regular army and receive back pay.

is carried out to some extent, especially, of course, should the bandits be interfering with any of a Tuchun's schemes for raising money, but the Chinese have for hundreds of years realized that, though it may at times be necessary to refer disputes to the arbitrament of force, such a process is dangerous, unpleasant, often unsatisfactory, and compares disadvantageously in every respect with resort to arbitration.

For this reason, therefore, it frequently happens that in cases when the bandits have not been too outrageous in their conduct they are enlisted in the command of the local militarist, who thus kills two birds with one stone, in that he eliminates the bandits and increases his own forces. The only disadvantage is that he has more men to pay. The civil population gains to the extent that the exactions of the "official military" are possibly less piratical than those of the bandits.

Whilst on the subject of banditry, it would be ungracious to make no mention of their confrères at sea. The China coast, from the mouth of the Yangtze to Hainan Island, is infested with pirates. They swarm around Hong-Kong, and, in 1922, had the temerity to capture and loot the "Sui An"—a passenger steamer on the Canton-Macao route.¹

These junk pirates pursue the double trade of fishing and piracy, and to give some idea of their numbers it may be mentioned that a member of the Lights Department informed the present writer that he had good reason to know that on one of the many islands off the Fukien coast, all the inhabitants, numbering about 2000 were fishermen-pirates. These sea-rovers are unable to vary their unlawful careers by periodical enlistment into some "official" strength, since there has not, as yet, emerged any "Tuchun of the China Seas"; on the other hand the occasional expeditions against pirates of small Chinese gunboats must afford more amazement than apprehension to the hardy mariners of Kwangtung, Fukien and the West River Delta. The activities of the British gunboats up the West River are a different matter, but these are few, whilst the waterways and trading junks are legion.

Some description is now necessary of another symptom, which is the condition of the so-called Central Government. The kaleidoscopic vicissitudes of Parliament and shifting scenes of Cabinets rising and falling within a day have been touched upon in earlier chapters of this book. But the fact remains that a

¹ Coastal steamers are usually pirated by the method of the gang travelling in the ship as passengers, and seizing the ship when she is off a rendezvous arranged with confederates who are waiting in junks.

collection of men calling themselves the Government of the Republic of China is always to be found at Peking.¹

Not only do they style themselves "The Government," though their claims to this title are based on fiction, but *they are called the Government and are afforded recognition as such by the diplomatic agents of the Powers.* This is a very important point. Recognition by the Powers is of supreme importance to any Government in China because the diplomatic body in Peking have a strangle-hold on Chinese revenue. It is in this fact that we find the explanation of why the Tuchuns still profess to hold their appointments by authority from Peking. The Maritime Customs and the Salt Gabelle have been so well managed by the foreign inspectorate, and China's commerce has, notwithstanding all her troubles, flourished so strongly, that of recent years a handsome surplus has been available after the interest on the foreign loans has been paid. This surplus has been the funds from which the Central Government meet those general payments for which they are responsible. The majority of these payments consist of a portion of the interest which ought to be paid on foreign loans other than those secured on the customs and salt, and some of the interest on domestic loans. Such salaries as those of the Navy, the teachers and the police in Peking are usually much in arrears. Theoretically, the Central Government is always bankrupt. At least twice within the year 1922 they were only saved from a serious default by an unexpected windfall. At one moment in 1923, the salaries of China's diplomatic agents abroad were eleven months in arrears. The Central Government seems to have exhausted every conceivable source in its efforts to raise money for current expenses. For the hundredth time foreigners in Peking are proclaiming that the long-foreseen financial débacle of the Central Government is assuredly at hand. Time will show. There are powerful interests to whom it is of advantage to keep the Peking Government in *status quo*—with the minimum expense, be it understood—for, should Peking collapse hopelessly, it would destroy once and for all the convenient fiction that in dealing with the politicians of the capital, the diplomatic body is dealing with the Chinese nation. The state of affairs outlined above, the Tuchunate system and its corollary of banditry, together with the chaos in China's political situation, is China's heritage, firstly, from Western aggression pitting itself

¹ This was not strictly true in 1923 when President Li Yuan-hung fled to Tientsin, but Mr. Wellington Koo took over the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and more or less carried on.

against Oriental exclusiveness,¹ and secondly, from the revolution of 1911.

Since during the last century, the logic of their own civilization has forced the Occidental nations (copied in this respect by Japan) to develop China, to use her as a market for their goods and as a rich prize of diplomacy, it follows that these nations have been obliged² to inflict on China certain conditions of outside control without which the lives of their nationals in China would have been intolerable and the exploitation of China impossible.

Though, things being as they are, these limitations of Chinese sovereignty have been, and still are inevitable, they do not and have not, assisted in the stabilization of China to any appreciable extent. This contention is admittedly arguable; the advantages of railways can be balanced by the disadvantages of the Nishihara loans, and even here the matter is not certain, since one "expert" of some distinction traced the whole root of the evil of China's present-day militarism to the fact that troops can now be moved rapidly from one province to another by rail, whereas in the old days the journey might take months. "Remove"—in effect said he—"the control of the railways from China, place them under foreign management, forbid all troop movements, and the Tuchunate system would die of boredom."

However, the question as to whether China has gained or lost by Western exploitation is a matter for philosophers to discuss. Mr. Bertrand Russell, in his book, "The Problem of China," considers it at some length, and, on the whole, seems

¹ Sir Ronald Macleay, British Minister to China, speaking at Shanghai in February, 1924, made the following very statesmanlike observations:—

"I fear that in recording and commenting on the present unrest, disunion, and lack of stability in the country, we are, I think, too prone to forget that we are in some measure responsible. It must be remembered that we foreigners originally forced the door of China's exclusiveness, and first by wringing from a reluctant Chinese Government extra-territorial rights, special privileges and concessions and then by opening up the country . . . we inculcated in the younger generation the belief that our methods and ideals were superior to theirs, and in so doing we sowed the seeds of the 1911 revolution. . . . It is therefore necessary to admit the right of Chinese thinkers to opinions which we do not necessarily share . . . such an attitude is not incompatible with a sturdy defence of British interests in China . . . or the stern reproof of abuses such as opium and brigandage."

² This obligation is considered from the logical point of view of Western civilization, whose virility finds its outlet in the doctrine of economic Imperialism. "New Markets" are the aim and object of Western industrialism.

to regret that he does not grace an Oriental civilization. The present writer is content to accept the facts, which are, that extra-territoriality, foreign supervision of customs, the international consortium, the Sino-Japanese treaties of 1915, the control by the Powers of China's tariff, and such-like matters are in existence, and will remain in existence until China does one of two things. Either she must force the Powers to treat her in every respect as an equal, and the classical example of this policy is Japan, or she must convert the Powers to the desirability and justice of granting her equality. It is quite certain that neither policy can start operating until some stability is evolved from her present chaos.

As a final example of the chaos in China, an attempt will be made to give a sketch of the financial condition of the country. With the possible exception of the currency question, this matter of Chinese finance is of an intricacy to appal the most stout-hearted investigator. Chinese Budgets are as simple and as straightforward as they are inaccurate, but, fortunately, in 1923, Mr. Lo Wen-kan, the Minister of Finance, published a detailed statement which, in richness of information, surpassed anything which had previously emanated from the offices at Peking. Mr. Lo has a considerable reputation, and probably his statement, which is reproduced in all its statistical intricacy on pages 703-48 of the 1923 China Year Book, is as accurate as one can expect at the present time. At all events, the tables there published include all the more respectable loans and are those which would require attention at the hands of any commission, Chinese or European, which set about the formidable task of balancing China's revenue and expenditure.

Before attempting to give the salient facts of the financial situation, three excerpts from Mr. Lo Wen-kan's explanatory statement will be quoted. In one place he remarks, apparently more in sorrow than in anger: "The Government has to incur expenses on the one hand, but on the other hand it receives no income"; and again: "Even if all the provinces co-operate, the task is by no means a small one." Finally, he wrote: "The Government does not have the support of the provinces, which are unexpectedly pressing for payment of arrears and trying to increase expenditure at the same time."

Though Mr. Lo Wen-kan's statement is couched in a pessimistic strain, the Chinese financial situation is in reality very far from desperate. The total indebtedness of China in September, 1922, was \$1,906,000,000, which gives a *per caput* debt of \$5—approximately eleven shillings at ruling rates of exchange. China's economic wealth is at present literally incalculable, and this debt

of \$5 per head¹ is a mere flea-bite compared to her potential income per head, once a fraction of her wealth is realized. For the moment, however, she is in the position of a person sitting on an undeveloped gold mine and being harassed for payment of daily accounts by the milkman and the butcher. The above-mentioned \$1,906,000,000 is made up as follows:—

Domestic loans, with security	\$208,000,000
" " without security	\$249,000,000
Foreign loans, secured	\$1,029,000,000
" " unsecured	\$240,000,000
Unpaid administrative expenses (civil and military)	\$180,000,000

As regards assets, the Peking Government was receiving in 1922, \$230,000 a month for current expenses. These monies were derived from mining, stamp, wine, tobacco, and income taxes. In addition to these funds, the Central Government also received dollars from three other sources, viz. the surpluses of the Maritime Customs and the Salt Gabelle after these departments had provided for the foreign loans secured on their revenue, and the Peking Octroi. But the monies from these sources were not available to swell the \$230,000 mentioned above since they were already fully hypothecated as security for domestic loans, treasury and national bonds, which had been floated on the basis of these surpluses.

Even these surpluses, upon which the Peking Government has been living for the past few years, do not reach Peking intact. The provinces, which have stopped sending their proper quota since 1916, regularly withhold a proportion of the Salt Gabelle funds, which deduction is, of course, allowed for by the Group Banks when they decide how much surplus is available. For example, in 1921-22, \$48,551,190 surplus was released, but the provinces had retained \$22,858,362.

Against the \$230,000 which trickle into the Peking Treasury, the expenses of Peking amount to \$9,000,000 per month, of which no less than \$6,000,000 is absorbed by naval and military expenditure, leaving \$3,000,000 for everything else—educational grants, agricultural, salaries, pensions, etc. (incidentally, education had to be satisfied with \$294,165 a month).

Mr. Lo Wen-kan pointed out that there were two solutions to the impasse, and he left it to the provinces to decide which they preferred. He said that either the provinces should remit their proper quota and allow Peking to pay the national bills,

¹ The *per caput* debt in England is at present over £200.

or else would the provinces reduce the establishment of the troops within their jurisdiction and then support the troops which remained ?

Failing some such remedy, Mr. Lo did not see how the Government, with no credit at home and practically none abroad, could continue to function, observing that, in 1922, the unsecured debts upon which payment was already due totalled \$480,000,000. But the Finance Minister in his statement did not mention the real and only permanent solution, which consists in the establishment of a Government which is a real central machine enjoying the confidence of the people. To such an institution either the Consortium or the Chinese Banks and merchants would joyfully advance the money necessary to consolidate the Chinese debts. Once this operation was initiated, China's financial position would rapidly be made the envy of the world.

Since the above paragraphs were first printed, further accurate information has become available from the interim report of the Commission for the Readjustment of Chinese Finances, which was appointed in September, 1923. A précis of the Report appeared in "North China Herald," 26 April, 1924. The Government is now (1924) receiving revenue from five sources :—

Maritime Customs and Native Customs (within 50 Li radius)	\$94,400,000
Native Customs (outside 50 Li radius)	6,700,000
Salt Gabelle	89,800,000
Wine and Tobacco Tax	15,000,000
Stamp Duty	3,200,000
	<hr/>
	<u>\$209,100,000</u>

Of this total only about \$148,000,000 reaches the Central Government, the balance being either retained by the provinces or spent in collecting the taxes.

From the \$148,000,000, \$98,000,000 are absorbed by the interest on the domestic and foreign loans secured on the Salt and Customs, and \$43,000,000 are taken by the domestic loans secured on the Salt surplus.

This leaves about \$7,000,000 for general military and administrative purposes. The latest figures as to the requirements under these heads is \$128,000,000.

It is obvious from the above figures, that from a purely financial point of view it is essential that the provinces should extend a large measure of support to the Central Government. In the above figures no allowance has been made for about \$700,000,000

worth of unsecured loans. With regard to the latter, it is significant that, to quote the "North China Herald," : "It is curious that some of the foreign creditors appear reluctant to send in a precise account of their claims. This is a very old money-lender's trick."

II

We have now to consider the various remedies which, if applied to China, might give her that stabilization which is so necessary both for her own salvation and for the benefit of the world.

The remedies are about as numerous as the symptoms of the disease. First to be considered are those which might come from without, in the form of some kind of international control. This control might be exercised in degrees of varying intensity. The extreme case—which can claim advocates—supposes the employment of foreign troops to restore order in China. So far as fighting is concerned it is probable—but not more than probable—that a few divisions of first-class foreign troops equipped with tanks, aircraft, and gas, could defeat any troops the Tuchuns can put into the field. The issue is doubtful owing to the difficulties an expeditionary force would encounter, which might have to use very long lines of communication, amidst a civil population of immense numerical strength and certain hostility. The idea of forcibly intervening in Chinese affairs is only mentioned here in order to illustrate the extraordinary attitude adopted by some foreigners towards China. Perhaps the most obvious of the many defects of this scheme is that the divisions mentioned above would have to be drawn from at least five nations,¹ probably more, and the Powers have already provided an object lesson at the time of the Boxer rising as to what happens when they try and co-operate in a Chinese military expedition. The foreign troops would have to be operating ostensibly on behalf of some Chinese Government, and a Government of super-Tuchuns who had risen to power on foreign bayonets, amongst which would have been Japanese, would hold office for exactly the same length of time as it controlled foreign aid and not a day longer. Amongst the minor objections to this and similar schemes may be mentioned that it would be an absolute breach of the Washington Nine Power Treaty. But perhaps the strongest objection and obstacle to armed intervention in China is the realization by the

¹ Japan is probably the only country where a Government could obtain some measure of popular support for this kind of policy. The United States and Great Britain would never permit it unless they participated, and public opinion in those countries would not support such a policy.

Powers that the expeditionary force would be inevitably generalised and controlled by Japan, whose predominating position in the Far East has now been further buttressed by the Washington Conference. The only advantage which can be claimed for foreign armed intervention is that it would have a rapid unifying effect on Chinese public opinion, but, as such opinion would be entirely anti-foreign, even this advantage is questionable.

Abandoning as impractical direct foreign intervention, we come to schemes of indirect intervention.

This method is not new, and various phases thereof have been frequently employed during the last decade. It takes the form of supplying arms, funds, and military advisers to various Tuchuns. Japan has undoubtedly been the leading exponent of this phase of indirect intervention, but, during the last few years, arms (in contravention of an international agreement ¹) have been supplied to factions in China from Germany (unofficial consignments), and Italy,² whilst aircraft (ostensibly for commercial purposes) have arrived from America and been delivered in China in defiance of the American authorities in China, who attempted to treat the planes as contraband but were over-ruled by the Supreme American Court in the Far East. The astounding quantities of arms and munitions which are seized every year in Hong-Kong harbour by the police afford ample evidence of the private trafficking which is going on in this respect.

A minor form of this indirect intervention appears in the shape of a kind of an unofficial backing and support which the Powers and the foreign Press extend from time to time to various leaders in China. For example, in 1922, the whole attitude of Hong-Kong society, the Government, and the local Press was extremely hostile to Sun Yat-sen and his Canton Government, largely because he was accused of being at the bottom of the general strike of Chinese labour which gave the Colony an unpleasant but beneficial jolt. The repudiation by his Government of the Cassell ³ contract for the exploitation of Kwangtung minerals may also have had some influence. In 1923, when Sun Yat-sen touched at Hong-Kong on his way back to Canton after

¹ For text see "China Year Book," 1921-22, p. 530.

² A notorious sinner in this respect. On 10 April, 1924, the British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated that he was aware "that attempts were being made to ship from a European country large consignments of arms for the East, and that a British shipping company had been asked to transport these munitions."

³ Entered into by a Government at Canton whilst Sun Yat-sen was suffering his first eclipse. (See p. 192.) The Cassell group were to float a loan in return for the concessions. The Americans had a rival syndicate in the field.

his second eclipse, the change of attitude at Hong-Kong was most peculiar and caused comment. He was welcomed cordially and generally treated as a long-lost brother, and much was heard of the inter-dependence of Hong-Kong and Canton and the need for close co-operation.¹

Similarly, when Wu Pei-fu came to the front in 1922 in his initially successful campaign against Chang Tso-lin, a general impression permeated the Far East to the effect that he enjoyed British support. "The Times" backed him strongly, and he was "the Liberal leader." Latterly, his stock seems to have fallen heavily in the diplomatic and foreign Press market.

The type of intervention described in the foregoing paragraphs has done no good to China, since arms, loans, military advisers, and support have been given to Chinese leaders, not from the point of view of benefiting the country, but with the object of securing some advantage for the purveyor.

We will now consider the third degree of international assistance. This is the method of large loans issued to some group in China with the backing of the Powers. It may be taken as axiomatic that the stabilization of China is going to cost money, and the foreign semi-official financial groups are one of the three sources of supply. The other two are private financial foreign groups and Chinese groups. The potentialities of these last two sources of finance will be discussed later on. The machinery for lending money to China by semi-official foreign groups is in existence in the shape of the New International Consortium, latest descendant of three earlier foreign groups, all born of the mutual jealousies of the Powers in China during and after the "Battle of the Concessions"² period. The principal objections to loans through the Consortium to China are two in number. In the first place the root idea of the New Consortium is that any money lent under its auspices must not be advanced to factions in China, but only for undertakings having the guarantee of the Chinese Government,³ and likely to prove of assured productive value. The stabilization of China, viewed as an academic proposition, is certainly such an undertaking, but who is to do the stabilizing? The super-Tuchuns, Wu Pei-fu, Chang Tso-lin, or Tsao-Kun? The Peking Government? (which would mean a super-Tuchun) or Sun Yat-sen and his clique? All these groups,

¹ Officially, he was, of course, a rebel from the Peking point of view. This gives rise to a peculiar situation. Peking is the only Chinese *de jure* Government recognized by Great Britain, but for practical reasons Hong-Kong, a British Colony, has to have all kinds of semi-official dealings with the Canton Government, which amounts to *de facto* recognition thereof.

² See p. 40.

³ Whatever this is at present—presumably Peking,

not to mention others, such as the members of the Anfu Club party, are possible starters for the honour and profits of being China's saviour.

Unfortunately, none of them, to use an historical phrase, "can guarantee to deliver the goods." There is more probability that money advanced to these persons will simply disappear down the sink of inter-clique fighting and bribing. The Consortium recognizes the absence of a borrower with adequate credentials, and, being in the lending business for profit, it appealed through the Legations at Peking in September, 1920, "for the early consummation of a united Government in China so that the new Consortium may eventually be enabled to give practical expression to the desires of the Four Governments concerned to assist in the future development of this country."¹

At present there are no signs of the appearance over the political horizon of a comet brilliant as the late Yuan Shi-kai, and therefore no signs of a repetition of the re-organization loan of 1913. Since its inception in 1920, the New Consortium has carried out some investigations, has maintained offices in Peking, and has given rise to some exceedingly instructive correspondence regarding Japan's views of her special interests in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.² This is the sum total of its activities. There is a further point in connexion with a Consortium loan which needs comment. If the Consortium put through a loan, the bond-holders would be foreigners and the Consortium and its Government backers must insist on first-class security. This means that some portion of China's revenue at present controlled by Peking, Cantonese, or Tuchun authorities, must be ear-marked for the service of the loan, and this means foreign management of that revenue. It might mean, for example, a Foreign Inspectorate for Land Tax³ analogous to the Foreign Inspectorate of the Maritime Customs and Salt Gabelle. There is very strong opposition in China to any further mortgaging of Chinese assets, an opposition partly inspired by vested interests who would have everything to lose and nothing to gain by the upright methods of collecting and accounting which would accompany foreigners into any branch of Chinese revenues of which they received charge, and partly having its root in the new spirit of nationalism

¹ United States Department of State documents quoted in "The Foreign Relations of China," M. J. Bau, p. 409.

² See p. 193, Chapter X, and also "China Year Book," 1922-23.

³ In the summer of 1923, at a meeting of the Council of the Consortium held in Paris, the representatives denied that a loan secured on the land tax had ever been contemplated. They reaffirmed the disinterestedness of the Consortium. For text of resolution see "Far Eastern Review," July, 1923, p. 431.

which is abroad in China and is fostered by "Young China" and the students all over the country. There is now evident in China a public opinion amongst the educated classes which aims at the ultimate elimination of all the foreign control which now exists, and would certainly be utterly opposed to any further extension of that control even as a temporary measure. This public opinion, which receives yearly reinforcements, and with the spread of education is bound to grow, is a force to be reckoned with.¹ It is off-set to some extent by another body of opinion—older men, more interested in commerce than in abstract consideration of national sovereign rights, who would be prepared to tolerate some further foreign control of Chinese finance if they were satisfied that the country would be stabilized thereby. This class of men is likely to decrease in influence as "Young China" grows in strength, and is probably far from being as influential at the present time as foreigners like to believe it is.

Before discussing possible means of stabilization from within, there is a kind of connecting link between help from without and help from within which deserves consideration. This is the possibility—a slight one at that—of private financiers advancing money to Chinese groups. The classical case is the Birch Crisp loan of August, 1912. Its partial cancellation under pressure from the Group Banks (the old Sextuple Consortium from which America withdrew) is a matter of history. The power of the semi-official groups is so enormous that outsiders can hardly hope to compete against them. A further handicap on private venture is that the "interloper" financial group—should one take the field—has neither the foreign diplomatic support necessary to get good security, a support which is the prerogative of the Consortium, nor have they that intimate local knowledge of personalities and politics which would enable a Chinese Banking Group to gauge the risk of advancing funds to a Chinese faction.

We will now consider the prospects and possibilities of reforms from within. As with reform from without, there are two great obstacles to stabilization; one is the militarist and Tuchun question, the other, the need for money. In a sense, the solution of one would solve the other, since if any one party in China became really supreme in a military sense—and to reach this position would involve the curbing or defeat of all rivals—then that party would probably have no difficulty in securing sufficient funds, either from foreign or native banks with which to set the administration on its legs and disband the parasitic soldiery. Similarly, if one of the groups now struggling for power in China

¹ See Chapter XIII, p. 320.

became possessed of large funds, it is probable that the other parties would inevitably go to the wall.

When one examines the public statements of the several leaders who, from time to time, jointly and severally occupy prominent positions on the stage of Chinese affairs, and when one compares these statements with past actions, one is forced to the conclusion that no one man or party, be he Sun Yat-sen, Wu Pei-fu, Chang Tso-lin, or be it Pei-Yang or Kuo-min Tang, can be definitely distinguished by any exceptional effort to bring stabilization out of China's chaos.

There was once such a man, his name Yuan Shi-kai, and, though his methods may have been open to much criticism, and his ultimate ambition a personal one, there can be no shadow of doubt that, whilst he sat in the Presidential chair, he was determined to the utmost of his power to stabilize the country.

The conflicting claims of personal liberty and good order in the land did not worry him, but to attain good order in the land was the object of his constant attention. He passed, and the disturbing elements, which had been crushed by his strong hand, raised their heads afresh and are now ripe to be crushed again.

It may be that some of the leaders in China to-day are as anxious to restore order as Yuan Shi-kai was. It is impossible to say how far this is true, for those best qualified to know report so conflictingly concerning the intentions of these men. The present writer is inclined to place most belief in what he was told by a man whose wisdom and experience in the Far East is beyond question. This gentleman, who might object to his name appearing in print, said: "The point to remember about the present leaders in China is that they have no fixed policy beyond that of consolidating their present power and waiting to see what turns up."

Independent investigation confirms the belief that this appreciation of the leaders of to-day is correct. Their public statements are full of vacillations. Sun Yat-sen, a man concerning whose character and political ambitions the "experts" ludicrously disagree, may be a public-spirited idealist (according to some), or a double-dyed hypocritical self-seeker (according to others), but it is a fact which Dr. Sun himself could not deny that at times he has preached that China can only be unified by force, and that at other times he has preached the gospel of disarmament and mutual reconciliation,¹ whilst on other occasions it has seemed

¹ Dr. Sun's latest pronouncement, January, 1924, is as follows:—

"Let the Powers withdraw the moral and financial support which they accord to Peking. Let them observe, in fact, that neutrality towards China's internal troubles which they profess in theory. The only thing

that his policy has consisted in creating a model confederation in the South, which, by its manifest benefits, should gradually attract into its arms the other provinces. The catholicism of his preaching has been well illustrated by the miscellany of his practice.

If the present leaders are to bring forth nothing from the travail into which they have plunged China, a new leader will arise. He may be a soldier; he may be a teacher; a man of literature—for China is still a country in which a philosopher might twist a nation's destiny.

If China is to wait for a new leader, let it be hoped for her sake that she must not wait too long, and for the sake of the world that he is not a man of war, intent to stablish China upon a base of military strength. But apart from what might be described as the "professional leaders" in China to-day, and apart from the possibilities of a new "professional" arising who would be more successful than the present cliques, there are other groups in China from whom stabilization might get its genesis.

Most powerful of all in their latent potentialities are the Chinese masses. Millions of agriculturists, patiently fighting their life-long battle with nature, in which defeat means death, and victory means but sufficient to make ready for the next year's battle, could, were they organized and had they the will, sweep Tuchuns, brigands, and other excrescences into the China Sea. But at present they are not organized, and it is tolerably certain that, generally speaking, they have no particular desire to alter the existing state of affairs—for the present. Amongst the masses—and in China these are the millions of agriculturists—perhaps 5 per cent are literate. This figure, based on available statistics, is little more than a guess, and may be an exaggeration. They are miserably poor and steeped in the conservatism of ages. What to them is a Central Government, when for generation after generation, they have been accustomed to living their restricted lives and confining their outlooks to their immediate district? Their political consciousness, which from a national point of view can only be derived from education, is negligible. They are accustomed to and nurtured in the tradition of managing their own local affairs, each "Hsien" in China having been for centuries, so far as its internal management was concerned, one amongst 1500 miniature republics. No need has ever arisen to make them employ their democratic experience nationally. Added to this mentality is the Eastern philosophical doctrine which makes its adherents adopt an attitude of passive submission to which keeps China in turmoil is the prestige which the illegal Government of Peking, which we do not, and never will, recognize, derives from foreign recognition. And until that is withdrawn I will never cease fighting."

inconveniences which would stir a Western people into rebellion. It may be argued that surely the masses who suffer from the disturbances prevailing in China do not enjoy it? Certainly they do not, but the blunt fact is that China is so vast and her population so huge, that these disturbances only directly affect a comparatively small proportion of the people. One writer estimates that 4,000,000 are affected. If we double the figure it only amounts to 2 per cent of the masses. But leaving aside figures, the most convincing proof of the relative superficiality of the disturbances is afforded by the amazing rapidity with which China's trade, postal service, etc., has expanded during the last few years, as evidenced by the trustworthy figures of such institutions as the foreign controlled Maritime Customs. This index of prosperity shows that bad as things seem on the surface, the great majority of these remarkable people are carrying on their affairs very much as if things were normal.¹ It may, perhaps, not inaptly be compared to the situation in London when we read in "The Times" that Scotland Yard announces that an exceptionally heavy epidemic of bag snatching and pick-pocketing is taking place. The effect of this news on the affairs and behaviour of the average citizen is nil. The chances are negligible that he will be a victim. It probably only means that .001 per cent, instead of .0005 per cent of Londoners are likely to be robbed.² If the Londoner be further imagined to consider that, even should he be a victim, it is due to a fate against which it is waste of time to complain, one arrives at what is probably the general attitude of the Chinese peasant towards the present disturbances in his country.

The conditions outlined above are changing. Education and enlightenment are spreading, thanks to the railways, the telegraphs, missionaries, students, commercial travellers of large firms, steamer services up the rivers, industrialization (in its absolute infancy) and the mushroom-like growth of the native Press; but the change, though very rapid compared with the absolute stagnation of the past, is very slow compared to the need for stabilization as viewed through Western eyes. Because of this slowness, and because the masses are not, as a whole, discontented with anyone, it does not seem in the least likely that any reorganization or upheaval will take place which requires as its instrument the peasantry of China. There is nothing in the Chinaman's existence comparable to that desire to own land

¹ See Chapter XIII, "Modern China."

² I have not the faintest idea of how many pickpocket cases occur every day in London, and these figures (70 and 35 on a basis of 7,000,000) are purely imaginary.

which was in the heart of the Russian peasant, and which made him a convenient tool in the hands of the Bolsheviks.

Though the agriculturists are the backbone of present-day China, there are two other groups of public opinion which must be considered. These are the merchants and the students, or, "Young China." The merchants form an extremely powerful, though politically stagnant body, and always have been in this position. The term "merchants" is here being used in a wide sense, embracing small shop-keepers, bankers, and the growing number of Chinese capitalists.

This class has been organized for many centuries in the old guilds, and latterly—in the case of the big men—in modern Chambers of Commerce. In the past, it has sometimes happened that, under Imperial rule, the officials of a province became intolerably tyrannical. Under these circumstances the commercial community employed a weapon which was usually efficacious. They went on strike. A complete stoppage of business took place, and all trade was paralysed until the officials (who were ever apprehensive that news of the discontent might ruffle the serenity of Peking) mended their ways. It is important to note that this commercial stagnation was only produced when the officials behaved monstrously; ordinary injustice was not worth bothering about and was best ignored as far as possible. This organization of the commercial men, a state of affairs primarily intended to assist commerce, is very flourishing to-day as may be seen by the efficient manner in which boycotts of Western and Japanese goods have been carried on at various times during the last two decades, and there is no doubt that if the business men of China decided to eliminate the disturbing elements, the Tuchuns and the politicians, they have it in their power to do so. Why do they not do this?

The main answer is that, broadly speaking, they do not consider it is worth while so doing. Certainly their trade is hampered, but, on the other hand, it is flourishing. As the sage has written: "Of what use to build a mansion if one can never live in it oneself?" At the moment of writing, the only evidence available as to the attitude of the commercial mind shows that they are beginning to protest through the Chambers of Commerce against the existent political confusion, but that they are definitely opposed to embarking on an active policy for the abolition, say, of the Tuchun system. The Chinese Banks, for example, control very large sums of money, and are hostile to the New Consortium. Every one admits that a large loan is an essential preliminary to China's stabilization, but though the Chinese commercial man has got to the stage of taking sufficient interest in the idea of

China as a nation to object to further mortgage of her national assets, he is not prepared to supply on a large scale the much-needed money himself—an operation which he could comfortably perform.

In December, 1921, the big native banks of China held a Conference of their Union at Shanghai, at which they passed a number of resolutions calling upon the Peking Government to stop its "hand to mouth" system of finance, and pointing out how money was absorbed by unnecessary soldiers. "With the exception of a certain strength of military and police, adequate for the maintenance of domestic peace and order, not another soldier should be maintained." They then examined the state of the domestic loans, and came to the conclusion that the face value of the \$350,000,000 domestic loan bonds had depreciated 50 per cent, and that only three loans were in a good state. They advocated that all the surplus of the Customs should be retained by the Inspector-General of the Customs, and devoted to paying off domestic loans and establishing the credit of the Government. They then called upon the Government to reform the currency, and threatened to refuse to float any more domestic loans. A domestic loan which was floated shortly afterwards by the local banks for the Ministry of Communications for the purchase of rolling stock did contain very strict terms which, if they have been adhered to, will prevent the money going elsewhere than into the railways. The banks insisted (*inter alia*) on only paying the money to the manufacturers of railway cars and locomotives, and also that if necessary the agents of the banks should collect the interest direct from the revenue officers of the railways.

This loan is a straw showing the way the wind blows, but as yet the breeze is a very gentle one.

Chinese business circles cannot be blamed for refusing to invest their money in stabilizing the country when the funds would be handled by Peking, Tsuchuns, or Canton, for they feel that to lend money here would only be to throw it down a sink, and they are probably right, but that they have as yet made no effort to replace these objectionable cliques by a party whom they would trust is not to the credit of Chinese commerce.

It seems likely that the merchant classes will not modify their comparatively indifferent attitude towards China's political condition until one of two events takes place. The first postulates much trouble for China, and it is to be hoped that it will not arise; it is that the chaos should become so tremendous that China's trade is not only hampered but definitely arrested and thrown back. This would force the commercial classes to do something for their country's welfare, but it might also mean

an attempt at intervention by the Powers, who are so closely interested in the welfare of China's trade, and what this may mean we have already considered.

The other event presupposes a change of heart in Business China, coupled with the rise to responsible positions of men with new ideas. Men not content to allow their country to be a by-word for disorder so long as their trade prospers; men not content to see their country a helpless ward in chancery surrounded by international uncles, whose suave protestations at Washington contrast strangely with their actions two decades ago. If this kind of man acquires influence, then an end to disorder is in sight, and the key to the production of this new class is to be found in the third body of Chinese public opinion, which, with the agriculturists and the merchants, combines to form the Chinese trinity.¹

This third group is the student class or "Young China." In it are included, for the purpose of this discussion, all those who have been, as well as the growing number of those who are being, educated on Western lines.

It may be as well to state at the outset that this class have many defects. They are often vociferous, and, when still students, they clamour loudly for the moon before they have established themselves on earth. At the same time, their great merit, from the point of view of the problem we are now considering, is that this class does command influence, exerts that influence, and exerts it along Western lines of thought. Their power is increasing as the number of students increases who are educated on Western lines in America, Japan, Hong-Kong, Germany, France, and England, together with those taught in the European-controlled universities and schools in China. Elsewhere in this book² the movement has been described, together with an account of the influence this body of opinion has exerted up till now on Chinese affairs.

More and more will up-to-date business China be recruited from Western educated men, and more and more will the commercial classes of China look on their country's present status from the same angle as would a European if his country were in a similar state. It seems probable that a time will come when this "Young China" public opinion will be strong enough to embark on the task of stabilizing China. They will, of course, have to produce a political leader—not necessarily a man of the Wellington

¹ The militarists have been deliberately excluded as being a passing phase. The industrial workers will be very important one day, but at present are negligible in numbers and influence.

² See Chapter XIII.

Koo type, who is so Western in his outlook that one wonders if he has lost the understanding of his own race—but a man who can rule Chinamen, yet appreciates the fact that under modern conditions China must be controlled by a political mechanism designed on Western principles. Such a leader may arise from amongst the militarists—and it was thought Wu Pei-fu might turn out to be he—or he may be a big business man turned politician. At present no man is in sight, but he will come. China has produced many great administrators in the past, and the not distant past at that, and the fine qualities of the race are still there waiting to be embodied in the person of a strong, honest leader of “Young China.”

And here it is necessary to return again to a matter which has already been mentioned in this chapter, viz. the recognition by the Powers of the *opera bouffe* Government at Peking as the *de facto* and *de jure* Government of the country. At one period in 1923, the Chinese Cabinet was virtually non-existent, whilst the President had temporarily withdrawn from the harassings of political life and sought refuge in the foreign concession at Tientsin. To this so-called Government the diplomatists of the Western Powers had no alternative but to address their demands in connexion with the Lincheng banditry, when several thousand brigands descended from the hills of Shantung and held up the Peking express, taking a selection of Shanghai residents into temporary captivity. It is thought in some quarters that this coup was fostered by Tsao-Kun, in order to embroil the President with the Powers, and pave the way to the realization of Tsao-Kun's well-known ambition to be President. According to others, it was organized as part of a political campaign against the Tuchun of Shantung. The whole story of this incident is typical of the present attitude of the Powers towards China. It came to the present writer's knowledge from a source in which he has every confidence that the Peking authorities were thoroughly alarmed by the possible consequences of this outrage, and that very drastic steps were about to be taken against the brigands. The diplomats at Peking, alarmed at the idea that the brigands might retaliate on the captives, immediately forbade Peking to take any action at all beyond negotiation. This meddling at once gave the Peking people an opportunity of assuming a helpless and irresponsible attitude, of which they were not slow to take advantage.

There is no doubt at all that a very large share of responsibility for the chaos in China which the Europeans deplore, actually lies with the latter, or, to be accurate, with their Governments. On more than one occasion, influential Europeans in the Far

East have publicly advocated the summoning of a Conference of all the sectional leaders in China. These Conference advocates might well consider whether their energies would not be better employed in urging upon their home Governments the imperative need of withdrawing recognition from Peking. It is of no use saying that a first essential is the establishment of a Central Government more or less recognized throughout China when the Powers continue to pretend that such a Government already exists. Furthermore, the perpetuation of this absurd pretence means that, should any attempt be made by, say, the business men of China, or "Young China," to produce an alternative to the Peking gang, the reformers are, *ipso facto*, committed to a policy contrary to the official attitude of the Western Powers. It is, of course, idle to deny that the withdrawal of recognition of Peking by the Powers is a matter of considerable practical difficulty. The Powers could undoubtedly bring the creaking machinery of Chinese Government to an absolute standstill in a moment by withholding the financial surpluses, but this would turn chaos to anarchy. The problem consists in determining how to keep some sort of an administration going during the interval between the dethronement of Peking and the rise of a genuine Central Government in its place. This difficulty would not be insuperable if there were any evidence that the Powers were single minded in their desires to stabilize China; they probably all wish to set her on her feet again, and they all hope to get something in the shape of a "cumshaw" for playing the good Samaritan. Another way of looking at it is that each Power wants nothing for itself but is suspicious of the motives of its companions. It is this jealousy amongst the Powers that chiefly accounts for the continued recognition of Peking. At the moment there are no signs of repentance in this matter, though if a few more bandit outrages occur affecting Europeans and these are followed by ineffectual protests to irresponsible Peking, and if all foreign business men in the Far East would collectively press their Governments to recognize realities and not fictions, something might happen. Until the Powers clear themselves of the onus of blame which now lies upon their shoulders, the circumstances will not be favourable for the advent of the Chinese leader to whom reference has been made.

In any other country but China one would feel inclined to dogmatize and declare that such a leader could only acquire his initial impetus by force. From time to time the present leaders have emphasized this fact, whilst at other times they have announced that unification (a necessary preliminary to stabilization) can be obtained by negotiation. So far, neither method can claim

the credit of any practical achievement. The fighting between the leaders, and the Shanghai Conference between North and South have equally resulted in no improvement. If the view put forward in the preceding paragraphs is correct, namely, that the best hope for stabilization lies in the growing power of "Young China," then the present writer ventures the prophecy that fighting on a large scale is not necessary and will not take place.

Before concluding this chapter with some observations as to the scheme of Chinese stabilization, it is necessary to consider one possibility—fortunately a remote one, but certainly disquieting. It is the chance that China be stabilized by Japan on a militaristic foundation.

There is evidence that a section of extreme nationalist opinion in Japan not only desires to exploit China economically, but also visualizes a great pan-Asiatic movement, definitely anti-White, with Japan as its mainspring. They note the influential position Japan has attained in the councils of the world; how, from narrowly escaping the present subordination of China, their country has sat as an equal amongst the great ones of the earth at Versailles and Washington, and they consider what could be made of an Asiatic Confederation with 450,000,000 subjects, with the 340,000,000 of the Indian continent hovering on its borders—neutral, perhaps friendly. Such considerations open up vistas perhaps a century or half a century hence, in which the hitherto dominant White race dominates no more and perhaps does not equalize.¹ A day when the bitterness of racial discrimination will be assuaged.

The theory of an Asiatic Monroe doctrine is no new one in Japan these last twenty years.² Fortunately for the welfare of the human race it is not likely to be realized.

In the first place, the Chinese have a hereditary dislike for the Japanese, a sentiment which has been greatly strengthened by Japan's aggressive policy towards China since 1895.

Secondly, the Chinese are not, at present, strongly anti-

¹ Then would Hideyoshi's (1536-98) boast to Nobunaga be fulfilled. The Napoleon of Japan said: "I will make of Japan, China, and Korea one country. I will do it as one rolls up a mattress under one's arm."

² See Japanese Notes to Russia reference Korea previous to Russo-Japanese War.

See Article 1, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902, and compare it with Articles 3 and 4 of the 1905 Alliance.

See Franco-Japanese Agreement, 1907.

See Sino-Japanese demands of 1915.

See Ishii-Lansing Agreement, 1917.

See Sino-Japanese Military Pact, 1918 (as published), Article 1.

Western in sentiment, and, if treated fairly, are not likely to become so.

Thirdly, the European Powers and the United States of America have definitely set their faces against Japanese domination in China, and, unless the common attitude is weakened by jealousy, Japan will have to fall into line.

Fourthly, the future attitude of Russia is uncertain. It is not unlikely that, as she settles down internally, her old foreign policy of expansion on the Northern-Eastern Asiatic Coast will assert itself. Mr. Bertrand Russell writes: "The hegemony of Russia in Asia would not, to my mind, be in any way regrettable, but, at any rate, a strong Russia would act as a deterrent to Japanese Imperialism."

Lastly, it is doubtful whether the forward party in Japan will be able to count on sufficient support from their own people to make an Asiatic *bloc* policy a practical proposition. It is more likely that the extreme nationalists will have enough trouble at home with "dangerous thoughts"¹ to keep them from thinking dangerously about China.

As a conclusion to this chapter, some observations will be made on the subject of the principles which must govern the stabilization of China. That it had best come from within, and from non-militarist sources, are conclusions already reached, as is also the general principle that, in broad outline, China must be governed on lines of Western, or democratic political thought. That this last principle will inevitably throw a heavy strain on the Chinese polity is obvious, and has indeed been amply illustrated since 1911. It should be the aim, therefore, of China's reorganizers at the outset to keep so far as they can to the traditional forms of government, and only adopt Western forms where essential.

Where is this essential? China must be governed in all that concerns her international relations on the lines of a Western Power. One of the roots of all her troubles lies in the fact that her traditional foreign policy utterly denied the existence of *equal* Powers. The stable Government of China must, therefore, be able to speak for China as a whole, in diplomatic, naval, military, and financial affairs. On the other hand, in local affairs the Central Government should leave well alone. The provinces and the districts and the villages have been accustomed for centuries to govern themselves, and they resent interference in local affairs. It is now considered by many people, both Chinese and foreign, that one of the faults of the Nanking Constitution of 1911 was its

¹ See Chapter XII, "Socialism and Labour in Japan."

over-centralization.¹ It is of no importance to foreigners how China is governed locally, so long as there is good order in the country, and this condition is likely to obtain if the local officials are left alone. If this principle is correct, a stabilized China will consist of a Federal Government² controlling customs, communications, foreign relations and defence—perhaps education.³ The provinces will be autonomous in other respects. When China is well stabilized she can begin to recover those sovereign rights which are now in the international pawnshop. The Powers will never release those pledges until China reforms herself, and that for two reasons: firstly, from a genuine belief that China is not fitted to be entrusted with full sovereignty; secondly, no one will be afraid of Chinese retaliation, either military, or, in its more likely economic form, until she speaks with one voice.

¹ The downfall of dynasties in China have usually been presaged by over-centralization.

² It is a pity Peking is not more central. Nanking has claims, but from many points of view Hankow has great advantages. Its chief failing is that it has no tradition. Hankow will probably be the largest city in the world in fifty years' time.

³ Or, at any rate, primary education.

CHAPTER XII

SOCIALISM AND LABOUR IN JAPAN

“Those who have used to cramp liberty have gone so far as to resent even the liberty of complaining.”—JONATHAN SWIFT.

“Labour and Socialist element is absent in the House of Representatives; all movements upholding either cause are under strict control of the authorities, and labour agitations against employers being still treated by the peace regulation generally end in prosecution and arrest of ring-leaders, some of whom are made to pass a term in prison.”

—“JAPAN YEAR BOOK,” 1921, p. 656.

IN this chapter it is proposed to trace the growth, and then describe the present situation of the social and political movements amongst the masses in Japan. It must be said at the outset that these movements have a history which extends farther into the past than most people believe; but their influence in Japan, so far as outward indications are concerned, has only been appreciable within the last few years. It is fitting, at this juncture, to acknowledge the great assistance which has been received from an able and well-informed, though little-known, pamphlet, entitled: “The Socialist and Labour Movement in Japan,” by “An American Sociologist,” and published by the “Japan Chronicle” at Kobe. Especially is this publication useful for details as to the early history of the movements.

If we seek to lay hold of certain root factors which, once appreciated, will act as lamps illuminating much intricate detail, the following will answer that purpose. Firstly, as might be expected, the organization of “Labour” in Japan, making it into a force which must be reckoned with in social and political problems, is a very recent event.¹ The industrialization of Japan (and industrialization has been a preliminary to the modern organizations of Labour the world over) has been going on for little more than thirty years, and is still in full development. Secondly, the political conceptions of the country have not been

¹ The guild system has, however, an ancient history in Japan, as in China.

such as to provide favourable soil for the open growth of organizations devoted to Labour interests. The industrialization of Japan has been a part, and a very important part, of the immense plan for making Japan into a Great Power. She has been given industries just as she has been given a Constitution, an Army, and a Navy, and the men who decided that she must have these things in order to *be great* had clear ideas as to the kind of industrialism that was needed. Organizations of workers who might be expected to try and meddle with questions such as hours of labour and rates of pay were not in the programme.

Nevertheless, it has proved impossible to prevent the worldwide Labour movement from affecting the Japanese workers, whilst the influence of foreign ideas, the effect of the World War, and the increasing degree of education amongst the people, have combined to produce a public opinion on Labour questions which has been made use of by those men who hold Liberal ideas in political matters and who, from the mild Liberal to the Anarchical Communist, are conveniently termed "Socialists" in Japan.

The Socialists who, as a definite group, have been in existence in Japan since about 1895 have also, of course, found nothing in the political ideas of officialdom to assist them in the furthering of their theories. Initially, the few educated men who held Socialistic theories were in reality beating the air. There was no body of opinion or group of people in the polity of Japan at the close of the nineteenth century, to whom the ideas of the Socialists made any appeal. The first Socialist movement in Japan failed, and its failure was chiefly due to this lacuna in which it was trying to operate, and in which it was aimlessly spinning its theories. It revived, or, to be more accurate, it reappeared from underground, just before the outbreak of the World War, and it was also at this time that the Labour movement first began to show its strength.

The Labour movement, by which expression is meant a movement having as its principal aim the improvement of the workers' condition, and the Socialist movement, by which is meant a movement intended to Liberalize the political institutions of the country, are, therefore, complementary one to the other.

This fact is, of course, not peculiar to Japan, but, in drawing comparisons with other countries, it must be remembered that, in Japan, the twin movements and the resulting conditions which they have jointly and severally produced, are at an earlier stage in their careers than are those in the advanced Western countries. They have also moved much faster, and apparently skipped certain stages in evolution which were necessitated by similar movements in the West.

We will first consider the history of the Socialist movement. Its founder in Japan was an American-educated man named Dr. Katayama Sen, who began spreading Socialistic ideas in 1898. A few years later, a Socialistic party was formed, and it was joined by such men as Dr. Abe Iso, Kotoku Denjiro, and Sakai Toshihiko, the two latter being able journalists on the staff of the "Yorodzu Chuo."

It will be remembered that it was during the opening years of the twentieth century that the Jiyuto and Kaishinto political parties were in full development towards "their present party functions, i.e. a political ring, buying elections openly and cynically, and serving merely as camouflage for a military oligarchy in no way responsible to the Japanese people."¹

Though the Socialist party was suppressed when it was formed in 1901, it was not singled out for persecution by the authorities until during and after the Russo-Japanese War. The staunch Socialists denounced this war as a conflict between Imperialistic nations, and this attitude produced three results. It purged the Socialistic movement of weaklings; it caused the Socialists to lose control of their Press—then the "Yorodzu Chuo"—and it determined the authorities to bring pressure to bear upon Socialism.

From the close of the Russo-Japanese War, the authorities steadfastly tightened up the screw. Socialist meetings were broken up, Socialist literature was suppressed, and Socialists were imprisoned. The consequences were inevitable.

Men of moderate or lukewarm views disassociated themselves from the movement, and a few men of strong views became fanatics whose minds gradually turned towards desperate measures of a "direct action," anarchical, and revolutionary nature.

In 1908 there occurred the "Red Flag Case," when the display of that emblem in Tokio led to a riot and the imprisonment of men such as Sakai, Yamakawa Kin, and Arahata Katsuza. Kotoku—the journalist who was the leader of the extreme Socialists—was not in the Red Flag incident, but his name reappears in history in 1911, when he and eleven others, including a woman, were executed for their share in a bomb plot. By this date, official repression had turned men like Kotoku into out-and-out anarchists. As a result of this bomb plot, there was a general comb-out of the movement in Japan, and many Socialists were imprisoned. The movement outwardly collapsed. What was left of it disappeared underground.

¹ "The Socialist and Labour Movement in Japan," p. 3, and Appendix VIII.

It reappeared amongst some intellectuals in 1913, and from this renaissance it has, on the whole, progressed steadily. It has done so because, at its re-birth, it found a growing body of public opinion to whom its doctrines had a practical message.

The opinion was that of Japanese labour, which was now beginning to become a factor of importance. From now onwards, in addition to the advantage of having an audience from amongst the masses to whom they could preach with some effect, the Japanese Socialists were assisted by developments in other parts of the world. In chronological order these were as follows: The revolution of 1911 and establishment of a Republic in China, with its consequent focussing of attention on democratic ideas throughout the Far East. Secondly, the increasing influence of Socialist ideas in Western countries; the rise of the Labour party in England, and the general increase of Socialist parties in the Western legislatures. Thirdly, the Great War, with its results, the downfall of Imperial Russia and Germany—last strongholds of autocracy in Europe—and a consequent forward surge of democratic ideas the world over.

Though it would be more correct to interrupt the narrative of Japanese Socialism at this juncture in order first to trace the beginnings of the Labour movement, it is convenient for the sake of continuity to finish first the history of Socialism. When the intellectuals openly revived Socialism in 1913 they started a newspaper called "The People's Paper" (*Heimin Shimbun*). It was suppressed, but in 1915 a magazine called "New Society" appeared. Sakai, Yamakawa, and Arahata contributed to this periodical.

In 1916 the Socialists began to hold meetings, and in 1917 they went so far as to run Sakai as a candidate for the Diet. They can have had little hope of his success, but, as a piece of propaganda, it was not without value. In 1918 there was a split in the movement, due to the belief of some Socialists that the time had come when Socialistic ideals should be shelved in favour of various practical schemes of state-ownership. These men, the so-called State Socialists, supported the idea of a Government exercising minute paternal control on all the activities of the people. Nationalization of most things, and an ultra-Imperial conception of the Emperor's position were their professed aims.

This movement, which was tainted by officialdom, and its magazine, "State Socialism," perished quickly of inanition. The main stream pushed on, its flow receiving exceptional impetus from the famous rice riots of 1918, of which more hereafter. Socialist literature increased in volume, the figures for the books whose publication the Government had sanctioned being:—

1917	21
1918	49
1919	194
						(First eight months.)	
1920	165

In addition to this officially tolerated output, a considerable amount of matter was produced and circulated secretly.

The various elements which in Japan as in other countries were loosely grouped under the banner of Socialism, varied from Anarchist to broad Liberal, and were to an increasing extent finding a common foundation in the aspirations of organized Labour. Universal suffrage which had at one time been an exclusive battle-cry of the Socialists, had by this period passed out of their hands and was being vociferously fathered by the official opposition parties—the Kenseikai and the Kokuminto.¹ It was but an illustration of the well-known fact that political ideals move steadily from the “right” in politics towards the “left,” and that what the Socialists demand to-day, the Conservatives will defend on the morrow. More and more the Socialists have been turning to Labour, but as we shall see “Labour” has not yet in Japan attached any importance to attempts to control the Diet.

As a result of this unifying effect of a “Labour public” upon the various groups of Socialists, it was determined to form a definite Socialist party. This was accomplished in December, 1920, when the Japan Socialist League was born. The meeting of delegates in Convention at Kanda was raided and broken up by the police and many arrests were made, but the League was declared formally inaugurated.

In January, 1921, the League numbered 1400 members. There are many more people in Japan than this who approve of and agree with the activities and views of the League, but there are obvious disadvantages in publicly joining an association whose attempts at propaganda are strictly prohibited.

The League endeavoured to hold its second annual meeting on 9 May, 1921. An audience of several thousand persons collected, but the meeting was dissolved by the police as soon as the Chairman rose. Some Socialists were arrested on arrival and others were taken into custody as a result of a scuffle which followed the dissolution of the gathering. A “social soirée,” which the Socialists endeavoured to hold on the next evening at the headquarters of their movement, was equally doomed to failure, as the Chief of the Kojimachi police station, who was present,

¹ The Government party—the Seiyukai—were toying with the idea in 1923.

decided that the meeting was detrimental to public peace and order, and directed that it be broken up. On 9 June, 1921, the Home Office ordered the dissolution of the Japan Socialist League, but Mr. Sakai, one of the prominent Socialists, is quoted by the "Mainichi" as saying that this order made no difference, since the attitude of the authorities had always been uncompromisingly hostile, all the League's publications being invariably suppressed and its meetings broken up.

Not only have the Socialists encountered official opposition, but they have also had to contend against a reaction of an unofficial nature, for there have appeared in Japan sundry signs of a counter movement deriving its inspirations from the same motives as did the "Black Hundred" in Tsarist Russia, the Fascisti in Italy, and the revived Ku-Klux-Klan movement in the United States of America. Bands of persons—often of the hired bully type—break up Socialist meetings and support an ultra-nationalist doctrine. One such association which was publishing propaganda in 1921, urging the "rooting out of the evil," called itself the Kokoku Isshin-Kai (Single-mind Association of the Fatherland). Its handbills stated that control of the Socialists could no longer be left in the hands of the police, and that a "great army of attack" must be raised as "we cannot tolerate a day's existence of Socialists, anti-national, and immoral . . . which endangers the national foundations and disturbs the people's minds." Other associations of a similar nature, whose attacks on Socialists appear from time to time in the Press, are the Yamato Minro-kai and Kokusui-kai¹ (Association for the Development of National Characteristics or Essence).

¹ The "Japan Chronicle" of 8 September, 1921, published an interesting translation of an article from the magazine "Suntetsua," having as its theme the Kokusui-kai.

This society was formed in the autumn of 1919, and posed as a revival of a chivalrous organization existing in feudal days. The Articles of Association of the Kokusui-kai run as follows:—

"1. The Association is an organization of men actuated by a sense of justice and the spirit of chivalry.

"2. The members of the Association agree to respect and maintain the blood-signed rules of association which have customarily prevailed among the people of the same mind since the olden times.

"3. The Association aims at rallying people of the same mind round about the Imperial House and rendering loyal service in time of need.

"4. The members shall be bound immediately to gather at the appointed place on receipt of any extraordinary call in case of a national or local emergency."

The Kokusui-kai enjoys (or did until very recently) semi-official support, though the high-handed behaviour of its members placed the authorities in a very invidious position on more than one occasion.

In the 1922 session of the Diet the Government were severely heckled by the Opposition as to what support, secret or open, the Government were giving to the Kokusui-kai, and it came out that during the previous few days when the Government had surrounded the Diet with thousands of police and barricades to keep back the crowds during the debate on manhood suffrage, a telegram had been received from Osaka stating that 35,000 of these "white guards" were prepared to come to Tokio to act as "popular police" and make a counter suffrage demonstration. These men are called in Japanese "Kyokaku," which means, "dare to kill."

The normal police surveillance of Socialist activities in Japan is very similar to that exercised in Germany in pre-war days. At any Socialist meeting ample police are in attendance, and the proceedings are often speedily suppressed. The Congress of the Socialist League at the Y.M.C.A. Hall at Kanda on 10 December, 1920, is a typical example of the general procedure, though the meeting itself was a larger affair than the ordinary Socialist assemblage in Japan. About 2000 police were present and the meeting was suppressed before any speeches were made, many Socialists having been arrested just previous to the meeting. The leaders then arranged a second meeting in the evening. The Chairman, a certain Mr. Sakai, rose and said: "We are to begin the lecture." The police instantly ordered the suppression of the meeting, whereupon he rose and exclaimed: "Long live Socialism." A number of policemen then arrested Mr. Sakai, who suffered considerable personal damage in the process. The minute manner in which the police control Labour and Socialists' demonstrations is well illustrated by a typical series of regulations issued for the control of Labour processions in Tokio on 1 May, 1921. Herewith a selection:—

1. No drunkard or man strangely dressed to take part in the procession.
2. The participants to be divided into groups. Each group to have a leader. Each group to be composed of less than fifty persons.
3. Each participant to wear a badge.
4. The leaders to wear special badges.
5. All badges to be a colour other than red.
6. No speeches to be delivered *en route*.
7. Cudgels and dangerous articles not to be carried.
8. Bands, drums, bugles, etc., forbidden.
9. Inscriptions on flags to be limited to the names of associations, their mottos, and "May Day Congratulations."

10. Flags not to be of extraordinary size.
11. Procession not to stop *en route*, or distribute handbills.
12. The Labour Song to be sung on the Day must be previously submitted to the Metropolitan Police.

The patent fact that since 1918 Socialistic ideas in particular and democratic ideas in general had made headway amongst these masses at an increasing rate of progress, determined the Government to devote more attention to checking the ravages of public disease. It was proposed in 1922 to employ as a cure a short Bill, commonly referred to as "The Bill for the Control of Dangerous Thoughts." Though short, it was to the point as regards penalties, if suspiciously vague as to offences. As amended by the House of Peers it ran as follows:—

Article 1.—Those who have either propagated or canvassed matters subversive of the national Constitution shall be liable to penal servitude or imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years. Those who have complied with such canvassing shall be dealt with likewise.

Article 2.—Those who have organized societies, meetings, or mass movements with the object of executing, propagating, or canvassing matters specified in the first paragraph of the foregoing Article shall be liable to penal servitude or imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years.

Article 3.—Those who have propagated or canvassed matters designed for the alteration of the fundamental organization of society by means of riots, violence, threats, or other similar illegal means, shall be liable to penal servitude or imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.

Article 4.—Offences falling within the purview of Article 1 or Article 3 shall be punishable, even though they are unconsummated.

Article 5.—Those who have made preliminary preparations with the object of committing the offences specified in Article 1 or Article 3 shall be liable to penal servitude or imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years.

Article 6.—Those who have supplied money or otherwise afforded facilities to others with the object of making them commit the offences specified in Articles 1, 2, and 3, or those who have accepted money or facilities with knowledge of the circumstances, shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of these Articles.

Article 7.—Should any person who has committed any of the offences in the foregoing six Articles denounce himself before the authorities prior to detection, his penalty shall be either reduced or entirely remitted.

Article 8.—The law shall also apply to persons who have committed offences mentioned in Articles 1 to 6 hereof outside of the area in which the same is in force (i.e. in foreign countries).

It was to be still-born,¹ for its appearance brought forth a degree of opposition from all quarters which was as remarkable as it was significant. Remarkable, in that a Government Bill of this nature had never been seriously and successfully opposed up till this time; significant, as a measure of the rapid growth of power of Japanese public opinion. The Press almost unanimously condemned the Bill; even the House of Peers amended and slightly weakened its provisions; the Opposition members in the Diet of course opposed it, and even in the serried ranks of the Seiyukai, support for the measure was so lukewarm that the Cabinet considered it advisable to refrain from employing the closure, and allowed the Bill to be talked out. It was a clear victory for Liberalism, and in some respects as noteworthy an event as the rice riots of 1918.

The general attempt on the part of the authorities to control men's thoughts by legislation of which attempt the "Dangerous Thoughts Bill" was a typical example, had the inevitable result of stimulating interest in the forbidden fields of Communism, Socialism, Syndicalism, and such-like advanced doctrines, and especially was this the case amongst the universities and higher schools, the students at which places began, towards the end of 1922, to form associations for the study of these "isms." At one such institution according to a member of the professional staff, about 80 per cent of the students would be classed as, he said, "Liberals in England, Dangerous Socialists in Japan." He added that his predecessor had been removed from his post due to suspicion that he encouraged the students in "dangerous thoughts."²

We will here conclude this description of the Socialist movement, and starting again from the closing years of the nineteenth century, trace the growth of the Labour movement.

The early stirrings of Socialism in Japan in the late nineties was accompanied by a slight Labour movement, but in those days the country was not sufficiently industrialized and the general status of Labour throughout the world was not high enough to make Japanese Labour a factor of any importance.

¹ A rumour, current in December, 1922, that the Government intended to reintroduce it in the 1923 session, revived all the opposition.

² In May, 1923, there was a riot amongst the students at Waseda University in protest against the formation of a University Society for the Study of Military Affairs. Four professors at Waseda were placed under police surveillance as being suspected of spreading Socialism amongst the young idea. See "Osaka Mainichi," 14 May, 1923.

Since that time Japanese industry has stepped forward with great strides, partly as a result of normal development, partly as a consequence of two wars. The Russo-Japanese War forced Japan to produce at home many articles she had previously imported, and the Great War, which so completely absorbed the attention of the great manufacturing nations of the West, left markets open to Japan which that country laboured exceedingly to exploit, and struggled hard to retain. In the natural course of events, the boom which followed the Russo-Japanese War was succeeded by a depression, and this condition weakened Labour.

By 1912 the economic condition was improving, and Labour lifted its head. This year is noteworthy in that in it occurred the first big Japanese strike—that of the Tokio Tramway Workers. In it was also formed the Yuai Kai (Labourers' Friendly Society), by Mr. Susuki Bunji, a man whose name is bound up with the growth of organized labour in Japan. The Yuai Kai, which at that time received a measure of support from men like Baron Shibusawa and other members of the upper classes who professed advanced views, did not openly call itself a union. To do so was to risk suppression by the authorities, as trades unions were virtually forbidden under the notorious Clause 2 of the 17th paragraph of the Police Regulations. These Regulations, which were promulgated in 1900, are continually being attacked in the Diet and elsewhere, but are still in force ¹ (1924). The clause in question runs as follows: "Those who, with the object of causing a strike, seduce or incite others, shall be sentenced to major imprisonment of one to six months with additional penalty of 3 yen to 30 yen."

Quite recently the Government have found it advisable to intimate that it is not their intention in future to employ the provisions of the above order as a weapon with which to suppress genuine Labour unions, but they cling to the order itself. Though, in its early days, the Yuai Kai did not dare to call itself a Labour

¹ In the 1922 Diet, the three parties all brought forward Bills with the purpose of modifying the Police Regulations. The Kokuminto's measure was the most advanced.

They wished to abolish Article 5, which forbids Shinto and Buddhist priests and teachers and students to organize and join political associations, and it forbids minors and women to attend political meetings.

They wished to revise Articles 8 and 10, which give the police discretionary power to dissolve or stop public meetings. Article 17 they proposed to abolish.

The Kenseikai fathered a less radical Bill, whilst the official *bloc* of the Seiyukai gave its approval to an amendment removing the disabilities on women in regard to attending political meetings. This amendment alone became law. The other Bills were shelved.

union, it acted, nevertheless, as a focal point for trade union ideas.

The industrial isolation of Japan which occurred as an immediate consequence of the Great War rapidly put Labour in a stronger position than it had ever been before, or has yet been since. The unending demands laid upon her industries, both from the Allies and from the half-starved Eastern markets, whose normal flow of imports from the West had almost ceased, raised the price of labour to figures hitherto undreamt of. The effect of this condition on the Labour situation soon made itself felt. In 1917 the number of strikes was officially returned as being 398, involving nearly 60,000 workers. The figure for 1917 was seven times that for 1916.¹ As elsewhere in the world, the cost of living rose steadily and wages attempted in vain to keep pace. In August, 1918, the price of rice, the staple food of the masses, reached a price of upwards of 60 sen a sho, a 300 per cent increase on its price during 1915. The price of other essential foods were similarly inflated, but it was rice that "broke the camel's back." Though an advance in prices was to some extent a natural economic evil arising from the disturbance of the war, the masses believed, and with justice, that they were being shamelessly exploited by the war profiteers, who were springing into existence on every hand.

Riots broke out at an obscure fishing village and the rice shops were raided. This flash set alight a conflagration which spread all over the country and approached the dimensions of an insurrection. Its chief characteristic was the looting of rice shops, save where the merchants were quick enough to lower the price, but, in combination with this feature, there were others of a more revolutionary character. The offices of unpopular newspapers were attacked as were also establishments which catered for the tastes of the new rich; the "narikins." The movement was a passionate and primitive protest by the masses to mark their rage against both the intolerable cost of living and also that class on whose members they fixed chief responsibility for that condition. The Government were thoroughly alarmed—the Japanese Government always has been particularly responsive to popular disturbances—and called out the troops. At first all reference by the Press to the riots was absolutely forbidden, but this order was wisely withdrawn as a result of a unanimous representation by the newspapers. In the rioting and fighting which took place over wide areas there were many casualties. Accurate figures are not available, but thousands were injured and over a hundred killed, whilst a number of persons (again exact figures are not available)

¹ Official figures for 1921 were 246 strikes, involving 58,000 workers, and for 1923, 226.

were executed in the subsequent trials. The casualty list of the rice riots is also mixed up with that due to conflicts between the troops and strikers which took place in a series of strikes immediately after the riots. The rice riots of 1918 stand for a very significant landmark in the development of modern Japan.

It was the first movement of a nation-wide character which came from below. Ever since the Restoration, the Japanese people had been spoon fed in every conceivable way from above by the comparatively few men at the top who had devoted their lives and genius to the tremendous task of equipping a mediæval Eastern State with the material panoply of Western civilization within the amazingly short period of three-quarters of a century. That in the course of this metamorphosis the people should suffer some change in their mental outlook, that they should acquire something of the democratic ideals of the West, in addition to the material things, was inevitable. Sooner or later it was certain that the ruling classes would have to deal with a new outlook on the part of the people, an outlook derived from the West, and which had been revealed to the people by their enforced contact with Western forms and ideas.

Commenting on the outlook for the forty-sixth session of the Diet, the "Kokumin" (a more or less independent paper) wrote in January, 1923: "In the House of Peers, the majority party, consisting of the Kenkyukai and the Koyu Club, will lord it over others, setting themselves up as supporters of the present Government, while in the House of Representatives the Seiyukai will give itself high and mighty airs as patrons and guardians of the Cabinet. But while they are elated at their power, millions of people around and under their nose are of an entirely different mind. While the Diet remains as of old, the people have advanced far onwards. . . . Perhaps a majority of members will some day realize that they are representatives of the governing class and hush their petty strifes in order to face the people unitedly. But that will be the time when the people come into collision with the Parliament in real earnest."

The civilization of the West, which, in the judgment of the founders of modern Japan, it was necessary to graft on to Japanese life, was not a thing from which parts could be taken piecemeal. Newspapers, telephones, cables, railways, and Western means of communication were bound to bring in their wake a broadening of thought, a sense of inquiry, a feeling that what was good for a man working in the pits of Wales was also probably good for a man working in the coal pits of Hokkaido. With the passing of the outward forms of feudal life, there must also pass feudal conceptions in regard to the relative positions of the classes.

For Western civilization was an entity, its material and philosophical factors closely locked, and when the old Genro reversed the ancient policy of Iyeyasu, they opened the door to all the features of the West, both its good, and, from their point of view, its bad ones. Material development is always more rapid than the development in man's thoughts on such subjects as his political position, for the first is an obvious thing in front of him, whilst the second is an intangible factor. Consequently it was but natural that in Japan the obvious and the mechanical aspects of Western civilization were the first to make their mark on the country. Nevertheless, sooner or later the philosophy of the West was bound to produce a harvest, and the first indication of that harvest were the rice riots of 1918.

For the first time, and it is not likely to be the last, a new voice was heard in Japan. Not the voice of officialdom, but the less polite accents of the masses. Moreover, this new voice did not speak in vain. It achieved what no Diet had ever done. It overthrew the Government. When Count Terauchi resigned he did so to mark his sense of responsibility for the happenings of August, 1918. Thus the Ministry appointed to office by the Genro in opposition to the wishes of the then majority in the Diet fell as a result of direct action by the people most of whom had no votes. The new Government,¹ Mr. Hara's Ministry (the first commoner to hold the Prime Minister's office in Japan) took the lesson to heart and hastily extended the suffrage, until the franchise embraced 3,000,000 voters. All these results tended to open the eyes of the masses to the power which might be theirs. On the other side of the picture it should be noted that the riots proved that the Government could rely absolutely on the Army. Appeals "not to fire on your brothers" were useless.

From the Labour point of view, the riots led to an increased use of the strike as a weapon, and drew hints from the authorities that genuine Labour unions would not be suppressed through the Police Regulations.

1919 was notable for an increase in the number of strikes, which totalled 661 according to the "Ohara Labour Year Book"; 497 according to the statistics of the Police Affairs Bureau of the Home Office, whilst it was during this year that strikes took place at the Government arsenals. By the end of 1919 the trade depression was setting in, and this factor weakened Labour in Japan, as it did Labour all over the world. For the time being the power of Labour had reached a high-water mark, and from this point it has temporarily receded.

¹ See Chapter VII, p. 141.

It was mentioned that, in the Parliamentary session which succeeded the rice riots, the so-called "party" Government of Mr. Hara hinted that the open establishment of trade unions would be permitted. Those members of the Yuai Kai who worked in the Kwansei district, an area embracing the big industrial towns of Kobe and Osaka, promptly formed the Kwansei Rodo Domeikai (Labour Federation). Other unions were also formed about this time, but the Kwansei Federation was remarkable for the democratic nature of its organization and the control exercised by the members over its officials. It was under the ægis of this union that there took place in 1919 the reorganization of the Yuai Kai, which, from a friendly society became a general federation of Labour,¹ with an eight-hour day and a six-day week as its principal aims.²

Hardly had the unions in Japan begun to organize on Western lines, than a struggle on a definite issue between Labour and the Government took place.

It will be recollected that the Peace Treaty of Versailles provided for an annual International Labour Conference, the first of which was due to be held in Washington at the end of 1919. The Japanese Government's method of selecting the Labour delegates did not commend itself to the unions. In brief, the system was as follows: The Provincial Governors directed industrial concerns in their province to send a representative "preferably after consultation with the workers" to a provincial conference. This conference was to elect a delegate to a general conference, which, in its turn, was to choose a delegate to represent Japanese Labour at Washington. At the general conference 89 per cent of the delegates were thus elected either by provincial councils or else by Government-controlled undertakings, such as the railways. Only 11 per cent of the delegates represented the large Labour unions. The meeting of the general conference was characterized by the protests of the 11 per cent against the official idea as to how a workers' delegate should be elected. Their arguments availed nothing against the official majority, and the conference finally decided to offer the position to one of three men. These were: Dr. Honda, a journalist, Dr. Takano, a professor, and Mr. Masumoto, ship-building engineer and director of a steamship company, but a man thoroughly acquainted by personal experience with labour conditions. The last-named gentleman accepted the appointment, after it had been refused

¹ General Federation of Labour = Dai Rodo Sodomei.

² For list of principal unions in 1923 and membership thereof see Appendix VIII.

by the two other nominees. Between the day of his acceptance and that of his departure from Yokohama, numerous meetings of protest were held. So much feeling was aroused that the Japanese Labour delegate was smuggled out of the country by the police, as it was feared that the unpopularity of his appointment might inspire some over-zealous trades unionist with the ambition to provide a real corpse for the mock funerals which were being held. Baulked of the opportunity of choosing their own candidate, the Labour leaders, led by Mr. Susuki Bunji, President of the new Labour Federation, protested direct to Mr. Gompers, the head of the American Federation of Labour, and their objections to Mr. Masumoto were then published in America. The Japanese delegate, faced on one side by this announcement and on the other by similar pronouncements which were being made by unofficial representatives of Japanese Labour who had come to America, adopted an attitude entirely different from that expected of him. In the words of the author of the pamphlet to which several references have already been made: "Masumoto judged, and judged wisely, that his Government would gain far more if he worked for its reputation rather than its capitalists. So Masumoto came out as a Labour man, and argued for the eight-hour day for Japanese Labour, and against special exemption, and called on his Government for a guarantee that the workers would have freedom of organization and action. All that a Labour man could have done, he did."¹

1920 and 1921 were marked by a series of struggles between Labour and Capitalism, in which the unions fought with marked success to obtain official recognition of their status by the employers. The Ashio mining strike established the first case in Japan wherein the workers successfully struck for the right of collective bargaining. This case was followed by many others. At the same time the workers were frequently agitating for increased retiring allowances in the event of dismissal. This form of "unemployment dole" has its origin in Japan in the old family idea and what is called the "paternal position" of the employer. In this respect the workers were not as a rule successful, the business depression engendering a stout resistance in the ranks of Capitalism towards any avoidable expenditure. From July to August, 1921, the greatest industrial struggle Japan had ever seen took place at Kobe, when thousands of workers in the Mitsubishi and Kawasaki shipyards struck or were locked out

¹ The author of the pamphlet infers that Mr. Masumoto adopted the attitude *faute de mieux*. There is, however, considerable evidence pointing to the fact that he was a champion of Labour by conviction.

for a month, a period of unprecedented length in Japanese Labour disputes, as the workers are always very weak financially. The men were defeated in this struggle. Their demands included the following: The right to join any Labour union they pleased; a reduction of working hours; recognition of the shop committee system; increased retiring allowances. In the course of the dispute the men produced a new demand, in which they put forward the idea that they should exercise a kind of Syndicalist control over the works for six months.

Fighting as they were, at a period of acute industrial depression, the workers were handicapped from the start. Though troops were kept in readiness, there were comparatively few disturbances, the attitude of the authorities being strictly neutral, save in regard to public order. The accusations of the Japanese Labour leaders that the civil and military powers had supported the companies were not borne out by facts.

In any attempt to weigh up the present position of organized Labour in Japan, consideration must be given to some aspects of the situation which, for the sake of clearness, have been omitted from the foregoing general outline. One of these is that of female labour. The main industry in Japan is that of the textiles, and these depend on the labour of women. In the raw silk, spinning, and weaving industries, there were employed at the end of 1918, according to official statistics, 648,157 women and 129,503 males. In machine-making, shipbuilding, foundry work and tool work, 18,296 women, 270,610 males. In chemical and porcelain industries, 46,398 women, 113,364 males.

Out of a total of 1,409,196 classified workers, 763,081, or nearly 50 per cent were females.

In addition to the women working in factories, large numbers of them work in the mines. The "Japan Year Book" for 1919-20, in regard to coal mines, quotes the following figures:—

Under ground	154,631 males.
"	"	58,185 females.
Above ground	52,265 males.
"	"	22,080 females.

Exclusive of the above are the figures for children of both sexes between twelve and twenty. As an example of the extent to which child labour is used, the following figures refer to coal mines in 1918:—

Under 15 years old:	Under ground	.	1,075 males.
"	"	"	869 females.
"	"	Above ground	881 males.
"	"	"	673 females

Under 20 years old : Under ground	.	24,415 males.
" " " " "	.	14,100 females.
" " " Above ground	.	9,495 males.
" " " " "	.	6,896 females.

From another source the following figures were obtained for the coal mines of Kyushu during 1919:—

Males	272,000.
Females	81,000.

These figures have been selected in order to illustrate a general situation rather than with the idea of describing exactly the present distribution of female labour in Japan, for which the current Year Book should be consulted. It is desired to emphasize here that women are of great importance to the Labour movement in Japan for two reasons. Firstly, because such a large proportion of the total of the Japanese workers are women, and secondly, because the women predominate so greatly in the spinning and weaving industries, which are undertakings of vital consequence to Japan's economic position in the world. The conditions under which Japanese women carry out their work are not good according to Western ideas, but the natural backwardness of female workers which, until very recent times, has been a characteristic of female labour in the West, is enormously magnified in Japan (and China) where the advanced women of the upper classes are only just beginning to evince a desire to escape from the trammels of the Oriental conception of their status relative to man. Nevertheless, the women workers of Japan have made a start, and there is a woman's branch in the Japan Federation of Labour. Its membership, never impressive, sank to negligible proportions as a result of a sympathetic strike of women workers at the Fuji Spinning Mill at Tokio in July, 1921. In this strike the women came out to support men workers, but the strike was lost due to the collapse of the men. At present women are of no importance in Japanese Labour affairs, but as the whole movement expands, they will assuredly exercise a very considerable influence. Incidentally, whilst on the subject of women, it is of interest to note that several fairly prominent social workers and writers are of the female sex. Mrs. Yamakawa Kikuye and Miss Ito Noe¹ may be mentioned in this respect. There are other signs that Japanese ladies are becoming more independent. During the last two or three years the subject of birth-control has been somewhat widely discussed in Japan and has created considerable interest among some of the "new women," as they are called. The authorities were

¹ Murdered after the earthquake, 1923, by Captain Amakasu (see p. 277).

not well disposed to this doctrine, and Mrs. Sanger was not encouraged in Japan when she toured the Far East. The present writer was informed by the wife of a big industrialist, who at the age of thirty-seven, was the mother of fourteen children, that a lady of her acquaintance had taken the trouble to travel as far as Peking in order to hear some lectures on birth-control, which were forbidden in Japan. Finally, it should be noted that the 1922 Diet revised Article 5 of the Police Regulations, and thereby made it legal for women to attend political meetings.

So far we have considered the Labour questions of Japan purely from the industrial point of view, but there is another aspect, which if less spectacular is equally important, and that is the relationship between the landlords and the five and a half millions of small tenant families who are the backbone of Japanese agriculture. The relationship between the farmers and the landlords is still strongly tinged with feudal ideas, but to-day there is plain evidence in the ever-growing numbers of agricultural disputes¹ and the increasing ill-feeling between the two parties in this contest, that the small farmers are awakening to the unsatisfactory condition of the position, and the powerful weapons they can employ towards its amelioration. The tenantry system in Japan is based on the fact that, with the exception of some "upland" farming areas, rent is paid to the landlord in rice; about 60 per cent. of the first crop being an average figure. From his share the tenant has to pay for implements and fertilizers, and it is now generally recognized that the farmers can hardly make a living from the proceeds of his labours in the paddy fields, even at that very modest standard to which an Eastern cultivator aspires.²

The rent the tenant pays varies little with a good or bad crop. The magnitude of the crop is looked upon by tenants and landlords from two opposite points of view, and it is in this divergence of interest that most of the trouble lies, for a good crop is advantageous to the tenant, whereas a bad crop is of advantage to the landlord. The explanation of this peculiarity lies in the fact that the landlord's basic income is delivered to him in rice, which he must convert into money. In bad years the price of rice rises and so does the landlord's income, the gain out-weighing any loss he may incur through shortage of rents. On the other hand, the peasant is comparatively speaking unaffected by the

¹ The tenancy disputes, 1921-22, numbered 1600, an increase of 400 per cent over 1920-21.

² The great subsidiary occupation of the tenant farmer is sericulture. Without this industry, millions would collapse and so would the financial stability of Japan, since silk is the core of the export trade.

price of rice, since by the time he has paid his rent and laid aside sufficient for his own household he has very little, if any, surplus to dispose of. If, however, the crop is good, he gains immunity from the need of buying rice in the open market for his own consumption—a course to which he is often driven in bad years. In a sentence, the landlord is benefited by low production and increased price; the tenant is only benefited by increased production. Mr. Kamiyama, discussing this problem in the "Tokio Asahi" in 1922, remarked, "the so-called farmers, who make so much fuss whenever the crop is good and the price is low are really landowners and not tenants. It is also in the interest of the same 'farmers' that in a year when the crop is bad and the price is high, agitation is carried on against any proposals for reducing or remitting duty on, and facilitating the import of foreign rice." Mr. Kamiyama, a member of the House of Peers, was Vice-Minister of Agriculture in the Terauchi Cabinet, which collapsed after the 1918 rice riots, so he speaks with authority.

Emphasis was laid on the fact that the peasants have powerful weapons at their command should they be driven to extremes. Slow to anger and normally weak, burdened by the traditions of those centuries of feudalism from whose shackles they have but recently escaped, the peasant owner will, and does, endure much, but in the judgment of many observers the limit of his patience has nearly been reached. At the moment, one of the visible signs is the increasing volume of drift to the cities; the peasants are simply returning their land to the landlord and going to the industrial centres. The movement only touches the fringe of the problem, and the majority will probably prefer to remain on their land and fight their landlords. They have every advantage. In numbers they probably amount to at least 30 per cent of the entire population, and the product of their labours is the staple food supply of the nation. They can support themselves on their own land and are not dependent, like the industrial worker, on wages and strike funds; a widespread passive non-rent-paying movement would be, so far as one can judge, absolutely irresistible, since eviction on a wholesale scale would be quite impracticable. As yet, the peasants hardly appreciate their strength, but this ignorance on their part will not exist much longer, and unless some attempt is made by the Government and the landowners to remedy the condition of the tenants, considerable disturbances may be anticipated.

Another phase of the Labour situation in Japan which requires mention and is best dealt with separately is that relating to seamen. In the early days of the Yuai Kai, when it was little more than a workers' mutual benefit society, there were seamen in its

ranks. When the Yuai Kai was reorganized in 1919 into something resembling a trade union, the seamen formed a union which boasted about 10,000 members, and when the trouble arose over Mr. Masumoto's visit to Washington in that year, as a Japanese Labour delegate, there was talk of the seamen refusing to work the ship in which he was to travel. The seamen affiliated to the Yuai Kai succeeded in making Japanese Labour history when, in September, 1920, they achieved the unprecedented feat of forcing a steamship company (the Katsuda Company) to recognize their union, and engage its men through the union officials. In May, 1921, the Nihon Kaiin Kumiai (Japanese Seamen's Union) was formed, embracing 30,000 members. This union broke away from the Yuai Kai; it was not very democratically organized, and steamship owners are connected with it. It is too early as yet to say how the seamen will act in the general intriguing which is taking place with the object of forming one Great Federated Union of all workers.

There are at the present moment three tendencies in Japanese Labour which may be roughly classed as Political, Co-operative, and Direct Action. A few years ago there was much activity in the Political direction, for then both the Labour leaders and the Socialists, who are frequently the same men, believed that by obtaining universal suffrage, they could approach their ideals through the Diet. This movement has had a set-back, partly because the Socialists and Labourites observe that "Universal Suffrage" has become a convenient political battle-cry, used as requisite by both Opposition parties as a stick with which to beat the party in power, without any signs appearing that those parties want to see universal suffrage in existence; partly because the corruption connected with the Diet, its disorderly behaviour, and its obvious impotence, continue to lower its reputation; partly, no doubt, because it is questionable whether a great many of the people of Japan who are ready to shout for universal suffrage really want it, so long as the possession of a vote means the payment of a tax. The dissolution of the Diet, February, 1920, on the suffrage question, also had much effect in convincing Labourites and Socialists that the Diet was of no use to them. The abandonment of "constitutional action" by the councils of Labour and Socialism has reacted unfavourably on the influence of those leaders who support co-operation between Capital and Labour, and has strengthened the position of the "direct action" men.

That there has been a distinct surge over towards "direct action" methods since the end of the war is admitted by the authorities and by men such as Mr. Susuki Bunji—late President

of the Japanese Federation of Labour. It is also proved by the increasing degree to which sabotage is a feature of strikes. At a meeting held in April, 1921, of the Kwansi Labour Union, federated to the Yuai Kai, a resolution was passed "that the Yuai Kai definitely abandon its support of the universal suffrage movement," an incident which the "Asahi" considered was "worthy of grave attention" as it "must be obvious to all" which of the two—universal suffrage or direct action—is the more dangerous.

As an indication of the general trend of Japanese Official Labour the events attendant on the participation by Japan in the Fourth International Labour Conference are instructive.

For the election of a Labour representative to this Conference at Genoa, an indirect system of election was adopted, which gave the workers quite a reasonable opportunity of expressing their wishes. The interest taken by official Labour was not great, and the two candidates who received the highest number of votes refused to accept the position, Mr. Kawai Shinsui declining on the ground of ill health, and Mr. Kagawa Toyohiko (Christian philanthropist; Secretary to the Japan Labour Federation; Director of the Farmers' Guild) declining because he said that he did not believe the Government had any intention of paying heed to the Conference, and the Japan Labour Federation did not, therefore, think the Conference was of any use.¹

Eventually, Mr. Tatzawa Gisuke, No. 3 on the voting list, accepted the post. He was a Director of the Roshi Kyochokaa (Capital and Labour Harmonization Society), a fact which went against him in the eyes of many workers, for, since its formation, with a capital of 10,000,000 yen, and a Prince as its President, this society has done nothing to live up to either its name or its capital.² There is another aspect of the condemnation of these conferences by the principal Labour organizations in Japan, and that is, the indication this affords of a growing contempt for "constitutional" adjustment of Labour troubles, and the corresponding inclination towards "direct action" which is a feature of the Labour situation in Japan, and not only Japan, at the present time. In answer to criticism, the Labour Federation issued a manifesto explaining its refusal to support the International Conference (a copy will be found in the "Japan Weekly Chronicle," 5 October, 1922), but its reasons are not convincing. It is true, as the

¹ They carried out the same policy in 1923, but in 1924 Mr. Susuki Bunji went to Geneva.

² Though strange to say, it suddenly came into the limelight in May, 1924, by publishing a report on the labour movement in Japan which was so startling that the police suppressed the document.

Federation said that though the Japanese Government insisted on a number of exceptions being made in her favour at the Washington Conference of 1919, yet even so, the Labour Regulations thus modified had not been ratified in Japan in 1922; yet this would seem to make it all the more necessary for the Japanese Labour leaders to bring this fact to the notice of successive conferences.

Since the foregoing words were written the great earthquake and fire at Tokio and Yokohama have taken place. The general consequences likely to arise from these events have been mentioned on page 68, but certain incidents took place in the aftermath of disaster which have a direct bearing upon the subject of Labour and Socialism in Japan and these will be dealt with here.

In the first place it is necessary to remember that when a great disaster occurs such as that which took place in Japan, it is to be expected that incidents will take place which will subsequently be catalogued as "regrettable." This is true of all nations and places, though doubtless some races are better fitted by national temperament to stand the psychological strain of upheaval than are others. The disaster in Japan was unimaginable in its extent and intensity, and only personal inspection soon after the event, and conversation with the survivors whilst their experiences were still hot in their minds, could be any substitute, and then only a poor one, for the experience itself.

After the Japanese earthquake certain "regrettable" incidents took place which require description. They are not creditable to Japan, and the present writer, who has received much kindness in that country where he has numerous friends, would gladly ignore these events were it not for the reflection they give of a certain state of development of the Japanese policy. The significance of these events from the point of view of a study of the Far East lies in the fact that they revealed plainly the existence and nature of certain influences in the country which had previously been only suspected by outside observers and generally denied by Japanese. The disaster was of course so complete in Tokio and Yokohama and the area to the east and south-east of those towns that for some time all administrative machinery, such as police services, ceased to function. They were wiped out. It was during these days of confusion and of martial law that a considerable number of Socialist and Labour leaders were seized and murdered by the police and gendarmerie authorities of the lower grades, who found themselves without supervision from above.

At the same time several hundred Koreans were murdered in various parts of the devastated area by police, soldiers, and gangs

of persons called "Vigilantes."¹ The latter were often the young men's associations which formed themselves into a species of unofficial special police and took charge of the situation in their vicinity. The origin of the murders of these Koreans and a number of Chinese who were killed "by mistake, as they resembled Koreans" is to be found in the amazing rumours which gained credence to the effect that the Koreans were trying to take advantage of the confusion to stab Japan in the back. It was said and believed by thousands that the Koreans were poisoning wells and starting fires. In actual fact that there is ample evidence to show that the Koreans realized the dangerous position they were in and did their utmost to reach places of safety. In at least one case the police did their best to save the Koreans from the fury of the mob and were themselves in danger of their lives. Even Europeans in one or two cases had great difficulty in persuading the "Vigilantes" that they were not Koreans.

In the case of the Labour and Socialist leaders, the responsibility of at all events the subordinate officials was more direct. Perhaps the most amazing incident was that which involved the deliberate murder of the noted Socialist leader Osugi, his wife,² and a small child living with them. The family were taken to a police station by a certain Captain Amakasu and there deliberately strangled one by one.

The Captain is now (December, 1923) on his trial, and it would be premature to make any comment until one hears its result and the evidence which will be given, but, as throwing a flood of light on a certain aspect of the Japanese mind which is far more prevalent than Europeans generally suppose, the following facts are of interest. The "Osaka Mainichi," a leading Japanese paper, mentioned that on a certain date it had received 206 letters regarding this affair. Of these letters 129 favoured the action of the gendarmerie captain, 75 opposed it, and two criticized the trial. The following are typical extracts from these letters:—

"I consider that Captain Amakasu's act is the proper thing for him as a Japanese to have done, and that his act should have been questioned is evidence of the imperfection of the law."

"Without any reason the very name of Captain Amakasu sounds heroic to us young men."

"His heroic act is a revelation of the highest human feeling on behalf of the national and social welfare of Japan."

"A murder which promotes the happiness of the community, therefore, should be considered differently from that which harms the welfare of human existence."

¹ "The butchery of Koreans . . . was the most deplorable and lawless event in Japan's history."—From the "Yomiuri."

² This lady was Ito Noe. A considerable writer on labour and social subjects (see page 271).

"The act of Captain Amakasu is a revelation of typical Japanese national feeling. His act only eventually made up the want of law. The only regret that I hold is that Japan has lost one of her patriotic officers as the price of the life of a traitor."

This last correspondent was unduly pessimistic, as Captain Amakasu received ten years' imprisonment. Sergeant Mori who appears to have dealt particularly with the small boy was sentenced to three years in prison. At the moment of writing (June, 1924) a number of similar trials have been concluded. Sentence of three years' imprisonment (with suspension of sentence) seems to be the normal penalty for murdering a Korean or anyone "mistaken for a Korean."

The following results of recent trials illustrate this statement :—

Ito Suyeo sentenced to two years' penal servitude for murdering two Japanese "in mistake for Koreans". Four persons sentenced to two years' imprisonment for murdering "several Chinese". Kamatsubara Koji found guilty of murdering a Korean with a shot-gun, two years in prison. On 3/5/24 seven men were found guilty of killing eight Koreans after the earthquake and were sentenced to terms of imprisonment of from two years to six months.

In all the above cases "execution of sentence was suspended". This means the convicted persons are let out on probation.

In considering this matter it is necessary to remember that as elicited by Mr. Nagai Ryutaro in the Special Session of the Diet, December, 1923, the attitude of the Japanese mob towards the Koreans was largely due to the unfortunate nature of instructions for the "Control of Koreans" which was telegraphed out from the Home Office on September 3rd. The mob got it into their heads that the authorities feared trouble with the Koreans and took the law into their own hands.

CHAPTER XIII

SHINTO

“ If God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent Him.”
—VOLTAIRE, “ The Way of the Gods ”

I

THE rise of Modern Japan is a phenomenon in whose creation are to be noted many curious processes, and amongst these parts of the whole none is more remarkable than that side of the metamorphosis which is concerned with the spiritual foundation of the modern Japanese State.

Though the men who have made Japan have been intent on Western materialism and its assimilation by their country, they have not—even from the earliest stages—lost sight of the importance of the spiritual aspect. Whether they have attached thereto that paramount importance which is its full due is a matter of doubt, in any case the logic of events is rapidly forcing the present-day rulers of Japan to pay much attention to the disintegrating influences of Western thought upon the political religious foundation on which the stability of their nation is supposed to depend. The prevalence of “ dangerous thoughts,” and the national danger consequent therefrom is a constant subject of discussion in the Diet and in the Press. Both by legislation and by less direct methods the foreign ideas are attacked and suppressed and the national cult supported and strengthened.

It is a fact from which great consequence may arise that the cult which is considered by the Japanese rulers as the principal cement of national morale, is antithetic to the whole spirit of modern Western thought. It is unscientific; it is intensely official and centralized; it is Imperialistic; it is militaristic and undemocratic; it is intolerant.

If Japan is to develop along those democratic lines, which, so far as one can judge are, with occasional set-backs, the lines of future political development throughout the world, it is difficult to suppose that this national cult of Shinto can remain as the foundation of Japanese morality.

If this deduction is correct, then one of two events may take place, either Japan is not going to become democratized, in which case the shadows of great wars darken appreciably, or else Shinto and all that it connotes will pass away. If Shinto passes, its going is not likely to be quiet. In any case therefore, an appreciation of Shinto is necessary for correct judgment in Japanese matters. In this chapter an attempt will be made to deal with this very difficult subject.

The most exhaustive study of "The Political Philosophy of Modern Shinto" which has come to the notice of the present writer is to be found in Volume XLIX, Part 2, of "The Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan." In this monograph, which contains an invaluable bibliography on the subject of Shinto, the Rev. D. C. Holton discusses, largely from a comparative point of view and from original documents, the growth and present state of modern Shinto. To this scholarly exposition I am much indebted. Other sources worthy of study by those specially interested, are: "The Japan Chronicle," and a pamphlet by Professor Chamberlain, entitled, "The Invention of a New Religion." The relation between modern Shinto and Christian evangelization is well set forth in an article which appeared in "Les Nouvelles Religieuses," Paris. This was reprinted in pamphlet form by the "Japan Chronicle," July, 1918.

II

One of the difficulties encountered at the outset of an investigation into modern Shinto is this: that for a multitude of reasons, which will be apparent in due course, Shinto can be accurately described as a species of State-controlled, State-invented, State-supported religion—using the word religion in its generally-accepted Western interpretation, namely, a human recognition of a super-human agency to whom obedience, devotion, and respect are due; whereas, for other reasons, also to be apparent in due course, the Japanese Government persistently adopt the attitude that Shinto is not a religion. The latter is the official attitude, and many Shintoists—especially members of the advanced or ultra-Shinto wing—do not subscribe to this official attitude.

For myself I am convinced that it is rational to define Shinto as a religion, an opinion confirmed by most eminent foreign investigators as well as many Japanese authorities, and this definition will be presumed throughout the discussion. But having said that Shinto is a religion, it is at once necessary to qualify the statement by adding that it is a religion of a peculiar nature, in that its principal aim is political. To a varying extent

all religions are connected with human politics, in that religions teach men—broadly speaking—how they ought to lead their lives, whilst politics are the practical applications of doctrines of life to the needs of a community ; but in the case of Shinto, the distinction between politics and religion is indistinguishable.

Shinto is a political conception designed to meet the requirements of everyday life, and simultaneously it is a religious duty. A Japanese must worship at the shrines and look on his Emperor as semi-Divine, because it is politically correct and religiously incumbent upon him so to act.

It will be convenient, however, for our purpose, to examine Shinto from two points of view, first, as to its religious influence, and secondly, as to its political effect.

In its fundamental aspects, Shinto is an animistic cult springing from an early mythology which the Japanese, in common with other primitive peoples, evolved from Nature. In this mythology, the sun, moon, storm, earth, lightning, etc., become gods, such as the "sky-father" and the "earth-mother." According to the story of the Japanese mythology, the gods created Japan and the sun goddess sent her grandson to rule the land. The grandson of this grandson was the Emperor Jimmu Tenno, who came to the throne in the year 660 B.C.

This date is the official beginning of the Japanese era, and, according to the official doctrine, the present Royal Dynasty are directly descended from Jimmu Tenno.

Before considering the inferences that arise from the above paragraphs descriptive of the elements of Japanese mythology, a few words as to their authority is of interest.

The earliest Japanese historical writings now extant—the *Kojiki*¹ and the *Nihonji*—date from A.D. 712 and 720 respectively. Between these dates and the accession to the throne of the grandson of the grandson of the sun goddess there stretch a thousand years of historical blankness. Nevertheless, the date 660 B.C. is as official in Japanese history as that of A.D. 1066 is in English annals. In fact, although much vagueness actually surrounds the early history of Shinto, officially everything is cut and dried.

There is no doubt that the Japanese mythology was connected, at a time whose latter end may be approximately fixed as A.D. 600, with a native religion known as Shinto.

Concerning this first period—the pre-Buddhist period—the Rev. Mr. Holton writes : "The great deities are aspects of Nature, interpreted in terms of human experience. The rituals are motivated primarily by the desires to safeguard the food supply, to

¹ For a translation of the "Kojiki" see "Transactions A.S.J.," Vol. X.

ensure the success and permanence of the Governmental régime, and to secure release from ceremonial impurity.¹

The next period extends for eleven hundred years, and, during this period, Shinto—the old indigenous Nature worship—was largely absorbed by Buddhism, which has never made any difficulty in drawing into its fold local beliefs and gods. During this period Buddhism and Shintoism became largely amalgamated, the temples of the one cult and the shrines of the other were used indiscriminately by priests of either sect.

This period was brought to a close at the beginning of the eighteenth century when a movement having as its object the revival of pure Shinto began to make itself felt. This movement is attributable to the following cause:—

The internal confusion of the country, due to the conflicting ambitions of the several clans, was dissipated by the rise to supreme power of the Tokugawa family and the assumption by this group of the Shogunate. As a result of this centralization a spirit of national consciousness began to arise which in its turn, led scholars to pay attention to the study of ancient national ideals and documents long obscured by the Buddhist-Chinese influences and culture which had invaded Japan from the mainland of Asia. The prolonged period of peace and the enforced seclusion from foreign affairs enjoyed by Japan during the autocratic régime of the Tokugawa Shoguns likewise encouraged the great nobles to devote their energies to the arts and to the investigation of their national culture.² This revival of pure Shinto had an immediate political result which has long since passed into history, but it is worth noting here, since the same doctrine of Shinto is employed politically—but for different ends—at the present time. When Shinto was revived in the eighteenth century the contrast between the position the Emperor should occupy according to Shinto, and the position he did occupy in relation to the Shogun at once became plain. This fact suggested to the clans who were jealous of the Tokugawa ascendancy, a battle-cry which, suitably employed, might overthrow the ruling dynasty of Shoguns. It has been described elsewhere³ how, as the Tokugawa Shogunate sank into decadence, this battle-cry was employed by the four clans

¹ Cf. Leviticus. The parallel between the theocracy of Judaism and Shinto is very interesting. Cf. also the theocratic position of the Chinese Emperor.

² Especially Prince Mito Kamon (1622-1700), a grandson of Iyeyasu. Mito caused the famous "Dai-Nihon-Shi," a great history of Japan in 240 volumes, to be prepared. This classic work was the chief source of material for the pre-Restoration and nationalist philosophers and teachers, Mabuchi (1697-1709), Motoori (1730-1801), and Hirata (1776-1843).

³ See Chapter I.

who dubbed themselves Imperialists, and that, their aim accomplished, they retained the manipulation of this Shinto doctrine as to the importance of the Emperor, and employed it for political purposes in connection with the Westernization of their country.

We now come to the last and present stage of the development of Shinto. During this period two policies are observable. There is the policy which has been directed towards insistence that Shinto is secular and not religious, and there is the policy which has aimed, and largely succeeded in producing a special kind of modernized Shinto designed to interlock with and influence every phase of Japanese national life. The first policy, whose pursuit has led the Government into an awkward cul-de-sac, is directly connected with the second policy.

Ignoring the temporary appearance of a post-Restoration policy, which aimed at creating a State religion (compounded of Buddhism and Shinto, called Ryobu-Shinto), we come to 1875 when Shinto was definitely separated from Buddhism. It is from about this time that the Japanese Government began—by legislation—to build up the machinery of modern Shinto, and, by 1900, regulations were being passed which divorced the Shinto shrines from religious matters and placed them under the charge of a Bureau in the Department of Home Affairs. The reason for this insistence on the fact that the shrines and “worship” at them is not “religious” is that, on the one hand, the Government attach supreme importance to the “stabilizing” influence of Shinto on national thought, and, therefore, they feel that they must be in absolute control of Shinto; whilst, on the other hand, the Government realizes the inexpediency of openly confessing to the world that notwithstanding the proclamation of religious freedom contained in the Constitution (a freedom dependent on public order being maintained) one of their most valued and potent instruments for the control of the nation is, in effect, a State-invented religion. They therefore call it a national cult to which Japanese of any religious persuasion ought, and, indeed, must, adhere.

It will be convenient now to consider the actual theories and methods by which Shinto is made to exercise its political influence on the people.

In the first place, the interpreters of modern Shinto have taken as the leitmotif of the Shinto symphony the sanctity of the Emperor. It will be recollected that in the mythology connected with early Shinto, Jimmu Tenno—the first so-called historic Emperor—is described as a grandson of a grandson of the sun goddess. From Jimmu Tenno the Imperial line are supposed to trace direct descent. Granted this supposition and we can

at once make two deductions. Firstly, that the Emperor today has the blood of the gods in his veins—partakes, in fact, of Divinity ; secondly, that since—as described in the mythology—the gods specially created Japan, the Emperor is *de facto* the living descendant of the original ancestor of all Japanese ; he is, in fact, the head of every Japanese household.

This is the Divine Right of Kings *in excelsis*. Strange as this may sound to Western ears, the fact that such a theory is a fundamental principle far more important to the political stability of Japan—in the opinion of the Government—than, for instance, is the principle of Habeas Corpus to English stability, seems to us still more remarkable. But fact it is, and in proof of this statement a selection of evidence will be cited.¹ The Constitution clearly lays down in Articles 1 and 3 that the Emperor is “sacred and inviolable.” Prince Ito, in his commentary, says : “The Emperor is Heaven descended, Divine and sacred.”

The insistence on the unlimited past and future of the Imperial House is prominent in the constitution and the preamble to the Imperial House Law. In his relations with the people the sacredness of the Imperial Person is insisted upon. Up to a few years ago it was forbidden for any person to be on the second story of a house or at an elevation superior to that of the Emperor when he passed. Cheering as a public manifestation of loyalty was forbidden until the arrival of the Prince of Wales in 1922, when H.R.H.'s democratic behaviour astonished, bewildered, and finally enchanted thousands of Japanese. A tremendous stir was created in Japan when it was decided that the Crown Prince should visit Europe, and thousands of subjects lined the railway to Yokohama and prayed at the shrines in protest against this innovation as by visiting other Sovereigns on terms of equality, the Crown Prince to some extent impaired his divinity.

Within the last two years a school teacher deliberately sacrificed his life in order to try and rescue from a fire the official school portrait of the Emperor. The “Hochi's” comments on this are interesting : “Similar cases having occurred before, the event may not attract much attention, but it really is a great question affecting the very foundation of the national organization. Loyalty and filial piety are the pivot of education at present. Neither water nor fire is to be shirked for the sake of His Majesty. . . . it was inevitable for a school teacher, whose duty was to preach loyalty and filial piety to sacrifice himself to his teachings

¹ For full details see Rev. Mr. Holton's monograph, also Vol. XLII “Transactions Asiatic Society of Japan,” “Official Documents during the Transition Stage of Modern Japan.”

... the State should treat a man like this as one who has died for his country."

Photographs of the Emperor were, until the last year or two, usually exposed for sale in shops with a lightly pasted slip of paper covering the face from the public gaze.

The very latest development is a distinct tendency on the part of the powerful Court officials to democratize the Royal family. This has been particularly noticeable ever since the present Crown Prince Regent visited Europe and His Royal Highness, the Prince of Wales, returned the compliment. The Crown Prince Regent is now to be seen driving in an open carriage, and, as the Press recently announced in startled head-lines, he shook hands with the manager of a golf links!¹ How this tendency is going to fit in with Shinto ideas remains to be seen, for the theory of Imperial Divine descent is still rigidly maintained. In conversation with educated Japanese, it is apparent that the equation of "god head" and "plus fours" is a problem which has been frankly abandoned amongst the intelligentsia. To the masses the incongruity of the situation is not yet obvious.

In the Japanese "History for Middle Schools" there is a Royal pedigree which sets forth in detail the fact—AS A HISTORICAL FACT—that the present Emperor is the 122nd descendant of Jimmu Tenno, who is shown in the genealogical tree as sixth in direct descent from "Amaterasu-o-mi-kami" (the sun goddess).

In the first chapter of this book one finds:—

"OUR NATIONAL CONSTITUTION."—"Our Empire of Great Japan, with an Imperial line from above unbroken from time immemorial and with its subjects below matchless in loyalty and patriotism from ancient times down to the present has never once received a foreign insult. Such a national character is without parallel throughout the world."

Throughout the teaching in the Japanese schools one finds emphasis laid upon the Divinity of the Emperor and the supposed peculiar wonders of Japanese patriotism and "Yamato damashii" (soul of the Yamato race).

Professor Tanaka—one of the leading Shinto writers—as quoted by the Rev. Mr. Holton, writes:—

"In the matter of basic conceptions there is a difference between the people of our nation and foreigners." He goes on to explain that, whereas in foreign countries individualism is ranked above the State, in Japan the process is reversed. Foreigners consider that the State exists for the individual, but

¹ Nevertheless, see Japanese Press in connexion with the "Serious Affair," February, 1921, when a clan struggle took place "on the steps of the Throne" in connexion with the Crown Prince's engagement.

Japanese place the State first, with the Imperial family as its centre. Hence—according to Professor Tanaka—Japanese political institutions have been superlatively stable. Japan possesses a past of unequalled length and splendour and “a national organization without parallel in the world.”

Dr. S. Uesugi writes :—

“The absolute authority of the Emperor constitutes the basis of our national system. It is the foundation on which the nation stands. If there were no Emperor, there would be no nation. Without him there would be no subjects and our territory would cease to exist. . . . He is god of light; he is manifest god. Authority is vested in a single person. His authority is unique. He is the absolute ruler determined by the Divine Ancestor, etc.”

The Rev. Mr. Holton also quotes at some length from a publication issued by the Shinto College in Tokio in 1921, and entitled “Lectures on the National Constitution.” It is a remarkably frank exposition of the official attitude, as the following extracts will show. After explaining that Japan possesses the only truly monarchical institution, the argument proceeds :—

“Our national constitution—unique, peerless, matchless in all the world—in truth possesses a value that is beyond comparison. It is a matter of course that the reason why our national constitution, in comparison with those of other countries of the world, is special and unique, and further, pre-eminent above all other countries in a commanding way, is because the rights of Sovereignty in the State are wholly vested in the Emperor . . . (he is) absolute and complete Sovereign. . . . The Imperial Throne from the very foundation of the State has been occupied throughout successive generations by the offspring of the Heavenly Ancestor (Amaterasu-o-mi-kami) . . . the fact that the relations of the Imperial House and the State have been consistent from the beginning—this is the fundamental system on which our State is established.” The author then asserts that, judged by world history and present-day events, this system “is most emphatically without peer on earth.”

It is almost impossible to imagine a greater contrast than that existing between the political doctrines expounded in the foregoing extracts from contemporary Japanese literature, and that conception of Japan as a democratic State which is so industriously circulated by the Government for the benefit of foreigners. The continued existence of this glaring contrast is, of course, only made possible by the peculiar Japanese language, with its consequence that the foreigner who may suspect that there are two sides to the Japanese medal is obliged to rely upon the labours of a few learned Western scholars for an account of the side

designed exclusively for local display. As is often the case in all branches of scientific investigation, the labours of such men are frequently inaccessible to the general public, who will not take the trouble to go to the obscure specialist publications written by experts—for experts. Thus is the field of propaganda left unploughed and unsown to the active attentions of those writers who, some consciously and some unconsciously have, during the last forty years, created in the West a picture of Japan whose glowing colours are equalled by its astounding falsity. It must again be insisted here that the mythological stories mentioned above are taught as facts, and that any criticism will and has brought down the heavy hand of authority upon the daring critic.

It is analogous to the situation which would exist if a European Government officialized Genesis I, connected Adam and Eve by a genealogical tree to the Royal family, and used this invention as a "unificator for the thoughts of the people."

Apart from the inherent absurdity of ranking mythology as facts, there is of course a mass of reliable historical data which proves that at various times in her history, Japanese Emperors have undergone all the vicissitudes common to rulers throughout history.¹ Japan has had her rebellions, her civil wars, and similar disturbances in full measure. But it must be borne in mind that these contradictions are deliberately ignored by the Government and that both in Japan and in Korea² the official attitude is that the Emperor is of direct Divine descent, and the head of every household. It follows *a priori* that the decrees of the Emperor are beyond earthly criticism. One finds therefore, as one would expect, that this fact has been an invaluable tool in the hands of the bureaucrats who have made modern Japan.

For example, the Japanese Constitution is a gift to the people from above, and could logically be withdrawn again at will, though even in Japan the time has long passed when this act could be considered as practical politics. Nevertheless the alteration of the Constitution can still only be initiated by the Emperor.

The use of "Imperial Rescripts" to pass legislation obstructed in the Diet has been not infrequent.³ From such Rescripts there

¹ See Brinkley's or Murdoch's histories of Japan. For a concise sketch of Japanese history see Hovelague's "Le Japon."

² See Chapter IX (II).

³ For some of their early uses and their language, see Vol. XLII, part 1, "Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan." The opening sentence of the Imperial Rescript of 12 September, 1923—after the great fire and earthquake—is interesting. It runs thus: "We have always been endeavouring to perpetuate the glory of our Imperial Ancestors, and our nation emerged victorious from the World War, due to the Divine assistance of our Ancestors and the united effort of our people."

is no appeal—it is the voice, not only of the ancestral head of every Japanese family, but also of God. The most important rescript ever issued in the name of the Emperor is the famous rescript on education, issued on 30 October, 1890, as a kind of sheet-anchor for a nation possibly excited by the gift of a Constitution the previous year. This rescript embodies the fundamental principles of modern Japanese ethics. It is translated on page 72 of the Rev. Mr. Holton's monograph. Its general tenour may be typified by the following extracts:—

“Our Imperial Ancestors have founded our Empire on a basis, broad and everlasting, and have deeply implanted virtue; our subjects, ever united in loyalty and filial piety, have, from generation to generation, illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of our Empire. . . . Always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State, and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth.”

The foremost Japanese scholars and expositors of Shinto have united in declaring that this rescript is “the foundation of the spirit of the nation,” “it transcends all criticism,” (it is) “the august teachings of the gods,” “perfect in spirit and form, especially in fostering the spirit of loyalty and patriotism.”

So much for the kernel of the modern Shinto which aims at the focussing of all national thought and teaching upon the concept of a Divine ruler, who is the embodiment of the peculiar virtues of the Yamato race and whose commands it is the religious and secular duty of every Japanese to obey implicitly.

A part of the machinery by and through which this concept is woven into the national consciousness has been mentioned; the teaching in the schools and the extreme public respect insisted upon for the Imperial person have been touched upon, and to this might have been added, did space permit, some account of the special position in which the Emperor stands in relation to the Army and Navy,¹ but it is now necessary to examine another branch of the Shinto machine. This is the matter of shrines.

From statistical tables published by the Rev. Mr. Holton, it appears that in 1920 there were 115,509 shrines, graded as follows:

The Grand Shrine of Ise	1
Government Shrines	105
National Shrines	75
Prefectural Shrines	685

¹ Cf. the ex-Emperor William of Germany—a mild example of the Japanese case.

District Shrines	3,462
Village Shrines	45,112
Ungraded Shrines	66,069

In considering the question of the shrines, it will be convenient to approach the subject from the following points of view : Firstly, the nature of the spirit enshrined at the large shrines ; secondly, the nature and origin of the ritual employed.

As regards the first point of view, the Rev. Mr. Holton points out that in the 183 Government and National Shrines (July, 1921) the Deities fall into four classes. There are Emperors, Princes, Subjects, and Nature Gods.

The emperors and empresses absorb twenty shrines, and of these twenty, seven are more properly described as being devoted to the enshrinement of Hachiman (the god of war) as these seven are legendary emperors identified with Hachiman.

The preponderant position enjoyed by this deity is not without significance in its relation to the history of modern Japan, when it is borne in mind that, though the idea of shrine worship in a general way is inherent in indigenous Shinto, the particular shrines we are now considering are inventions of the post-restoration Government.

The remaining thirteen shrines devoted to emperors are divisible into two groups. In one are to be found emperors who during their lifetime were badly treated by their subjects as, for example, Junnin Tenno (A.D. 758-764), who was deposed after a reign of six years and then strangled ; he is to be found enshrined at Kyoto whither his spirit was brought in 1873. Likewise Go-Daigo Tenno (A.D. 1318-33), who had a troubled reign, was enshrined at Toshino in 1889 with the rank of a Government shrine of the middle grade. In 1901 his shrine was raised to that of major grade.

The second group of emperor shrines, four out of five of which have been established since 1890, are devoted to the worship of emperors under whom the Japanese race has made great progress. A typical example is the late Emperor Meiji Tenno (1867-1912), whose reign witnessed the rise of modern Japan.

His spirit is enshrined at Tokio and at Seoul in Korea. It was brought to Tokio in 1915 and to Seoul in 1919. It is of interest to note that at the Seoul shrine the spirit of Ama-terasu-omi-kami (the Imperial ancestress goddess) . . . is also enshrined.

We may note before passing to a consideration of the shrines devoted to princes, that out of the 122 available emperors, mythological and historical, a judicious selection has been made with the object of focussing national attention on emperor worship

of a special kind. At first glance it may seem curious that emperors are included who have been badly treated by their subjects, but, as the Rev. Mr. Holton explains, "the worship here includes also the ideas of consolation and propitiation."

In the case of the princes it will be found that eleven are enshrined.¹ Without exception they are chosen as conspicuous examples of men who suffered privation, hardship, or death in the military service of their emperors. They are the Herewards and the Prince Ruperts of Japanese history. All these hero-worshipping (heroes in Imperial causes) shrines are of recent invention.

We now come to the third group of shrines, those devoted to subjects. These shrines, first established in 1871, are Government shrines of special grade. They are, with one partial exception, devoted to the spirits of subjects who have displayed conspicuous loyalty to the State—the word "State" here meaning Imperial House. The exception is the Yasukuni shrine at Tokio, which is exclusively reserved for those who have died for their country since 1853.

Fourthly, there are the shrines devoted to the worship of nature gods who are derived from the old Shinto mythology. The "storm god," "moon god," and various gods of the sea and rivers are to be found in a long list compiled by the Rev. Mr. Holton.

These nature gods in modern Shinto have been equated by the authorities with ancestral gods, but "this does not alter their original character as forces and phenomena of nature."² The function of these nature gods is to help in the making of Shinto a part of the life of the common people. The masses want a religion which has gods to whom they can pray for a good harvest of rice, a heavy catch of fish, male children, etc. For this reason the old mythological gods have their place in modern Shinto. These old nature gods have been worshipped on the countryside from traditional days and could not be excluded. They have been very ingeniously identified with "national ancestors of the Yamato race" by the inventors of modern Shinto.

Before considering the style of ritual connected with shrine worship, attention must be paid to the Great Imperial Shrine at Ise. This shrine, of exceptional sanctity, is the seat of enshrinement of "Ama-terasu-o-mi-kami" (the Divine ancestress of the royal house). The textbooks on ethics in the Government school

¹ Details of their careers are given by the Rev. Mr. Holton, pp. 276 *et seq.*

² "The Political Philosophy of Modern Shinto," p. 285.

lay great stress on the supreme holiness of this shrine, the respect paid to it by even the Emperor, and the worthiness of making a pilgrimage thereto. The custom of reporting events of national importance to the Great Imperial Shrine is still rigidly adhered to. Victories in war, marriages of the royal family, the safe return of royalty from abroad are all reported to the spirit of the ancestress goddess.¹

In a summary of the nature of spirits enshrined, one may say this: that in order to meet the traditional needs of the common people, the pantheon of ancient Shinto is to be found enshrined, whilst super-added to these gods of a primitive religion, are a body of specially chosen spirits, whose selection by the modern Japanese Government has been influenced by the facility with which the traditional or historical events of their lives can be used as moral object-lessons in the political education of the nation.

In examining the question of ritual at the shrines, two reflections suggest themselves. One is the minute manner in which everything is laid down by official rule.² The second reflection is that, whatever the Government may decree by law as to the non-religious nature of the shrines, the ritual largely consists of prayers. Summing up an account of the several prayers employed, the Rev. Mr. Holton says: "It (the ritual) includes prayers for the protection of growing crops, for abundant harvests, for the prosperity, health, and contentment of the people, for domestic harmony . . . and for the extension of the prestige of Japan throughout the world."

It is largely in this matter of ritual that Christianity joins issue with Shinto. Evangelists in Japan—with the exception of some writers who make a somewhat ludicrous attempt to harmonize Christianity and Shinto—find it impossible to subscribe to the official attitude that Shinto is not a religion³ but only a kink of secular national cult, and that they can attend the shrines

¹ "His Majesty the Emperor is to send an Imperial messenger to the Momoyama mausoleum on 1 October in order to report conditions of the earthquake disaster and of the resuscitation work. In the hall where the Yata mirror is installed in the Imperial palace, the ceremony of reporting to the Imperial ancestors the earthquake devastation was held yesterday morning (27th instant) at 10 o'clock. Baron Ijuin, the new Foreign Minister, attended, representing the Government. Imperial messengers are to be shortly dispatched to the Grand Shrine of Ise, the mausoleums of the Emperors Jimmu and Meiji, to report on the desolation."—"Japan Chronicle," 28 September, 1923.

² By regulations of 1875 revised in 1914 by the Department of Home Affairs.

³ At the lower grades of shrines, Shinto priests conduct funeral services—essentially a religious function.

without compromising their Christian belief. A moment's thought will suffice in fact to show that Christianity and Shinto are inevitably opposed, splitting at once upon the rock of such a question as was posed to a Christian candidate for a normal school. The question was: "Whom do you regard as highest, your God or the Emperor?"¹

Enough has now been written to afford material for a summary of the nature of modern Shinto and its position in the Japanese polity. The situation is as follows:—

The modern Japanese Government have devised a religion which has for its object the advancement and maintenance of certain political doctrines. This religion has been given to the people under the guise of a revival of an old animistic cult differing in no radical manner from the primitive religions based on Nature worship which seem to have been common to the human race the world over. For political reasons connected with the fact that Japan is ostensibly a modern democratic State, the Government spend much effort in asserting that Shinto is not a religion but a State-controlled secular cult. Under cover of this sophistry Shinto can be, and is, directly and indirectly, infiltrated into every phase of the national life.

The doctrines for whose advancement Shinto is manipulated are of an Imperialistic nature and intensely national quality. Shinto is centred in the conception of Emperor worship, and in the theory that the Japanese are a chosen race endowed with special virtues to an exceptional degree, and that they have a "mission" on earth. The shrine worship, for which the common people have a traditional leaning, has been adapted to the needs of modern Shinto by enshrining "spirits" of a suitable character.

III

As a conclusion to this study of modern Shinto, an attempt will be made to appraise the degree of success with which the scheme is at present working. It is certain that to-day (1924) Shinto amongst the masses is not entirely fulfilling the expectations of the Government. As yet, the doubters are comparatively few in number, but that the impairment of the national mental unity, whose solidarity is the *raison d'être* of Shinto, has become a matter of concern to the authorities, is a fact susceptible of easy proof.

Early in 1919 the results of the labours of a special commission appointed by the Government to report on education were made public. The terms of reference had included the question of national thought. The commission admitted that all was not

¹ "The National Cult in Japan," p. 6.

well in social conditions, and attributed the deterioration to the fact that Japan had been over-Westernized. They considered that a remedy would be found in "the preservation of the dignity and solemnity of the shrines, commensurate with their sacred associations, and the universal education of the people to the true meaning of religious ceremonies, and also to elevating the status of the Shinto priesthood."¹

In another chapter we have reviewed the attempts of the Government to deal with the question of national thought by purely legislative action.²

The following examples from a recent session of the Diet also illustrate the official anxiety:—

27 January, 1921, Mr. Hara (Premier) in House of Peers, speaking on the Government's policy for control of ideas, said that though individual freedom in some matters was right, the Government felt constrained to exercise strict control over those ideas which are calculated to work havoc with the guiding principles of national polity. Dr. Tokouami (Home Minister) spoke in the same sense. Dr. Takata (an ex-Minister of Education) criticized the education policy founded on the Imperial Edict of 1890: "The policy pursued by the Meiji Government had its merits, which were most strikingly vindicated in connexion with the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars, but it can hardly be described as best adapted for the more advanced nation of the present day."

10 March, 1921, Count Yamagihara "fears that the appearance of pictures of their Majesties in newspapers and magazines may lead to cases involving disrespect."

The Home Minister, whilst assuring the Count that he did not mean the pictures might be treated disrespectfully and that strict control would be used in this respect, expressed the opinion that there was no objection to such appearances.

Baron Chiaki said "that national thought was a very difficult thing to keep under perfect control, but it was profoundly regrettable that national ideas, which had been unassailable in the past, were becoming chaotic."

Mr. Hara said that the Government were always paying close attention to questions of thought. He admitted that "though there had been sound ideas in Japan in the past, the improvements in communication had brought in foreign ideas, and a situation inspiring grave concern had been brought about." The Government opposed universal suffrage because they feared that the adoption of the system would facilitate expression of extreme

¹ Quoted by Holton, p. 67; see "Japan Times and Mail," February, 1919.

² See discussion of "Bill for Control of Dangerous Thoughts," Chapter X.

views. Foreign ideas were imported chiefly by means of foreign books . . . (these) naturally contained many ideas ill adapted for Japan.

Baron Chiaki gave as his remedy for this difficult situation : " that the beautiful habit of revering the gods and of worshipping ancestors should be encouraged. Efforts should be made, therefore, in the direction of training scholars whose business it was to inculcate in the Japanese nation the ideas peculiar to the Yamato race."

Mr. Hara replied that the Government were endeavouring to promote ancestor worship and training of scholars, whilst the expenditure in connexion with shrines was increasing yearly.

The Home Minister stated that steps would be taken to increase the staff of the Shrine Bureau.

31 March, 1921, Mr. Hoshishima Jiro advocates a strong commission to examine the handling of national thought. " Germany and Russia were ruined by not giving wise guidance to popular ideas."

* * * * *

Lack of space precludes further quotations illustrative of the fact that the question of national thought is one which is the object of constant attention on the part of the Government. In fact, since this chapter was first written the Home Minister, Dr. Mizuno, told the assembled Governors at the Gubernatorial Conference of 1923 that the Government had set up a commission to examine matters appertaining to Shinto shrines ; piety and ancestor worship being the essence of the national polity of the Japanese Empire. It had an important relation to the culture of the nation, and the Government found it urgent to foster pious thoughts among the people in order to counteract the existing tendencies of the age.¹ (See " Japan Chronicle," 31 May, 1923.)

In concluding this study of Shinto in its present-day form, a question inevitably puts itself :—

What position is Shinto to occupy in a truly democratized Japan ? The answer lies in the spirit of Shinto itself—it cannot hold any position in such a Japan, since Shinto exists to further political conceptions which are directly opposed to democratic ideas. If Shinto were modified to fit democracy it would be destroyed.

And yet, every nation must have a spiritual foundation of some kind. In the case of the British peoples we hold fast to the idea

¹ On the 20/2/24 the Prime Minister convened a meeting of the heads of religious sects and " solicited their efforts in the direction of discouraging radical speech and demeanour among the public " (" Yomiuri ").

of personal freedom in all its aspects. The United States of America rally round the conception of an amalgam of races enjoying Republican benefits.¹ The French stand on a foundation composed of a belief in their artistic and intellectual genius. The Germans hold to scientific industriousness. The Chinese still stand, as they have stood for thousands of years, unshaken upon the Confucian philosophy.²

What are the Japanese to adopt if they abandon this Shinto, which is yearly becoming less susceptible of equation with scientific realities and world policies? It is when one seeks the answer to that question that the true measure of the Japanese dilemma becomes apparent, for the Japanese race, examined critically, seems only to possess one marked national characteristic, which is that of acquisitiveness. In this virtue—if virtue it be—she is certainly in the van of the human race, but a genius for imitation as a spiritual foundation on which to establish the morale of a nation seems a proposition of doubtful validity. One may suspect that these doubts were present in the minds of those who decided to invent modern Shinto and use it for the purpose of teaching their countrymen that they were endowed with certain superlative national qualities—an endowment for whose existence history affords no justification. We may, perhaps, also find in these doubts a clue to the continued determination of the Government to exalt, cultivate, and hold fast to Shinto. They cannot be blind to its anomalies, but they consider, and perhaps rightly, that the known difficulties are preferable to the unknown perils consequent upon an official abandonment of Shinto.

If, however, Shinto is not to be abandoned, the dilemma of Japan does not diminish in seriousness, though it alters in nature, for in this case the Government will find an increasing difficulty in confining the national thoughts within the rigid barriers of Shinto. Sooner or later the flood will burst its dams, and, should that calamity occur, the Japanese Empire will crumble, for as an English poet has written:—

A thousand years scarce serve to form a state,
An hour may lay it in the dust.

Though the downfall of Japan, brought about by internal disease, would be a tragic event of great import to the world, it would be less terrible than the circumstances consequent upon a decision by the rulers of Japan that internal trouble could only

¹ The American spiritual foundation is often blatant, and in practice ineffectual, but its psychological influence on its upholders is considerable.

² But see also Chapter XV, "Modern China."

be averted by concentrating national thought on a great war for expansion on the continent of Asia or in the lands from which Japanese are now barred for racial reasons.

It is a disquieting fact in the Far Eastern situation that the Shinto cult, upon which Japan officially depends, and is to continue to depend for her national stability, is one admirably suited for the inculcation of Imperialistic and war-like ideas.

CHAPTER XIV

MODERN JAPAN

“He who rides a tiger cannot dismount.”—A CHINESE SAYING

IF a comparison be made between Japan as she is to-day and what she was in 1860 the contrast is startling. It is almost bizarre; and if one wishes to make a dispassionate examination of the progress of this metamorphosis, it is not an easy task. It is made difficult by the existence of a mass of biased literature dealing with the rise of modern Japan. On the one hand there is the output of the Japanese propagandists; on the other, there lies a heap of literature inspired by jealousy, fear, and contempt, for this newcomer amongst the great Powers.

Surveying the trail of Japan's rocketing progress, one impression stands out beyond all others; it is that of speed. Haste marked the design of the plan by which Japan was to become a great Power. Speedily has the plan been executed.

To-day, Japan is accepted by the world at large for what she appears to be, that is, a modern State composed of a dash of American hustle and a liberal proportion of Prussian centralization, superimposed upon a foundation of antique picturesqueness. Well in the foreground of the picture are to be noted such local products as cherry blossoms, geishas, kimonos, “Bushido,” and a brand of patriotism of unearthly devoutness peculiar to Japan.

Few of those who visualize this almost entirely inaccurate picture of Japan realize what she was like sixty or seventy years ago. If one appreciates that, at the middle of the nineteenth century, Japan was in a state of feudalism not unlike the European feudalism of the fifteenth century; that she had been cut off for all practical purposes from intercourse with the other nations for over two centuries; that her art, her script, and her culture had been borrowed from China, then one can understand why speed seemed so vital to the men of genius who dedicated their lives to the creation of modern Japan.

When the veil was torn from Japan, and she stood naked and wondrous-eyed beneath the searching and commercial stare of Western civilization, the leading exponents of that civilization were, with the exception of the United States of America,¹ well advanced in their designs upon China, and it seemed to the rulers of Japan that there was grave danger that their country would prove a second China so far as the Western Powers were concerned; the balance of evidence available to-day shows that they were right. At that time Japan was witnessing an internal struggle for power between the adherents of the decadent Tokugawa Shogunate, and the members of other clans, particularly Satsuma and Choshu. The latter, having dragged from its picturesque retirement the shadowy and semi-religious conception of a Mikado, utilized the idea of an Emperor long denied his lawful rights, in order to attack the Tokugawa Shogunate. They also attacked the Shogunate, whose weakness had for some time marked it as ripe for destruction, on the grounds that, by conceding the privileges of intercourse to the insistent foreigners, the Shogun was betraying Japan.

The Tokugawa Shogunate collapsed and the new faction ruled in its stead. It was then that the leaders of the victorious party made one of the most momentous decisions ever reached by statesmen in the West or East. They realized that Western civilization, little though they knew of it, could not be denied. They saw that, neither materially nor spiritually, could the influence from the West be combated by forces or ideas then existent in Japan. The virility of the West, its pushing and forceful progress, could only be met by a counter-blast, derived from similar impulses.

The leaders of the Restoration decided to Westernize Japan. It was a decision comparable, in its influence on world history, to that exercised by the division of the Roman Empire; the French Revolution; or the American Declaration of Independence.

Obvious to these leaders was the need for rapidity of action; it was a race between Japanese acquisitiveness and occidental aggression. By grace of the rapidity with which they taught and trained a nation tricks they had barely mastered themselves; by the docility of the nation in their hands; they won this race. The prize was Modern Japan.

Though the achievement of this *tour de force* could not have taken place unless men of exceptional ability directed operations,

¹ The explanation of this attitude is not attributable to any special virtues of the American people, but arose from the fact that the American nation was then too young to bother much about foreign affairs. She was still becoming a nation by means of a civil war, etc.

it was equally essential that the inevitable difficulties of the task should not be enhanced by deliberate opposition from within the nation. Fortunately, the revival of Mikadoism, primarily employed as a factor in the struggle against the Tokugawa Shoguns, lent itself admirably for use as a bridle with which to control the nation during Westernization. It was, therefore, allowed to remain, and, mingled with the invention of modern Shintoism, it became the most powerful of all the tools wielded by the elder statesmen. It was often made use of in the form of an "Imperial Rescript"¹—which inevitably silenced all criticism, as being the voice of (a) God, (b) the Emperor.

Hitherto we have written of the Westernization of feudal Japan without defining exactly what is meant by that expression. Superficially of course, it means that Japan took unto herself Western modes of communication, Western methods of commerce, and Western armaments. The complicated mechanism of Western life was imported lavishly and dumped on the shores of Japan, some of it to rust before the bands of Western professors and experts who were also imported, could advise as to its incorporation into Japanese life. This was the superficial result of Japan's Westernization. More important than this was her adoption of an international outlook modelled on that in vogue amongst the white races, and her imitation of Imperial Germany in the sphere of internal government.

At the time when Japan was starting on her great adventure, the international attitude of the Powers was, broadly speaking, that of every nation for itself and the devil take the hindmost.

Nothing was heard in those days, and little was to be heard until 1918, of the conception that perhaps there is something which transcends in importance the national point of view; that, under certain circumstances, international considerations are the more important; that some questions should be considered from the broad aspect of their relationship to the peace, happiness, and prosperity of the whole world just as, within a modern and matured State such as England, it has been long recognized that a compromise must be obtained between the liberty of the individual and the requirements of the community.

During the last half of the nineteenth century, and indeed up to the close of the Great War,² the foreign policies of the Powers were concentrated on either grabbing parts of the earth inhabited by backward races, or else in manœuvring to obtain parts of the

¹ See p. 130.

² In the case of several Powers, I fear the date 1924 must be inserted here.

earth already owned by another Power, and in obtaining "markets" by methods open and secret.

The diplomatists did the talking and writing of notes, and behind each word written or spoken, lay the ultimate argument of war, for which purpose each Power maintained the largest fighting force it could afford. Of course, it was not put quite so crudely as that. There was a deal of talk about the "imperative needs of defence," and the "maintenance of the balance of power," but actually the most civilized section of the world, the white races who flattered themselves that they were the vanguard of the human race in its slow progress from apes to angels, lived in an atmosphere of intense mutual suspicion and carried on their business—which, paradoxically enough, was becoming increasingly international—from within armed camps.

Over a century ago Clausewitz, the soldier philosopher, wrote that war was a continuation of policy. Between 1914 and 1918 his dictum was illustrated.

This, then, was the situation in the international circle when Japan began to prepare to force her way within its charmed ring, and she had perforce to imitate those she wished first to equal, and then perhaps excel.

Was a great fleet necessary to become an island Power? Apparently it was. Who had the best fleet? It was England. Then from this country the secret of naval strength must be learnt. And it was. Her early ships were built in England, her fleet was trained by Englishmen, and to this day the influence of the Royal Navy can be discerned in the Japanese Fleet.

Similarly with the case of the Army—an apparent necessity to an aspirant for the position of a great continental Power. Here, the obvious model was Prussia,¹ and the Japanese Army to-day is stamped with the influence of perhaps the greatest fighting machine the world has ever seen.

How did an Empire grow? How did it spread its flag over alien lands and by the number of its subjects and the area of its possessions become GREAT, BIG, POWERFUL? Chiefly it seemed by conquest. France, Germany, Russia, England, were actually illustrating this method at regular intervals all over the world, and in 1860 some of these examples were close to Japan—in China.

Applying this lesson to her own case, Japan warred on China and secured Formosa. Thus encouraged in the soundness of their reasoning her rulers prepared to war on Russia. When all

¹ Until the disasters of 1870-71 the model was France. In the early days of modern Japan, French influence was very great; it was succeeded by that of Germany.

was ready they struck. Once again Japan emerged from the conflict a more considerable figure in the world than she had previously been. After 1905 Japan was a Power, almost a Great Power ; she was the equal of any in the East and allied with the greatest of all the Great Powers.

Then came the World War. The various ways in which she pursued her determined path of Imperial expansion during this period, have already been described, but the climax of her progress came at Versailles. Here she was indisputably supreme in the East. Her position in the world was such that she demanded—but failed to obtain—racial equality. Nevertheless, she stood an equal amongst the Great Powers and she sat in judgment upon a great White Power now humbled in the dust of defeat—Imperial Germany, from whom Japan had borrowed a system of Government and on whose Army she had modelled the machine which overcame the Russian in the East ; Germany, who had joined Russia and France in 1895 when those three Powers warned Japan to abandon two-thirds of her spoils from the Sino-Japanese War, now lay prostrate and saw Japan complacently confirmed in her seizure of Tsingtau.

The Versailles Conference may not improbably mark the summit of modern Japan's progress along the line marked out for her by the famous Elder Statesmen, of whom but one—Prince Yamagata, or two, if Okuma be included—lived to see that day of ambitions realized.

It may mark the summit because, since 1918, a very noticeable change has taken place in the ideas of a large number of the adherents to Western civilization. For what contemporary judgment is worth, it seems accurate to say that at the present time the theory that States ought to be governed in their relations to each other by the same standards of decency as regulate intercourse between civilized individuals, is one which can claim a substantial following in the world to-day. The League of Nations, for all its imperfections, seems to fill a place in the world. Were it to be abolished to-morrow, millions of people would instinctively feel that the world had retrogressed ; a gap would be left, and many people who, at present, take little interest in its efforts, would strenuously oppose its abolition. This good-natured toleration, verging on casual desire, which is extended by the world in a general sense towards the League of Nations, is quite different from the attitude of Europe a century ago *vis-à-vis* the Holy League. That mechanical result of the Congress of Vienna found no support in the hearts of men excepting perhaps in the heart of its idealistic Russian promoter, and when it died, it was unwept and unlamented.

The difference between the general attitude of, say, the average Englishman of 1823 towards the Holy League and the attitude of his great grandson towards the League of Nations is a measure of the degree in which ideas on the relationship of nationalism to world governance have changed.

Much of this change, of this broader and saner outlook, is due to the advance which has been achieved in individual culture and education, but the sharp spur of the World War and the voice of the idealist Wilson accelerated the growth of this change of ideas. The League of Nations and its growing prestige are not the only signs of what is happening. The Washington Conference, and most particularly the manner in which Mr. Hughes' famous speech was re-echoed amongst the masses all over the world, is another sign. The foreign policy programme of the English Labour Party—now (1923) within measurable distance of power—is another sign. Many others could be instanced. One curious fact about this inclination on the part of the civilized peoples towards the new philosophy in foreign affairs¹ is that the masses appear to be in advance of their rulers. In this matter the traditional conservatism of the upper classes is especially prominent. No one, in surveying the present world situation, can find enough evidence of this change of ideas to justify more than a faint and prayerful hope that war as a method of argument between nations has had its last fling, but it does seem justifiable to say that, broadly speaking, the white races now realize that the inevitable consequence of placing nationalism as the God above all others, is war sooner or later. They also appreciate that war is becoming ever more unpleasant; that owing to modern commercial conditions it can only result in the mutual destruction of economic wealth, and that it is ridiculous to suppose it can ever be a profitable undertaking.

They realize these things, and vaguely comprehend that unless some steps are taken to live up to a new standard of international relationship, another war will eventually result.

At the same time, mutual suspicion between the nations is still such that no one has the courage to say: "We trust in righteous dealing, we believe that no one covets what is ours, and we shall disarm completely, hoping that the rest of the world will see how sensible we are and follow our example."

How to reconcile the old legacy of suspicion with the new feeling that right, and not might, should rule the world, is the greatest problem now before mankind. Its possible solutions

¹ New in the thoughts of statesmen and people, but first laid down in its purest form 1900 years ago by Christ.

involve many interesting speculations which would be out of place here, but the foregoing digression has a direct bearing on an analysis of modern Japan.

An endeavour has been made to make plain that the new theory of international relationships is more widely supported in the world to-day than it has ever been before, and that it has come to stay. It has also been explained that when the Restoration statesmen decided to Westernize Japan they saw that speed was essential. So far as they could foresee, the world was always going to be governed on the "might is right" theory, and this idea was the underlying principle of their plan. Having once decided on the general lines along which Japan was to be Westernized, the requirements of speed made close adherence to the plan quite imperative. There was no time to experiment, to allow that slow growth which is the strength of British political conceptions. The result was that at Versailles the Japanese sat as representatives of a nation which was an almost perfect exemplar of the old style Great Power.¹

Internally, she was highly centralized, bureaucratized to the last button, a perfect example of an autocracy masquerading as a democracy, having a Diet without power, irresponsible Cabinet Ministers, a General Staff in control of foreign policy; the secret thoughts of her people supposedly under strict official guidance. As external signs of greatness she had a colonial empire, governed and exploited by and for the benefit of the mother country; she had a powerful Navy and Army and a superbly efficient system of national propaganda.

Thus Japan at the close of the Great War. But ideas are changing and the type of Great Power which Japan so laboriously and wonderfully achieved between 1867 and 1918 is out of fashion. To exaggerate, it is as if a man saved up for fifty years to buy a whisky distillery and the day he bought it the world went prohibitionist.

The world is, of course, not yet antagonistic to war and to the idea that nationalism should be the supreme ideal, but it is leaning

¹ Some months after this chapter had been written, the writer noticed the following confirmation of his opinions:—

"Our intellectual heritage is from China. But the day came when we found our small country beset by aggressive Westerners. We found that we might be completely destroyed as a people. We found that the West's superior knowledge of material things, of the products of the earth, and of technical knowledge in engineering and science made the West powerful over the East. So we set to imitating the West. We also became a great Power."—Baron Goto, then Minister for Home Affairs, and one of the coming men in Japan, quoted in the "North China Daily News," 30 August, 1923.

that way, and much of Japan's great effort has been directed into avenues which may well be dead ends in the future.

An important point now needs consideration. Up to comparatively recent times—say the last decade—it was accurate to study Japan from the point of view of officialdom. That is to say, it was only necessary to consider what the rulers of Japan were doing and contemplating. The nation did what it was told with sheep-like fidelity, hence the famous Japanese patriotism about which so much nonsense has been written by befooled white men, and so much clever propaganda by Japanese.

To-day the official picture of Japan and the real one are very different matters; they form a contrast which is of great importance to the future of Japan. Her rulers are, and will continue to be, troubled by two problems. In the first place they have realized that the old style method of running the world is at a discount and that a change of policy is necessary if they are to keep in line with the other Powers. In Rome one must do as the Romans do. The Japanese were a trifle slow in appreciating this change of front upon the part of their fellow Romans. There is evidence that they thought that the end of the Great War would be true to type; the victors would garner in the spoils (to Japan there was to remain Shantung) and the international dog fight would be resumed on pre-war lines. This, of course was, and is, the secret belief of a great many people in the West; but outwardly it has not been entirely thus, for officially the League of Nations, the Washington Conference, the Mandate System, etc., have enjoyed the support of the Western Powers, save perhaps official France and latterly Signor Mussolini.

One consequence of Japan's slowness to appreciate the new fashion was that she had difficulty in getting away from the sensation of being the criminal at the bar at the Washington Conference. The Siberian expedition and the Shantung question invested her with an odour of Imperialism which required much disinfectant. Nevertheless, it is to the credit of her statesmen that they realized at Washington how the wind was blowing and they trimmed their sails accordingly; they protested sufficiently but not excessively against disarmament; they appended their signatures to the Nine-Power Treaty; they abandoned much in Shantung, and, as a consequence of these actions, they were able to don a white sheet which appeared no more incongruous than that worn by M. Briand.

Since the Washington Conference the Japanese Government has continued its efforts to live up to the new pattern world policy. In the case of Japan this really means her policy on the mainland of Asia. She has professed to desire a *rapprochement* with China.

In 1923 some bandits in Shantung held up the Shanghai-Peking express and abducted therefrom a score of foreigners. Amongst many absurd suggestions which were mooted in the Far Eastern foreign Press was that of armed intervention which should force the Peking Government to exercise some kind of authority. With singular unanimity the Japanese Press—and in such cases it is an official megaphone—raised the cry of “hands off China.” Japan also officially threw her influence on the side of moderation when the penalties to be inflicted on China were being discussed by the Powers. Japan has also followed the example of the United States of America and the recent example of England in declaring that it is her intention to devote the remains of the Boxer indemnity to her educational purposes in China. She has sent delegates to the several meetings of the International Labour Conferences though she has applied to her industries very few of the resolutions passed at Washington or Geneva.

The Japanese Government have not found it an easy task to swing the ship of State on to a new true course; the calculation of the compass deviation is complicated even if the new international variation is correctly assessed; moreover, the vessel is showing signs of steering sluggishly.

The military party, who have hitherto dominated Japan's policy, do not take kindly to these new ideas which, as a very minimum, presuppose the subordination of armies and navies to civilian direction. It is probable that unless a certain section of the military party in Japan had realized the imperative need of a change as a tactical move and supported the civilians who were this way inclined, nothing would have happened at all. It is certain that a powerful group of Chauvinists recruited from amongst civilians and naval and military men have been fighting tooth and nail against a change of policy. This group maintain that Japan has reached her present position by an aggressive policy and that to retain what she has got will be impossible with a new policy. They say that Japan was betrayed at Washington, which was an organized conspiracy, with their country as the victim. They say, that by her evacuation of Shantung, Japan has weakly given way to China and encouraged that country to work for the abrogation of the 1915 treaties.

For these treaties and the Imperial policy they represent, the Chauvinists stand firm in the Diet, in the columns of their Press, and in their strongholds, the Privy Council and House of Peers.

One might expect that the Liberal Group, who, either from conviction or expediency, are trying to carry out a pacific policy, would turn for support to the Liberal elements in the nation.

This they are unable to do, and for a reason which brings us

to the second problem which confronts the Japanese Government. The nation as a whole can be divided into two sections. The major part of it is absolutely under the control of the bureaucrats. Forty years in the jungle of bureaucracy—of tutelage in every walk of life, have kept the majority of the people amazingly docile. Unfortunately, these people have been brought up on the old ideas; they have been taught to believe that one of man's highest ambitions should be satisfied by service in a conscript army. It is, therefore, hopeless to expect that the majority of the Japanese nation will either welcome or understand the idea that the whole of the national philosophy on which they have been brought up needs recasting; on the contrary, these people are a source of strength to the Chauvinist party, who can appeal to them to rally to the protection of the ideals and policies which have made Japan the Great Power she is. So much for the majority of the Japanese people. The minority hold opposite views. These people are Liberal enough, too much so in fact, for they are hostile to even the Liberal elements in the governing classes. The Socialists and Labour in Japan are bent on reorganizing the Government of their country;¹ they declare that it is only a democracy in name; that the Diet is corrupt and that Japan is ruled by clan system through a cast-iron bureaucracy. They cultivate, in fact, what the Government consider to be "dangerous thoughts."

This minority is rapidly growing in size, and its control is a subject which makes a corresponding increase on the attention of the Government. Before further considering this question, it will be as well to summarize what has been already written. The conclusions are these:—

1. Modern Japan developed very rapidly according to a fixed plan.
2. That plan had as its underlying principle the "might is right" theory in its most unadulterated and crude form.
3. Chiefly as a result of the Great War, the white nations have pushed this idea of the importance of nationalism into the background. They have done this slightly for expediency's sake and partly from a growing conviction that the old international scheme of things is unfitted to the modern conditions of human society.
4. A section of the Japanese Government has realized the need of participating in the worship of these new theories.
5. They have been hampered in their task by the obstruction of an influential section of the ruling classes, who believe in the old idea and have no use for disarmaments, "cultural régimes" in Korea, self-determination, mandates, and rigid respect for the

¹ See Chapter XII, "The Labour and Socialist Question in Japan."

sovereignty of "weak nations," such as China. The bulk of the Japanese nation are still prepared to follow the arch-Conservatives. Twice in history, in 1895 and 1902, violent internal discussion was instantly hushed by a foreign war. The Siberian military expedition in 1919 was the first military enterprise which raised any protest, even here it was practically negligible.

6. The struggle between the section of the ruling classes who think that Japan must follow the fashion, and that section which believes in continuing the old policy is at present (1924) in full swing. The advantage inclines to the modernists, not because the people support them, but because of the generally recognized need, even amongst some Imperialists, of adjusting Japanese policies to the new standard of international values in appearance if not in effect.

7. The conflict is complicated by the fact that the majority of the Japanese nation have been brought up very stiffly upon extreme nationalist lines, whilst a minority of increasing influence have reacted toward extreme views; this minority demands a complete change in the present system of government in Japan. Not only are they dissatisfied with her past foreign policy, but they claim that the nation must be purged from within.

* * * * *

At the beginning of this chapter it was emphasized that, in studying the growth of modern Japan, the speed with which the process took place is the outstanding impression received. In order to obtain this speed much was sacrificed; stamina were neglected, solidarity was ignored, foundations were shallow.

The whole paraphernalia of Western materialism was thrust down the gaping throats of a credulous and trusting people without consideration of the digestive capacities of the organs to which the gullets were the ante-chambers, with the result that there has been indigestion, and some nausea. The Japanese nation is weak in the bone; there is in Japan no solid block of comfortably situated, moderately progressive bourgeoisie such as the middle classes in England, which form a lasting and impervious central national core around which the advanced Radicals and hidebound Conservatives ceaselessly wrangle. In the van in England, "The Daily Herald"; in the rear, the "Morning Post"; in the centre, the dead-weight of the "Daily Telegraph." In Japan the "Daily Telegraph" element is missing.

It is because it takes time, centuries of gradual development, to build up this solid centre in a nation, that the centre in Japan is a vacuum. Consider the position of the Japanese Diet. By the bureaucrats it is still valued as, and used for, the original

purpose of its creation, viz. a convenient cloak for autocracy. By the advanced men it is derided as a corrupt and unrepresentative body, so far removed from a really democratic legislature as to be unworthy of reform. These divergent views would be unimportant—they exist harmlessly and even usefully in many other countries—if there was a central group of people who believed in the Diet and were determined to support it whilst ridding it of its notorious defects. But there is no such group—unless the newly-formed Kakushin Club should turn into a political party with these principles and with a following; of this there is no sign. With a vacuum in the centre, the pendulum is swinging violently from right to left.

As the material consequences of Westernization bring in their train the inevitable mental awakening, the ranks of the extremists swell with unhealthy rapidity. Shintoism and all that it stands for is ignored and disbelieved by an increasing number of people, who substitute for this keystone of Japanese politico-religious thought the doctrines of Karl Marx. Some nonsense has, at times, been written about the Bolshevization of China; such statements betray a crass ignorance of the Communist type of village life in which the great majority of the Chinese nation have been organized for centuries. The Bolshevization of Japan is not such a fantastic idea. Extremes meet; a Lenin and a Mussolini are substantially the same, and Japan might adopt the shortest way round the circle. It is necessary to remember carefully when considering the possibilities of a social upheaval in Japan that the forces which might produce such a catastrophe are at present very weak in proportion to that section of the nation which is still completely under the influence of the old bureaucrats, and would shout "Banzai" for a war with China to-morrow. In another chapter (see "Labour and Socialist Question in Japan") an attempt has been made to estimate the present value of the advanced elements. But weak though they are, they are growing, and since Japan's Government is being obliged to Liberalize the international behaviour of their country, the Government are committed to an encouragement with one hand of what they are trying to suppress with the other.

One day the Government are sending delegates to a Labour Conference in Europe, the next they are refusing to repeal a Police Regulation which virtually forbids the formation of trades unions.

To hold the balance between advanced Radicals and the Reactionaries is the common task of Governments; to hold it, so that it tips but does not crash on the side of progress, should be their ambition. To accomplish this feat both in the domain of

international and national affairs, and with a people volatile in character, politically unconscious, nurtured on fallacious traditions which must sooner or later be officially exposed before the people themselves see through the great illusion, is the special and supremely difficult task of the Japanese Government at present and in the immediate future.

Some mention has already been made of the growing tendency for Shintoism to lose influence. This fact is inevitable. One cannot expect human beings trained to Western civilization to accept for the foundations of their spiritual and political ideas mythological stories about persons—however exalted their rank—being descended from ancestors who sprang from sexual intercourse between the sun and moon, and it is putting the Government into an awkward dilemma. Religious and political ideas being hopelessly intertwined, the textbook in schools and the Ministers in the Diet have to give official countenance to a mass of picturesque nonsense without which it is supposed that the whole structure of the nation would collapse. But, on the other hand, though Japan is sufficiently bureaucratized to swallow more or less without protest a brand new Government-manufactured political-religious doctrine, if one was forthcoming which would be more in harmony with the times, to produce such a doctrine would amount to a candid admission that Shinto, lauded these last forty years as a holy thing, was, and is, nothing more than a political trick. This might not be disastrous at the outset, but would probably lead to some very unpleasant after-effects.

Nor can Shinto be allowed to quietly fade away as yet, because the mass of the nation are still incapable of thinking for themselves—once again a legacy of their abnormally rapid material development—and if Shinto is dropped, something must be given to the nation in its stead. And yet Shinto is fundamentally so undemocratic, having been designed purely as a tool for Imperialism, that the whole trend of policy towards which it has been argued Japan must henceforward lean, is anti-Shintoistic.

Truly the Japanese Government and their people are entering a very critical period, but though its perils will be great, they will not be unavoidable. To overcome them Japan will need rulers whose strength of purpose is as great, and whose vision is as far-sighted, as that of the giants who laboured so wonderfully and foresaw so much at the time of the Restoration.

But these new men must look in a different direction. It will be their sad and dangerous task to pull down much which the old men spent their years in erecting. The future rulers of Japan will have to gradually abolish the bureaucracy which is so fearful and wonderful, yet efficient, a monument of the Meiji era. In its

place they must substitute a real democracy and the encouragement of private initiative. The Government control in every department of finance and commerce should be gradually relinquished ; the people must be encouraged in every way to develop the political consciousness which at present they lack. Education must be divorced from Shintoism and militarism, and realigned along Liberal and democratic principles.

The Liberal element in the nation must be won over by the governing classes before it becomes definitely ranged in the camp of the extremists, which at present is its only haven.

These requisites presuppose the advent of a group of rulers who are prepared to make a break with tradition and a *volte-face* as great as that made by the Restoration statesmen who overthrew the Tokugawa Shogunate with the battle-cry of "exclude the Westerner," and, having attained power, immediately Westernized their country.

The Japanese nation is still so young and docile in the hands of authority that almost any degree of Liberalism would be accepted from above—however startling the break with tradition might be. This state of affairs will not last much longer, and if Japan can produce the necessary man or men who will realize this fact, it will be well with her. Once let the Liberal and Extreme elements abandon hope of receiving sympathetic treatment from above, and the future of Japan becomes cloudily tumultuous.

At present there are no signs of the rise to power of a group of Conservatives who appreciate the need of being rather more Liberal than the Liberals. That a section of the Government of Japan has, during the last two or three years, realized the need of a change of policy, both foreign and domestic, is a fact which can be exemplified by many instances ; but it is equally true that they have frequently expressed their opinion that such change must be gradual. On the face of things this seems sound enough, but in Japan it is unsound. Special cases required special treatment, and Japan is a very special case in national development. It would have been better from many points of view if Japan had been able to Westernize herself gradually by orderly and evolutionary processes. This could not be, for the price of evolution was to all appearances foreign domination.

Similarly, the change of democracy must be made with a speed exceeding that slow growth appropriate to a ripe and mellowed nation. In China a somewhat similar situation arose in 1908, when the Empress Dowager realized that the Westernization of China's central government was inevitable. By all theory she was wise in laying down the need for slow transformation ;

by the resulting chaos of the last decade her wisdom has been confirmed ; but her action did not prevent the revolution, and it is at least to the degenerating effect of revolution as to any other single cause that China owes her present inability to overcome chaos.

Japan is not yet out of the spoon-feeding stage ; if her Government try to allow her democratic development to take place gradually and naturally—as it is, and has been taking place in England—then they will find that in the fulfilment of their first duty of keeping good order they will have to repress the Liberals, who will thrive under repression and be driven into the advanced camp, there to work up pressure until the explosion takes place. The disadvantages of manufacturing a democracy, even as the old men manufactured a militarist style Western Power, are obvious. It will inevitably lead to a loss of efficiency in material things which will endure for some years until the people are forced by circumstances to learn how to run their own affairs. It may lead to much discontent among the upper classes and militarists, even as the policy of the Genros met with bitter opposition from the stalwarts of their day ; but these difficulties cannot be avoided ; they are the heritage of the policy of 1868 and the consequence of its speed. They are at all events less ominous than the dangers of a revolutionary upheaval which would leave nothing behind it but the pitiable spectacle of the wreck of an Eastern culture which had sacrificed its soul on the altars of Western materialism.

CHAPTER XV
MODERN CHINA

“The intellectual power, through words and things
Went sounding in a dim and perilous way!”

—WORDSWORTH.

MR. H. G. WELLS—I think it was—whilst at Washington, in 1922, asked the question: “What is China?” He was asking a question which, so far as it can be answered at all, can be answered truthfully in opposite terms. China is amazingly old, yet strangely young—crudely so; she is solidly stable and yet in flux; she is lethargically pacific, yet cursed by militarism; in short, she is paradox itself. There are few remarks concerning China of which the exact opposite cannot also be said with equal truth. The fact is that “China” and the “Chinese” are words which embrace so vast a subject that any attempt to delineate details inevitably obscures the main features of the picture. A consequence of the vastness of this picture is that China, like statistics, can be made to supply apparent proof for any preconceived notion. This attribute of China has been freely pressed into service by numerous Chinese and foreign publicists and speakers.

I may as well make plain without delay that in the following pages I am not going to attempt the encyclopædic task of presenting a picture of China as she is to-day. What I am endeavouring to achieve is the ascertainment of a rate of progress. A passenger in a liner is usually ignorant of the ship's dead reckoning or observed position, but he probably has a rough idea of the speed at which the vessel is moving and the general direction of her course. Even so with China. I propose to discuss certain facts relative to her speed of advance and the course she is making good. At the outset I shall present two opposite views of China, each of which will be encountered by anyone who skims the extensive modern bibliography of China. The first is the rosy picture, the second is sombre.

¹ “In fact, everything connected with China is anomalous.”—Sir Robert Hart, writing in 1900 in “These from the Land of Sinim.”

During the last few years a number of books have appeared, written in English and American by Western educated Chinese. They are frankly propagandist, and are written with the purpose of convincing the West that China, admittedly the cradle of a great Eastern civilization, has recently acquired the best features of the rival system in the West. That a certain turmoil still exists is generally admitted in these books, but it is brushed aside as being the inevitable after-birth of the great and glorious changes which have taken place. Diplomats like Mr. Wellington Koo, scholars of the erudition and intellectual capacity of Dr. Tsai Yuan-pei, Mr. Liang Ch'i-chao, Dr. Lim Boon-keng, and others of their calibre are the living counterparts of these books. Now the facts in these books are as true as is the fact that the highly-trained and polished Mr. Wellington Koo is in existence, but they are not all the facts just as all Chinese are not in the same class as the distinguished gentleman mentioned above.¹ Judging, however, by the facts displayed in these books, it certainly does seem strange that China should have no legal control over foreigners within her territory (except over the Russians, Austrians, and Germans); that her tariff should be fixed by foreign Powers; that her rivers should be patrolled by foreign gunboats; that foreigners (and thousands of Chinese)² should live in self-governing settlements and concessions within Chinese territory; and that two of China's greatest civil services—the Salt Gabelle and the Maritime Customs—should be managed by foreigners. All this seems so strange that one begins to suspect that perhaps the picture of China is a trifle highly coloured. Actually, it is a caricature.

Now, there are also in existence other books—no author's names will be mentioned in either case—and other public men,

¹ As a reminder of the necessity of preserving a sense of proportion, the intellectual difference between, say, Lord Curzon and an illiterate casual labourer of whom he may be the Foreign Minister should be remembered. In a social sense the immense gulf between Lord Curzon and the labourer is non-existent in China.

² One of the consequences of the existences of these foreign settlements—consequences which were not foreseen when they were first created—is that they provide havens of refuge to Chinese political agitators and outlaws. This would not matter so much did they not also afford safe retreats from which the said agitators can and do organize fresh chaos in China. The revolution of 1911 was in its initial stages largely organized from the International Concession at Shanghai, whilst the number of officials who have grown rich by speculation and retreated to the sanctum of the concessions at Tientsin is notorious. During the last few years the Chinese have begun to protest frequently against this state of affairs. The Europeans have, in many cases, become seriously concerned at this development, and the various municipal authorities do their best to cope with this delicate and difficult problem.

especially foreign merchant princes of the Far East, who deal in a different kind of fact. In these pages and from these lips we read and hear harrowing tales of misgovernment, of barbarous injustice, of brigandage, of civil wars, of famine, of "squeeze," of public works hampered by gross corruption, of piracy, of Government bankruptcy. Judged by these facts alone it certainly seems extraordinary that any trade takes place at all (that trade is increasing is simply inexplicable) or that foreigners waste their lives trying to earn an honest competence in the Far East. It seems extraordinary that the precautions taken by the foreigners to ensure their supremacy and safety in this evil and turbulent land are so mild and forbearing. This picture is also a caricature. As an example of the exaggerated information which responsible bodies disseminate about China the following extract (*italics mine*) from the 1923 Report of one of the European Chambers of Commerce in China is interesting: "The present position (in China) is one of infinite chaos . . . it would be *difficult to conceive a more hopeless state of affairs*. Whoever drew up this statement had a poor imagination. A similar note of despondency can be relied upon at the annual meeting of the Hong-Kong & Shanghai Bank, which, nevertheless, contrives to remain one of the most flourishing financial institutions in the world with its \$125 shares quoted round about \$1125. One of its branch managers once remarked to me: "The chairman's annual gloom and the bumper annual profits made in this distressful country is the biggest paradox in the East."

In the early chapters of this book an account was given, necessarily compressed and incomplete, of the material and spiritual state of China during the régime of the Manchu dynasty. It can be written now, though to have written it at an earlier stage in this book would have needlessly confused the reader, that much of that pre-revolution account of China's condition is already acquiring that sense of obsolescence which hangs, for example, around an account of the spiritual and material values of Imperial Germany or Tsarist Russia. In China, the recent changes in these values have been astounding. It has been as if long pent-up forces had suddenly been released. If there is one respect in which the change has been more noticeable and more momentous than any other, it is that exemplified by the growth of national consciousness.

Deep down at the bottom of this thing is the impact of West on East; the dynamic thrust of Western philosophy, with its insistence on forward movement, its harnessed science, its active spirit, impinging upon the self-satisfied contemplative calm of the East. The reaction was inevitable and early signs thereof are

to be detected in the "Rights Recovery Movement" already mentioned on page 48. A national awakening such as began to take place in China in the last decade of the nineteenth century and which, gathering momentum, has rolled rapidly forwards ever since, is almost invariably expressed initially through an intellectual medium. In the somewhat analogous movement which took place in Germany at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the students and the intellectuals were the driving force. The stirrings from which the French Revolution arose were likewise first apparent in similar quarters, though subsequently the movement passed from the minds of thinkers into the rough hands of men of action whose brutality led to the Napoleonic reaction. In China, very much the same phenomenon has taken place, and the growth of national consciousness is indissolubly linked up with what is generally referred to as the Student Movement. This affair is at present so part and parcel of the whole scheme of change which is taking place in China that it requires further discussion. Sir John Jordan—than whom no man is better qualified to express an opinion on Chinese affairs—wrote these words in 1920: "Public opinion (in China) which was formerly non-existent or inarticulate, is now a growing and powerful influence, and the Student Movement, much as it has been criticized, is a factor which no Government can afford to ignore."

What exact meaning this distinguished authority attached to the word "Government" is not clear from the context, but it is my conviction that no Government, either Chinese or foreign, will be able, in the future, or, in fact, ought at present, to remain indifferent to the forces of which the Student Movement is but one somewhat blatant indication.

In order to appreciate the position occupied by the students in the modern Chinese polity, it is necessary to realize that in China to-day an intellectual renaissance of great significance is taking place. The European renaissance of the Middle Ages had as two of its chief consequences the creation of a fierce appetite for knowledge and the gratification of this appetite by the substitution of the vernacular tongues for Latin, which, until then, had been the invariable medium for the expression of cultural and scientific thought. A medium foreign to the minds of the common people. In China a similar event has taken place.

In so far as it can be said to have had a definite beginning, it can be traced to the Chinese students who were educated in Japan in the last years of the nineteenth century. They were brought into touch with an Oriental nation then in the full tide of Westernization, and they returned from Japan with the realization that if the younger generation of China's intellectuals were to acquire

the all-important Western learning, then radical changes were essential towards scholarship and learning in the traditional Chinese attitude.

It may not be out of place¹ to observe that the methods of communication between people in China have from the earliest times been of a complicated nature. Not only have her inhabitants spoken many hundreds of dialects, though "languages" would more aptly express the difference between the home speech of a Cantonese and a man from Shantung, but the written language has been employed in two distinct ways. This broad distinction is not absolutely accurate, since there are several forms of book language, but is sufficiently accurate for our purpose here. One is the classic method or book style. This has gradually become entirely divorced from the spoken word, and occupies a place comparable to that occupied by Latin in the Middle Ages in Europe. The classic style is capable of employing characters for which there is no word in the spoken language, and the characters have to be arranged in an extremely formal manner so as to produce a kind of rhythmic balance. Further to this, the classic style insisted upon the utmost brevity and is invariably rich in allusions. It is as if an understanding of a piece of English prose (only it would be written in Latin) in the English classical style (if there was such a thing) could only be achieved by a reader who was perfectly well acquainted with the writings of Milton, Shakespeare, the Bible, Bacon, and any other writer whose works were commonly quoted and alluded to. Such is the difficulty in attaining proficiency in the use of the book language that a distinguished educationalist and scholar in China informed the present writer that success could not be achieved with less than fifteen years' study. To bridge the gulf between this written language and the spoken tongue has been the principal object of the reformers, and within the last few years they have achieved remarkable results.

They had to their hands a convenient tool in the shape of the "Pai Hua" which is the colloquial Chinese. Printed matter had been produced in "Pai Hua," i.e. written in the words and style of everyday speech for hundreds of years, but this printed matter had nearly always been fiction, a branch of literature which intellectual China has always treated with contempt. Books falling into one of the four great subdivisions of Chinese literature were always written in the classical or book style. These subdivisions are roughly as follows: firstly, philology,

¹ The Chinese characters by which this movement is expressed may be translated by the phrase "new tide of thought."



lexicography, etc. ; secondly, history, geography, biography, etc. ; thirdly, philosophy, arts and sciences ; fourthly, poetry and poetical criticism.

Of very recent years the Educational Congress of 1919 marked a turning point. The "Pai Hua" has been officially raised to the dignity of an official language (kuo yu). This has meant that Chinese scholars have begun to write serious books in the colloquial or "Pai Hua" style ; that translations of the works of such men as Bertrand Russell, Einstein, Tolstoi, Ibsen, Marx, Wells, Kant, Darwin, Rabindranath Tagore, and Spencer are pouring forth in a medium understood by every man who can read a paper, whilst the national language¹ is now the sole medium of instruction in the textbooks of the primary schools throughout the country.

The adoption of "Pai Hua" has not, of course, solved the difficulty inherent in the fact that so many Chinese speak different dialects, and the reformers are engaged in the further step of attempting to standardize the sounds of the national language.² A character alphabet of forty symbols has been invented to phoneticize Chinese. It has been officially sanctioned for use in the schools since 1918, and its sponsors hope that in twenty years' time every Chinese boy or girl who has been to school will pronounce a given Chinese word as represented in the "kuo yu" in a similar manner. This is probably a very optimistic hope, owing to the retarding effect on the whole of China's education of the existing political confusion. Yet another group of scholars advocate the phoneticization of Chinese by using the European alphabet. They maintain that the new forty symbol-alphabet is taking two bites at the cherry. A pamphlet explaining this method of writing Chinese phonetically lies on my desk ; it grapples with the tone system. It is, however, far too early to say whether this idea will catch on with the Chinese. Amoy³ University is at present the centre of the movement. I may seem to have digressed from consideration of the student question, but an understanding of these educational movements is a necessary preliminary to a grasp of the whole intellectual revival.

In China, the respect and desire for learning has always been very great, and this national trait was encouraged, if in fact

¹ Its only disadvantage is that a book in "kuo yu" is a good deal more bulky than the same one in the very recondite and terse literary style.

² The language movement is at present more active in the North than the South, where it is sometimes viewed suspiciously by the political opponents of the North. This is curious, since, as a general rule, the South has been the home of reform and the North the refuge of reaction.

³ See Appendix XII.

it was not directly the result of the circumstance that in the old days the only road to success and service as an official was through the examination halls, where the thousands of candidates wrestled with the extreme formalism of the eight-legged essays. This system is dead, but in its place there is now an insatiable thirst for modern knowledge in the hearts of Young China, and the student class find themselves, as a consequence of certain events shortly to be described, in a most responsible and peculiar position in China.

They have attained this position because the time was ripe for an expression of national consciousness on the part of the Chinese, and, since this growth of national feeling was at bottom due to certain events which were in turn caused by foreign pressure on China, who more likely to react and interpret national sentiment than the students who had studied in Europe, America, or Japan, or else had absorbed something of Western ideas (including nationalism) at the middle schools and universities in China?

Though Western educated men like Dr. Sun Yat-sen were at the bottom of the 1911 revolution until control passed into the hands of the autocrat, Yuan Shi-kai, it was not until 1919 that the student class as such really made themselves felt as a national force. Four years previously, at the time of the twenty-one demands, the turmoil this event created throughout China had shown all with eyes to see and ears to hear that the theory, undoubtedly a fact a few decades ago, that the Chinese of one province were indifferent to the fate of those in another, was once and for all quite false. The manner in which China was treated at the Versailles Peace Conference, coupled with the fact that the party in power at Peking were undoubtedly extremely pro-Japanese (to put the most charitable construction on their behaviour) roused the students of the capital to action. They struck work, sacked the house of an unpopular Minister, defied the Government, and appealed to public opinion as the saviour of China. The movement spread all over the country, and the Government gave in. The pro-Japanese party were ousted, and, as one of the consequences of the state of public opinion, the Peking Government felt obliged to instruct its delegates not to sign the treaty at Versailles. The Student Movement in China as a political force had definitely come, and undoubtedly was going to stay for some considerable time. Since the events narrated above, the students have exercised an increasing influence on China's destiny. Has it been good, or bad? THAT is the supreme question.

We will first examine its bad aspects. The tone of the student

class is set to a very large extent by the returned students from abroad. Many of these young men have recently returned with the conviction that advanced thought in the West has declared religion to be a back number—an unnecessary superstition of the past clinging to the skirts of the future. They extend their theories to China, with the result that, amongst the younger generation of educated Chinese, the old Confucian teachings of morality, such as filial piety and ancestor worship, are being shaken to their foundations.¹ In its place there are signs that these young men will elevate an extreme and crude form of nationalism as the spiritual foundation of the nation. This may lead to very deplorable consequences. It inevitably means that a similar change of thought will permeate down to the masses who are as yet untouched by this thing, since the students to-day fill the place of the old-time scholar who, steeped, and with his being in the spirit of the classics, once occupied such an important place in the Chinese polity.

It must also be remembered that, apart from any anti-religious tendency, the "New Tide of Thought" inevitably

¹ In connexion with the complaint now being heard on all sides as to the neglect of Confucian teachings by the younger generation it is of interest to note what Legge wrote more than fifty years ago in the first volume of "The Chinese Classics," p. 108. It is plain that he considered that the Confucian teachings would not suffice a modernized China. Nevertheless, the loss of balance which will at any rate be a temporary consequence of the abandonment of these doctrines is a grave affair even if justified by its promise for the future. Legge wrote:—

(Confucian views of Government) ". . . are adapted to a primitive unsophisticated state of society. He is a good counsellor for the father of a family, the chief of a clan, or even the head of a small principality, but his views want the comprehension which would make them of much service to a great empire. Within three centuries of his death, the Government of China passed into a new phase. The founder of the T'sin dynasty conceived the grand idea of abolishing all its feudal kingdoms and centralizing the administration in himself. He effected the revolution and succeeding dynasties accepted his system and gradually moulded it into the forms and proportions which are now existing. Principles have been needed and not 'proprieties.' The consequence is that China has increased beyond its ancient dimensions, whilst there has been no corresponding development of thought. Its body politic has the size of a giant while it still retains the mind of a child. Second, Confucius makes no provision for the intercourse of his country with other independent nations."

In connexion with the last remark, Chinese scholars to-day are rather fond of quoting the dictum of the sage to the effect that within the four seas all men are brothers, and deducing from this that Confucius was an early "internationalist," but this deduction seems to me distinctly far fetched.

exalts individualism as opposed to the old "five relations" idea of Confucianism.¹

Then there is the question of the channels into which the students divert their energies whilst they are at the schools and universities. The latest statistics from fourteen universities with 9175 students are as follows:—

Medicine002 per cent.
Agriculture	1.7 "
Education	3.6 "
Science	4.5 "
Commerce	9.1 "
Arts	10 "
Engineering	15.0 "
Law and Political Science	40.0 "
Unknown	(about) 20 "

The consequence of the unduly high proportion of students in the last-named subject is that many of them drift into the rôle of political agitators and tub thumpers. Much effort is wasted which would be better employed in serving their country in the many utilitarian services which are crying out for recruits. Another charge which can be justly levelled against the students is the undisciplined spirit which permeates their ranks. The revelation of their political influence has gone to their heads, and they forget that the chief purpose of a student should be study, and not political agitation.²

Perhaps the best explanation of everything which has been said and is said against the students in China is that they are about nineteen years old. They behave accordingly and in a manner which shows that the age of nineteen is very similar whether the subject carries these years in Europe or the Far East. What makes young Mr. Nineteen so interesting in China is that, by a turn of the wheel of destiny, the future of this very ancient civilization will largely be determined by these same young men. China is in flux, and it is from the student class—the Western educated Chinese—that the men will arise who must shape her mould.

I have mentioned the bad points of the student movement

¹ Of this tendency to elevate individualism in New China with the Shinto doctrine of subordinating the individual to the State, see Chapter XIII.

² Exactly the same phenomenon is to be seen at present in Japan, where revolts by the students against their teachers have been frequent of late and are reported to be causing the paternally minded "authorities" much concern.

and now there remains to be recorded the one fact which, in my judgment, will eventually justify in the eyes of China and of her true friends, all the stupidities, the callowness and the blatancies of these young men. In a sentence, they are doing something for their country. They are definitely engaged on a policy of activity for China. They are not the only people doing things in China. The merchants are doing business whenever the political situation permits—for themselves. They try to evade the chaos; if this be impossible they lie down under it. Within a few hundred yards of where I write these words, the merchants of a considerable city are paying the local general a sum of several thousand dollars a day as a kind of bribe to prevent him looting the city with his troops. The militarists are also for ever doing something. They fight—or what passes for fighting in Chinese civil wars to-day—and they do this entirely for themselves. The god of war is invoked as a formal preliminary to the interminable negotiations which take place between rival generals and which are swayed by the god of wealth. Finally, there are the students who are for ever agitating, and the particular form which their agitation is taking now, and has been concentrated on since 1919, has been the raising of Chinese feeling against Japan. They are doing this because they think it is good for China. It is very obvious, especially to us who look on from the outside, that it would be more satisfactory from many points of view if they would agitate against the Tuchun system, but we are dealing here with facts and not with ideals, so for the moment we will confine ourselves to the anti-Japanese movement. In an interview with some Kenseikai members on 23 June, 1923, Count Uchida, the Japanese Foreign Minister, remarked: "The ill-feeling of Chinese towards Japan is as it were an annual function since 1915. It has become a national trait."

For this fact the students are primarily responsible. Their main weapon is the boycott. At the moment of writing an anti-Japanese commercial boycott of unprecedented intensity is being carried out in China, particularly in the Yangtze Valley.¹ Its immediate cause was the refusal of the Japanese Government to consider the abrogation of the 1915 treaties when this demand was put forward by the Peking Parliament in 1923; put forward incidentally, more as a bid for popular favour than for any other

¹ The Japanese Government has protested to China more than once, though of course the Peking Government is quite helpless in the matter, even if it had the will. Many indignation meetings have been held by merchants in Japan. The Japanese imports to China dropped 50 per cent in the first half of 1923. Fifty per cent of this decrease took place in Central China, 28 per cent in North China, and 22 per cent in South China.

reason. The bitterness of feeling between China and Japan has been accentuated by a clash between Japanese sailors and Chinese boycotters at Changsha, which led to the loss of some Chinese life. This particular boycott is the fifth more or less national anti-Japanese movement since 1919, but it is causing a much greater loss to Japanese trade (and, of course, Chinese) than did any of its predecessors. It is also exceptionally widespread, and, though the Yangtze Valley is the area in which it is practically complete, its influence has been noted as far afield as the Chinese merchants in the Dutch East Indies. From an economic point of view it is hardly necessary to point out that the boycott is a piece of stupidity, but with that aspect of the question I am not here concerned; my interest in it is that it is chiefly due to the students. It is by them that it is organized in hundreds of towns in Central and North China; theirs are the minds which compose, theirs the brushes which write, theirs the hands which affix the placards which are common features to-day in the cities of many provinces. The burden of these notices is nationalistic and anti-Japanese. This boycott is not—the point must be insisted upon—a provincial matter. It is dominant in perhaps a dozen provinces, present in the others. Those who scornfully contrast the energies wasted in the boycott with the need for internal reform in China do so with justification, but, having scorned, let them pause and ask themselves whether during the years of the Great War, the White races were not providing posterity with a far more terrible example of senseless economic destruction for the gratification of man's combative instinct. Not only did the White races do this thing, but, having done it with a thoroughness worthy of their highly-organized civilization, they are still allowing nationalist bickering to keep Europe in the chaos into which her inhabitants plunged her.

At present the students are haunted by this idea of fanning the flames of anti-Japanese feeling. It is an easy thing to do, it is not very dangerous and it is popular. A proportion of the students—not so large a proportion as it ought to be—go into business and the professions. If these men, having acquired experience in the school of life, employ their commercial organizations to manipulate the public opinion the students have begun to arouse in a sense favourable to the establishment of internal order in China, the student movement will have deserved well of the country. Whether one approves or not of the student movement—and most Europeans, for easily understood reasons, do not approve of it—I do not see how it can be gainsaid that no improvement can be expected in the internal state of China until public opinion and national consciousness are still further de-

veloped. The student class and the intellectual renaissance with which they are associated must be given most credit for the extraordinary progress which has been made in developing these factors during the last few years.

It is probably obvious that these spiritual changes, which, being most significant, are mentioned first, have been assisted by and have in turn assisted sundry material changes. A good general idea of material progress in China can be obtained by studying successive editions of statistical compilations such as the "China Year Book," the annual reports of the Chinese Maritime Customs and Post Office, etc. In this book it is proposed merely to mention a few examples of the sort, for the benefit of those who have not the time to go to original sources.

First, the astonishing growth of the vernacular Press is significant. The available statistics on this subject are highly untrustworthy, but there is no doubt that whereas up to 1870 China possessed one newspaper, "The Peking Gazette," supposed to be the oldest established news-sheet in the world, at present the number of vernacular papers in China number thousands. Many of these are mere rags, but they are the teeming spawn from which the big journalistic fish will grow up. One or two of them, notably the "Shen Pao," printed at Shanghai, already wield considerable influence, especially in their effect on the Chinese in international matters.

A second example of the material change which is intimately connected with the awakening of China is the progress of the Chinese Post Office. It is a useful example, because its statistics are trustworthy and are taken from all over China. Here are some records of its growth :—

Date.	Length of Courier Lines in Li.	Number of Offices.	Articles Posted.	Parcels.	Steam and Boat Lines in Li.
1901	—	176	3,500,000	126,000	—
1906	133,000	2,096	31,994,143	400,126	17,000
1911	319,000	6,201	116,748,914	954,740	45,000
1916	421,000	8,797	233,234,373	2,232,100	64,700
1920	603,300	10,469	400,886,935	4,126,220	74,600
1921	637,800	11,032	442,116,358	4,569,660	79,300
1922	658,400	11,306	426,363,616	4,791,420	82,900

NOTE.—The 3 per cent decrease in 1922 is partly attributable to the political chaos, but principally due to the exclusion of official correspondence from the statistics.

all the consequences of such inventions are not only contacting with the Chinese at the Treaty Ports and the more or less Westernized areas adjacent thereto, but they are also to be found all over China, even in the remote districts of the indifferently explored (by Europeans) western provinces. Throughout China, the National Post Office and its subsidiary services are being used by the people and entering into their daily lives to a rapidly increasing extent. Year by year the ancient Minchu postal companies, who can trace their genesis back for 3000 years, are being absorbed by the pushing and alert National Post Office, which has now succeeded, despite Japanese opposition, in extinguishing the 150 foreign offices which, up till 1922, existed within its domains, and undoubtedly in the case of some nationalities formed a most convenient channel of communication for the smuggler of drugs into China. The above remarks on the subject of the Chinese Post Office reveal a state of affairs upon which all concerned are entitled to look with pride, yet no better instance can be adduced of my contention that China is paradox exemplified, than that afforded by the fact that an excellent and graphic picture of the details of China's internal maladies may often be obtained from the annual and district reports of this flourishing national institution. In these publications one may read of hindrances to the Republican mail caused by robberies and civil wars; of the murder of couriers in the execution of their duty. As one reads the records from some of these provinces, it requires an effort to realize that the Post Office is expanding fast.

As a final illustration of change in China, I propose to consider briefly a few facts relative to the industrial progress of the country. She is still, of course, the country *par excellence* of the individual craftsman member of his guild, whose workshop is his home. No one who has once threaded his way down the narrow alleyway which is called a street in a Chinese city and passed the hundreds and hundreds of families busily at work, can fail to be impressed by the contrast between these myriad manual workshops and the great centralized machine-stuffed factories of the West. But, like other Occidental ideas, industrialism has reached China. As long ago as 1919 the annual reports of the Maritime Customs noted that there were at that time few articles of Western origin used by Chinese which were not being produced in China in factories with modern equipment. In the next year's report one reads: "Machinery. This heading deserves the notice of all those interested in the future of China, since, by the increase in the importation figures of the articles grouped under it may be gauged the progress made by the country on the road to industrial development. The demands for all kinds of machinery, machine

tools, and engineering goods is steadily growing, and inquiries are more and more received from remote places in the interior. Machinery of all kinds imported in 1913 was valued at 4.6 million taels, which increased to 14.1 millions in 1919 and 23.3 millions in 1920." In 1921 about 90 million taels worth of machinery was imported.

In another paragraph the report remarks: "Factories modelled and managed on foreign lines are springing up in every suitable locality. At the end of 1920 there were more than 400 of these factories producing articles of foreign type. . . . Many other signs of progress are noticeable.¹ . . . The improvement of transportation and the construction of roads is increasingly engaging the attention of the provincial authorities. Motor-boats are coming into favour on inland waterways, and motor-cars are now encountered wherever the roads lend themselves to such traffic. Shipbuilding in China is becoming a flourishing industry with a promising future. . . ."

Successive volumes of the "China Year Book" tell the tale and recount how the variety and number of factories in China are increasing. At present, with a few notable exceptions, the phenomenon is chiefly noticeable at the treaty ports and in their vicinity, but it cannot fail to spread. The hand loom still weaves millions of yards of cloth, but spinning and weaving mills have increased considerably during the last two decades. The most recent list of mills I have seen was published in the June, 1923, edition of the "Far Eastern Review," and is as follows:—

(The mills are here tabulated by provinces)

Kiangsu	49 (24 of these are in Shanghai).
Chibli	9
Hupeh	5
Honan	4
Chekiang	3
Shantung	2
Anhui, Hunan, Shansi, Fengtien	1 mill each.

So far as can be ascertained from somewhat fragmentary statistics, there are at present about three million spindles and seven to eight thousand machine-driven looms operating in China. The Japanese have been quick to appreciate the fact that it is cheaper to build and operate a factory in China, preferably, for security and independence, at a treaty port, than it is to do, say, in

¹ The "China Year Book," 1923, mentions 278 electric light and power companies distributed in 17 provinces. Many are, of course, small concerns, but it is a significant beginning.

Japan, for Chinese labour is still amazingly cheap.¹ Child-labour is extensively employed, though the foreign-owned mills at Shanghai are doing their best to grapple with this difficult question which is bound up with the extreme poverty of the Chinese masses.

The Japanese own (1923) 32 mills, the British 5, and the remainder are nominally Chinese, though the Japanese certainly have invisible holdings in these mills. By spindles, the national ownership is as follows :—

Chinese	44 per cent.
Japanese	40 " "
British	14 " "
Miscellaneous	2 " "

The rise of this mill industry has naturally stimulated the cultivation of raw cotton, and though a very great deal remains to be done in the improvement of the methods of growth, China is at present the third largest producer of cotton in the world.² This question of the improvement of culture is not being neglected by the interested parties, nor is the question of improving sericulture being ignored.

Did space permit, accounts could be given of the beginning of China's industrialism in other spheres, such as silk filatures, flour mills, iron works, coal mining, match factories, albumen factories, etc., but it is now time to come to conclusions.

Firstly, it will hardly be disputed that change is taking place ; that much is self-evident to-day, though not so many years ago plenty of people were still prepared to say that no real change was taking place. It further seems obvious that it is quite impossible to apply to a country, the modern institutions and factories of which some typical examples have been given, without

¹ In 1922 the following rates ruled at Shanghai :—

Unskilled cooks	25-40 cents = 8-12 pence.	10-12 hour day.
Mill workers (male)	30-40 " = 9-12 " "	9-10 " "
" " (female)	20-25 " = 6-8 " "	9-10 " "
" " (child)	10-20 " = 3-6 " "	9-10 " "
Bricklayer	50 " = 1s. 3d.	10 hour day.
Mason	60-80 " = 1s. 6d. to 2s.	" "
Carpenter	50-80 " = 1s. 3d. to 2s.	" "
Painter	50-70 " = 1s. 3d. to 1s. 9d.	" "
Machinist	\$1-\$2 = 2s. 6d. to 5s.	9 hour day.
Engineer	\$50-\$100	per month.
Mill foreman	\$40	" "
Locomotive driver	\$45-50	" "

² About 1,800,000 bales of 500 lbs. Most of this is very short staple, about $\frac{1}{8}$ to $\frac{3}{8}$ inch.

inaugurating a change of a very fundamental nature. Granted the change, what is the rate? Here one comes at once to personal opinions. Weighing up the facts in my knowledge, testing them by my impressions and such personal observations (necessarily limited in so vast a field) as I have been enabled to make, I have reached the conclusion that the change began to speed up in 1919 and has been increasing in rapidity ever since that date, until, at the present time, China is changing faster than any other country in the world. Her rate of change is approaching the rapidity of the Japanese change in the last years of the nineteenth century, though I doubt if it will ever equal it in speed, and, for the sake of China, I hope it never will attain that unhealthy and giddy velocity.

Chinese national consciousness is growing fast and it has already reached a stage when only one country remains which could wantonly flaunt it. That country is Japan, and even in her case the task of so doing would be attended by grave danger. But it is because the Chinese still feel that, to a large extent, they are at Japan's mercy, and because in the past she has shown signs of a hard heart that the anti-Japanese feeling grows in strength and violence. Japan has just begun to appreciate the consequence of this fact, and, having failed in her attempts in 1915 to dominate China before it was too late, she is now veering towards a policy of conciliation. She has a long road to travel, and will have to abandon much which she yet regards as essential if she is to make friends with China.

As regards the European Powers, the hey-day of their domination over China has gone, never to return; it has vanished, partly because of the rise of Japan, partly because the Westerners exhausted themselves in the Great War, and partly because of China's change. The Powers are still dominant in China, and the outward and visible signs of this domination are evident in Concessions, Settlements, Leased Territories, Extra-territoriality, control of China's tariff, and the Salt Gabelle. But, within the last few years, the domination has been compromised. China has managed to resume relations with the Russians, the Germans, and the Austrians, on terms of perfect equality. This is a fact of immense future significance, for Russia and Germany, though temporarily fallen by the way, cannot fail in time to reassert themselves as two of the most influential national groups in the world. Already the Germans are proving that loss of extra-territoriality is no bar, and can, on occasions, prove a positive benefit to commerce.

As an instance of the casualness with which official China is at present treating the demands of the Powers, it is worth men-

tioning that one of the demands put forward by the Legations after the Lincheng Banditry was that the Tuchun of Shantung in whose province the outrage took place, should be dismissed. The Chinese Government allowed him to resign and then promoted him. The Diplomatic body protested; Peking blandly explained that there had been an unfortunate oversight in drafting the mandates. He should have been promoted first and then retired!

It seems to me that sooner or later the peculiar and privileged position enjoyed by foreigners and their business concerns in China will have to be abandoned, and that the moment in question is going to come within the ambit of practical politics a good deal sooner than most foreigners in the Far East imagine. There is no doubt that during the last two years a number of incidents have occurred which plainly show that the foreigner in China does not stand where he did in the eyes of the native. The local residents in the Far East are naturally concerned at this state of affairs and at this moment from every treaty port the cry goes up to heaven and home and Europe that "the prestige of the foreigner in China must be restored; something drastic must be done before all is lost." Although only the real die-hards say so in public, the idea at the back of the average foreigner's mind is the employment of force. Not necessarily armed force—though this has its advocates—but financial pressure, though the sponsors of even this method do not seem to realize that in the ultimate an institution like the Salt Gabelle really depends upon foreign force. Now the use of force in China suffers from two grave disadvantages. One is that the Chinese won't stand it, and are rapidly reaching a stage when they could practically resist it, and the other objection is that the people in Europe, who would have to pay for the force, would not, for a variety of reasons, partly moral, partly financial, dream of sanctioning such a policy.

That the abandonment of the special foreign position in China must take place gradually is a platitude to anyone acquainted in the slightest degree with conditions in China, but the necessity of the abandonment needs to be recognized and considered by the foreigners. The Chinese have been considering it for some time. My impression is that an influential body of opinion amongst foreigners in the Far East denies this necessity or alternatively relegates it to a very distant and visionary future. If men who think in these terms have the ears of their Governments (though I doubt the Governments listening to them) they will bring destruction to themselves, ruin to their countries' trade with China, and the worst form of militaristic nationalism into the

hearts of the Chinese. It really amounts to this : Are we going to alter our position gracefully (and profitably),¹ or are we going to wait to be kicked ? If, on the other hand, the leaders of foreign opinion in China adopt the attitude of conceding gracefully and, perhaps, a little earlier than they need, those privileges whose destruction they can, at the most, but hope to defer, then the Chinese will be the more inclined to listen to the counsels of the white men and profit by the experience the latter have painfully acquired in the working of Western civilization.

There are ideals in the national philosophy of the Chinese for which the white man's attitude towards life would be the better. There is a very great deal in the white man's practice of life which the Chinese must acquire if they are eventually to take their position as one of the partners in the government of this world which is the common heritage and inescapable confine of every human being, whatsoever the colour of his skin.

One of the greatest problems likely to perplex humanity during this century is that of how the Western civilization is to be purged of certain features, such as crude nationalism, which threatens to destroy the system from which they have arisen ; and of how the Eastern civilizations are to be brought into line with the higher aspects of Western culture which, in such matters as the application of science to man's material needs, represent the most advanced state yet reached by humanity in its toilsome upward climb.

Towards the solution of this latter problem is offered the contribution of this book, in the hope that the thoughts of some may be directed thereby towards those principles of international co-operation and service in the world for the world, which are the only principles having within them the necessities for the future peace of the Far East, and therefore of mankind.

¹ Cf. in this respect the advantages which accrued to England in the shape of prestige in Japan by Lord Salisbury's action in 1895, when he revised the treaties with Japan in the teeth of the opposition of the Europeans in that country.

CHAPTER XVI

SOME CONCLUSIONS AND L'ENVOI

I

UPON reaching the end of an investigation, even one whose proportions are modest, thoughts of varying nature spring to the mind. There is satisfaction for the thing accomplished; there are regrets for the palpable deficiencies of the work; there are hopes that enough has been well done to justify the statement: "It was worth while doing this thing"; there are hopes that what has been done will illuminate, if only by a flickering beam, the difficult path which other men must explore and map with accuracy before this question of how the Far Easterners are to help the Western men to govern the world, can be fully answered.

I wish I had command of words and influence enough to impress upon an apathetic Western world one half of my conviction of the supreme importance of the Far Eastern peoples to the future government of the world; I wish I could describe in an arresting manner the visions I see of what will happen to our fragile civilization if we make no effort to reorganize the basic principles on which it depends, and, in that reorganization, find a worthy place for the hundreds of millions of yellow men whose leaders have raised the cup of our culture to their lips at a time when thoughtful Western men are beginning to realize that the brew from the West has within it poisons leading to self-destruction.

Therefore, to relieve my mind of confused conflict, I have laid apart the last chapter as a kind of mental overflow in which will be found discussion on matters upon which I have not already written, and which seem important to me.

Perhaps the most flagrant omission that is suggested by a perusal of the headings of my chapters is the racial question. In this matter one reaches bed-rock; here we are examining fundamentals; a thing not logical, yet intensely realistic. Something, moreover, which, so far as one can judge, will remain illogical but important for many years, perhaps for centuries.

No advantage is gained by paying lip service to the catch-phrases connected with the racial question; harm is done by

concealing the issue. If we are to be frank, one must say this : that white men feel that they are superior to yellow men, and will not admit them to racial equality, whilst the yellow men are torn between two emotions ; one is a feeling that, encased in their own culture, they are superior to white men, but that, when they adopt Western civilization they are inferior exponents of it compared to its creators. Why, then, have the yellow men, and particularly the Japanese, adopted Western culture ? Because no people can refuse Western civilization and endure ; that is the law. Faced with this problem, the East has sought safety in the adoption of Western culture, and it is significant of the passive receptiveness of the East that it has adopted and not adapted this thing. But the yellow men have discovered that to dress in a frock coat, to ride in a motor-car, and to write on a typewriter, are accomplishments which, when attained by Asiatics, astonish the white men, but do not cause the latter to abate their racial prejudices. The mere fact that white peoples are always more or less astonished to see Asiatics using the materials of Western civilization, is, in itself, evidence of this racial prejudice.

Now, to my way of thinking, the racial question can be considered under two headings, which I label " mass prejudice " and " individual prejudice." By mass prejudice I mean the determination of the white men who live in lands adjacent to Asia to exclude from their countries Asiatic emigrants. The Americans on the Californian coast and the Australians are of fixed mind in this matter, and the present state of human nature being what it is, there is not the slightest hope of this determination being altered for many years, even if a change of thought in this respect were desirable. This kind of racial prejudice is a natural instinct reflecting the present state of human development. To endeavour to run counter thereto would bring retribution in the shape of social-economic evils. In the matter of mass prejudice, then, the white men are right and the yellow men ought to recognize the fact. Do they ? The answer is that they do not. They appeal to a logic which is theoretically sound, and point out that the implications involved in Western civilization at its best presume racial equality. The Asiatics use this as a political tool in an attempt to force the Westerners into a mental cul-de-sac. At the Peace Conference at Versailles and at the bar of the League of Nations, the Japanese have manœuvred in this sense. They have long claimed that mass emigration to white men's lands was an economic necessity to Japan. This plea is not true, for the Japanese people will not even emigrate to their own near-by possessions ; in fact, the over-population argument

has lately been abandoned in Japan, having been replaced by the slogan of "Japan must be industrialized." So much for mass prejudice. But in individual prejudice the case is different.

By this kind of prejudice I mean the prejudice encountered in Western communities by the intelligentsia of the East, a prejudice which appears almost inversely proportioned to the distance of the community from the Far East. Here I find the white men are wrong. They should recognize that visits, prolonged visits, residence if necessary, of Asiatic statesmen, artists, business men, scientists, etc., in white men's lands should not only be tolerated but actively encouraged. As I have tried to insist throughout this book, the East has not been able to exclude the West, and now we have reached a stage in world affairs when, as a consequence of what the West has taught the East, the white men can no longer expect to enjoy a monopoly of world government.

If this co-operation is not a necessity of the future, then I am wrong in all my ideas about the Far East, but if I am right, then for this co-operation to be successful, intercourse between the leaders of East and West is essential. This kind of intercourse must be on a basis of equality.

Of course some men will say that this state of affairs has already been obtained. I deny it, and only lack of space precludes my giving reasons for this contradiction. It can only be attained through a conscious attempt on the part of the intelligentsia amongst the white men to overcome the purely racial part of their prejudice against individual Asiatics. Other men will say that to make the way too easy for individuals of a certain class, will open the door to mass immigration. I agree that for so long as the Asiatics perversely refuse to recognize the unalterable if illogical mass prejudice of the white men, the objection on the part of white men to abandoning individual prejudice has some foundation; but as I have already written, an early requisite of the clearing up of this racial question is a change of policy on the part of the Asiatics in regard to their claims for mass racial equality. Once the Asiatics recognize this factor, the white men will have no further excuse for discrimination against the upper classes of the East.

Lastly, there will be people who insist on the difficulties of drawing the line, and in this respect such things as "literacy tests" are certainly abominable. Here, again, a solution lies in the frank recognition by both parties of the justifiable existence of mass prejudice and the unjustifiable existence of individual prejudice. As an example of what can be done in this respect, the "Gentleman's Agreement" between Japan and America is

worth studying. It seems to have worked tolerably well until 1924, though one must add that the Japanese have continually complained about the "individual prejudice" they encounter on the west coast of America. In summary, then, the lines along which a practical working agreement can be reached are as follows:—

The Asiatics must drop their demand for mass racial equality and concentrate their attentions on securing an individual racial equality which will give their intelligentsia unrestricted intercourse with the West. The white men must remain content with mass exclusion, and concentrate on overcoming individual prejudice.

Much of the foregoing argument is theoretical, and it must not be forgotten that the practical state of the racial question is in a far from satisfactory condition. Since this book was begun, one aspect of the problem has developed into something of a crisis between the U.S.A. and Japan. This particular international relationship has within it all the seeds of war, and might even have already produced such a catastrophe were it not for the fortunate fact that the practical difficulties of a war between the U.S.A. and Japan are very considerable. In view of the importance of this question and the certainty that its end is not yet, it is proposed to trace briefly the history of the American-Japanese problem.

In 1882 the U.S.A. enforced the Chinese Immigration Law, and under its provisions the Chinese, who to the number of some 50,000 had been encouraged to immigrate to the Californian gold fields, were excluded.

Soon after this event a few Japanese crossed the Pacific and at first it seems that they met with little trouble. At about the same time a considerable number of Japanese had emigrated to Hawaii, and when these islands were annexed by the U.S.A. in 1891, the road was clear for the Japanese Hawaiians who wished to move to the Pacific coast of North America.

In 1894 a commercial treaty was signed between the U.S.A. and Japan. The second article of this treaty reserved (in effect) the right of the U.S.A. Government to restrict severely and even stop completely the entrance of Japanese. In 1906 there was trouble about the Japanese children in Californian schools. In 1907-8 the Japanese objected to the discriminatory nature of the 1894 treaty, and President Roosevelt gave them the so-called "Gentleman's Agreement" instead. By the provisions of this understanding, the Japanese Government agreed to restrict the issue of passports to Japanese wishing to enter America to such numbers as would be approved of by the U.S.A. Government.

The agreement came into force in 1908, and there is no question whatsoever but that its terms have been scrupulously observed by the Japanese.

It may be as well to state here the figures for Japanese immigration into the U.S.A. from 1880 to the present time :—

1880	148
1890	2,000
1895	6,000
1899	35,000
1908	103,638
1920	110,000 (approx.)

There are also about 109,000 Japanese in Hawaii.

Although there can be no question that as far as limitations of numbers was concerned the "Gentleman's Agreement" has worked admirably, it has not met the objections of the very influential section of Western United States' opinion which objects to the presence of any Japanese in the country. The men of this opinion have been responsible for a steady stream of legislation in the Pacific coast States with the avowed object of making life so uncomfortable for the resident Japanese that the latter would prefer Japan to a residence in a country whose Declaration of Independence contains the words: "All men are created equal . . . they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."

Mr. Katayama (a Japanese Socialist writer) stated in 1924 that during the period 1911-15, some fifty anti-Japanese Bills were discussed by the Californian Legislature.

One of the most stringent of these was the Alien Landownership Law of 1913 which, amongst other restrictions, prevented persons ineligible for U.S.A. citizenship from owning lands. This Bill was further strengthened in 1920 so as to bring within its scope American born Japanese. In vain the Japanese residents in U.S.A. endeavoured to disarm hostility by requesting their Government to strengthen the already strong "Gentleman's Agreement," so that on 1 March, 1920, the Japanese Government voluntarily ceased to issue passports to "picture brides," i.e. women desirous of proceeding to the U.S.A. to marry Japanese residents there. Such concessions did nothing to appease the opponents of the Japanese.

The approach of a crisis was foreshadowed by the introduction into the Senate and the House of Representatives of Immigration Bills in March-April, 1924. The introduction of this legislation followed on the decision (1924) of the United States Supreme

Court that certain anti-Japanese laws of California were not in conflict with the law of the United States. The effect of these laws was to render Japanese ineligible for American citizenship.

The crux of the Immigration Bill is to be found in one of its clauses which denies the right of entry into the U.S.A. of any person who is not eligible for citizenship. In other words it means the complete exclusion of Japanese and the bracketing of these people with Chinese, Koreans, and other Asiatics. Mr. Hughes, the U.S.A. Secretary for State, realized the seriousness of the situation and addressed a protest to Congress, in which he said: "Such legislative action would largely undo the work of the Washington Conference." He proceeded to recommend that the quota basis be applied to Japan as to other countries. It is interesting to note that had this proposal been adopted only about 200 Japanese would have entered the U.S.A. every year. Unfortunately, two events played into the hands of the "100 per cent American" group. In the first place they were able to make great use of that hostility between the Senate and the Executive in the domain of foreign affairs, which seems to be a permanent feature in U.S.A. politics. The issue became involved with domestic politics. Secondly, Mr. Hanihara, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, presented a Note to the State Department. In this communication, the Japanese Government outlined the past history of American and Japanese relations; it pointed out that no complaints could be laid in regard to the manner in which the "Gentleman's Agreement" had been employed; it emphasized that the proposed legislation deliberately discriminated against the Japanese; that it would only exclude 146 Japanese annually, and the Note concluded with the expression of opinion that if the exclusion clause in the Bill became law that fact "will bring . . . *grave consequences* upon the otherwise happy . . . relations between the two countries."

The "100 per centers" seized on the expression "grave consequences." "It was a veiled threat" (Senator Lodge). Senator Borah agreed. Both Lodge and Borah had supported a compromise until the arrival of Mr. Hanihara's Note. Senator Johnson (California) stigmatized the Note as an "impertinent communication which would not be tolerated even by a fourth-rate Power."

In vain the Japanese Ambassador wrote explanations; in vain Mr. Hughes assured him that "I feel sure that you had no intention of signifying or suggesting a threat."

The fat was in the fire, and its smoke obscured the solemn importance of the whole question. On 12 April the Bill passed

the House of Representatives by 327 to 71 ; on the 16th it passed the Senate by 71 to 4.

Up to the last possible moment the Japanese Press had magnified every hope that somehow the Bill would not pass. When the Bill became law, a wave of intense indignation swept over Japan. The national honour was felt to have been affronted, and this blow to Japanese pride from America contrasted strangely in Japanese eyes with the position of their nation as a permanent member of the Council of the League of Nations, and with the sympathetic assistance Japan received from the U.S.A. after the earthquake of 1923. Mr. Cyrus Wood, American Ambassador in Tokio, resigned his position. It is understood that he was not in sympathy with the new law. On 20 April, 1924, fifteen Tokio papers published a joint declaration on the subject of the "in-equitable and unjust nature of the anti-Japanese Bills." Both Houses of the Diet passed strong resolutions of protest. Naturally, the militarists and their Press in Japan were not slow to point the moral. "If America challenges Japan to war," writes the "Yorodzu," "Japan will have to take up the challenge. Racial conflict is destined to come sooner or later . . . all the coloured peoples must be up in arms."

Lesser signs of the passion aroused in Japan were afforded by the cases of suicide in front of the U.S.A. Embassy and demonstrations against American citizens in Japan.

On 31 May, 1924, the Japanese Government sent a formal protest to the United States. It is too long to reproduce here, its main features were as follows : It pointed out that the new legislation was directed essentially against Japanese on the basis of a "racial distinction." It controverted the stock argument of the exclusionists that Japanese could not be assimilated ; it then reviewed past history, and pointed out that the new Act completely demolished a satisfactory working agreement which had been laboriously achieved. The Japanese Government admitted that "it lies within the inherent sovereign power of each State to limit and control immigration to its own domains, but when in the exercise of such right an evident injustice is done to a foreign nation on disregard of its proper self-respect, of international understandings, or of ordinary rules of comity, the question necessarily assumes an aspect which justifies diplomatic discussion and adjustment. Accordingly, the Japanese Government consider it their duty to maintain and place on record their solemn protest against the discriminating clause in Section 18(c) of the Immigration Act of 1924 and to request the American Government to take all possible and suitable measures for the removal of such discrimination." In this controversy the

Japanese point of view appeals to both my sympathy and common-sense. If some concession is not made to Japanese national feeling a typhoon may arise from clouds which at the beginning of 1924 were not even formed. The Japanese are not asking for anything which comes under the heading of mass racial equality as defined in the opening pages of this section. They are asking for the removal of a stigma. They are asking, to put it plainly, for soft soap instead of hard words, and a very human demand it is. They ask that the U.S.A. should use tact instead of bluntness. They want the few hundred Japanese who will still be able to enter the U.S.A. annually as students, business men, etc., to be increased by about 146 persons of other classes and the whole called a "percentage quota," instead of the few hundreds without the 146 being called "exclusion of Japanese as aliens ineligible as citizens."

Tact is cheap. The Executive of the U.S.A. are perfectly aware of this fact, and it is permissible to hope that when the steam generated in the domestic political situation in the U.S.A. has escaped through the safety valve of the next Presidential election, an effort will be made to solve the outstanding problem between Japan and America along lines satisfactory alike to Japanese amour-propre and to the legitimate desire of the U.S.A. to fashion their growing nation in whatsoever image they deem best.

II

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN CHINA

The activities and influences of the United States of America in China have been and still are distinguished by certain characteristics which are peculiar to American foreign policy the world over. It has often been remarked that for a variety of reasons, of which one example is the principle of national isolation embodied in the Monroe doctrine, the United States of America have not up to recent times taken that share in world affairs to which their importance entitled them. There is, perhaps, one exception to this generalization, and that is to be found in the policy of the United States in the Far East. The United States of America grew westward, and as great ports and termini of trunk railways arose on the Pacific coast of North America, so the interest of Americans in the Far East grew apace. It was an American squadron that forestalled by a few months the British Navy in the forcible introduction of feudal Japan to Western civilization, whilst the Americans were prominent amongst

Western nations in the later opening up of Korea. As a consequence of their victory over Spain, they became possessed of the Philippines and the Spanish Asiatic Empire, and, for the past thirty years they have been increasingly interested in the China trade until, in 1923, the total value of exports and imports between the United States of America and China exceeds that of any other country save Japan. Hong-Kong is excluded from this statement, being a transit port. Since the United States of America have not been disinterested in the Far East in the past, it was only natural that when the World War and its aftermath forced the Americans to take a greater interest in world politics, it was on the Far East that they concentrated much of their attention.

At the outset of this section it was written that there were certain characteristics peculiar to American foreign policies, and these will now be considered and exemplified by illustrations from the one sphere, viz. the Far East, in which America has shown interest for some time. The first point to note is the characteristic of idealism. This characteristic of their foreign policy is a reflection of the great illusion harboured by the American people, an illusion, which curious as it appears to other nationalities, has nevertheless proved an admirable foundation on which to build up a nation from an amalgam of aliens around an Anglo-Saxon core. The illusion cherished by Americans is that their country is *par excellence* the land of freedom. The original Anglo-Saxon revolutionaries, impatient at the slow growth of democracy in the Empire to which they belonged, cut loose and hastened forward on their own account. The tradition of maximum freedom survived, and was fostered by the belief of many that the new state in North America was an Eldorado for oppressed men. As a matter of fact, though the British Government blundered badly in 1775, events have since shown that the rate of democratic development then proceeding in England was a normal rate, for from it has arisen the present state of democracy in the British Empire which is unquestionably closer to the ultimate ideal of perfect individual freedom and perfect good order than is the state of democracy existent in America.

The American people, with their cast-iron Constitution conferring despotic powers on the President, the largely irresponsible position of the executive, the formidable influences and corruptions of the political machine, the big business trusts, etc., exist under a tyranny which the English would not endure. That this tyranny is a very real one must be admitted by anyone who considers such recent legislation as the Prohibition Acts, and the savage sentences passed on Socialists during the war. It is also curious that, side by side with the tradition of extreme freedom,

we find most reactionary legislation limiting immigration and designed to prevent others (presumably oppressed men) from enjoying the freedom of which the present holders are so proud. This disquisition on the difference between the actual and theoretical state of American political thought may seem to have little connexion with the Far East, but in reality it bears directly upon American policies therein, for it affords the only explanation of the curious fact that official America says and does one thing, whilst unofficial America usually says and does something quite different. The word "usually" is employed of a purpose, for, as we shall see, the two policies are sometimes superficially in accord.

Officially, American policy in the Far East has been, and still is, strictly in accord with the traditional ideal. Herewith some examples :—

(a) On very many occasions during the years 1830-1900, when England at the outset, and later France, Germany, and Russia, were forcing their ideas of international intercourse upon China, it will be found that the American Government prevented their local representative from collaborating with the aggressive policies of the Powers, even when he urged the need of collaboration in order to protect American interests in the Far East.

(b) The Knox suggestions calling for the neutralization of the Manchurian railways.

(c) The withdrawal of America from the sextuple group in 1913 because the terms demanded by the banks infringed upon Chinese sovereign rights.

(d) The American Note to China advising her to compose her internal differences rather than enter the World War.

(e) The American letters to England, France, and Japan in connexion with the New Consortium.

Last, but not least, there is the widespread American educational and missionary enterprise in China which flourishes under the wing of the official tradition of idealism.

Unofficially, the Americans have much the same ideas as other people, that is to say, they are out in the East to trade and make money. Some people would say that in reaction against official idealism, unofficial American activity is more self-seeking than that of other nationals, but that is only an opinion. The unofficial Americans in the Far East are rather fond of abusing their own Government, which they declare gives them no assistance and spends energy on behalf of the Chinese which would be better expended in backing American business ; but, on the other hand, the unofficial Americans usually support the missionary and educational work because they see in it the equivalent of much

expensive advertisement. This is idealism as a business and well worth the prime cost when it is calculated that of the future rulers of China, perhaps 50 per cent will have been American educated.

Perhaps it is to counteract this American invasion of intellectual China that both Japan and Great Britain have announced their intentions of expending the balances of their shares of the Boxer indemnity upon Chinese education.

Now it might be supposed that, even if one grants that unofficial Americans are looked upon by the Chinese as on a par with other foreigners, then the fact that without the slightest doubt the behaviour of official America towards China has been more idealistic than that of the other Powers, would be a fact entitling America to a premier position of respect and esteem in the minds of the Chinese. It is doubtful if she does hold this position. She has erred in promising so much and performing so little. We all know that in private life if a man of high character and high ideals (publicly expressed) commits a crime, the contrast is so glaring that he seems more wicked than another man of ordinary character who is guilty of the same offence. Just so with America in China. The American Government have so frequently publicly expressed their solicitude for China (in accordance with the national American tradition of idealism) that any departure from this standard becomes most obvious, and of all departures, the most obvious, the most shocking to the Chinese was President Wilson's double dealing with Japan at China's expense over Shantung Province.

The details of this episode, though scandalous from the point of view of American official standards, were commonplace if considered in relation to ordinary European diplomatic behaviour, and need not be repeated here, but the whole business dealt a blow at American prestige in China, from which, notwithstanding the Washington Conference, it has yet to recover. Many Chinese were confirmed in their opinion that the Americans were good talkers but poor doers, and that a lot of the fine sentiment which has come from Washington during the last thirty years was hypocrisy.

Which nation, then, does enjoy to the greatest degree the confidence and respect of the Chinese? The answer, in my opinion, is that British prestige is predominant in China.

III

THE BRITISH IN CHINA

The British have succeeded where the Americans have partially failed because they have ever been practical in China. This is a

quality the Chinese understand and appreciate. The British have always been careful to promise very little and even that little was less than they could undertake. They have never pretended to be more solicitous for the welfare of the Chinese than of the British, but, at the same time, they have given the Chinese the impression that the British in China believe in just treatment of the Chinese because it pays. The British have behaved towards the Chinese in exactly the same way as they have behaved towards the many Orientals who grace their Empire. It is a kind of slightly conservative and paternal benevolence, coupled with the strict enforcement of a high standard of rectitude ; as might be dealings between father and son. The United States of America has many monuments to the generosity of its citizens towards China, such as the Rockefeller Institute at Peking. It is typical of the British that perhaps their greatest achievements towards the general benefit of China are strictly commercial and equally beneficial to themselves. One is the creation of the great free port of Hong-Kong on a rock which, less than a century ago, was a pirate lair ; the other is the creation of the Chinese Maritime Customs service with which will ever be associated the immortal name of Sir Robert Hart.

This general principle of business and benevolence with business first, appeals to and impresses the Chinese, and is, in my judgment, the secret of the respect enjoyed by the British in China. At the same time, in true British fashion, there has been a tendency of late to rest on our oars, and to shut our eyes to the very rapid and significant changes which are taking place, chief of which is the arrival of the Western educated student type. This type is, perhaps, the most significant product of modern China, and, together with the intellectual revival in China, has been discussed in Chapter XV.

Intellectual renaissances are events which the average man of our race views with considerable mistrust and suspicion, but it is "the mind that makes the man," and in China, to paraphrase Cervantes, "the brush is the tongue of the mind," and the thoughts expressed by its caligraphic curves have done far more than all else to mould the destinies of this vast nation. It is, therefore, necessary that the present representatives of Britain—and by representatives I mean the British Community—should pay so much attention as they can to the trend of native thought in China. In many cases it requires an effort to do this, and there is only one type of Englishman who will make this effort as a matter of duty and not necessarily pleasure. Not to beat about the bush, that type comes from the upper classes. The foundations of British prestige and trade in China were laid in the early

days of the nineteenth century by men of education and birth, and to maintain them, the same type is required.

In China more than anywhere else, it is not the pushing, hustling bagman, replete with the results of a commercial correspondence and advertising course, who is required ; the Chinese like best to do business with a gentleman of education.

Some firms, one world-famous one in particular, are alive to this fact, and take steps to recruit their personnel from the best material. I am told by those who may be supposed to know, that of recent years the standard generally has deteriorated. With the great increase in numbers, this is no doubt inevitable. Should these lines meet the eyes of Taipans, I trust they will carefully consider this question, and bear in mind that material things are of negligible importance compared to men, and that, from the moment a "griffin" disembarks on the Bund at Shanghai, Hong-Kong, or Tientsin, he is automatically enrolled in the company of ambassadors of the British Empire, and that it is largely upon his actions, together with those of his few thousand companions, that so much will depend during the forthcoming momentous years in the Far East.

ENVOI

The time has now come to send forth this book.

I am very well aware that some people will criticize what they will say is the unduly idealistic tendency of the book. I admit I am an optimist, and the distressing condition of the world to-day convinces me that the only remedy lies in an idealism which strains the limits of practicability to their utmost. This is no time for half measures.

In war, all nations took great risks to achieve what was called "victory," a thing whose reality is turning out to be something very far removed from what we thought it would be. The contrast seems particularly glaring perhaps to us younger men whose privilege and duty it was to undertake the fighting. If these risks could be taken in war, when they were said to be justified by the fact that national existences were at stake, cannot something also be risked for the sake of achieving an enduring peace? The stake is the same ; the penalty of failure is becoming ever more frightful.

APPENDIX I

NINE YEAR'S PROGRAMME OF CONSTITUTIONAL PREPARATION IN CHINA

First Year, 1908-9

- Organization of Provincial Assemblies.
- Issue of local administrative regulations.
- Issue of census regulations.
- Issue of regulations for financial reform.
- Establishment of a bureau for the reform of the Manchu system, particularly as regards the treatment of Bannermen, and the fusion of Chinese and Manchus.
- Preparation of elementary text books for the teaching of reading.
- Preparation of books for general reading.
- Revision of the penal code.
- Drafting of Civil, Commercial, and Criminal codes.

Second Year, 1909-10

- Inauguration of Provincial Assemblies.
- Issue of regulations for the National Assembly.
- Elections for same.
- Organization of Local Administrative Councils.
- Taking of census of whole Empire.
- Investigation of provincial budgets.
- Reform of metropolitan official system.
- Drafting of Civil Service examination regulations, and the regulations for official salaries.
- Issue of regulations for Judicial Courts.
- Organization of Judicial Courts.
- Drafting of new criminal laws.
- Organization of elementary schools.
- Inauguration of modern constabulary system.

Third Year, 1910-11

- Inauguration of the National Assembly.
- Local administrative system to be extended to townships.
- Report by Viceroy and governors on census in provinces.
- Consideration of provincial budgets.
- Drafting of local tax regulations.
- Endeavour to carry out provincial budgets.
- Issue of regulations for Civil Service examinations.
- Establishment in all capitals and treaty ports of Judicial Courts.
- Issue of new criminal laws.
- Extension of primary education.
- Organization of police in "Hsiens."

Fourth Year, 1911-12

Organization of system for auditing of government accounts.
 Investigation of the budget of the empire.
 Issue of government tax regulations.
 Enforcement of Civil Service and official salaries regulations.
 Establishment of Judicial Courts in "Fu's."
 Organization of elementary schools in all townships.
 Consideration of the revised commercial, civil, and criminal laws.
 Investigation of the census.

Fifth Year, 1912-13

Local government system to be carried out this year.
 Issue of new metropolitan and provincial official systems.
 Judicial Courts in all cities, towns, and townships must be in working order this year.
 Extension of the elementary system.
 Extension of the police system.

Sixth Year, 1913-14

Endeavour to carry out budget for the whole empire.
 Organization of Judicial Courts to deal with political matters.
 Complete organization of all Judicial Courts in the provinces.
 Inauguration of village courts.
 Enforcement of new criminal laws.
 Issue of civil and commercial laws.
 Police forces shall be established this year in all towns and villages.

Seventh Year, 1915-16

Strict adherence to the Imperial Budget.
 One per cent of the population should be able to read and write this year.

Eighth Year, 1915-16

Budget for Imperial Household.
 Abolition of distinction between Manchu and Chinese.
 Organization of a statistical department.
 Enforcement of new civil and commercial laws.
 Organization of police throughout the empire to be complete.
 Two per cent of the population should be able to read and write.

Ninth Year, 1916-17

Issue of constitutional laws.
 Issue of Imperial House laws.
 Issue of parliamentary laws.
 Issue of regulations for the election of an Upper and Lower House.
 Elections for the Upper and Lower Houses.
 Preparation of the budget for the following year for discussion in Parliament.
 Organization of a Privy Council and of advisory ministers.
 Five per cent of the population should be able to read and write.

(Taken from "China Year Book," pp. 361-363, 1912 edition.)

APPENDIX II

MAIN POINTS OF THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE OF 1902

Article 1.—The High Contracting parties, having mutually recognized the independence of China and Korea, declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by aggressive tendencies in either country. Having in view, however, their special interests, of which those of Great Britain relate principally to China, whilst Japan, in addition to the interests which she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree, politically as well as commercially and industrially in Korea, the High Contracting parties recognize that it will be admissible for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other Power, or by disturbances arising in China or Korea, and necessitating the intervention of either of the High Contracting parties for the protection of the lives and properties of its subjects.

Article 2.—Declaration of neutrality if either signatory becomes involved in war through Article 1.

Article 3.—Promise of support if either signatory becomes involved in war with more than one Power.

Article 4.—Signatories promise not to enter into separate agreements with other Powers to the prejudice of this alliance.

Article 5.—Two signatories promise to communicate frankly and fully with each other when any of the interests affected by this treaty are in jeopardy.

Article 6.—Treaty to remain in force for five years and then at one year's notice, unless notice was given at the end of the fourth year.

APPENDIX III

MAIN POINTS IN SECOND ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE, 12 AUGUST, 1905

Preamble (describing the objects of the agreement).—

- (a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and India.
- (b) The preservation of the common interest of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China.
- (c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and India, and the defence of their interests in the said regions.

Article 1.—The two governments promise to communicate frankly and fully with each other when their interests are menaced, and will consider in common the necessary measures of defence.

Article 2.—If one Power is involved in an unprovoked attack, the other Power will come to its assistance.

Article 3.—“Japan possessing paramount political, military, and economic interests in Korea, Great Britain recognizes the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Korea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard those interests, provided always

that such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations."

Article 4.—"Great Britain, having special interests in all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognizes her right to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian frontiers."

Article 5.—The two Powers will not enter into agreements with other Powers to the prejudice of this agreement.

Article 6.—Great Britain will remain neutral in the Russo-Japanese War (then taking place) unless another Power joins Russia.

Article 7.—Naval and military authorities will consult from time to time on matters of mutual interest.

Article 8.—The agreement shall run for ten years, with a year's notice.

APPENDIX IV

THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS OF JAPAN, 18 JANUARY, 1915

I

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, being desirous of maintaining the general peace in Eastern Asia and further strengthening the friendly relations and good neighbourhood existing between the two nations, agree to the following articles:—

Article 1.—The Chinese Government engages to give full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with the German Government relating to the disposition of all rights, interests, and concessions which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung.

Article 2.—The Chinese Government engages that, within the Province of Shantung, and along its coasts, no territory or island will be ceded or leased to a third Power under any pretext.

Article 3.—The Chinese Government consents to Japan's building a railway from Chefoo or Lungku to join the Kiaochau-Tsinan-Fu railway.

Article 4.—The Chinese Government engages, in the interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by herself as soon as possible certain important cities and towns in the Province of Shantung as commercial ports. What places shall be opened are to be jointly decided upon in a separate agreement.

II

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, since the Chinese Government has always acknowledged the special position enjoyed by Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, agree to the following articles:—

Article 1.—The two contracting parties mutually agree that the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny, and the term of lease of the South Manchurian Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway, shall be extended to the period of ninety-nine years.

Article 2.—The Japanese subjects in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia shall have the right to lease or own land required either for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for farming.

Article 3.—Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and to engage in business and in manufacture of any kind whatsoever.

Article 4.—The Chinese Government agrees to grant to Japanese the right of opening the mines in South Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia. As regards what mines shall be opened, they shall be decided jointly.

Article 5.—The Chinese Government agrees that in respect of the two cases mentioned herein below, the Japanese Government's consent shall be first obtained before such action is taken :—

(a) Whenever permission is granted to the subjects of a third Power for the purpose of building a railway in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.

(b) Whenever a loan is to be made with a third Power pledging the local taxes of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.

Article 6.—The Chinese Government agrees that if the Chinese Government employs political, financial, or military advisers or instructors in South Manchuria or Eastern Inner Mongolia, the Japanese Government shall be first consulted.

Article 7.—The Chinese Government agrees that the control and management of the Kirin-Changchun Railway shall be handed over to the Japanese Government for a term of ninety-nine years, dating from the signing of this agreement.

III

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, seeing that the Japanese financiers and the Hanyehping Company¹ have close relations with each other at present, and desiring that the common interests of the two nations shall be advanced, agree to the following articles :—

Article 1.—The two contracting parties mutually agree that, when the opportune moment arrives, the Hanyehping Company shall be made a

¹ The Hanyehping Co. is a combination of three concerns—the Hang Yang Steel and Iron Works, the Tayeh Mines, and the Pinghsiang Collieries. Its mills are at Hang Yang, one of the most important commercial centres in the Upper Yangtze Valley. The company was originally a purely Chinese property, but in 1912 the whole property was mortgaged to the Yokohama Specie Bank as security for a loan. As a condition of the loan it is provided that the auditor and certain technical experts employed by the company shall be Japanese, and that the total output of the Tayeh Mines must be sold to the Japanese Government ironworks at rates to be fixed biennially, but much below market prices. The Bank has also acquired preferential rights to advance further loans. The mines at Tayeh, according to a Japanese report, are almost inexhaustible, and will produce 1,000,000 tons annually for 700 years, the quality of the ore being as good as that produced in Germany or the United States. In the districts surrounding the Tayeh Mines there are many other mines—copper, lead, and zinc—which are not the property of the Hanyehping Company. It will be noted that in Article 2 (of the twenty-one demands) Japan demands that these mines shall not be exploited without the consent of the company, which, being controlled by the Yokohama Specie Bank, really means that they shall not be exploited without the consent of Japan. This group of demands is significant in that it illustrates Japan's intention to enter and control a region in the valley of the Yangtze which Great Britain has always considered within her own sphere of interest.

[I am indebted for the above note to Alexander Powell's "Asia at the Cross Roads," page 242. The principal cause of Japan's interest in this area is the anxiety of the General Staff over the question of the supply of raw materials for munitions in the event of war. The essential ores from the Yangtze Valley would have to cross the Sea of Japan, and recognition of this fact is to be seen in much of Japanese foreign policy designed to secure the sea communication with Asia.]

joint concern of the two nations, and they further agree that, without the previous consent of Japan, China shall not by her own act dispose of the rights and property or whatsoever of the said Company, nor cause the said Company to dispose freely of the same.

Article 2.—The Chinese Government agrees that all mines in the neighbourhood of the Hanyehping Company shall not be permitted, without the consent of the said Company, to be worked by other persons outside of the said Company; and further agrees that if it is desired to carry out any undertakings, which, it is apprehended, may directly or indirectly affect the interest of the said Company, the consent of the said Company shall be first obtained.

IV

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, with the object of effectively preserving the territorial integrity of China, agree to the following special article:—

The Chinese Government engages not to cede or lease to a third Power any harbour or bay or island along the coast of China.

V

Article 1.—The Chinese Central Government shall employ influential Japanese as advisers in political, financial, and military affairs.

Article 2.—Japanese hospitals, churches, and schools in the interior of China shall be granted the right of owning land.

Article 3.—Inasmuch as the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government have had many cases of dispute between Japanese and Chinese police, which caused no little misunderstanding, it is for this reason necessary that the police departments of important places (in China) shall be jointly administered by Chinese and Japanese, or that the police departments of these places shall employ numerous Japanese, so that they may at the same time, help to plan for the improvement of the Chinese police service.

Article 4.—China shall purchase from Japan a fixed amount of the munitions of war (say 50 per cent or more) that are needed by the Chinese Government, or there shall be established in China a Sino-Japanese jointly worked arsenal. Japanese technical experts are to be employed and Japanese material to be purchased.

Article 5.—China agrees to grant to Japan the right of constructing a railway connecting Wuchang with Kiukang and Nanchang, another line between Nanchang and Hangchow, and another between Nanchang and Chaochou.¹

Article 6.—If China needs foreign capital to work mines, build railways, and construct harbour works (including dockyards) in the province of Fukien, Japan shall be first consulted.

Article 7.—China agrees that Japanese subjects shall have the right of missionary propaganda in Buddhist China.

¹ These towns are in Hupeh and Kiangsi.

APPENDIX V

TUCHUNS

It is almost impossible to read any contemporary account of events in China without encountering the word "Tuchun." The present-day Tuchun is the military governor of a province in China. A few men such as Chang Tso-lin and Wu Pei-fu, whose official authority extends in military matters to more than one province, are Inspector-Generals or in journalese, "super-Tuchuns." In theory, and usually in fact, there is also a civil governor in each province, but in the present state of China the *de facto* ruler is the Tuchun. The term Tuchun is also sometimes used loosely by foreigners to denote generals operating with armies who do not actually profess to hold the appointment of Tuchun. In the Wei and Chin dynasties of the third and fourth centuries A.D., the title of Tu-tu was borne by officials who were solely in charge of military affairs in the provinces. During the T'ang dynasty (600-900 A.D.) the Tu-tu seems to have controlled both military and civil affairs, and to have occupied something of the position subsequently held by the Manchu Viceroy. The title of Tu-tu disappeared under the Manchus, and was revived (as being a pure Chinese title) in the first year of the republic. Yuan Shi-kai, about 1915, abolished the title of Tu-tu, and for it substituted the Tuchun, whose functions were purely military. The title of Tu-tu is sometimes used by foreigners to-day when Tuchun would be more correct.

I am indebted to A. E. W. for a learned note explaining in detail the exact definition and varying functions of the Tu-tu at different stages in Chinese history.

APPENDIX VI

CHINESE POLITICAL PARTIES.

Though at the present time parliamentary government is of negligible importance in China, where the stage is almost completely occupied by local militarists, the period during which the Tuchuns shall dominate China will one day end—and other and better forces will govern the country.

The present writer, differing from most Europeans, believes, for reasons which have been fully set out in various chapters, that the Tuchuns are not far from their inevitable decline. If this belief is correct, it is probable that the new forces which are now stirring in China's ancient womb will make use to some extent of existing organizations, and it is therefore interesting to note what political groups there have been recently and still are to-day in China. It is also convenient to know something of the older groups when studying Chinese history of the nineteenth century.

Throughout the history of China there is ample evidence of the existence of secret societies; these often wielded great power. But they were exclusively of a revolutionary character, and hardly to be classified as political parties. During the great Empress Dowager's reign, that superb Viceroy, Li Hung-chang, collected a personal party around him which became known as the "Hwai Clique." At about the same time, Tseng Kwo-fang was the centre of the "Hunan Party." When in the plenitude of his powers Yuan Shi-kai likewise had a numerous personal following.

Subsequent to the abortive reform movement of 1898, two groups arose which somewhat resembled political parties, one was called the Pao-hwang-Hui (Constitutional Party), the other the Tung-meng-Hui (Alliance Party). The former was led by K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Chi-chao (the noted scholar), the other was controlled by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Hwang Hsing. When the republic was established in 1911, "parties" blossomed into brief existence on all sides. By 1912 the Tung-meng-Hui had been reorganized as the Kuo-min Tang (Nationalist). This party, like its parent, was, and remains, essentially republican and revolutionary. Its principal opponent in the first Parliament was the Chin-pu Tang (Progressive). The Chin-pu Tang was controlled by Li Muang-hung, Liang Chi-chao, Wu Ting-fang, Chang Chien, and other moderate men, and it professed to favour slow and constitutional reform. The Chin-pu Tang was composed of an amalgam of parties of which the old Pao-hwang-Hui and another group called the Kung-ho Tang (Republican Party) were the principal components. The collapse of the second rebellion in 1913, an event principally due to the control by Yuan Shi-kai of the proceeds of the Reorganization Loan, left the President master of the situation. On 4 November, 1913, he dissolved and persecuted the Kuo-min Tang, in whose leaders he recognized the principal domestic obstacles to his schemes of personal ambition; he did more than this, for though the Chin-pu Tang had been inclined to support him against the Kuo-min Tang, they were likewise crippled by Yuan's dissolution of Parliament. At the President's death the two parties revived in the reconvened Parliament, but were hopelessly antagonistic to each other on the question of the future organization of the Chinese administration. The Chin-pu Tang favoured centralization, whilst their rivals insisted upon a large degree of autonomy being granted to the provinces. The two parties were also torn internally by corruption. The second dissolution of Parliament in 1917 scattered the parties.

Since that date the Kuo-min Tang has been located at Canton, whilst the Chin-pu Tang has been making hay at Peking by selling its support to whichever military group controlled the central organization. Other groups whose names appear in contemporary or recent Chinese history are the Chihli group (led by Wu Pei-fu and Tsao Kun) and the Fengtien Party (Chang Tso-lin). These two groups were evolved after the death of Yuan Shi-kai from a previous association of Northern Militarists known as the Pei-Yang party. The Pei-Yang party had been originally founded by Li Hung-chang.

Then there was recently a group known as the "Communications Group," followers of the able financier-politician, Liang Shi-yi. The Anfu Club, led by Tuan Chi-jui, was an opportunist group openly in the pay of the Japanese, and was thrown down by popular clamour with which the Chihli party identified themselves. As things stand at present, the Chin-pu Tang and Kuo-min Tang alone present any resemblance to political parties, and it is possible that about their skeletons will one day grow the flesh of two parties, one Conservative the other Liberal.

APPENDIX VII

CLAN RULE AND MILITARISM IN JAPAN SINCE THE RESTORATION

The question of clan rule, or the immense influence exercised in Japanese politics by the Sat-Cho clique since the Restoration, together

with the unconstitutional and arbitrary actions of the military party, are matters much at variance with the outward appearance of Japan's so-called Western type of government. In an appendix I have thought it desirable to describe these factors at greater length than would be justified in the body of the book.

The source material for a detailed study of these affairs is contained in the "Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan," Volume XXX, Part 3, "History of the Rise of Political Parties in Japan," A. H. Lay; in Vol. XLII, Part I, of the "Transactions" of the same society; "Japanese Government Documents, 1867-89," W. W. McLaren; and the files of the "Japan Chronicle," Weekly Ed. For the general reader, W. W. McLaren's "A Political History of Japan in the Meiji Era," and J. H. Gubbins' "The Progress of Japan, 1853-71," are invaluable. W. W. McLaren says that the early files of the "Japan Times," when that paper was under the editorship of the late Captain Brinckley, are most informative. I have not had access to this last source of information.

* * * * *

The persistence throughout the Meiji Era, and even down to the present day in modern Japan of what the Japanese themselves call "clan rule," is undoubtedly due to the impress left upon the Japanese by a thousand years of feudalism. In Europe, the disappearance of feudalism at various times and places was never, even in France, a clear-cut process, and the groups of persons centred about great families continued to exercise wide powers long after the strictly legal prerogatives which had been theirs in feudal days had been abolished by evolution (in England) or revolution elsewhere. It is not fantastic to say that the political influence still exerted in England by a few great families is a faint and distant reflection of the Middle Ages.

In Japan, feudalism was in full legal existence up to 1871; as late as 1877 a considerable rebellion, in which the issue was feudalism versus centralization, took place, so it is hardly surprising that feudal ideas should yet be existent in Japan. It would be contrary to the experience of the past were they not, for the fundamental ideas of man change slowly, and are not—in disregard of the hopes of revolutionaries of all epochs—to be altered overnight by the artificial creation of a new machinery of government, be the principles on which it is devised ever so excellent.

The overthrow of the Tokugawa shogunate and the nominal Restoration of the Emperor by the four western clans of Satsuma, Choshu, Hizen, and Tosa, transferred the reins of power not, as is sometimes supposed, from the Tokugawa Shogun to the Emperor, or even to the Daimios of the four clans; it passed from the Samurai, who had been controlling the weak Shogun, to the leading Samurai who controlled the affairs of the four clans. For just as the Shogun in the Tokugawa group had long lost the personal power enjoyed by men like Iyeyasu and Iyemitsu, so had the Daimios of the clans gradually passed under the influence of their leading Samurai in clan council.

It was these Samurai who brought about the Restoration, and it has been in their hands and those of the men trained by them, that the real government of Japan has lain since 1867.

It has been noted elsewhere that one of the causes of the Restoration arose from the Japanese renaissance movement of the eighteenth century, and that from this movement there grew a chauvinistic cult exemplified by the "patriotic schools" with their theological-military doctrines, which sprang up all over the country during the first half of the nineteenth

century. One of the most famous teachers at this time was the fanatic and Choshu patriot, Yoshida Shoin, who wrote an oft-quoted book in which he advocated the Restoration, which was to be followed by a Greater Japan, to include Formosa, Korea, and territory on the mainland of North Asia. Yoshida was executed by the Shogun in 1859 for his political activities, but it requires only a glance at a map to observe that his ideas have been alive during the last half-century.

The influence of this school of thought was soon to lead to a split in the coalition of western clans, which up to 1874 was engaged and was free from internal jealousies in consolidating the central Government. In 1874 the question arose as to whether Japan was to assume an aggressive policy towards China and Korea. The peace party represented by Ito and Itagaki triumphed, and their views held the field for twenty years. During these years the complexion of the Government became more and more Satsuma and Choshu, and when a Legislature and Constitution were given to Japan in 1890 the leaders of these clans practically monopolized power.

As explained elsewhere, the complexion of the administration in Japan has but a slight relation, and sometimes none at all, to the state of the so-called political parties in the Diet. For the first four years of parliamentary government the Sat-Cho oligarchy endeavoured successively to ignore, to crush, and to placate the opposition groups in the Diet who were led by men like Okuma, jealous of the supremacy of the two great clans.

In the meanwhile, the continued domination of the Sat-Cho clique was creating conditions favourable to the renaissance of militarism, since due to circumstances connected with the feudal history of Japan, the clan of Satsuma treated the modern navy as its particular preserve, whilst that of Choshu controlled the army, whose foundations had been laid by the Choshu Samurai Yamagata (he died a prince in 1922). The definite passing of power into the hands of the militarists was not accomplished without a struggle, and to the end of his life, Prince Ito (as he subsequently became) opposed Yamagata and his henchman Katsura in their policies of Imperial Expansion. But in the long run Ito failed, and he failed because the only instrument which could have helped him to succeed was useless for this purpose. There is tragic irony in the fact this instrument—the Diet and Constitution—was Ito's own invention, or rather his adopted child from Germany.

After his first split with Yamagata in 1898, Ito realized that in order to protect the administration from the ceaseless obstruction in the Lower House of the Diet, it was necessary to create what may be described as a permanent party on whose support each succeeding Sat-Cho administration could rely. Moreover, Ito hoped that by dominating such a party he could overcome the military section of the bureaucratic clique.

Ito used his immense prestige, and taking advantage of the failure of the Okuma-Itagaki coalition, he reared from the wreck of their collapse the Seiyukai Party. Now, had the administration been responsible to the Diet, and had the Lower House been truly, or even partially representative of public opinion, Ito might have been able to use the Seiyukai to control Yamagata and his friends. He might have been able to prevent the military from embarking on the Russo-Japanese War, to which recent evidence has shown that Ito was opposed until he saw that the issue had been taken from his control. But the Constitution and the nature of the Diet made any political party therein powerless for these purposes; moreover, the militarists had in 1895 taken further precautions of an

unostentatious but immensely important character with a view to ensuring their independence of the Diet, howsoever it might develop.

Regulations were passed—subsequently strengthened about 1911—which restricted the Cabinet portfolios for the navy and army to the ranks of naval and military officers. These rules effectually placed every subsequent administration at the complete mercy of the militarists, since no Cabinet could be formed without a contribution from the army and navy for two of the most important ministries. When desirous of bringing the administration to heel, the military oligarchy simply refused to allow an officer to serve. This method of controlling affairs is quite distinct from the power obtained through the privilege enjoyed by the Chief of the General Staff of direct access to the Throne.

The issue of the Russo-Japanese War, though profoundly disappointing to a large section of the Japanese public, who entertained the most extravagant ideas of their country's military and financial position, actually firmly seated the Sat-Cho oligarchy (military wing) in the saddle. To a very large extent they still occupy this position.

Gradually the real wielders of power, with that affection for indirect rule which seems to have an irresistible fascination for the Japanese, retired into the mysterious and sacrosanct shadows about the Throne, and the famous and all-powerful, yet extra-constitutional body known as the Genro or "Elder Statesmen," came into being. Of this inner council a Japanese writer well qualified to know his subject wrote in 1922: "Perhaps Prince Yamagata will go down to history chiefly as the creator of the Genro or body of Elder Statesmen, who for the last twenty years have been the real rulers of Japan, making and unmaking ministries, dictating policies, determining peace and war, and ignoring popular government as far as was prudent, thus setting up an oligarchy and establishing a dual control that bore no little resemblance to the Shogunate, which the Revolution of 1868 was supposed to have eliminated."

It is true that once the militarists felt that their position was secure, administrations began to include a certain number of so-called "Party men," but this change was purely superficial, and the years rolled by without the slightest impairment of the absolute powers enjoyed by the decreasing number of Sat-Cho Genro.

Incidents have been quoted elsewhere illustrative of the complete contempt shown by the Genro for the opinion of the Diet, the Press, or the people. It is sufficient to mention here that in 1915 as a variant to the long succession of Sat-Cho administrations, "supported," as the Japanese say, on the Seiyukai, the Genro who were at that time completely under the thumb of the aged Yamagata, sanctioned the formation of a ministry by Okuma "supported" on the Kenseikai, the rivals of the Seiyukai. There were sound reasons of expediency for this liberal move, since both the Satsuma and Choshu clans were suffering at the time from financial scandals, with the additional handicap of internal dissension in the case of Choshu, where a quarrel had arisen between Yamagata and his erstwhile henchman Katsura.

Long and weary years had Okuma wandered in the wilderness as the penalty for his early opposition to the Sat-Cho clique, and during this period he had never ceased to declaim bitterly on the corruption, the autocracy, and the selfishness of the party in power. To the uninstructed and outside world it seemed that the appointment of Okuma heralded the dawn of Liberalism in Japan and the end of subtle control by hidden and uncontrollable forces. Vain expectations.

Okuma, it almost seems, had been placed in power as an ironical illustration of the fact that the Genro were still supreme, for his tenure of office was distinguished by the most extreme chauvinistic policy towards China; a policy made memorable by the twenty-one demands. When he had served his purpose he was discarded, and though his party, the Kenseikai, enjoyed a majority in the Diet, and he tried to recommend his chief supporter, the Viscount Kato, as his successor, the Genro cynically ignored these things and recalled General Terauchi, the Governor-General of Korea. This straightforward militarist was ordered to form an administration which was to be supported on the Seiyukai. A general election, distinguished by the usual corruption, soon gave the Seiyukai the majority necessary to play its part, since every Seiyukai candidate was able to announce that his party had once more been selected to act as the profitable support which, for convenience and appearance sake, present-day administrations find indispensable in the Lower House. Even now, however, lest the "support" should think itself too indispensable, the unanswerable arguments of a dissolution of the Diet by the Throne and the "Imperial Edicts" are held in reserve and displayed from time to time. These two precautions can also be used punitively. The dissolution of the Diet after a sitting of a few days (as has sometimes been the case) is a very severe financial strain on the members in view of the extraordinary expenses attendant upon a parliamentary election in Japan, whilst a term of office of only a few days hardly affords much scope for recoupment. Similarly, on one famous occasion when the Lower House was fractious and refused to agree to estimates for the expansion of the fighting services, the Throne silenced all criticism by an edict which decreed that the estimates should pass, but that in order to meet the arguments of the economists, all officials throughout the empire (including the paid members of the Diet) should contribute one-tenth of their incomes towards the expenses of the vote in question.

In 1923 the Genro established Admiral Yamamoto (Satsuma) as Prime Minister, or Minister President as the Japanese call the occupant of the post, which I have found it convenient to call the Premiership. The Admiral's last administration fell in disgrace as a consequence of the naval scandals of 1913, and it cannot be said that the 1923 administration was in any sense connected with any of the parties in the Diet, so far as political principles are concerned, though it was "supported" on the Seiyukai. This administration, like that of the late Admiral Baron Kato, was called "Transcendental" by the Japanese, which means definitely above all party connexion, as opposed, say, to Mr. Hara's administration, which was in theory a Seiyukai Cabinet. In practice Mr. Hara's government was, so far as could be noted, as closely controlled by the Sat-Cho bureaucrats as any before or since.

The Genro have been written about as if they were everlasting. Actually, they now consist of the Marquis Matsukata¹—undoubtedly a full Genro—and the Marquis Saionji; the historical claims of the latter are not quite so good as those of Matsukata for full Genro-ship. Matsukata is very old and infirm, but all the available evidence points to the fact that he still exercises his power.

As might be expected, the gradual dying-off of men like Ito and Yamagata who were indisputably Genro, by virtue of their share in the founding of modern Japan, has brought into the limelight various groups and personalities who are anxious to inherit the peculiar powers of the old bureaucrats. Of personalities, certain statesmen of what may be described

¹ Died 1924.

as the second rank in prestige, second-generation men as it were from the giants of the early days, are accused by the Press of trying to be "quasi-genro"; of groups there are the Privy Council and the House of Peers.

How the mantle is falling cannot yet be precisely determined, though its ultimate destination is the subject of the liveliest speculation in Japan. We shall probably know more when the stage is finally cleared, as soon it must be, of the last relics of the old Genro, and the occasion arises to recommend a new administration to the Throne.

But this much is certain, and that is the present existence in the background of Japan's political life of the Sat-Cho domination, largely militarist in nature, and so long as this influence exists, it will find a channel for the expression of its power, be that channel a new group of Genro, the Privy Council, or the Peers.

I confess that a study of the political events in Japan between 1920-23 had led me to believe that the after-effects of the Great War, the Washington Conference, and the egregious failure of the militarists in Siberia, 1919-22, as well as certain events in Japan, had combined to seriously weaken the Sat-Cho domination. However, the appointment of Admiral Yamamoto, in 1923, and the preludes which led up thereto, are matters which have made me modify my opinions, and the Sat-Cho clique are evidently still in full vigour. The same remark applies to the appointment of the Kiyoura Cabinet in 1924.

Nevertheless, opposing influences are gaining ground, and when the temporary shock given to national life by the terrible earthquake has passed away,¹ I venture to predict that these anti-clan-government forces will begin an active campaign in favour of reforms, having as their ultimate aim something approaching the British conception of Parliamentary Government.

July, 1924.—The striking failure of the Seiyu-Honto party and bureaucrats in the April, 1924, general elections, make me think that perhaps I modified my opinion too soon. The results of these elections are discussed on page 146.

APPENDIX VIII

PRINCIPAL LABOUR ORGANIZATIONS IN JAPAN AND THEIR APPROXIMATE MEMBERSHIP IN 1923

(From the translations of the Social Bureau's investigations, see J.W.C., *New Series, No. 1125, 26 July, 1923*)

NAME OF THE ASSOCIATION.	MEMBERSHIP.
Nippon Rodo Sodomei (Japan Labour Federation)	15,000-20,000
Kikai Rodo Kumiai Rengokai (Mechanical Labour Union)	3,000
Shibaura Rodo Kumiai (Shibaura Labour Union)	2,000
Nippon Bijutsu Yusen Shoko Kumiai (Fine Art Mousseline Workers' Union)	1,000
Chubu Rodo Kumiai Rengokai (Central League of Unions)	1,000
Koji Kai (Progressive Association)	1,000
Nagoya Kojikai (Nagoya Progressives)	1,000
Rodo Kumiai Doshikai (Brotherhood of Labour)	2,000
Osaka Rodo Kumiai Domeikai (Osaka Unions)	2,000
Jun Koji Kai (Pure Progressives)	1,000

¹ The earthquake practically coincided to within a few hours with the appointment of the Yamamoto administration.

NAME OF THE ASSOCIATION.	MEMBERSHIP.
Nippon Nogyo Rodo Kumiai (Farm Workers' Association)	70,000
Ishikawajima Shipbuilders' Association	1,000
Nippon Kain Kumiai (Japan's Seaman's Association)	15,000-20,000
Kain Kyokai (Seaman's Association)	4,000
Yushi Doyukai (N.Y.K. Seaman's Association)	2,000
Shosen Doshikai (O.S.K. Company's Seaman's Association)	1,000

APPENDIX IX

THE NATIONAL DEFENCE SCHEME OF JAPAN, 1922

When the hurly-burly of the Washington Conference had died down, the General Staff in Japan held a conference to consider the question of the National Defence of Japan in view of the changed situation arising from the treaties of Washington. The "Yomiuri"—a paper of Liberal tendencies which has from time to time strongly criticized the activities of the military party in Japan—published an account of the conclusions reached by the General Staff. This journalistic scoop, which was prominently reproduced in the London "Times," caused a great uproar in Japan, and its accuracy was vehemently denied by the authorities. There are, however, various reasons for supposing that the "Yomiuri" was exceptionally well informed. The full article may be read in the "Japan Chronicle," Weekly Ed., of 20 April, 1922. It is reproduced here in summary:—

It was anticipated by the General Staff that in a future war Japan must be prepared to stand alone. "So the Army and the Navy must devote their whole energies in concert to maintaining sure connexion with the Asiatic continent to the last."

To ensure this object, certain national defence lines were laid down, which were as follows:—

At sea the line connecting Shumsu island in the Kuriles, the Bonins, Amami, Oshima, and Formosa shall be the first line of defence. Control of the neighbouring waters of the Pacific, the East China Sea, and the Sea of Japan, together with the Yellow Sea, shall be absolutely maintained.

On land the line connecting Hankow, Shantung, Harbin, and the frontier of Saghalien shall be absolutely maintained. It is the first line of defence, and the area within this line shall be the district for operation to ensure that communication shall be maintained with the mainland of Asia.

The Straits of Tsushima shall be the second line of defence, with a view to making a prolonged war practicable.

General Scheme of Operation (Army).—In order to strengthen the military position the garrisons in Formosa, Saghalien, and Korea are to be reinforced first of all. Communication to be ensured with . . . in order to get coal on the continent and with . . . in order to get iron . . . whilst with a view to discounting a possible sudden change in international relations . . . is to be seized, and in order to secure food supplies from Manchuria, the points . . . and . . . are to be seized. The remaining troops are to be formed into line of battle in order that connexion through the Straits of Tsushima may be secured by means of subsidiary vessels of the Navy and the Army in the event of it becoming impossible to rely on the strength of the main fleet.

General Plan of Operations (Navy).—Conditions having become unfavourable through the limitation of capital ships to aggressive action on the high seas, the first line of defence is to be defended to the last, surprise attacks being resorted to as a rule. In the event of a balance of strength being secured, aggression may be undertaken in the near seas. Throughout the war the great importance of maintaining communication with the mainland is to be borne in mind.

In publishing this statement the "Yomiuri" had a playful dig at the General Staff by asserting that all the facts they had published were also to be found "scattered broadcast in the papers and minutes of the Imperial Diet."

What makes the above plans interesting, even if the "Yomiuri" was "guessing," is that with one exception they are an able and excellent appreciation of Japan's present strategical position. The proposed employment of the Navy is open to criticism, but the need for Japan to strive at all costs to keep her communications open with Asia in time of war is certain. To Japan these lines of communication in war would be as vital as were the South and Western Atlantic routes to England, in 1914-18.

The blanks in the foregoing account can be filled in without much trouble if a map of the Far East is studied for a short time.

APPENDIX X

PRÉCIS OF THE TREATY FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS RELATIVE TO SHANTUNG

SECTION I. RESTORATION OF THE FORMER GERMAN LEASED TERRITORY OF KIAOCHOW

Article 1.—Japan restores to China the leased territory of Kiaochow.

Article 2.—Joint commission to settle the transfer of administration of territory, public property, etc.

Article 3.—Within six months of the coming into force of the Treaty, the questions in Article 2 are to be finally settled.

Article 4.—Japan to hand over to China all archives, registers, and plans as may be necessary for the administration of the territory. Also those that may be useful for the administration of the 50-kilometric zone around Kiaochow.

SECTION 2. TRANSFER OF PUBLIC PROPERTY

Article 5.—Japan to hand over all public properties, buildings, works, etc., in the territory, whether formerly possessed by Germans or whether built or purchased by the Japanese during their administration, except as in Article 7.

Article 6.—No compensation required for transfer of properties in Article 6, but China is to refund a "fair and equitable proportion" of the expenses incurred by the Japanese authorities in the purchase or construction of public properties, and in the improvement of those formerly possessed by the Germans.

Article 7.—Properties organized for the benefit of the Japanese community (i.e. schools, shrines, and cemeteries), and such properties as are required for the Japanese Consul, to be retained.

Article 8.—Joint commission to arrange details in the above articles.

SECTION 3. WITHDRAWAL OF JAPANESE TROOPS

Article 9.—Troops and police along Tsingtau-Tsinanfu Railway to be withdrawn as soon as they are replaced by Chinese.

Article 10.—Date of completion of withdrawal to be, if possible, within three months, and in any case within six months of the signature of the Treaty.

Article 11.—Japanese garrison in Tsingtau to be withdrawn, if possible, on transfer of administration, or in any case within thirty days of it.

SECTION 4. MARITIME CUSTOMS IN TSINGTAU

Article 12.—Customs House at Tsingtau to be an integral part of the Chinese Maritime Customs.

Article 13.—Provisional agreement dated 6 August, 1915, to be annulled. (Relative to re-opening of the office of the Chinese Maritime Customs in Tsingtau.)

SECTION 5. TSINGTAU-TSINANFU RAILWAY

Article 14.—The railway, its branches, and all its properties to be transferred to China.

Article 15.—China to reimburse the actual value of the above properties. This is estimated at 53,406,141 gold marks for the properties left behind by the Germans, plus the expenses of Japan in improvements or additions to them.

Article 16.—Each country to appoint three commissioners to appraise value of the railway and arrange transfer of properties.

Article 17.—Transfer of properties to be completed as soon as possible.

Article 18.—In payment for above, China to deliver Chinese Government Treasury notes, secured on the properties and revenue of the railways, and running for fifteen years. Redeemable after five years, or at any time later upon six months previous notice.

Article 19.—A Japanese Traffic Manager and Chief Accountant to be appointed by Chinese for as long as any part of the Chinese Government Treasury notes remain in Japan. Chief Accountant to co-ordinate with Chinese Chief Accountant.

Article 20.—Further financial details to be settled as soon as possible by Chinese and Japanese.

SECTION 6. EXTENSION OF THE TSINGTAU-TSINANFU RAILWAY

Article 21.—Concessions relating to the two extensions of the Tsingtau-Tsinanfu Railway (Tsinanfu-Shunteh and Kaoin-Hsuchowfu lines) to be made open to common activity of an international financial group. Terms to be arranged between this group and the Chinese Government.

SECTION 7. MINES

Article 22.—The mines of Tsechuan, Fangtze, and Chinlingchen (of which Germany formerly held mining rights) to be handed over to a company formed under special charter of the Chinese Government in which Japanese capital is not to exceed Chinese. Joint Commission (*see* Article 2) to settle details.

SECTION 8. OPENING OF THE FORMER GERMAN LEASED TERRITORY OF KIAOCHOW

Article 23.—Japan declares that she will not seek to establish a Japanese or an international settlement in the above territory.

China declares the whole of the territory open to foreign trade, and that foreign nationals will be permitted to reside freely and carry on commerce, industry, and trade within that area.

Article 24.—Vested rights acquired by foreign nationals within the territory during either the German or Japanese administrations to be respected by the Chinese Government. Joint Commission (*see Article 2*) to settle the status or validity of such vested rights.

SECTION 9. SALT INDUSTRY

Article 25.—Interests of Japanese subjects in the salt industry, or Japanese companies employed in the industry along the coast of Kiaochow Bay, to be purchased by China. Exportation of a certain amount of salt to Japan to be allowed on reasonable terms. Arrangements for the above to be settled by the Joint Commission (*see Article 2*).

SECTION 10. SUBMARINE CABLES

Article 26.—Japan declares all rights, titles, and privileges of the former German submarine cables between Tsingtau and Chefoo, and between Tsingtau and Shanghai (except for the portions of these cables utilized by Japan for laying a cable from Tsingtau to Sasebo), to be vested in China. Joint Commission to settle questions relating to the landing at Tsingtau of the Tsingtau-Sasebo cable and to its operations.

SECTION 11. WIRELESS STATIONS

Article 27.—Upon withdrawal of Japanese troops from Tsingtau and Tsinanfu, the Japanese wireless at these two places to be handed over to China, for fair compensation.

Article 28.—Treaty to be ratified as soon as possible, and not later than four months after the signature thereof. To come into force on date of ratification.

Annex 1.—Japan renounces all preferential rights with regard to foreign assistance in capital, persons, and material stipulated between China and Germany on 6 March, 1898.

Annex 2.—Public properties (*see Article 5*) to include roads, waterworks, parks, and drainage. Public enterprises to include telephone, electric, stockyard, and laundry. Foreign community in the territory to have fair representation in the management and maintenance of public works. Chinese Government, on taking over telephones, to give consideration to foreign requirements with regard to telephone extensions.

Municipal authorities to take over from Government all public enterprises (electric light, stockyard, etc.), and cause commercial companies to be formed for their management.

Annex 3.—Inspector-General of Chinese Maritime Customs to be instructed to permit traders within the territory to communicate in their own language to the Tsingtau Custom House, and to consider the needs of the trade of Tsingtau in selecting the staff of the Custom House.¹

¹ I.e. appoint Japanese.

Annex 4.—If Joint Commission fails to come to an agreement regarding the Tsingtau-Tsinanfu Railway, the Governments of Japan and China shall discuss the points at issue, and possibly the recommendations of a third Power (approved by both parties) shall be obtained.

Annex 5.—Provided that the Chefoo-Weihsien Railway is constructed with Chinese capital, the Japanese Government will not require the option of financing it to be made open to the International Financing Consortium.

Annex 6.—Chinese local authorities to consult views of foreign residents in municipal matters, pending the regulations of laws regulating the system of local self-government in China.

AGREED TERMS OF UNDERSTANDING RECORDED IN THE MINUTES OF THE DELEGATIONS

1. Japanese subjects permitted to become shareholders in commercial companies formed to manage public enterprises.
2. No Japanese military force of any kind to remain in Shantung after withdrawal (*see* Article 9).
3. All light railways and their properties constructed in Shantung by Japan to be considered part of the Tsingtau-Tsinanfu Railway.
4. Telegraph lines along the railways to be part of their properties.
5. Chinese Government can retain or remove Japanese employees on the railway, provided that reasonable notice is given of removals before railway is taken over.
6. Chinese Managing Director to appoint entire staff of the Japanese Traffic Manager and Chief Accountant. After two and a half years, a Chinese Assistant Traffic Manager may be appointed, or on redemption of Treasury notes, for a period of two and a half years.
7. Japanese subjects not to be appointed on the above subordinate staffs.
8. Redemption of Treasury notes will not be effected with funds raised from any source other than Chinese.
9. Chinese to ask Japanese Government in selecting Japanese Traffic Accountant.
10. Joint Commission to settle questions relating to existing contracts and commitments made by Japanese authorities in charge of railways.
11. In Article 23, agriculture is not included, nor any enterprise prohibited by law, or not permitted to foreign nationals under Chinese law.
12. Japanese post offices outside the German leased territory to be withdrawn on transference of railway, or by 1 January, 1923. Post offices within the territory to be withdrawn on transfer of administration.
13. List of claims of Chinese citizens against Japanese subjects, or Japanese authorities, for restoration of property or damages respectively, and all evidence, to be sent to Japan.
14. Japanese Government not responsible for damage caused directly by military operations during the late war.

APPENDIX XI

CURRENCY QUESTIONS IN CHINA

The following is a brief attempt to explain in outline a matter which at once perplexes a new arrival in the Far East, and which in all its

ramifications is extremely complicated. To study currency (and the allied questions of exchange) in China in any detail, it is necessary to refer to text-books on the subject, some of which have been mentioned in the bibliography.

Europeans coming to the Far East soon notice that whereas at Hong-Kong all values (or nearly all) are quoted in dollars Mexican (abbreviated to \$Mex.), at Shanghai all values above a certain small and indefinable amount are quoted in "Tael."

Since the tael is one of the chief features in the complication of Chinese finance, it will be treated first.

A tael is not a coin or a currency. It is a certain weight of silver of a standard "fineness." Pure silver is considered to be of 1000 fineness, and an ingot of the metal of 980 fineness, or "touch," is 98 per cent. pure silver and 2 per cent. alloy.

The tael is not invariable either in weight or on "touch." For though certain taels are of more general importance than others, nearly every city or district has its own tael. Dr. Morse, in his book, "The Trade and Administration of China," mentions that he has notes of 170 different taels. In the "China Year Book" for 1922, it is mentioned that there are more than seven taels in use in Peking, and three others in Tientsin. The distance between Tientsin and Peking is about 60 miles.

The most important taels are as follows:—

The Kuping or Treasury Tael.—Paying rate, 573.9 grains 1000 fine; receiving rate, 575.4 grains 1000 fine. This tael was the tael of computation for all taxes other than Custom dues under the Manchus, and still functions as such.

The Shanghai Tael.—525 grains 1000 fine. This is the commercial tael of Shanghai, and is the tael of account for foreign banks and exchange transactions. It has varied on sterling (banks selling rate T/T on London) between 9s. 3d. and 2s. 1¼d. between 1902 and the present time (1923).

The Haikwan or Customs Tael.—583.3 grains 1000 fine. This is purely a tael of account used by the Maritime Customs and no one else. It is an arbitrary standard, and nothing is ever actually paid in the shape of a H.K. tael. Payment is made in local currency and converted into H.K. taels.

The Canton Tael.—579.85 grains 1000 fine. Used at Shanghai for weighing bar silver. At Canton for general purposes.

The Tsaoiping Tael.—Is the tribute tael of 565.65 grains. The quality of the silver varying with localities.

In converting one tael into another there are three factors to be considered, each of which affects the operation. They are as follows:—

- (a) Difference of weight.
- (b) " " " " "touch."
- (c) "Old custom" or precedent.

"Old custom" is often either inexplicable or else buried in the doings of the remote past. I believe I am correct in stating that no satisfactory explanation exists as to why at a certain stage in the calculation, *after an addition for difference of touch*, in the operation of converting Kuping taels to Shanghai taels, it is decreed by convention that the figure then arrived at is divisible by the factor decimal 98. The figure thus obtained is then increased by an arbitrary addition of decimal 008 for meltage fees.

Since taels (which were never coins) are no more in circulation in China than guineas (which were once coins) are in England, retail transactions are carried out in the following mediums :—

Dollars.
Subsidiary silver coins.
Copper cents.
Paper money.

There have been various dollars in circulation in China at various periods in her history, but at the present time the principal are as follows :—

The Mexican dollar.
The Chinese Republican dollars (various issues).
The Hong-Kong dollar.

These dollars fluctuate greatly in their exchange values with local taels and with each other, and with true Chinoiserie this fluctuation does not by any means solely depend upon the intrinsic value of the silver in a coin. It is very greatly influenced by "old custom," and by the popularity or otherwise of a given kind of dollar in a given area.

A Hong-Kong dollar will be at premium in regard to a Republican dollar at Canton, but at a discount to the same coin elsewhere. The most common and the most virile of the Republican dollars are those bearing the portrait of the late Yuan Shi-kai. This is the "Yuan." The word Yuan means "round," and is the official name for the dollar. If only a uniform standard dollar in whose weight and touch everyone believed could be produced—or to be accurate, was produced—there is no doubt that the yuan would become the standard coin of currency, and drive out the principle of the tael as a unit of account.

The use of taels is highly inconvenient, and there are signs that the yuan or dollar is gaining ground in the commercial world, though the adherence to the Tsaoing tael of the foreign banks still continues. The main idea governing the inception of the scheme of the New Shanghai Mint, which, if it ever operates, is destined to become the National Mint of China, is that it shall turn out standard dollars. As in the case of many another reform in China, the existing political chaos is holding up the scheme for this mint. For the latest details of its progress the current "Year Book" should be consulted.

The subsidiary coins in China are 5, 10, and 20 cent pieces—these are the most common. They are marked, however, in candareens, which in theory are a tenth of a mace, of which ten are supposed to go to a tael. Similarly the subsidiary coins are theoretically decimal units of a dollar, which is supposed to contain 100 cents.

In practice the exchange values vary vastly, and all accounts dealing with subsidiary coins as well as dollars (e.g. Post Office Savings Banks) are kept in two parts, viz., "The big coin account" and "the small coin account."

Lastly, as regards coins, there is the copper "cent," which in theory represents ten brass cash; the brass cash was the token coin of the masses for two thousand years. It is now fast disappearing. It was strung on strings.

It is impossible in the absence of reliable statistics to attempt an accurate description of the existing state of affairs in regard to "cash." The following general observations will have to meet the case. There is no legal ratio between "cash" and any of the dollars, nor is there in practice any standard ratio between "cash" and any tael. The exchange rates are governed by the market values of copper and silver, plus the effects of "old custom," fashion, and local custom. The situation is further

confused by the effects of depreciation. In recent times some seventeen provincial mints have been striking off copper coins (and subsidiary coinage) for the purposes of provincial revenue. By a steady reduction in the net metal value of the coin in relation to its face value, and by the copious issue of coinage in excess of the natural demand, depreciation proceeds apace.

Finally, there are in circulation the note issues of the foreign banks, and those of the Chinese banks. The former are usually subject to a small discount outside their port of issue. The latter are always at a discount, varying between 10 per cent and 50 per cent outside their province, and usually at a heavy discount inside it. The note issues of the Banks of China and that of Communications, which are the nearest approach to national banks in China, are, in general, at a substantial discount.

One of the consequences of the currency chaos, which has been outlined in the foregoing pages, is that an immense amount of exchange business goes on in the foreign and Chinese banks and the exchange shops. Exchange speculation, in fact, is an important element in all banking operations and in any commercial transaction, since it is an inevitable part of the deal. The importer buys his goods abroad in sterling; the Chinese exporter or middleman wants silver to pay his clients up country. But the exporter will be paid in sterling when he sells his goods abroad, whilst the importer will receive payment in silver at some time in the future from the people to whom he has sold goods which he bought on a sterling credit. Since the "time element" is inevitable, it follows that in order to be able to make any balanced calculations the merchant must cover exchange movements during the duration of his credits. Though the foreign banks do much business in exchange transactions, the uncertainty introduced into trade by the present state of affairs is universally admitted to be harmful, and the present writer does not treat seriously the accusations of some people that the big banking corporations are not enthusiastic on currency reform, because it would undoubtedly diminish the exchange business. Banking in China is at present not sufficiently confined to "banking" in the usually accepted sense of the word, but with a stable currency the increased business of a legitimate banking nature which would accrue to the big banks would more than compensate them for any loss elsewhere.

The inconveniences of the present state of affairs is not confined to the exalted heights of "Big Business." In one port, I decided to try a small experiment. Tendering a Yuan Shi-kai dollar at a post office I received a 10 cent stamp and 90 cents change in small money (subsidiary coins), also 12 cents in 1 cent pieces. These particular pieces of cash would purchase a 5 cent subsidiary (supposed silver), but this particular 5 cent coin would not purchase a 5 cent stamp. In conclusion, I would add that the foregoing remarks are an attempt to summarize a complex subject. I am indebted to Dr. Morse personally and to his writings for much of my instruction in this subject, but the responsibility for the manner in which I have dealt with the subject is of course entirely mine.

APPENDIX XII

AMOY UNIVERSITY

Amoy University is one of the educational romances of modern China. At the outbreak of the War an Amoy man, Mr. Tankahkee, like many of his fellow provincials, had a rubber business in the

Straits Settlement. During the War he made 12,000,000 dollars. Though a self-made man himself, Mr. Tankahkee has an ideal, which is that as many as possible of his countrymen shall have the benefits of an education he lacked. Towards this project he decided to devote his fortune. He endowed a school at Cha-Pee, near Amoy, with \$8,000,000, and here 2000 boys receive absolutely free education. In the opinion of some of his Chinese educational advisers, it is a mistake not to have a nominal fee. The remaining 4,000,000 dollars he decided to devote to a university at Amoy. He was fortunate enough to enlist the aid of Dr. Lim Boon-keng. Dr. Lim is a Chinaman, but is by birth a British subject. A successful man of business at Singapore, where his family has been established for three generations, he was for many years a prominent member of the Legislative Council, but these distinctions are completely dwarfed by his reputation and achievements in the intellectual field. He is a Doctor of Literature, Hong-Kong University, and a Doctor of Medicine, Edinburgh; he speaks a dozen languages from German to pure Malay, and in the opinion of those qualified to judge, he occupies a conspicuous position amongst the half-dozen leading modern scholars in China. His magnetic personality is undeniable, and through a long official career he has shown that on a matter touching his principles he can be inflexible.

At the call of Mr. Tankahkee he left his home and business at Singapore and placed his services at the disposal of Amoy University, of which he is the first and present principal. He laid down as axiomatic that the standard at Amoy was to be of the highest from the outset, and, as a sign of his purpose, it is noteworthy that at the last examination only thirty-five students passed into the university, though 750 young men from every province in China, save remote Sin-kiang, presented themselves for trial.

He is also a believer in co-education, and the staff actually includes three Chinese lady professors, graduates from Columbia. The fact that these ladies have been teaching men students for nearly two years without any opposition at all is an incident small in itself, but of immense significance to anyone who knows what the attitude of the average Chinese towards such a proposal would have been in 1911. No doubt to the older generation the activities of the lady professors are still quite incomprehensible, but the younger generation take them as a matter of course.

The full course at Amoy is to be five years, and Dr. Lim has decided that the immediate programme is to be a university with 2000 graduates and a standard not lower than that of Hong-Kong University. It is interesting to see that he attaches even more importance to character formation than to book learning. "Theoretical half-bakeds"—to quote his own words—are his aversion. He is doing all he can to encourage games in order to impress the value of team work on his young men. As a practical step towards turning the students' thoughts into sporting channels, the university library is locked up from 4 to 6 P.M. every day. He has a particular horror of the American specialization idea invading his playing fields. In the development of this side of his work he seeks, and I am glad to say obtains, the co-operation of a few far-seeing European residents.

Meanwhile, Mr. Tankahkee lives in a small house in Amoy City with one idea in his mind—that is the provision of more money for his educational schemes. He has said: "I made \$12,000,000 from war; if there is another war it may be in or about China, and it will be more terrible than the last. Every dollar I can devote must go to the education of my countrymen, so that they can understand the new world China must live in."

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As its title indicates, the foregoing Bibliography is "assorted." Of the Far East, Bacon's statement that "some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested" is very true. I have examined the books in the foregoing list and I believe that amongst them are to be found every point of view from which the social and political problems of the Far East have been studied. This is not to say that I consider the list a list of best books; some of these books are, in my judgment, bad books, deceptive books. My chief object has been to present a comprehensive list of representative books. In the case of several writers I have not mentioned all their books. The reader who approves of an individual interpretation will find a typical book in the list and from this he can find the titles of other works by the same author. Finally, I wish to say that this list does not include all the books I have examined, and am therefore to a varying degree indebted; it is simply a suggestion for the guidance of anyone who wishes to take up the study of Far Eastern questions. It is only necessary for a reader to study three books, one by Mr. Bland, one by Putnam Weale, and one by a Western educated Chinaman, for him to realize the difference in angle from which it is possible to consider these very wide social and political questions.

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